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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the construction of Finnish identity by Finnish policymakers 
when discussing the Right to Return Policy for Ingrian Finns. This policy, which 
existed from 1990 to 2010, granted Finnish residency to citizens of the Soviet Union, 
and  subsequently  Russia  and  Estonia,  who  descended  from  seventeenth  century 
Finnish émigrés to the region around St Petersburg. The thesis critically analyses the 
discursive constructions of Finnish identity presented in the language of lawmakers 
on  this  policy,  and  argues  that  lawmakers  established  an  ideology  of  Finnishness 
initially predicated on ideas of language, religion, ancestry, and historical relations to 
Finland’s neighbours Sweden and Russia. I further argue that lawmakers’ calls for an 
end  of  the  policy  in  the  late  1990s  and  2000s  used  some  of  the  same  discursive 
constructions of Finnishness initially employed to justify Ingrian inclusion to now 
exclude Ingrians from their idea of Finnishness. To a large extent, the history of the 
Ingrian Return policy therefore presents a renegotiation of Ingrian, but not Finnish, 
identity by Finnish lawmakers.  
 
The thesis contributes to the study of identity construction on two levels. Firstly the 
policy presents the tension between constructions of Finnishness as an ethnic identity 
and as a community of Finnish citizens, and shows the relative resilience of ethnicity-
based identity constructions in Finnish immigration policy at this time. Secondly the 
Ingrian Finnish Return policy provides a case study of how essentialising discursive 
constructions of identity can be strategically used in political discussions. Analysis of 
this policy contributes to the broader study of identity theorisations as an example of 
establishing  identity  norms  through  public  policy,  using  essentialising  identity 
constructions  that  ignore  alternative  views  of  the  nation  as  a  diverse  community, 
particularly in a period of increasing migration.  
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Figure 1. 
Map of Finland showing changing borders 1595-1812. Ingria is shown in the bottom-right corner. 
Reproduced from Kirby, A Concise History of Finland, p. 32. 
Copywrited image removed from electronic version of 
thesis  
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A NOTE ON PLACE NAMES 
 
Many  of  the  place  names  used  in  this  thesis  have  several  variants,  reflecting  the 
changing  borders  and  language  influences  in  the  eastern  Baltic  Sea  region.  Many 
Finnish  cities  have  Finnish  and  Swedish-language  names,  particularly  cities  and 
towns with large Swedish city populations or old cities and towns founded during the 
Swedish  period.  Additionally,  many  formerly  Finnish  settlements  in  Karelia  and 
Ingria, which had Finnish and Swedish names, received new Russian names once the 
area came under Russian control. Some were then given new names during the Soviet 
period. Some reverted to their former Russian names after 1991, others didn’t. 
 
Unfortunately, many English-language sources concerning this area are not consistent 
with place names. It is common for some sources to refer to Turku by its Finnish 
name, while also referring to the 1743 treaty signed there as the Treaty of Åbo (using 
the city’s Swedish name). Likewise, some sources refer to Sweden’s two Karelian 
territories  as  Viipuri  (the  Finnish  variant)  over  Viborg  (the  Swedish  variant),  but 
Kexholm (the Swedish variant) over Käkisalmi (the Finnish variant).  
 
To retain use of the most recognisable place names and avoid confusion, whilst also 
maintaining consistence and clarity, this thesis employs the following rules for place 
names: 
 
a)  If there is a commonly used English name that differs from the Finnish and 
Swedish terms, the English shall always be used (eg Karelia, Savonia). 
 
b)  Concerning references to place names in Finland post-1918, the thesis follows 
the general Finnish practice of using the variant of the settlements’ dominant 
linguistic  group,  i.e.  Finnish  names  for  majority  Finnish-speaking  cities  and 
towns  (Helsinki,  Turku,  etc.),  and  Swedish  names  for  majority  Swedish-
speaking towns (Raseborg, Ingå, etc.).  
 
c)  Concerning historic references to majority Finnish-speaking cities and towns 
during  the  Swedish  period,  the  Swedish  name  shall  be  given,  with  the 
contemporary  Finnish  (and,  if  applicable,  Russian)  name  noted  in  the  first  
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instance  in  parentheses.  This  will  include  armistices,  agreements  and  peace 
treaties signed by the Swedish crown during the Swedish period, i.e. the Peace 
of Fredrikshamn (Hamina) or the Treaty of Åbo (Turku).  
 
d)  Concerning  references  to  settlements  that  belonged  to  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Finland or independent Finland after 1918 that have since come under Russian 
or Soviet control, the Finnish name is given when referring to these settlements 
during  their  time  under  Finnish  jurisdiction,  with  the  contemporary  Russian 
name given in parentheses in the first instance.  
 
e)  Concerning contemporary references to formerly Finnish settlements after their 
integration into Russia or the Soviet Union, the Russian name is used with the 
Finnish name given in parentheses in the first instance. 
 
f)  Concerning Russian cities and towns that have changed names during the Soviet 
period, historical references to the settlement shall use the name of the period 
being discussed, with the contemporary name (if different) noted in parentheses 
in the first instance. For instance, references to the city of St Petersburg before 
1914 and after 1991 shall use this name, whereas references to the city between 
1914 and 1918 shall use the name Petrograd, and between 1918 and 1991 the 
name  Leningrad,  reflecting  the  city’s  history  of  name  changes.  It  should  be 
noted that although Leningrad returned to its original name of St Petersburg in 
1991, the surrounding district did not, and continues to be known as Leningrad 
Oblast.  
  
  11 
  
Finnish  Swedish  Russian 
Helsinki  Helsingfors   
Turku  Åbo   
Espoo  Esbo   
Raasepori  Raseborg   
Hanko  Hangö   
Hämeenlinna  Tavastehus   
Hamina  Fredrikshamn   
Uusikaupunki  Nystad   
Porvoo  Borgå   
Maarianhamina  Mariehamn   
Ahvenanmaa  Åland   
Viipuri  Viborg  Vyborg 
Käkisalmi  Kexholm  Priozersk 
Petroskoi  Petroskoj  Petrozavodsk 
Korpiselkä (antiquated), 
Toksova 
Toksova  Toksovo 
Nevanlinna  Nyen  *replaced by St Petersburg 
(Petrograd 1914-1924. 
Leningrad 1924-1991) 
Pähkinälinna  Nöteborg  Shlisselberg (before 1944, after 
1992) 
Petrokrepost (1944-1992) 
Jaama  Jama  Yamburg (before 1922), 
Kingisepp (after 1922) 
Petsamo  Petsamo  Pechenga, 
Pechengsky District 
Tartto  Dorpat (antiquated) 
Tartu 
Derpt, Yuryev (antiquated) 
Tartu  
 
Figure 2 
List of place names in Finnish, Swedish and Russian used in this thesis. For contemporary Finnish cities and 
towns, the name of the dominant linguistic group is italicised.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
From 1990 to 2010, Finland’s Immigration Service (Maahanmuuttovirasto) followed 
a  policy  of  preferential  treatment  and  expedited  granting  of  residence  permits  for 
those  deemed  to  “have  Finnish  ancestry  or  otherwise  a  close  connection  with 
Finland”.
1 Once an applicant’s “Finnishness” or connection to Finland was proven, 
“[n]o other reason, such as work or study, is required in order to receive the permit”.
2 
The Finnish Immigration Service’s website (in August 2010) presented this policy as 
a  “returnees”  program,  implying  the  granting  of  “return”  immigration  to  Finnish 
émigrés and their families. The website also specifically addresses the eligibility of 
“returnees” from the former Soviet Union, noting that “[a] person from the former 
Soviet Union can be granted a residence permit if the person's nationality is Finnish, 
i.e.  he  or  she  is  not  a  Finnish  citizen  but  is  of  Finnish  origin  in  terms  of  ethnic 
background”.
3  
 
This policy, the Right to Return, was introduced in 1990 by Finland’s then-President, 
Mauno Koivisto (in office 1982-1994). In a famous televised interview in April 1990, 
Koivisto spoke of his decision to instruct the Finnish Immigration Service to grant 
residence permits to Ingrians, arguing that Ingrians met the core qualifications for 
Finnishness in the existing Right to Return provisions for the descendants of more 
recent Finnish émigrés.
4 Specific qualifications for Ingrians to the Right to Return 
provisions were introduced into Finland’s main immigration law, the Aliens Act, in 
1991.  Despite  core  reforms  in  1996  and  2002-2003,  Right  to  Return  status  for 
Ingrians continued to feature as an element of Finnish immigration law until 2010.  
 
                                                 
1 Maahanmuuttovirasto, “Returnees”, available online at URL: 
<http://www.migri.fi/netcomm/content.asp?path=8,2475>, accessed 17 August 2010. 
2 Ibid.  
3 Maahanmuuttovirasto, “Persons Coming from the Former Soviet Union”, available online at URL: 
<http://www.migri.fi/netcomm/content.asp?path=8,2475,2525>, accessed 17 August 2010. 
4 Pekka Hakala, “Koivisto vehemently denies that Ingrian migration to Finland was KGB initiative”, 
Helsingin Sanomat – International Edition, 8 February 2011, available online at URL: 
<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Koivisto+vehemently+denies+that+Ingrian+migration+to+Finland+w
as+KGB+initiative/1135263653011>, accessed 12 March 2011. This article also mentions an emerging 
controversy that Koivisto was pressured by the KGB to grant Finnish residency to Russian spies, using 
the Ingrian Right to Return as a front. Koivisto rejects this as a motivating factor for the Ingrian Return 
policy.  
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The  Ingrian  Right  to  Return  sets  up  an  interesting  divergence  between  two 
conceptions of the national community: one defined by legal status as a citizen, and 
one defined by a more opaque concept of nationality, described here by the Finnish 
Immigration Service as “ethnic background”. In this particular case, there thus appear 
to be two definitions of Finnishness. This policy appears to unite the concepts of 
Finnish  citizens  and  “ethnic”  Finns,  conferring  the  status  of  the  former  on  those 
deemed to belong to the latter category. Yet the latter category is also somewhat 
difficult to define – terms like “ethnic background” do not lend themselves easily to 
quantifiable  definition.  How  should  “Finnish  ethnic  background”  be  defined? 
Ancestry, cultural identification or other identity markers like language or religion 
may  all  be  used  to  shape  definitions  of  national  identity  based  on  “ethnic 
background”.  Designing  and  implementing  this  Right  to  Return  policy  provides 
Finnish policymakers with an opportunity to articulate their vision of Finnishness as 
an identity, and Finns as a broader community transcending the confines of Finnish 
citizens.  
 
This provides the core research questions of this thesis:  
 
a)  How is Finnish identity defined by Finnish policymakers in their discussion of 
the Right to Return policy?  
b)  How  were  these  identity  constructions  used  by  Finnish  policymakers  to 
support or challenge the Right to Return policy? 
 
To investigate these questions, I will examine the history of political discussions on 
the Right to Return policy as it existed from its inception in 1990 to its ultimate 
cancellation in 2010, focusing on the discursive construction of Finnish identity in 
policymakers’  public  statements  and  policy  documents,  and  how  these  identity 
constructions  were  strategically  employed  for  policy  ends.  I  argue  that  Finnish 
policymakers engaged in a strategic use of essentialising discourse to promote, and 
then challenge, the Right to Return policy.   
 
This chapter of the thesis will place the investigation of Finnish identity in this policy 
within  the  context  of  research  on  Finnish  identity  and  nationalism,  including  its 
relation  to  broader  theories  of  nationalism  and  national  identity  construction  in  
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Europe  and  the  relation  of  citizenship  and  migration  policies  to  these  identity 
concepts.  To  this  end,  section  A  of  this  thesis  provides  a  brief  discussion  on  the 
development of the language of national identity in Finland, focusing particularly on 
the Finnish terms for “nationality” and “citizenship” as they emerged as inter-related 
concepts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Section B of this chapter 
discusses  the  existing  literature  on  Finnish  national  identity  and  nationalism, 
including the broader theories of national identity construction in Europe.  Section C 
provides an overview of the thesis’ structure for the remaining chapters.  
 
A)  Nationality and Citizenship in Finland 
 
Finland presents a prime example of a state where the division between nationality 
and citizenship is grey and murky. Päivi Harinen et al. note that the Finnish terms for 
nationality (kansallisuus) and citizenship (kansalaisuus) are “difficult to distinguish 
from one another, even etymologically”.
5 They argue that Finnish citizenship policy 
“has been flavoured both by national and by ethno-cultural protectionism…[based on] 
the  myth  of  the  cultural,  ethnic  and  religious  homogeneity  of  Finnish  society”.
6  
Indeed, Henrik Stenius’ study of the history of the concept of kansalainen, the Finnish 
term for citizen, argues that it was developed by the Finnish-nationalist Fennoman 
movement in the nineteenth century, particularly in the pages of the Finnish-language 
newsletter  Valvoja,  as  surreptitiously  linked  to  concepts  of  Finnish  ethno-cultural 
nationalism.
7 Significantly,  Stenius  notes  that  the  stem  word  kansa in  kansalainen 
refers to “the people” as specifically the agrarian peasantry, linking the concept of 
Finnish  citizenship  to  the  Finnish  political  model  of  municipal  autonomy  in  the 
countryside, and rooting it in the agrarian, Finnish-speaking kansa rather than the 
Swedish-speaking  bourgeoisie.
8   The  Fennomans  were  ultimately  successful  in 
advocating the term kansalainen for citizen above other alternatives, including Elias 
                                                 
5 Päivi Harinen, Pirkko Pitkänen, Silvain Sagne and Jussi Ronkainen, “Multiple Citizenship as a 
Challenge for Finnish Citizenship Policy Today”, in D. Kalekin-Fishman and P.Pitkänen (eds), 
Multiple Citizenship as a Challenge to European Nation-States, Rotterdam: Sense, 2007, p. 132. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Henrik Stenius, “Kansalainen”, in M. Hyvärinen, J. Kurunmäki, K. Palonen, T. Pulkkinen and H. 
Stenius (eds), Käsitteet Liikkeessä: Suomen Poliittisen Kulttuurin Käsitehistoria, Tampere: Vastapaino, 
2003, p. 343.  
8 Ibid. pp. 320-1.   
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Lönnrot’s  suggestion  of  kansajäsen.
9 This  was  a  more  direct  translation  of  the 
Swedish term medborgar, literally “member of the people”, which was offered as a 
more inclusive term for the inhabitants of Finland, distinguished from kansalainen as 
a  member  of  the  more  exclusive concept  of  the  Finnish-speaking  kansa.
10 Stenius 
argues  that  subsequent  generations  of  Fennoman  statesmen  created  a  concept  of 
citizenship as “a diffuse concept of inclusion” wherein one’s status in the kansa or 
people could be graded by degrees, differentiating for instance between the “‘Finnish 
people  proper’  and  the  ‘Swedish  speaking  population’”.
11 Most  tellingly,  Stenius 
concludes that “by the end of the century even groups east of the Finnish border in 
parts of Russia that had never been part of Finland (or Sweden) came to be recognised 
as Finnish citizens simply because they spoke Finnish”.
12  
 
Thus, there is an established history in Finland of merging concepts of cultural or 
ethnic belonging into descriptions of the body of citizens. The use of Finland as a case 
study  to  illustrate  the  intersection  between  citizenship  and  ethnicity  in  the 
construction of national identity relies on the history of Finland not only as a state in 
which these two concepts have become intertwined, but also as a contested territory 
existing  between  European  Great  Powers  and  subject  to  fluctuating  borders  and 
political status. The territorial borders of the nation state are often impermanent, and 
fluctuations in border territories also influence transitions in citizenship status, if not 
ethnic or cultural self-identification. In the Finnish example, there was a population of 
Finnish descent in the Soviet Union concentrated in Ingria, a historic region on the 
easternmost point of the Baltic Sea surrounding the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, 
which  historically  has  served  as  a  borderland  between  the  Russian  and  Swedish 
spheres of influence.  At the end of the Ingrian War in 1617, the Swedish Crown 
annexed this area, then a sparsely inhabited outer region of the Russian province of 
Novgorod, populated largely by indigenous peoples (Izhorians and Votes) speaking 
Finno-Ugric languages.
13 Over the course of the seventeenth century, the Swedish 
                                                 
9 Henrik Stenius, “The Finnish Citizen: How a Translation Emasculated the Concept”, Redescriptions: 
Yearbook of Political Thought and Conceptual Change, Vol. 8, 2004, pp. 180-2. 
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. p. 186.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Marja Nylund-Oja, Juha Pentikäinen, Frank Horn, Magdalena Jaakola and Laura Yli-Vakkuri, 
“Finnish Emigration and Immigration”, in J. Pentikäinen and M. Hiltunen (eds), Cultural Minorities in 
Finland: An Overview towards Cultural Policy, Helsinki: Finnish National Commission for UNESCO, 
1995, pp. 176-7.   
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kings consolidated Ingria into the greater Swedish Kingdom, and the region built up a 
significant population of Finnish-speaking émigrés from the kingdom’s eastern parts, 
making them the dominant ethnic group in Ingria.
14 This was to change dramatically 
following the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, during which the Russian Tsar Peter 
the Great claimed Ingria and constructed his new capital St Petersburg in its centre. 
This brought an influx of Russians that eventually reduced the Ingrian Finns to a 
minority population in the region.
15 Ingria has remained within Russia since the Great 
Northern War, successively as a part of the Russian Empire, the Russian Socialist 
Republic within the Soviet Union, and the modern-day Russian Federation, and today 
corresponds roughly to the Russian province of Leningrad Oblast surrounding the 
federal city of St Petersburg.
16 Ingrian Finns have been Russian and Soviet residents 
and citizens since the early eighteenth century, and have formed a significant minority 
group in the St Petersburg region, being overtaken as the dominant ethnic group in the 
late  eighteenth  century  but  remaining  in  second  position  until  the  1920s.
17 They 
therefore have made up part of the sociological composition of the St Petersburg 
region, its surroundings and Russia as a whole, playing this role as members of the 
Soviet  and  then  Russian  and  Estonian  society  and  citizenry.  Their  connection  to 
Finland, by contrast, would evidently rely on notions of ethnic identity and belonging 
in place of citizenship status, drawing from a centuries-past shift in territorial borders.  
 
The significance of Ingria as border-region underlines the Finnish geographer Anssi 
Paasi’s study of the changing sociological function of the Finnish-Russian frontier. 
For much of the twentieth century this boundary formed part of the Iron Curtain, 
delineating  the  communist  East  from  the  capitalist  West  as  a  clear  ideological 
border.
18 However,  the  collapse  of  communism  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s 
marked an end to this relatively clear separation, and precipitated a rise of “diverging 
ethno-regionalistic  and  ethno-nationalistic  movements”  as  identity  and  social-
                                                 
14 Ibid. p. 177.  
15 Ibid. p. 178.  
16 Ott Kurs, “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge between Estonia and Finland”, GeoJournal, Vol. 33, No. 
1, May 1994, pp. 107-13. 
17 Sanna Rimpiläinen, “Ingrian Finnishness as a Historical Construction”, in The Organisation Board of 
the Coimbra Group Working Party for Folklore and Ethnology (ed), Migration, Minorities, 
Compensation: issues of Cultural Identity in Europe, Brussels: Coimbra Group, 2001, p. 101.  
18 Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-
Russian Border, Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1996, p. 4.   
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grouping  processes.
19 Thus  the  role  history  and  geography  play  in  defining  (or 
complicating) identity in border regions has particular resonance for Finland. The fact 
that  ethnic  groups  do  not  correspond  (or  indeed  may  never  have  corresponded) 
exactly to the boundaries of nation states denotes the limits of a geographical or inter-
frontier definition of the nation, given the impermanence of boundaries highlighted in 
the Finnish example and the associated potential for transitions in citizenship status 
from  one  state  to  another.  Ethnic  and  cultural  conceptions  of  national  identity, 
depending on how they are viewed and constructed, may nevertheless end up being 
more salient than citizenship in regions that have experienced significant geopolitical 
fluctuations.  
 
B)  Nationalism and the Nation: Finland as an “Imagined Community” 
 
The core problem for studies of national identity and its relation to the nation and 
nation state remains, how should the nation and those it encompasses be defined. 
Hugh Seton-Watson, for instance, argues that the concept of nation defies simple 
classification, and yet nations clearly exist in some capacity, as a people, a territory or 
a  political  body.
20 Amongst  the  most  famous  definitions  of  the  nation  is  that  of 
Benedict Anderson, who sees it as “an imagined political community – and imagined 
as both inherently limited and sovereign”.
21 Nations bind together individuals in the 
abstract, rather than physically, in the sense that nations promote ties of kinship and 
solidarity with others one may never even see or meet.
22 Anderson further argues that 
nations are limited, and do not imagine themselves as “coterminous with mankind”.
23 
There must therefore be a distinction between belonging and not belonging, or insider 
and outsider, in which the insiders together form a “deep, horizontal comradeship”.
24 
If the nation state is defined as a state in which the citizens (largely) comprise a single 
nation, the criteria the state provides for naturalisation may be seen as an indicator of 
what the national community sees as the elements that bind the nation together. In a 
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case study of the Right to Return for Ingrian Finns, if the policy’s criteria and the 
accompanying political discussions on Ingrians’ Finnishness suggest the Ingrians do 
belong in the Finnish national community, the extent to which notions of common 
ethnicity and cultural heritage inform citizenship policy would also suggest the extent 
to  which  these  notions  inform  the  “imagining”  of  Finland  as  a  nation  state  and 
community.  
 
A further point of salience for the Finnish case from Anderson’s work is the notion 
that  nations  draw  on  the  imagined  past  for  political  purposes  as  nation  states. 
Anderson  writes  that  “[i]f  nation  states  are  widely  conceded  to  be  ‘new’  and 
‘historical’, the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an 
immemorial  past”.
25 For  the  Finnish  case,  the  significance  of  the  past  may  be 
important in informing the extent to which Finns consider themselves to be bound to 
Ingrian Finns from the former Soviet Union: e.g. how much common history do they 
share, how much were they a part of the “ancient Finnish nation” from which the 
modern nation state draws its sense of self, etc. If for example Ingrians were to be 
accepted as members of the Finnish “imagined community” outside the legal limits of 
Finnish citizenship in 1990, this could therefore be informed by perceptions of shared 
historic experience.  This may be seen as substantiating other aspects such as cultural 
heritage and ethnicity in defining citizenship and inclusion in Finland.  
 
However, other scholars of nationalism and national identity see Anderson’s approach 
in  Imagined Communities as  inherently  limited.  Alexander  J.  Motyl  suggests  that 
Anderson  “claims  only  that  nations  emerged  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
centuries as a result of various forces…[he] fails to suggest, in terms that are not 
specific to this historical period, what makes these factors converge at this time”.
26  
Indeed,  he  writes  further  that  Anderson’s  view  “that  imagining  suffices  to  make 
nations  of  communities  seems  at  best  a  gross  overestimation  of  the  power  of 
imagination. That nations, unlike other entities such as classes and electorates, are 
especially susceptible to imagination seems wrong”.
27 This charge that Anderson does 
not sufficiently differentiate between nations and smaller sub-national communities is 
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also levelled by Yael Tamir, who argues that “all human associations, even if no 
larger  than  families  or  primordial  villages,  could,  according  to  this  definition,  be 
considered imagined communities”.
28 Why the nation should take pre-eminence in 
identity  and  the  political  formation  of  nation  states  is  therefore  left  unexplained, 
unless a new element is introduced to increase the sense of the nation’s significance, 
permanence, and necessity beyond any other community or grouping. The state may 
be seen as the guarantor of the nation’s ethno-cultural identity, and thereby, right to 
return  policies  may  be  argued  as  moves  to  protect  those  communities  that  see 
themselves as vulnerable to loss or subjugation of their ethno-cultural identity.  
 
An  exact  definition  of  what  “ethno-cultural  identity”  specifically  entails  in  the 
construction of national identity can be difficult to come by. Jennifer Jackson Preece 
provides one definition, arguing that the concept of “ethnicity” has been constructed 
as an identity transmitted by birth or descent, and shaped by common racial, cultural, 
religious or linguistic characteristics.
29 She writes further that ethnicity may become a 
tool  for  social  organisation  “which  privileges  some  relationships  above  others”.
30 
Ethno-cultural identity therefore becomes an “imagined community” that focuses on 
birth  and  ancestral  connections,  which  forge  a  community  almost  as  a  dispersed, 
hyper-extended  family.  In  this  construction,  the  connection  to  the  community  is 
shaped by inheritance, by blood (jus sanguinis) rather than by place (jus soli). The 
focus on “descent” transcends the spatial limits of the nation state to create a proto-
familial  community,  with  a  shared  “family  history”.  Where  nation  states  have 
engaged with notions of ethnicity, Jackson Preece argues, they have “responded with 
various  minority  policies  designed  to  prevent  instability  and  fragmentation”,  be  it 
either through recognition or prevention of diversity.
31  
 
Likewise,  the  sociologist  Anthony  D.  Smith  has  famously  argued  that  national 
identity draws from the concept of an ethnie, which he defines as a community linked 
by six core attributes: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared 
historical  memories,  one  or  more  differentiating  elements  of  common  culture,  an 
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association with a specific homeland and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors 
of the population.
32 Smith notes that unlike attempts to classify and organise peoples 
based on the notion of race in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the concept 
of ethnie makes no allusions to science.
33 Rather, ethnie relies largely on subjective 
components, with paramount importance given to “the myth of ancestry, not any fact 
of ancestry (which can be difficult to ascertain)”.
34 Indeed, the elements of ethnie 
remain subjective until they are given significance by a large number of individuals, 
as “it is only when such markers are endowed with diacritical significance that these 
cultural attributes come to be seen as objective”.
35 In this sense, Smith sees ethnie as 
“anything but primordial, despite the claims and rhetoric of nationalist ideologies and 
discourses”.
36 This sets up the potential conflict in defining ethnicity, between those 
primordialists who believe ethnicity to be a natural component of human existence,
37 
and those who see ethnicity as a construction, a contingent way of installing group 
mentality.  
 
Smith  also  asserts  that  nationalists  “find  themselves  divided  in  their  allegiances 
between  loyalty  to  the  state  to  which  they  belong,  and  a  lingering  but  explosive 
solidarity to the ethnie of their birth and upbringing”.
38  Yet at the same time, Smith 
cites Finland as an example wherein these two concepts do not remain separate, but 
rather form a mutually renewing two-way relationship. He argues that the Kalevala, 
the collection of old Finnish poetry assembled by Elias Lönnrot in the nineteenth 
century, forms “essential links in the complex relationship between an active national 
present and an often ancient ethnic heritage, between the defining ethnic past and its 
modern  nationalist  authenticators  and  appropriators”.
39   This  gives  rise  to  “the 
nation’s explosive energy and the awful power it exerts over its members”.
40  This use 
of the Kalevala tales as a symbolic reference point for pre-nation state “Finnishness” 
implies a primordialist approach to ethnicity; a suggestion that Finns share a common 
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ancestral  link  to  the  ancient  characters  and  events  of  the  Kalevala,  which 
differentiates them from other peoples and which has transcended the Swedish and 
Russian  periods  to  modern-day  independent  statehood.  This  viewpoint  appears  to 
endorse a jus sanguinis approach to defining the national community, for though the 
land  itself  as  portrayed  in  the  Kalevala  remains  significant,  it  is  the  ancestral 
connection to the figures within the epic that defines Finnishness.  
 
Indeed, in the 1920s the Kalevala Society in Finland proposed building a monumental 
Kalevalatalo,  or  Kalevala  House,  which  would  serve  as  a  monument  to  Finnish 
cultural heritage, or as historian Derek Fewster describes it, “the Finnish race and 
people”
41 (though it is not specified how these terms would be qualified exactly). A 
plan for the Kalevalatalo was created by one of Finland’s most noted architects, Eliel 
Saarinen (responsible for, among others, Helsinki’s famed Central Railway Station) in 
1921 (see figures 3 and 4), to be built in the western Helsinki neighbourhood of 
Munkkiniemi, but the project was delayed throughout the Second World War and 
eventually faded away.
42 The design incorporated national romantic elements drawn 
from  the  Kalevala, and  would  act  as  a  repository  for  Finland’s  greatest  cultural 
achievements, including the scores of Sibelius, a cinema to display filmed versions of 
the Kalevala, and a central courtyard, the Kalevalapiha (see figure 4), which would 
also feature a crypt for the great and good amongst Finland’s cultural and intellectual 
leaders.
43 Had this great “Parthenon of Finnishness”
44 been realised, the connection 
between Finnish nationalism and the Kalevala would have been afforded a highly 
conspicuous physical expression. The fact that the Kalevala was mostly assembled 
from folk poetry in Karelia, which since 1944 has been largely Russian territory, may 
underline  the  potential  weakness  of  political  and  territorial  definitions  in  the 
construction of national identity in favour of more culturally or historically informed 
identities.   
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Figure 3 
Eliel Saarinen’s 1921 design for the Kalevalatalo, to be constructed in Munkkiniemi, Helsinki 
Reproduced from Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, p. 332.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Sketch for Saarinen’s design for the Kalevalatalo’s central courtyard (Kalevalapiha) and crypt entrance.  
Reproduced from Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, p. 331.  
 
Derek Fewster also argues against any “organic” connection between history and the 
emergence of Finnish nationalism in the early twentieth century. The Kalevalatalo is 
one example of how this connection could be constructed, or reinforced, for public 
consumption.  Fewster  argues  that,  whilst  Finns  did  maintain  a  level  of  linguistic 
otherness during the Swedish period, and elements of collective memory may have 
survived  in  rural  areas,  most  of  what  is  known  as  “traditional”  or  “ancient” 
Finnishness  was  “imagined,  invented  and  constructed  by  modern  nationalists”, 
making  the  notion  of  Finnishness  as  an  ethnie prior  to  the  nineteenth  century  a 
Copywrited image removed from electronic version of thesis 
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thoroughly  questionable  presumption.
45 Far  more  significant  to  Fewster  in  the 
creation of modern Finnishness was the sole question of language. Fewster sees the 
Fennoman movement led by Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806-1881) in the nineteenth 
century as motivated by the concept that language was the sole key unifier of the 
population, above religion, race, folklore and history (although the nineteenth-century 
Grand  Duchy  of  Finland  was  linguistically  diverse,  and  many  of  the  Fennoman 
movement’s  most  prominent  members,  including  Snellman,  were  themselves 
members of its Swedish-speaking linguistic minority).
46 Aira Kemiläinen describes 
Snellman’s approach to nationalism as a general belief that nations would eventually 
all speak a common language, and Finnish, as the first language of some 85% of the 
Grand  Duchy’s  inhabitants,  must  be  the  logical  choice.
47 If  Finland  began  as  a 
linguistic community, as Fewster appears to suggest, the other components of ethnic 
identity came later, as part of a “mandatory construction of a Great Myth of Ethnic 
Descent that could supplement the role of language in binding the population into a 
cohesive national identity.
48  
 
However, Fewster’s argument that language acted as the only unifying concept of 
Finnishness as an ethnic identity in nineteenth century Finnish nationalism overlooks 
other  arguments  that  language  at  this  time  in  Finland  was  embedded  in  other 
discussions of class and racial concepts. Kemiläinen argues that nineteenth century 
language groups were often also presented as class categories, and common terms for 
social groups in both Swedish and Finnish reflected this division.
49 The Swedish term 
ståndspersoner, in Finnish säätyläiset, or “estate person”, referred to the members of 
the  three  upper  estates  in  the  Finnish  Diet  –  the  nobility,  clergy  and  burghers  –
amongst whom Swedish had predominated.
50 The fourth estate, the mostly Finnish-
speaking  land-owning  farmers,  were  not  included  as  ståndspersoner,  instead 
belonging to the broad term for Finnish-speakers, allmoge in Swedish and rahvas in 
Finnish,  which  carried  a  negative  connotation  like  “mob”  or  “the  masses”.
51 
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Kemiläinen notes that even though Swedish-speaking peasants were not technically 
ståndspersoner, they  identified  with  the  term,  and  the  Swedish  language  did  help 
facilitate  their  social  mobility  and  entry  into  this  social  category.
52 This  suggests 
Finnishness was presented as a social group, in which linguistic identity could be 
linked  to  social  standing,  mobility  and  the  parameters  of  social  role  for  Finnish 
speakers. This could facilitate the imagining of Finnish nationalism as a community 
of peasantry, distinct from Swedish-speaking ståndspersoner as the “Other”.  
 
As  much  as  the  language  division  could  be  interpreted  as  a  class  division,  racial 
categorisation was also a significant part of nineteenth century Finnish constructions 
of  nation  as  a  community  of  (ethnic)  descent,  and  was  also  linked  to  language. 
Kemiläinen notes the significance of racial theories developed by, for instance, Matias 
Aleksanteri  Castrén  (1813-1852),  who  studied  the  philology  of  Finno-Ugric 
languages  and  proposed  that  the  Finnish  language’s  apparent  relation  to  Tatar, 
Turkish and Mongolian suggested Finns had originated from the Altai Mountains in 
Central Asia.
53 British politician and linguist John Bowring (1792-1872) argued rather 
that Finnish was related to Persian, Sanskrit and Hebrew, which could also prove the 
ancient migration of Finns from this region.
54 These theories of Finns’ Asian origins 
made  their  way  into  Joseph  Arthur  de  Gobineau’s  infamous  1850s  Essai  sur 
l’inégalité des races humaines, in which he argued that Finns were semi-barbaric and 
inferior  to  the  Germanic  race  he  saw  as  representing  the  pinnacle  of  human 
development.
55Although Snellman rejected the significance of race in defining the 
nation,
56 other  groups  like  the  Svekomans,  who  favoured  the  Swedish  language, 
engaged with Gobineau’s theory that the Finns as a race were primitive and incapable 
of establishing their own state.
57 This was taken to prove that Finnish Swedes, as 
representatives of the superior Germanic race, were needed to govern and promote 
arts and sciences in Finland.
58 There was thus a strain of thought in Finland at this 
time that constructed “Finn” and “Swede” in Finland as racial categories as well as 
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linguistic categories. The perceived racial otherness of Finns, beside their linguistic 
otherness, was thus also significant in the construction of Finnishness in Finland, 
although this could be translated to different conceptions of a Finnish nation. Whilst 
Fennomans ignored racial categorisations to a large extent, and the Svekomans held it 
as  justification  for  the  social  superiority  of  Swedish-speakers,  figures  like  the 
historian Zachris Topelius argued that while Finnish and Swedish speakers in Finland 
had remained racially and linguistically separate, history and nature had joined them 
to create a single nation.
59 Although linguistic identity in Finland was a particularly 
significant avenue for construction of Finnishness as an identity of descent, and thus 
bound in notions of “ethnicity”, theories of racial identity were also present in this 
discussion.  
  
Whilst  academic  studies  of  ethnic  nationalism  have  highlighted  problematic 
definitions of ethnicity, it should be noted that ethnicity does appear to retain a degree 
of ongoing contemporary popular significance. Smith argues convincingly that the 
appeal  of  ethnic  identity  continues  to  play  a  role  in  the  construction  of  national 
identity;  he  writes  that  the  scholarly  discussion  on  the  formation  of  nations  and 
nationalism has been focused too exclusively on economics, with no real exploration 
of the effects of political, social and cultural changes, or as he puts it “the conjuncture 
of culture and politics”, in the analysis of national identity construction.
60 Social and 
cultural  changes  in  Finland  in  the  1990s  and  2000s,  and  their  effect  on  political 
constructions  of  Finnish  national  identity,  including  changing  demographics  and 
immigration  patterns,  should  therefore  be  a  major  avenue  of  investigation  in  the 
examination of identity constructs in the Ingrian Right to Return policy.  
 
The nation, as it is “imagined” and defined, sometimes finds political expression as a 
community of citizens. Citizenship is the legal status of belonging to a state. There are 
examples and concepts of state-less nations and “anational” states,
61 where no distinct 
relationship between nationality and citizenship is drawn. However, for the purpose of 
defining membership of the state, some states choose to draw on a definition of the 
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nation in their citizenship law, which as discussed in the Finnish example may be 
defined by conceptions of ethnic identity. William Rogers Brubaker is concrete in 
linking  citizenship  to  notions  of  the  nation  state,  defining  citizenship  simply  as 
“membership of a nation state”.
62 Therefore, debates about access to citizenship and 
naturalisation “are simultaneously debates about nationhood. They are debates about 
what it means, and what it ought to mean, to be a member of a nation state in today’s 
increasingly  international  world”.
63 By  contrast,  scholars  such  as  T.K.  Oommen 
believe  the  concept  of  citizenship  should  be  separate  from  national  identity.
64 He 
argues  that  citizenship  and  national  identity  become  intertwined  largely  through 
attempts  “to  meet  the  specific  requirements  of  state-building”.
65 Likewise,  Jürgen 
Habermas  argues  “citizenship  was  never  conceptually  tied  to  national  identity”.
66 
Rather, it should be linked to a Vertragspatriotismus, or “constitutional patriotism”, in 
which the citizen’s loyalty is not to an ethnic kinship but to the unifying principles 
outlined  in  a  constitutional  document.
67 However,  for  diverse  communities  with 
significant minority groups, Will Kymlika and Wayne Norman argue that the concept 
of citizenship (being distinct from national identity) becomes problematic, and can be 
seen  either  as  a  homogenising  concept  that  makes  minority  groups  “play  by  the 
majority rules”, or, if it includes specific deference to minority rights, a reflection of 
group rights and “the politics of narrow self-interest” instead of the individual rights a 
constitution is supposed to enshrine for citizens.
68 Therefore, citizenship appears to 
become  problematic  in  diverse  societies  with  significant  minority  groups,  and  the 
classic  split  between  citizenship  and  identity  in  Habermas’  Vertragspatriotismus 
becomes  somewhat  doubtful.  This  may  be  particularly  prevalent  during  times  of 
political  transition  or  instability,  as  then,  Cynthia  Enloe  argues,  “national  ethnic 
groups  are  likely  to  be  looked  upon  as  alien,  having  less  right  to  the  rewards  of 
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national  sovereignty  than  indigenous  groups”.
69  Thus,  placing  the  notion  of 
citizenship above and beyond constructions of national identity is problematic, and 
appears to ignore the way nation states behave in reality, wherein (as exemplified by 
language on the Ingrian Right to Return policy) ethnic identity and citizenship are 
constructed as linked concepts which may not be readily separated.  
 
Many  scholars  have  attempted  to  create  models  for  understanding  the  roles  for 
ethnicity and citizenship in forging national identity as it emerged in Europe. Hans 
Kohn’s influential 1944 work The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and 
Background offers  one  interpretation:  nationalism  is  an  “idée force”  or  “state  of 
mind” that serves as a link between the individual and the nation state.
70 This “state of 
mind” developed in different ways in nineteenth century Europe to serve different 
purposes. Specifically in Central and Eastern Europe, it was developed “in protest 
against and in conflict with the existing state pattern – not primarily to transform it 
into  a  people’s  state,  but  to  redraw  the  political  boundaries  in  conformity  with 
ethnographic demands”.
71 Kohn thus divides conceptions of national identity and its 
relation to statehood into two models: the Eastern European concept of nation state as 
a  collective  identity,  which  was  held  together  not  by  identification  with  state 
institutions but by “traditional ties of kinship and status…[which] substituted for the 
legal and rational concept of ‘citizenship’ the infinitely vaguer concept of ‘folk’”,
72 
and the Western model of civic nationalism based on the concept of a “citizenship”-
based identity. This considered, the development of Finnish nationalism, framed by 
the concepts of citizenship and belonging, could be considered as conforming more to 
Kohn’s idea of ethnically determined, exclusivist Eastern European nationalism than 
to its Western counterpart. This contrasts sharply with the notion of Finland as the last 
bastion  of  Western  Europeanness  straddling  the  border  with  the  East  (Russia),  as 
described by Paasi in section A of this chapter. Indeed, the Kohn model of Eastern 
Europe  as  defined  by  its  approach  to  nationalism  potentially  undermines  any 
presentation  of  Finland  as  politically  and  culturally  a  wholly  Western  European 
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nation, separate and distinct from the East across the border, if one views the Ingrian 
Finnish Return law as an example of an ethnically-informed citizenship policy.  
 
“Folk” as a concept, however, has specific connotations in the Nordic region that 
diverge somewhat from the ethnic kinship concept in Kohn’s theory. The word folk in 
the Scandinavian languages, as noted by Mary Hilson, has traditionally been applied 
to the agrarian peasantry, denoting the peasant farmer as “the ideal embodiment of the 
people”, derived from “his intimate relationship with the harsh northern climate and 
landscape  in  which  he  and  his  ancestors  had  worked,  thus  cementing  the  bonds 
between  folk  and  territory”.
73 The  ideology  of  national  identity  provided  by  the 
Danish philosopher N.F.S. Grundtvig, for example, is described as emphasising the 
unity of land, country, God and folk, which proved influential both in Denmark and 
throughout  Scandinavia.
74 Although  this  concept  appears  to  reflect  Romanticism’s 
notions of idyllic life in nature, Hilson notes that cultural emphasis on folk did have 
some  important  civic  and  political  ramifications,  namely  the  substantial  civic  and 
political participation of peasants in nineteenth-century Scandinavia.
75 As discussed 
in section A of this chapter, kansa, as the Finnish translation of folk, had a similar 
function in the development of Finnish nationalism, and its etymological function as 
the  stem  of  kansalainen denotes  the  significance  of  the  peasantry  in  the  Finnish 
conception  of  citizenship.  However,  the  distinction  between  kansa  as  a  Finnish-
speaking  identity  distinct  from  Swedish-speaking  town-dwellers,  as  noted  by 
Stenius,
76 introduces an ethno-centric understanding of kansa that brings it somewhat 
into  line  with  the  Eastern  European  concept  of  “folk”  indicated  by  Kohn.  Ilkka 
Liikanen argues that kansa as an expression of “the ordinary people” has been used 
by educated elites like the Fennomans as a nation-building concept, in which they 
attempted to assert their position as the “true” representatives of the Finnish people in 
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the  countryside.
77 As  such,  despite  arguments  for  a  particularly  Scandinavian 
approach to the concept of folk, Finnish interpretations of folk/kansa do appear to 
involve  ethno-cultural  identity  constructions  that  would  place  it  within  the  East 
European tradition of folk nationalism in the Kohn model.  
 
Kohn’s dual nationalisms model has found some influence amongst later twentieth 
and twenty-first century scholars, as variations on this theory have frequently entered 
scholarly  discussions  of  nationalism  and  national  identity  construction  in  Europe. 
Many scholars view Kohn’s approach as outdated and unconvincing, but amongst 
these, many still attempt to account for a division in Eastern and Western traditions of 
nationhood with different explanations, whilst acknowledging that such a division 
exists. For instance, Ernest Gellner argues that conceptions of the nation in Eastern 
Europe are influenced by the legacies of multi-ethnic empires in the region, wherein 
communities were “locked into complex multiple loyalties of kinship, territory and 
religion”.
78 Replacing these multilayered identities with national identity and a sense 
of loyalty to the nation state, creating “that close relation between state and culture 
which is the essence of nationalism”,
79 could therefore necessitate what Gellner terms 
“a great deal of very forceful cultural engineering” that would make national identity 
more contiguous with the state, by removing (through expulsion or assimilation) those 
groups  outside  the  nation’s  identity  parameters  from  the  state’s  borders.
80 John 
Plamenatz  similarly  argues  that  nationalism  emerged  differently  in  Western  and 
Eastern Europe, summarising Western nationalism as a unifying high culture, and 
Eastern nationalism as an attempt to create such a unifying high culture in diverse 
regions where it had not yet been established.
81    
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Figure 5 
Huntington’s map of the European fault line between civilisations. 
Note in particular the small part of Russia (Karelia) he places in the 
West European sphere. 
Reproduced from Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign 
Affairs, p. 30. 
 
 
These notions of a divide in models of citizenship and national identity between East 
and West speak to discourses on Western and Eastern Europe as separate and distinct 
civilisations. Perhaps the most famous twentieth century manifestation of this concept 
comes from Samuel Huntington, the Harvard political scientist who developed in a 
seminal 1993 article for Foreign Affairs the theory of a “clash of civilisations”, which 
in the European context translates to a divide between Western Catholic-Protestant 
and  Eastern  Orthodox-Islam  spheres.
82 The  two  spheres,  in  Huntington’s  opinion, 
developed separately and are informed by different experiences – the West by the 
Renaissance, the Reformation and the Industrial and French Revolutions, the East by 
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Ottoman  or  Tsarist  dominion,  only  lightly  touched  by  cultural  and  economic 
developments in Western Europe.
83 To Huntington, “[t]he Velvet Curtain of culture 
has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line in 
Europe”.
84 Of  particular  relevance  for  the  study  of  Finnish  national  identity, 
Huntington defines this line in Northern Europe as running along the Russo-Finnish 
border (see figure 5).
85  
 
Indeed, despite the idea of a division between East and West based on models of 
citizenship and national identity constructions, which would make Finland part of the 
Eastern tradition when the development of Finnish nationalism and modern indicators 
like  the  Right  to  Return  for  Ingrians  are  viewed,  political  discussions  of  Finnish 
nationalism  and  identity  in  Finland  appear  to  place  particular  relevance  on  this 
distinction between Finns as Western and Russians as the Eastern Other. However, 
Huntington is wrong to assert that the idea of a division between East and West is 
anything more than an idea; that there are quantifiable East and West civilisations that 
are  fundamentally  and  demonstrably  different,  and  always  have  been,  ignores  the 
many different interpretations of West and East in different discourses on identity. 
Rather, this division should be treated as one particular representation of identity, 
based  on  particular  interpretations  of  history.  Huntington’s  suggestion  that  this 
division is based on a division in “civilisations”, particularly civilisations based on 
religious influences, is also extremely contentious, and is not borne out my analysis of 
the data on the political discourse on the Ingrian Finnish Return. Rather, I argue that 
perceptions of a division between East and West European identities in Finland are 
predicated on discursive representations of history, emphasising periods of peace and 
prosperity with Finland’s western neighbours and period of crisis and conflict with its 
eastern neighbours.  
 
For instance, in contrast to Ingria, which was annexed outright by the Russians in the 
early eighteenth century, when Russia claimed the Finnish peninsula following the 
Finnish War in 1809 this newly annexed territory became an autonomous and self-
governing  Grand  Duchy  retaining  most  of  the  socio-legal  features  inherited  from 
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Swedish rule.
86 Nineteenth-century Finnish nationalists viewed this inheritance from 
the West as a defining feature of Finnish identity, which must be defended from the 
Eastern  colonising,  suppressive  force,  the  Tsarist  Russian  system,  as  expressed 
artistically by Finnish painter Edvard Isto (also known by his fennicised first name 
Eetu) in his 1899 painting Hyökkäys, or The Attack (see figure 6). Occupying pride of 
place in the Finnish National Museum in Helsinki, the piece depicts the traditional 
personification  of  Finland,  the  flaxen-haired,  blue-and-white  clad  Suomi-Neito, or 
Finnish Maiden, clutching at a large book with the Latin inscription Lex (law) that is 
being wrenched from her hands by a mighty double-headed Russian Imperial eagle. 
Isto’s work was first exhibited the same year as the infamous “February Manifesto”, 
issued  by  Tsar  Nicholas  II  on  15
th  February  1899,  which  set  limits  to  Finnish 
autonomy and the powers of the Finnish Diet and made the Grand Duchy subject to 
the same law as the rest of the Empire.
87 Finnish nationalism, as presented by Isto, is 
demonstrated as a struggle to retain its laws (its credentials as part of the Western 
European legal tradition underlined by the Latin title page) at a time when they were 
threatened  from  the  East.  Indeed,  Paasi  argues  that  the  ongoing  significance  of 
“Western”  influences  in  Finland,  particularly  the  Swedish-inspired  legal  system, 
enabled Finnish intellectuals to “classify their country exclusively in the realm of 
Western  Europe  and  the  Western  cultural  heritage”,  despite  a  legacy  of  Russian 
political control.
88 This, he argues, was most pronounced in periods of conflict with 
Russia or the USSR (for instance, the Winter and Continuation Wars).
89 Paasi asserts 
that  Finns  themselves  have  presented  their  border  with  Russia/the  USSR  as  the 
definitive cultural boundary between West and East.
90 Differences between Russia 
and Finland were thus discursively produced and disseminated to support a particular 
political  goal,  in  this  case  Finland’s  independence.  As  argued  in  this  thesis,  this 
tradition of perceiving Western and Eastern Europe as separate identities continues in 
the  political  discussions  on  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return,  based  on  discursive 
constructions of historical events and periods as either positive and negative. It would 
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therefore be wrong to dismiss the idea that divisions between Russia as the East and 
Finland as the West were diminished in the Finnish political discourse when the Cold 
War ended, although the nature and reasons for this perception of division are not 
convincingly accounted for by Huntington’s thesis.  
 
 
Figure 6 
Hyökkäys (The Attack), by Edvard “Eetu” 
Isto.  
Oil on canvas, 1899.  
Suomen Kansallismuseo, Helsinki.  
 
 
Taking into account the citizenship and nationalism models developed since Kohn, to 
belong to the “Western” tradition of nationalism should also involve attitudes towards 
national identity based on citizenship status and identification with certain civic or 
constitutionally  expressed  values,  rather  than  perceived  ethnic  identity.  To  some 
extent, it is not completely accurate to suggest that Finnish identity developed in the 
nineteenth century as an ethnically homogenous movement, as the political scientist 
Miroslav Hroch argues that the period of Finnish nationalism in the late nineteenth 
century  was  marked  by  close  and  increased  cooperation  between  the  two  largest 
ethno-cultural groups (Finns and Swedes) against Russian Tsarist governance as their 
common enemy.
91 This presents a significant new factor to the discussion of Finnish 
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identity construction, in how the Swedish-speaking minority in Finland could fit into 
ethnically or linguistically essentialising national identity conceptions. It is possible 
that Swedish-speakers may act as living reminders of the links between Finland and 
the old Swedish kingdom, reinforcing Finland’s status as a Western European nation 
that appears significant to Finns’ self-perception. Yet overall, as is discussed further 
in  this  thesis  with  reference  to  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return  policy,  there  is  a  later 
substantial  political  expression  of  Finnish  identity  as  an  ethnically  homogenising 
concept, linking the nation state as a community of citizens to the concept of an 
ethnically defined national identity.  
 
However,  when  one  views  any  notion  of  a  divide  between  Eastern  and  Western 
European identities as discursive constructions of identity that have become pervasive 
in the study of nationalism in Europe, these constructions run the risk of suppressing 
alternative views that transcend or ignore these perceived identities. Specific to the 
case of Ingria, Russians in the region have also viewed themselves as belonging to the 
cultural West to a certain extent, and the presentation of Russia as the invading Other 
swallowing parts of Western Europe into its own Eastern civilisation is rejected by 
some Russian descriptions of the annexation of Ingria. Indeed, one famous Russian 
interpretation of this event portrays it as a “Europeanising” moment for Russia. The 
poet Alexander Pushkin famously described in The Bronze Horseman Tsar Peter the 
Great’s tour of recently conquered Ingria, where he is said to have declared: 
   
Here, Swede, beware – soon by our labour 
Here a new city shall be wrought, 
Defiance to the haughty neighbour. 
Here we at Nature’s own behest 
Shall break a window to the West.
92 
 
The “Window to the West” was the new Russian capital, St Petersburg, founded in 
1703 on the Neva River delta in Ingria. The city was consciously designed to create, 
as described by historian L.R. Lewitter, a “new and portentous landmark on the Baltic 
horizon…closer  to  Amsterdam  and  London”,  in  terms  of  geographical  proximity, 
economic  orientation  and  cultural  identity,  than  to  Moscow,  Russia’s  “ancient 
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capital”.
93 St Petersburg, as a “European” capital in its appearance and outlook, could 
be seen as a centrepiece of Russia’s arrival as a European power, a reflection under 
Peter of “the intense desire and fervent hope of becoming members, in every respect, 
of the European community”.
94 The Russian annexation of Ingria was not, in this 
Russian  understanding  of  history,  an  expansion  of  Eastern  civilisation  westward 
towards  and  into  Finland,  but  rather  a  defining  moment  of  the  Russian  Empire’s 
melding with Western European civilisation.   
 
These divergent interpretations of the East-West cleavage denote a major divergence 
from geographical understanding of nationalism and identity. Different regions and 
nations appear more “Eastern” or more “Western” at different points in their history 
or in different aspects of their political make-up. For instance, Taras Kuzio argues that 
nationalism  in  Germany,  Spain  and  Greece  involves  ethnic  identity  constructions, 
despite  being  geographically  outside  Eastern  Europe.
95 He  argues  that  all  nations, 
including those in the West, are constructed around an ethnic “core”, such that ethnic 
identity effectively always play a role in constructions of nationalism in Europe.
96 He 
also cites Northern Ireland, Corsica and the Basque region as examples of violent 
ethnic  nationalism  that  prove  this  problem  cannot  be  singularly  linked  to  the 
geographic  East.
97 Likewise,  William  Rogers  Brubaker’s  comparative  study  of  the 
citizenship policies of six Western nation states (the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, 
the USA and Canada) shows inconsistencies in an understanding of Eastern-ethnic 
and  Western-civic  modes  of  national  identity  and  citizenship.  Significantly,  both 
Sweden and Germany (at the time of Brubaker’s writing, West Germany) are seen to 
function on the principle of jus sanguinis, or citizenship by blood or heritage, and 
view citizenship as hereditary, e.g. the children of citizens will always be citizens no 
matter where they are born.
98 Unlike the other four examples, Swedish and German 
citizenship policies do not factor in place of birth in their citizenship policies (in 
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France, Rogers Brubaker argues, jus sanguinis principles have always been strongly 
supplemented by jus soli requirements).
99 Thus, in a thorough interpretation of the 
theory of “Eastern” ethnic nationalism, neither Sweden, with its very strong political 
and cultural influence over Finland, nor Germany may be considered truly “Western” 
in  their  attitudes  to  national  identity  and  citizenship.  Brubaker  also  notes  the 
preferential access to naturalisation provided for those with “ethno-cultural kinship” 
ties to the nation state, which are most noteworthy in Germany. German citizenship is 
granted automatically to those who were forced to flee during the Second World War 
and their descendants, and all those of ethnic German heritage are permitted to apply 
for naturalisation without the normal 10 years residency requirement (a presentation 
of Germany’s immigration law history and own Right to Return policy is provided in 
appendix three of this thesis).
100 This demonstrates a continuation of jus sanguinis 
beyond  the  notion  of  “inheriting”  citizenship  from  citizen  parents,  to  “inheriting” 
citizenship  to  a  degree  from  one’s  more  distant  ancestors.  Again,  this  denotes  an 
example  of  an  apparently  Western  nation  pursuing  a  line  of  policy  more  readily 
associated in much of the academic literature on European nationalism with Eastern 
Europe. This would suggest that in Finland the perception of belonging in Western 
Europe is distinct from and not reliant on persuing the “Western” civic model of 
nationalism in defining national identity and belonging. 
 
Other scholars of national identity in Europe challenge the approach to the model of 
Eastern  Europe  as  intrinsically  linked  to  ethnicity-based  models  of  nationhood, 
without actually rejecting the idea that ethnicity-based models do predominate east of 
the  former  Iron  Curtain.  The  political  scientist  and  member  of  the  European 
Parliament George Schöpflin is essentially dismissive of Kohn’s East-West/ethnic-
civic theory of European nationalism,
101 but acknowledges that ethnic identity retains 
a degree of greater political significance in Eastern Europe.
102 This is the legacy of the 
communist political system, which removed “all possible civic institutions and codes 
of conduct…turn[ing] these societies into civic deserts”.
103 Thus, ethnic nationalism 
emerged in post-communist Europe because “there was no other identity in the public 
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sphere that could have played this role”.
104 Indeed, Brubaker also writes on the legal 
intersection  of  ethnicity  and  citizenship  in  communist  Europe,  particularly  in  the 
USSR and its successor states, as the Soviet government’s attempt to grant a public 
space for ethnic identity that would remain distinct from one’s citizenship-delineated 
membership in a multi-ethnic communist society. He describes the USSR’s approach 
to  citizenship  and  ethnicity  as  “institutionalised  multi-nationality”,  in  which  the 
Soviet state officially recognised ethnic identity amongst the Soviet citizenry.
105 In 
this  system,  the  USSR  acknowledged  “nations”  as  identifying  both  with 
political/territorial  and  ethnic/cultural  entities.
106  Though  officially  linked, 
ethnic/cultural  entities  never  completely  corresponded  to  the  political/territorial 
entities, as individuals could retain their ethnic or cultural identity irrespective of the 
part of the Soviet Union they resided in.
107  
 
As such, there was no real legal significance associated with ethnic identity in the 
USSR - Brubaker notes ethnicity was always presented by Soviet authorities as a 
social  categorisation  distinct  from  citizenship.
108  The  institutionalised  multi-
nationality approach could acknowledge ethnic identity, whilst still strictly limiting its 
legal  and  political  significance  to  avoid  undermining  the  Soviet  state’s  ultimate 
authority.
109 It  could  therefore  serve  as  a  control  structure  for  the  central  Soviet 
authorities,  managing  the  peripheral  regions  with  largely  ethnically  or  culturally 
distinct populations – as Brubaker argues, “ethnocultural nations were given their 
own political territories, but not the power to rule them”.
110 With the collapse of the 
Soviet  Union,  Brubaker  argues  that  “the  sense  of  ethnonational  entitlement  and 
ownership  of  national  territory”  in  the  institutionalised  multi-nationality  system 
continues in the post-Soviet space, though it is now “joined to substantial powers of 
rule”.
111 Thus,  like  Schöpflin,  Brubaker’s  presentation  of  the  relationship  between 
ethnic identity and citizenship sees this relationship as informed by the particularities 
of the communist political system, as he sees the conflation of ethnic and citizenship 
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identity as a legacy of the USSR’s use of ethno-cultural identity in managing ethno-
cultural diversity. These arguments, however, do see that differences in nationalism 
between East and West exist, if the East is defined as post-communist Europe.  
 
These explanations behind the increased merging of citizenship and ethnicity east of 
the former Iron Curtain following the collapse of communism relate to Anderson’s 
definition of the nation state community as “limited”. Indeed, he writes that “[t]he 
most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the human 
race will join their nations in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for say, 
Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet”.
112 In contrast, Brubaker points out 
that the USSR was never imagined as a nation state in this sense, and the sense of a 
“Soviet people” after 1917 was explicitly supranational, as the beginnings of a “new 
historical  community”  of  the  proletariat,  rather  than  an  exclusive  nationalist 
community.
113 The  end  of  communism  in  the  USSR  precipitated  the  end  of  this 
construction of the Soviet people. With this decline, former citizens of the USSR 
could be perceived to have only their perception of belonging to an ethnic identity 
within the system of institutionalised multi-ethnicity to fall back on.  
 
However, Finland did not spend the Cold War years with a communist government, 
and therefore such argument for modes of nationalism informed by post-communism 
have little relevance to the development of nationalism, and any role ethnicity may 
play  therein,  in  this  case.  Likewise,  Finland  lacks  the  same  heritage  of  Soviet 
constructions  of  citizenship  and  institutionalisation  of  ethnicity.  The  presence  of 
ethnic constructions of identity in Finland’s immigration policies therefore presents 
an  interesting  counter-example  to  the  link  between  post-communism  and  ethnic-
nationalism in Europe.  The Ingrian Return policy dates from the similar time frame 
(1990) to the decline of the USSR and the move towards a closer symbolic integration 
of ethnicity into citizenship in the post-Soviet space, yet it provides evidence of the 
ethnocentric understanding of national identity crossing the former Iron Curtain and 
finding intellectual credence in non-communist Europe. Indeed, the Ingrian Return 
law actually encompassed the old Soviet policy of recognising ethnic identity, as in 
the  earliest  years  of  the  policy  Finnish  ethnicity  was  determined  by  the  ethnicity 
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marked in a person’s internal Soviet passport.
114 This followed a similar practice in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  wherein  all  those  with  ethnicity  classified  as 
German  in  their  internal  Soviet  passport  were  eligible  for  “repatriation”.
115 This 
approach was criticised by, among others, the former Finnish Ambassador to Moscow 
and Berlin, René Nyberg, who quipped about the seemingly perfunctory nature of 
classifying German ethnicity that “it was enough for your grandfather to have had a 
German shepherd as a pet”.
116  
 
It therefore appears that both theories of ethnic and civic nationalism as respectively 
linked to the East and West respectively, and East and West as strictly defined by 
religious  differences,  are  too  inconsistent  and  unconvincing  in  accounting  for  the 
development of European nationalism and identity. The Finnish example undermines 
the notion that ethnic nationalism is the by-product of communist governments, and 
therefore limited in Europe to the former Warsaw Block. Rather, the Finnish case 
reflects a sense that systems of citizenship that attempted to acknowledge ethnic-
identity have played to elements of ethnic nationalism in Europe as a whole. Whilst 
there  may  appear  to  be  no  wholly  convincing  model  for  understanding  the 
development of nationalism in Europe, there is nevertheless evidence of ethnicity’s 
ongoing  popular  significance.  Such  evidence  is  present  in  Jan  Germen  Janmaat’s 
analysis of a 2002 Eurobarometer survey conducted in 9 different European states 
(the UK, Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Germany,  with  German  results  split  between  the  former  East  and  West)  on  what 
respondents consider to be the most significant delineators of national identity. Ethnic 
identity,  encompassing  ancestral  and  historic  connection  to  the  nation  state,  was 
highest in Greece, Hungary and Poland, and lowest in West Germany, Austria and 
Italy.
117 Cultural identity, including language, was highest again in Greece, Hungary 
and  Poland,  and  lowest  in  West  Germany,  East  Germany,  Spain  and  Britain.
118 
Political  identity,  encompassing  the  legal  system,  civic  rights  and  duties  and  the 
socio-economic system, was highest in Greece, Spain and Poland, and lowest in West 
                                                 
114 Hakala, “Koivisto vehemently denies that Ingrian migration to Finland was KGB initiative”. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Jan Germen Janmaat, “Popular Conceptions of Nationhood in Old and New European Member 
States: Partial Support for the Ethnic-Civic Framework”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 
2006, p. 63. 
118 Ibid.   
  40 
Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
119 Janmaat argues that this survey data 
shows basic conformity to the notion that ethnic and cultural conceptions of national 
identity are more significant in the East than strictly political or legal elements.
120 
However, he also notes that variations within the Eastern and Western groups are 
substantial, and that broadly speaking, the survey data indicate positive responses 
from most respondents across the board, indicating that most respondents consider 
both ethno/cultural and political constructions of nationhood to be important.
121 He 
specifically  notes  the  position  of  Greece,  which  he  deems  part  of  the  West,  as 
reporting high indications of ethno-cultural identity, and Poland, as part of the post-
communist East, reporting high indications of political or civic identity.
122 Variations 
on what one nation holds to be important in defining belonging within the nation state 
are  therefore  best  viewed  on  a  country-by-country  basis,  with  the  legacy  of 
communist government and legal systems to be considered as just one potential factor 
in accounting for the significance any nation affords to ethnic-identity.  
 
Political  systems  and  other  contextual  factors  are  therefore  significant  in 
understanding the development of nationalism for different nation states, which may 
transcend simple classification as belonging to Eastern or post-communist ethnic or 
Western and non-communist civic traditions. Finnish approaches to nationalism are a 
key example of these divisions blurring substantially. Indeed, on the Finnish example, 
Max Engman argues 
 
there evolved a kind of nationalism that mixed features of the form of nationalism customary 
in western Europe, nationalism as a ‘civic religion’, i.e. support for the existing state, with the 
form  of  nationalism  customary  in  eastern  Europe,  which  aimed  at  liberation  from  the 
multinational empires and from a ruling class that spoke another language”.
123  
 
Recognising the presence of elements of ethnic nationalism in Finland, in the form of 
an approach to citizenship that draws on constructions of an ethnic national identity 
that is informed by the peculiarities of Finland’s historical development as a nation 
state,  is  the  most  accurate  approach  to  understanding  identity  in  Finland.  It  also 
highlights the underlying call for the nation state to defend ethno-cultural identity 
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when it appears to be under threat, as exemplified in the Ingrian Right to Return 
policy. In this understanding of national identity, the national community can be seen 
to extend beyond the political borders and citizenship status of the nation state to all 
those who may claim membership of the nation’s ethno-cultural identity. Citizenship 
affords the legal protection of the nation state to those who claim this ethno-cultural 
identity.  
 
As Anthony D. Smith quite rightly has written, economic factors continue to shape 
conceptions of the nation state, but the less-investigated ethno-cultural arguments also 
have their place.
124 This study of the Ingrian Finns’ Right to Return therefore aims to 
follow Smith’s suggestion of investigating the significance of ethno-cultural rationale 
in the formation of national identity, as expressed through citizenship policy.  
 
C)  Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The introductory chapter has introduced the 
background  literature  on  nationalism  and  national  identity,  discussing  the 
conceptualisations of national identity relevant to the Finnish case and the intersection 
of notions of citizenship and ethnic identity in the Right to Return law. From here, the 
thesis continues by studying the political discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return, 
how (and to what ends) politicians constructed Finnishness in these discussions, and 
what  these  discussions  and  constructions  can  reveal  about  discourses  of  national 
identity and their use in the politics of this period (1990-2010).  
 
Chapter two of this thesis describes the historical context in which the Ingrian Right 
to Return policy was brought to Finland. This chapter charts the history of Ingria as a 
region in the frequently volatile borderlands between, first, the Novgorod Republic 
and Teutonic Order, the Swedish Kingdom and Russian Tsardom, and subsequently 
Finland and the USSR and Russian Federation. The historical account in this chapter 
runs from the Middle Ages through to the introduction of the Ingrian Return policy in 
1990, addressing previous times in which Ingrians have entered the Finnish political 
discourse, and the economic and political realities of the late twentieth century as the 
                                                 
124 Smith, The Ethnic Revival, p. 5.   
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Return law was introduced. This includes the economic recession and the challenged 
welfare-state model in the early 1990s, the changing security dimension of Europe 
after  the  collapse  of  the  Iron  Curtain,  and  the  post-Soviet  relationship  between 
Finland and Russia.    
  
Chapter  three  gives  an  account  of  the  methodological  approaches,  particularly 
theories  of  identity  and  discourse  analysis,  that  inform  this  thesis.  It  explains  the 
concept of discursive resources as employed here, and describes the different themes 
into which the sources are divided for analysis in the core empirical chapters.  
 
Chapters  four  and  five  form  the  empirical  core  of  this  thesis.  They  analyse  the 
political  discussions  surrounding  the  Return  law,  employing  the  critical  discourse 
analysis-informed methodological framework described in chapter three, to ascertain 
the  ideology  of  Finnishness  discursively  produced  by  Finnish  lawmakers  here. 
Chapter four analyses discourses from the period of the first incarnation of the Right 
to  Return  law,  beginning  with  President  Mauno  Koivisto’s  important  statement 
introducing  the  policy  to  the  public  in  April  1990  and  continuing  to  its  initial 
legislative manifestation in the Aliens Act from 1991 up until 1995. The analytical 
focus of this chapter is on how the language of the Act’s provisions for Right to 
Return status, and Finnish politicians’ official discussions of these provisions, present 
and define Finnish identity relative to Ingrians as an initially inclusive relationship. 
 
The fifth chapter analyses discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Return law from the 
period of reforms to the Aliens Act’s provisions for returnee status, beginning in 
1996,  up  to  the  policy’s  ultimate  demise  in  2010.  This  chapter  investigates  the 
response in the political discourse to the actual experience of Ingrian Finns living in 
Finland. I consider whether this period should be characterised as the completion 
stages of an overall project of Ingrian Finnish “repatriation”, or as a reassessment of 
the  Finnish  identity  “credibility”  of  Ingrians.  I  focus  in  this  chapter  on  the  new 
amendments from 1996 and 2002-2003 to the policy, and their revised presentation of 
Ingrians’ belonging in Finland, as contrasted to the Act’s previous incarnation. In 
addition, I investigate the language of the 2010 decision to end the Right to Return 
policy  for  Ingrian  Finns,  with  a  view  to  analysing  the  change  from  inclusive  to 
exclusive language in policymakers’ presentation of Ingrians’ connection to Finland  
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and  Finnish  identity,  and  whether  this  involves  a  substantial  change  in  Finnish 
lawmakers’ perception of Finnishness.   
 
The sixth chapter introduces a further aspect of analysis of the Ingrian Return law, 
contrasting the presentation of Finnish identity from Finnish politicians at this time 
with  concurrent  constructions  of  identity  emerging  from  within  the  Ingrian 
community, both those identifying as Ingrians in Estonia and Russia and those who 
had migrated through the Right to Return program to Finland. I have identified the 
editorials from an Ingrian Finnish community newspaper, Uutisia Inkeristä (News 
from Ingria), as one significant source, providing insight to the way Ingrians’ identity 
was constructed in relation to Finnishness. The editorials, written in Finnish by the 
director of the Ingrian Finnish community organisation in St Petersburg, Inkerin-Liitto 
(Ingrian League), Wladimir Kokko, engage with the notions of a separate identity 
construction for Ingrians, distinct from but related to Finnishness, and react to the 
exclusion  of  Ingrians  from  Finnish  politicians’  definition  of  Finnishness  with  the 
cancelation of the Right to Return policy in 2010. I have also analysed interview and 
survey data from Ingrians both in Russia and in Finland, and their conceptualisations 
of  Ingrianness  and  Finnishness,  that  have  been  collected  by  other  researchers, 
particularly social psychologists, to analyse how Ingrians’ perceptions relate to the 
discussion in Finnish politics. This chapter evaluates the correlation between Ingrian 
constructions  of  their  identity  and  Finnish  politicians’  language  surrounding  the 
Ingrian Return law, and the potential intersubjectivity of Finnish political language on 
Ingrian identity for Ingrians’ own perceptions of their Finnishness, or lack thereof.  
 
Finally, the thesis ends with a concluding chapter, which provides an overview of the 
key results of this study, and indicates their significance for the study of Finnish 
national identity, and more broadly, ways in which national identities in Europe have 
been studied and theorised. This chapter also suggests ways in which the results of 
this study can be employed for future research in related projects across different 
disciplines. 
 
This  thesis  also  provides  three  appendices:  1)  a  list  of  Finnish  political  parties 
mentioned  here,  along  with  their  acronyms,  2)  a  timeline  of  the  Ingrian  Finnish 
Return policy set against the timeline of parliamentary and presidential elections, and  
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3) a brief comparison of the Ingrian Finnish Return with the Volga German case in 
Germany, showing the (potentially problematic) intersection of ethnic and citizenship 
concepts inherent in right to return policies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: INGRIA AND FINLAND UP TO THE 
1990s 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the context of the Ingrian Return law, 
grounding the analysis of the law and its surrounding debates in the ensuing empirical 
chapters  in  the  ideologically  dominant  historical  narrative  of  Ingria  for  Finnish 
lawmakers and the relevant context of late twentieth century Finland and Europe, 
which prove crucial to understanding the Return law and its significance for the study 
of national identity construction. To this end, context is provided here in two broad 
categories:  
 
1)  An introduction to the history of the Ingrian region, charting the 
effects  of  its  many  changes  between  various  state  entities  and 
powers, both as reflected by the dominant interpretations of history 
in Finland, and also as examples of the previous significance Ingria 
and Ingrians have played in Finnish politics 
2)  A  presentation  of  the  situation  in  Finland,  both  economic  and 
political, at the time of the Return law’s introduction. The argument 
of  this  section  of  the  chapter  is  effectively  that  political  and 
geopolitical  issues  appear  to  have  shaped  the  instigation  of  the 
Ingrian Finns’ Right to Return policy much more than economics. 
 
To this end, this chapter first traces the history of border fluctuations in the eastern 
Baltic Sea region between Sweden, Russia, the USSR and Finland, from the thirteenth 
century  until  after  the  Second  World  War,  as  they  have  been  presented  in  the 
dominant  Finnish  interpretations  of  history.  The  contemporary  border  between 
Finland  and  Russia,  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter  as  an  ideological  border 
between West and East that scholars like Paasi have analysed as a key partition in 
Finnish constructions of identity, is here acknowledged as a historically malleable, 
fluid political border that has at various points in its history oscillated back and forth, 
particularly around the Karelian Isthmus and Gulf of Finland. Ingria directly abuts 
this border, switching from Novgorodian to Swedish to Russian (and subsequently,  
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Soviet) control over the course of the early modern and modern periods. These border 
changes,  accompanied  by  influxes  of  new  communities,  have  shaped  Ingria’s 
characterisation  amongst  Finnish  politicians  as  a  region  of  problematised  national 
identity, between Russian and Finnish, or Eastern and Western, identity constructions. 
As this thesis investigates the construction of national identity with reference to Ingria 
and Ingrians through the Return law, an understanding of the historical narrative of 
Ingria as presented in the dominant Finnish interpretations of history that inform the 
law is essential for this analysis. As history is used in the political rhetoric of Finnish 
politicians  to  promote  connections  between  Ingrians  and  both  Finnishness  and 
Finland,  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  this  rhetoric  should  first  require  an 
understanding  of  the  details  of  this  history.  This  also  serves  to  provide  previous 
instances in which Ingria and Ingrians have entered the Finnish political discourse.  
 
This chapter then progresses to a discussion of the context of the introduction of 
Ingrian Finnish Return law itself, examining the economic and political climate in 
Finland in the 1980s and early 1990s. This period for Finland was marked both by a 
transforming  geopolitical  situation,  with  the  collapse  of  the  old  security  order  in 
Europe  as  the  Iron  Curtain  was  lifted,  and  a  critical  economic  situation,  as  an 
economic crisis transformed labour shortages into significant unemployment levels. 
This  information  is  presented  here  to  provide  an  insight  into  relevant  factors  and 
pressures informing Finnish political decisions and rhetoric on the Return program for 
Ingrians, and to ground the study of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in the wider 
academic debates on how national identity construction has responded to the fall of 
the Iron Curtain in Europe.  
 
A)  Introducing Ingria: Changing Borders in the Gulf of Finland Region 
 
Ingria has a complex place in the development of the Finnish nation state. The Right 
to Return for Ingrian Finns suggests that despite 300 years as citizens and residents of 
a different state, Ingrians retain connections to the homeland of their pre-seventeenth 
century  ancestors.  The  Ingrian  territory  (for  geographic  location  see  figure  1) 
stretches along the easternmost coast of the Gulf of Finland, bordered to the east by 
Lake Ladoga and linking the Finnish peninsula with present-day Estonia. Prior to the 
thirteenth  century,  the  region  was  a  sparsely  inhabited,  outlying  district  of  the  
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Republic of Novgorod, already subject to Russian-speaking immigration but largely 
populated  by  Votes  (also  called  Votians)  and  Izhorians,  who  spoke  Finno-Ugric 
languages related to but distinct from Finnish.
1 In the thirteenth century, the region 
became an increasingly volatile border region between the Orthodox Novgorod and 
the  then-Catholic  powers  of  Denmark,  Sweden  and  Livonia  (part  of  present-day 
eastern Estonia and Latvia), who invaded but were unable to successfully occupy the 
region  at  several  points  during  that  century.
2 The  failure  of  the  Swedes  to  gain  a 
lasting  foothold  in  Ingria  appears  to  have  (temporarily)  marked  the  southeastern 
border  of  Swedish  expansion  in  the  Finnish  peninsula  through  the  twelfth  and 
thirteenth centuries. By 1293, Sweden had ceased expansionist activities and begun 
consolidating  administration  of  the  new  largely  Finnish-speaking  territories  in  the 
fortresses at Åbo (Turku), Tavastehus (Hämeenlinna), Viborg (Viipuri) and Raseborg 
(Raasepori).
3 Viborg,  which  was  fortified  by  the  end  of  the  thirteenth  century,  is 
located to the north of Ingria, and thus could function as the border and vanguard 
against Novgorod, with Ingria therefore outside of the Swedish-administered Finnish 
territories.
4  
 
Finnish politicians’ discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return law are informed by 
border changes between Sweden and Russia dating to the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  In  the  early  seventeenth  century,  Sweden  was  able  to  obtain  a  more 
permanent presence in Ingria.
5 The region proved a strategic gain for the Swedes, 
establishing a land bridge linking the Swedish territories along the northern coast of 
the  Gulf  of  Finland  with  newly  acquired  possessions  along  its  southern  coast  in 
Estonia.
6 The annexation of Ingria by the Swedish Crown was completed by 1617, 
and was followed by a period of some 80 years in which the region was governed as 
                                                 
1 Evgeniya L. Nazarova, “The Crusades against Votians and Izhorians in the Thirteenth Century”, in 
A.V. Murray (ed), Crusade and Conversion on the Baltic Frontier 1150-1500, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2001, pp. 177-9.  
2 Nazarova, “The Crusades against Votians and Izhorians in the Thirteenth Century”, pp. 177-9. For 
example, attempts by the Swedish Kingdom in 1240 and the Livonian Order in 1242 to take Ingria 
were unsuccessful, and were repelled respectively at the Battle of the Neva and Battle of Lake Peipus 
by the Novgorodians under Prince Alexander Nevsky See Eric Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, 
2
nd ed, London: Penguin Books, 1997, pp. 117, 134. 
3 Philip Line, “Sweden’s Conquest of Finland: A Clash of Cultures?”, in A.V. Murray (ed), The Clash 
of Cultures on the Medieval Baltic Frontier, Farnham/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009, p. 90.  
4 Ibid.  
5. David Kirby, A Concise History of Finland, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 30. 
Kirby writes that this Swedish conquest was spurred by the “virtual collapse of the Moscovite state 
following the death of Boris Gudunov in 1605”.  
6. Ibid.   
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part of Sweden’s eastern possessions.
7 During this time, the region became a focal 
area for immigration by Finnish-speaking peoples from the Finnish peninsula, who 
would become the dominant ethno-linguistic group in the region.
8 These settlers, and 
their descendants, have become known as the Ingrian Finns.  
 
Finnish-speaking settlers at this time belonged primarily to two tribes, Savakko and 
Äyrämöinen, delineated by different dialect, dress and customs, and only extremely 
rarely intermarrying.
9 According to Ott Kurs’ geopolitical and historical profile of 
Ingria, the Finnish-speaking settlers in Ingria identified strongly with Finns living in 
Finland during the period of Swedish governance, united by Lutheran faith and use of 
the literary Finnish language, which was used during and after the Reformation for 
worship and education in local parishes.
10 Thus, according to Kurs, the inhabitants of 
Ingria self-identified as Finns of Ingria.
11 The cities of Narva, in present-day Estonia, 
and Nyen (in Finnish, Nevanlinna), on the site of present-day St Petersburg, became 
the main urban centres of the new territory, whilst fortresses were also maintained at 
Jama  (Jaama)  and  Nöteborg  (Pähkinälinna),  which  now  exist  as  Kingisepp  and 
Schlisselberg in Leningrad Oblast, but the region was not integrated into the core of 
the  Swedish  kingdom  that  included  present-day  Finland,  and  was  governed 
separately.
12 Later  presentations  of  Ingrians  as  connected  to  Finland  through  their 
common  Swedish  administration  minimise  the  significance  of  Ingria’s  separate 
political administration by the Swedish crown at this, the only period in which Ingrian 
and  Finnish  territories  were  under  a  common  authority  as  part  of  the  Swedish 
Kingdom. 
 
Less than a century after the commencement of Swedish rule, as a result of Russian 
conquest during the Great Northern War (1700-1721) Ingria was politically cut off 
from the Finnish peninsula.
13 However, the divide between Ingria and the Finnish 
peninsula territories can be viewed as not an altogether clean cutaway, as the gradual 
                                                 
7 Nylund-Oja et al., “Finnish Emigration and Immigration”, pp. 176-7. 
8 Ibid. p. 177.  
9 Rimpiläinen, “Ingrian Finnishness as a Historical Construction”, p. 102.  
10 Kurs, “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge between Estonia and Finland”, p. 110.  
11 Ibid.  
12 Hannes Silvo, “Karelia: Battlefield, Bridge, Myth”, in D. Kirby and M. Engman (eds), Finland: 
People, Nation, State, London: Hurst and Company, 1989, p. 64.  
13 Ibid. pp. 109-110.   
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westward  progression  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth 
centuries  proceeded  in  stages  that  have  continuously  redefined  what  may  be 
considered the “Finnish” territories. Other predominantly Finnish-speaking territories 
were taken by Russia over the course of the eighteenth century, including Viborg, 
which was ceded by the Swedes to the Russian Empire through the Treaty of Nystad 
(Uusikaupunki) in 1721, and Kexholm (in Finnish, Käkisalmi; in Russian, Priozersk), 
ceded  through  the  Treaty  of  Åbo  in  1743.
14 These  areas  retained  a  degree  of 
autonomy from the Russian Crown, and when the Russians conquered the rest of the 
Finnish peninsula in 1809 and established the Autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, 
this area was joined to the Grand Duchy.
15 Officially known as “Viipuri Province” 
using the Finnish city name, Russia’s eighteenth-century Finnish conquests have also 
been referred to as Vanha Suomi, or Old Finland.
16 This designation did not include 
Ingria,  whose  position  as  the  focal  point  of  Peter  the  Great’s  Westernisation 
movement and location of his new capital ensured it never formed part of the Grand 
Duchy and was governed wholly by Russian authorities.
17 Once again, more recent 
interpretations of Ingria as connected to Finland through the common experience of 
Russian  subjugation  must  minimise  other  potential  interpretations  of  history  that 
stress the difference in legal status between Ingria as part of Russia and the Grand 
Duchy of Finland as an autonomous entity within the Russian Empire.  
 
Legally speaking, Ingrian Finns were an ethnic minority population within Russian 
territory,
18 and thus subject to Russian law and not the semi-autonomous legal system 
of the Grand Duchy. There were, however, opportunities for Ingrian Finns to retain 
their religious and linguistic ties to the Grand Duchy, as the Evangelical Church of St 
Mary  was  founded  in  St.  Petersburg  in  1745  as  the  city’s  first  Finnish-language 
church (see figure 7), with an attached lycée that provided Finnish-language education 
                                                 
14 Silvo, “Karelia: Battlefield, Bridge, Myth”, p. 66 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Kurs, “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge between Estonia and Finland”, p. 110.  
18 Ingrian Finns in nineteenth century St Petersburg were a somewhat disadvantaged, largely working-
class city minority group, often working in domestic service and negatively stereotyped as drunks – 
they were even mentioned as such in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 1866 novel Crime and Punishment: 
“Amalia Ivanovna was simply a drunken St Petersburg Finn, and had probably worked as a cook 
earlier, or even as something worse…Amalia Ivanovna’s father (if she had one) was probably some St 
Petersburg Finn who worked as a milkman.” See Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment, 
translated by David McDuff, London: Penguin Books, 2003, p. 466.   
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up  to  the  seventh  grade  (see  figure  8).
19 Although  Finnish-language  elementary 
schools were abolished by the Tsar in 1908, Finnish-language religious instruction 
continued in the Ingrian Finnish parishes, such that Ingrian Finnish self-identification 
as linguistically and religiously connected to the Grand Duchy was maintained up 
until the Russian Revolution and Finnish independence in 1917.
20 These details may 
form an important aspect of interpretations of the history of Finland and Ingria that 
stress connections between Ingria and the Finnish Grand Duchy, and the potential for 
commonality  in  identity  between  nineteenth  century  Finns  and  Ingrians  that 
transcends their political separation.  
 
 
Figure 7 
The Evangelical Church of St Mary (popularly known as the Finnish Church), St Petersburg, Russia.  
Photo by Nicholas Prindiville, 17 May 2012.  
 
                                                 
19 Steven Duke, “Multiethnic St. Petersburg: The Late Imperial Period”, in H. Goscilo and S.M. Norris 
(eds), Preserving Petersburg: History, Memory, Nostalgia, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2008, pp. 153-5.  
20 Kaarina Ylönen, Religion and Ethnicity: The Renaissance of the Ingrian Church After the End of 
Communist Rule, Helsinki: The Research Institute of the Evangelical Church of Finland, 1998, pp. 10-
1.   
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Figure 8 
The building of the former Finnish-language lycée in St Petersburg, now home to Suomi-Talo, the Finnish Cultural 
Institute in Russia.  
Photo by Nicholas Prindiville, 17 May 2012.  
 
The separation of Ingria from the Grand Duchy of Finland is indeed significant for the 
potential classification of Ingria as lost Finnish territory. Historian Matti Klinge has 
argued  that  defining  pre-1809  Finland  as  a  concrete  geopolitical  entity  is  in  fact 
problematic.
21 The development of Finnish nationalism in the nineteenth century was 
preceded by the construction of the Grand Duchy of Finland, albeit one that was 
heterogeneous both in language (with a substantial Swedish-speaking population) and 
religion (with an Orthodox community found largely in Karelia).
22 Whereas Ingrians 
may have shared a common language and religion with the majority population in the 
Grand  Duchy,  the  separation  of  Ingria  from  this  territory  nevertheless  effectively 
ensured that Ingrian Finns existed outside this early legal conception of Finland and 
the Finnish citizenry, if “Finland” at this point is viewed as a national community 
based on principles of jus soli. Encompassing Ingrian Finns into a “Finnish” identity 
would  require  looking  past  jus  soli  definitions  of  national  communities,  and 
discounting Ingria’s isolation from Finland’s historic conceptions as a national entity. 
                                                 
21 Matti Klinge, Let Us Be Finns: Essays on History, Helsinki: Otava, 1990, pp. 119-20.  
22 Ibid. p. 70.   
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“Finland” as a concept would also need to be redefined as less a geographically or 
politically defined area, and more a community of ethnic descent, tracing roots back 
to a more vaguely defined region, with greater emphasis placed on shared historical 
origins and memories. 
 
From the creation of Finland as a political entity in the nineteenth century through to 
independence in the early twentieth century, the Ingrian Finns have not been included 
within the geographical boundaries of the early Finnish nation state. However, there 
are examples of experiences in the independent Finnish nation state for Ingrian Finns, 
and notable examples of Ingrians entering Finnish political discourse before 1990.  
Pirkko Malinen calls the arrival of Ingrian Finns in Finland in the early 1990s the 
“third wave of Ingrian-Finnish migration to Finland”,
23 the first wave being those who 
arrived in the years of civil war following the Russian Revolution, when Ingrian Finns 
lost much of their cultural and linguistic autonomy in the new Soviet Union, and the 
second wave being Ingrian Finns evacuated during the Siege of Leningrad in the 
Second World War.
24 The periods of these two earlier waves of Ingrian migration to 
Finland  have  been  characterised  in  Finnish  political  discursive  constructions  of 
Finnish identity as instances of Finnishness transcending the new and still malleable 
border  between  Finland  and  the  Soviet  Union.  For  instance,  the  Finnish  state’s 
interaction with Ingrians during the Russian Civil War period, from 1917 to 1922, 
was  informed  by  a  larger  movement  of  Finnish  expeditions  into  Russian/Soviet 
territories with significant Finnish-speaking minorities, or indeed minorities speaking 
related Finno-Ugric languages. This period of interventionism from the Finnish side 
has  been  called  the  Heimosodat,  or  “kinship  wars”,  which  included  the  Viena 
expeditions  (Vienan  retket)  to  East  Karelia  in  1918,
25 the  Petsamo  expeditions 
(Petsamon retket) to what is now Pechenga, in the Pechengsky District on the White 
Sea  in  1918-1920,
26 the  Estonian  War  of  Independence  in  1919,
27 the  Ingrian 
                                                 
23 Pirkko Malinen, “The Ingrian-Finnish Remigrants: Factors Preventing and Promoting Integration”, 
in M. Teinonen and T.J. Virtanen (eds), Ingrians and Neighbours: Focus on the Eastern Baltic Sea 
Region, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999, p. 195.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Jussi Niinistö, Heimosotien historia: 1918-1922, Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2005, 
p. 22. Original Finnish text: kiinteä osa vastaitsenäistyneen Suomen maantieteellistä 
muotoutumiskehitystä. 
26 Ibid. p. 68.  
27 Ibid. p. 148.   
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struggles  (Inkerin  taistelut)  of  1919-1920,
28 and  the  Karelian  uprising  (Karjalan 
kansannousu) of 1921-1922.
29 The historian Jussi Niinistö describes the Heimosodat 
as  playing  “an  integral  part  in  shaping  the  geographical  development  of  newly 
independent Finland”.
30 Niinistö may be considered to offer a particularly nationalist 
political interpretation of the Heimosodat and the links to territory and identity in the 
construction of the Finnish nation state they represent, as since 2011 he has been a 
member of parliament for the populist Perussuomalaiset (True Finns, see appendix I 
for  note  on  their  English-language  name),  whose  chairperson  and  presidential 
candidate in recent elections has openly advocated renegotiating the Russo-Finnish 
border.
31 However,  this  interpretation  has  broader  significance,  particularly  for 
Ingrian  Finns  themselves  at  this  time,  as  Pekka  Nevalainen’s  history  of  interwar 
Ingria also notes the irredentist movement in Northern Ingria from 1919-1920, which 
established a breakaway state (known in Finnish as Kirjasalon tasavalta, the Kirjasalo 
Republic,  named  for  the  northern  Ingrian  village  that  served  as  its  administrative 
centre) and petitioned Foreign Minister Carl Enckell to pursue the joining of Northern 
Ingria to Finland at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
32 Enckell advised caution, 
preferring to advocate Ingrian cultural autonomy without changes to existing borders, 
and  though  the  issue  was  raised  in  Paris,  it  was  not  pursued  further.
33 However, 
Nevalainen argues that the Ingrian irredentist movement captured the imagination of 
Finnish  nationalists  in  the  young  Finnish  Republic,  spurring  Finnish  volunteer 
brigades like the so-called Pohjois-Inkerin vapaajoukot (North Ingrian Free Corps, 
the volunteer Finnish paramilitary in Ingria), which in 1919 entered Ingria from the 
north.
34 Other volunteer units that had fought in the Estonian War of Independence 
also marched into Ingria from Yamburg, and by sea from the mouth of the River.
35 To 
                                                 
28 Ibid. p. 184.  
29 Ibid. p. 214.  
30 Ibid. p. 10.  
31 “Timo Soini kalastaa protestiääniä”, Iltalehti, 20 September 2005, available online at URL: 
<http://www.iltalehti.fi/verkkovieras/200509203519670_ve.shtml>, accessed 29 November 2012 
32 Pekka Nevalainen, “Inkerinmaan ja Inkeriläisten Vaiheet 1900-luvulla”, in P. Nevalainen and H. 
Sihvo (eds), Inkeri, Historia, Kansa, Kulttuuri, Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1992, pp. 
240-1 
33 Ibid.  
34 Niinistö, Heimosotien historia, p. 185. 
35 Ibid.   
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Ingria in the midst of the Russian Civil War they came, under the pretext of “rescuing 
Ingria from the yoke of Bolshevism”.
36  
 
Anssi Paasi argues that much of the public and government discourse after the Finnish 
Civil  War  expressing  anti-Bolshevism  was  related  to  sentiments  of  Russophobia, 
effectively  equating  Bolshevism  specifically  with  Russians  and  seeing  it  as 
destructive  to  Finnish  values  and  culture.
37 Paasi  describes  the  Soviet  Union’s 
depiction in the Finnish public consciousness of the 1920s as “the eternal hereditary 
enemy  of  Finland,  and  as  a  Bolshevist  bastion  that  posed  a  threat  to  Western 
civilisation and Christianity”.
38 Indeed, there is historical evidence that supporters of 
the Ingrian irredentist movement considered the notions of “Bolshevik” and “Finnish” 
as antonymous. This view of Bolshevism sees it as an ethno-cultural homogenising 
force emanating from the East and attacking the particularly religious foundations that 
underscore Finns’ belonging to Western European civilisation. In response, Finland 
should protect its perceived ethnic kinfolk in Ingria from loss of cultural identity and 
autonomy. Amongst the most prominent leaders of the Pohjois-Inkerin vapaajoukot 
was  Georg  “Yrjö”  Elfvengren,  who  later  served  as  chairman  of  the  Kirjasalo 
Republic’s governing committee. He wrote in July 1919 expressing frustration at the 
Finnish government’s lack of explicit assistance to the Ingrian irredentist movement:      
 
If Finland tells us to hand over the Ingrian villages back to the Bolsheviks, and prohibits 
people  from  helping  the  rescue  effort,  then  as  a  Finn  I  am  willing  to  comply  with  these 
wishes, but as a Finnish citizen I can’t understand them. I delay the time so precious to the 
fate of Ingria, waiting for what Finland will say to her ethnic kinfolk.
39  
 
Allowing the Ingrians to be governed by a Bolshevik government is presented by 
Elfvengren  as  an  incomprehensible  betrayal  of  fellow  Finnish  “kinfolk”.  In  his 
depiction  of  Ingria’s  situation,  Finland  owes  a  responsibility  to  Ingrians,  linked 
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through this relationship of heimo (tribe or ethnic kin), to rescue them from their fate 
under the Soviets.  The heimo relationship constructed in this discourse may not have 
been  explicitly  supported  at  the  time  by  the  Finnish  government,  given  Enckell’s 
cautious  approach  in  Paris,  but  allows  for  a  presentation  of  Ingrian  and  Finnish 
sameness  that  looks  past  potential  differences,  particularly  in  home  territory  and 
citizenship status. Later political discussions on Ingrian Finns in the Finnish political 
discussions  of  the  1990s  and  2000s  that  stressed  historical  connection  between 
Ingrians and Finnishness similarly emphasise periods of trans-border connection and 
cooperation, and relative resistance to elements like Bolshevism that may undermine 
Ingrians’ Finnishness. The Heimosodat period mirrors the Ingrian Right to Return 
period 70 years later by showing the presence in Finnish politics of assumptions that 
Ingrian Finns belong in the Finnish national community, although the Heimosodat 
activists  see  Ingrian  inclusion  in  the  Finnish  nation  state  as  extending  to  Ingrian 
territory as well as population.  
 
Constructing Bolshevism as a threat to Finnishness was particularly pertinent in the 
contentious post-Civil War political climate in Finland, and it is significant to note 
that Elfengren’s statement, for instance, comes in a period of significant animosity 
between  the  victorious  conservative  Whites  and  the  socialist  Reds.
40 David  Arter 
argues that the significance the Bolsheviks played in assisting the Reds’ unsuccessful 
1918 revolution in Finland, though in his view overstated, became a core narrative of 
the Whites’ historiography.
41 The Whites’ construction of Bolshevism and the threat 
from the USSR would have departed substantially from how the Soviet Union was 
constructed in Red narratives, as this was also a period of substantial migration of 
socialist  Finns,  including  those  from  the  politically  active  émigré  communities  in 
North America, to the Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic, headed in Petrozavodsk by 
Finnish  socialist  Edvard  Gylling,  who  had  been  active  in  the  revolutionary  Red 
government  in  Finland,  and  where  Finnish  was  officially  recognised  as  a  state 
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language.
42 Alexey  Golubev  and  Irina  Takala  have  characterised  the  migration  of 
Finnish  socialists  to  Soviet  Karelia  as  “the  search  for  a  socialist  El  Dorado”,
43 
suggesting representations of the Bolsheviks, the USSR, Russians and socialism that 
were  not  necessarily  antithetical  or  a  threat  to  Finnishness.  Recalling  Brubaker’s 
description  of  Soviet  identity  as  explicitly  supranational,  the  “new  historical 
community” of the proletariat to replace exclusive nationalist communities,
44 Finnish 
socialists  with  their  mother  tongue  officially  recognised  in  Petrozavodsk  may 
therefore have constructed different narratives of identity relating to the USSR and 
communism in the early years of the Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic.  
 
However, Golubev and Takala also note the effects of Stalin’s “Finnish Operation” of 
1937-1938, in which Red Finns like Gylling and Kustaa Rovio were purged from the 
Petrozavodsk  government  and  Finns  in  Soviet  Karelia  were  accused  of  being 
“national  deviationists”,  “border  hoppers”  and  “enemy  agents”  of  the  bourgeois 
Finnish  government,  leading  to  mass  arrests  and  executions.
45 They  also  note  the 
lingering  effects  of  the  Finnish  Operation  on  surviving  Finns  in  the  USSR,  who 
frequently changed their names and avoided speaking Finnish to mask their origins 
and avoid further persecution.
46 Stalinist era persecutions before, during and after the 
Second  World  War  are  a  key  narrative  in  the  discursive  construction  of  Finnish 
identity in relation to Russia, and its effects on the Finnish left are also significant. 
Tuomas Tepora writes that “[i]t is indisputable that the Soviet aggression in 1939 
strengthened the bonds between social classes and political parties” in Finland,
47 and 
Tiina Kinnunen further argues that the dominant White or rightist discourse of the 
Civil War as a “war of liberation” has undergone a degree of critical re-examination 
in  post-Cold  War  Finland,  informed  by  narratives  of  the  Second  World  War  that 
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include Red participation in the war effort.
48 Tepora and Aapo Roselius note that this 
is the view promoted in Väinö Linna’s fiction trilogy Täällä Pohjantähden alla (in 
English, Under the North Star), which prompted significant re-evaluation of Reds and 
their  wartime  loyalty  to  Finland  when  it  was  initially  published  in  1959-1962.
49 
Positive views of the USSR from Finnish socialists in the immediate post-Civil War 
period may thus contrast with constructions of the USSR/Russia amongst the post-war 
Finnish left. Yet in the Heimosodat period and the wake of the Finnish Civil War, 
Ingrians could carry particular significance in conservative Whites’ narratives of the 
Bolshevik threat that also reflect deep internal Finnish divisions between left and 
right.    
 
The Ingrian struggles of 1919-1920 (and the Kirjasalo Republic) were ended by the 
1920 Peace Agreement of Dorpat (Tartu). This agreement included the Declaration of 
the Russian Delegation Concerning the Position of the Population of Russian Ingria, 
which appeared to address the concerns of those like Enckell who focused on cultural 
autonomy over changing borders, as it proclaimed the Soviet Union’s guarantee 
 
[t]hat  the  Finnish  population  of  the  Government  of  Petrograd  [now  Leningrad  Oblast]  is 
granted full enjoyment of all the same rights and advantages that Russian law gives national 
minorities…[including to] make free use of the language of the local population for public 
education and teaching and for other internal affairs.
50  
 
However, this agreement did not completely dispel the idea of Ingrians (and Ingria) as 
a  part  of  the  Finnish  national  community  from  Finnish  political  discourse.  Paasi 
argues  that  the  1920s  also  saw  the  beginning  of  a  flourishing  of  “kinship 
organisations”,  which  he  describes  as  “strong  social-pressure  groups  in  Finnish 
society”.
51 These organisations advocated for the notion of “Greater Finland” (Suur-
Suomi). The concept was usually focused on Eastern Karelia, for which there were 
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several  early  pressure  groups,  including  the  Academic  Karelia  Society,  the  East-
Karelian Committee of the Karelian National Union and the League of Finnicists.
52 
Paasi writes that by the 1930s, these organisations began to expand the concept of 
“Greater Finland” to a highly complex geographical entity shaped by an “imagined 
territory” of kindred Finns – including usually Karelia, Ingria, the Kola Peninsula, and 
occasionally also Estonia, the Western coast of the Gulf of Bothnia and Finnmark.
53 
Tenho  Pimiä  argues  that  the  Greater  Finland  concept  was  specifically  linked  to 
pursuit of a larger nation state, a “utopian” vision of a united nation state “sharing a 
common cultural heritage and language”.
54 The focus on Eastern Karelia was the most 
feasible avenue for an expanded Finno-Ugric nation state in the 1920s and 1930s, 
with an eastern border drawn from Lake Ladoga to the White Sea.
55 However, Pimiä 
also notes that proponents of Greater Finland appeared to ignore mainstream Finnish 
perceptions  of  Eastern  Karelia  as  “alien  and  Russian”,  particularly  due  to  their 
adherence to the Orthodox, rather than Lutheran, church.
56   
 
Despite  this,  academic  discourses  on  ethno-cultural  identity  linked  specifically  to 
nation  states  and  political  borders  in  the  1920s  and  1930s  fits  into  the  broader 
environment of ethno-cultural interest at this time, particularly in the wake of the 
collapse of the Habsburg and Romanov empires and creation of new, more mono-
cultural nation states. Indeed, there were interesting parallel developments at this time 
in Hungary, which in the 1930s experienced a similar surge in scholarly interest in 
Finno-Ugric ethnography and identity. This prompted Hungarian political interest in 
Finland, with its similar history as a Finno-Ugric nation under the political control of 
a European Great Power, as a model for post-independence social, economic and 
political development.
57 The inter-war period thus also present cases in which Finnish 
political groups emphasised trans-border connections and common identity between 
Finns in Finland and groups in the USSR they perceived to be Finnish or closely 
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related, continuing somewhat the ideology of the Heimosodat. As Paasi writes, “[t]he 
basic idea of traditional geopolitical thinking has always been to emphasise the unity 
of the ‘state’ and ‘man’”,
58 and this ideology informed these inter-war organisations 
based on a conceptualisation of people linked to a geographical region, its borders set 
not artificially by politics but by the natural boundaries that separated peoples pre-
historically.
59  
 
To some extent, the Greater Finland discourse mirrors concurrent developments in 
Nazi Germany, as Pimiä sees similar arguments for uniting ethnic kin as a political 
tool for states aspiring to expand their territories.
60 Indeed, Pimiä notes links in the 
study  of  Eastern  Karelia  by  Greater  Finland  proponents  to  those  of  Nazi 
ethnographers:  Yrjö  von  Grönhagen,  for  instance,  was  active  in  Eastern  Karelian 
research during the Second World War and had worked for the Ahnenerbe Institute 
for Ancient Studies led by Heinrich Himmler, wherein ethnographic research was 
specifically created and employed to justify territorial expansion and annexations.
61 
Hana Worthen notes the Finnish state-commissioned work Finnlands Lebensraum: 
das  geographische  und  geschichtliche  Finnland  from  prominent  mid  twentieth-
century academics Väinö Auer, Eino Jutikkala and Kustaa Vilkuna, was a particularly 
notable example of state-sponsored research designed to justify Finnish expansion 
into both Karelia and Ingria, supported by Nazi German academics and institutions.
62  
The concept of Greater Finland came to the fore in Finnish policy during 1941-1944, 
when Finnish armed forces occupied parts of Eastern Karelia, and the government 
began  an  education  program  for  local  Karelian  and  Finnish-speaking  inhabitants, 
describing  them  as  citizens  of  the  forthcoming  Greater  Finland  state,  whilst  local 
Russian-speakers and other “non-national civilians” were interned in concentration 
camps.
63  
 
Finnish political thought during the Second World War thus also shows significant 
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elements  of  national  identity  construction  defined  along  ethnic  lines,  extending 
beyond the borders established by the 1920 Dorpat Treaty to include perceived ethnic 
kinfolk  in  the  USSR,  of  which  Ingrians  were  nominally  part.  In  this  sense, 
constructions  of  Finnish  identity  linking  Finnish  citizenship  to  Finnish  (or  Finno-
Ugric) ethno-cultural identity can be traced further back into the twentieth century 
than the 1990s Right to Return discussion. Recent studies of the Finnish inter-war 
period  and  Greater  Finland  concept  have  been  largely  critical  of  this  movement, 
seeing it as specifically linked to the racism and ethnic discrimination associated with 
ethno-culturally essentialist nation state constructions in diverse regions, including, at 
its most overt and disastrous, Nazism and the Holocaust.
64 Yet, as evidence presented 
in the following chapters of this thesis indicates, such criticism of this period does not 
appear  to  have  hindered  development  of  new  policy  linking  citizenship  to  ethno-
cultural identity later in the twentieth century. Interpretations of history that suppress 
the negative connotations of ethnic nationalism in the interwar period, particularly 
this link to Nazi ideology, also enter into the discussion on the Ingrian Return law in 
the 2000s (see chapter five), when this omission or glossing-over of links to Nazism 
actually provokes some controversy and contestation.   
 
In the history of the connection between Ingrian Finns and the Finnish nation state, 
the  period  of  the  Second  World  War  has  enormous  significance,  particularly  the 
Ingrian experience of the War as refugees fleeing Leningrad for the safety of Finland. 
This presents the next stage in the history of Finland’s relationship with Ingrians, 
characterised by the second wave of Ingrian migration to Finland. Finnish politicians’ 
narratives  of  this  period  form  a  further  example  of  promoting  representations  of 
Ingrians’  connection  to  Finnish  identity.  From  1941,  Leningrad  and  its  surrounds 
were the focus of a lengthy and extremely destructive military campaign, in which 
Nazi troops encircled the city, in what would become known as the 900-day Siege of 
Leningrad (lasting until 1944). As early as 1941, at the very start of the Siege, the 
Nazi government in Berlin entered into talks with the Finnish government to evacuate 
Ingrian  Finns  from  the  battle  zone,  although  evacuations  did  not  take  place  until 
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1943.
65 By November 1944, some 63,211 Ingrian Finns had arrived in Finland and 
settled temporarily, largely in the south.
66 However, their time in Finland was for the 
most part brief, as all but about 8,000 returned to the Soviet Union in 1944.
67 The 
September 1944 armistice between the USSR and Finland effectively only demanded 
the return of those Ingrian Finnish men who had fought alongside German forces (of 
which there were less than 800), with the rest being supposedly free-willed returnees, 
though  Ian  M.  Matley  argues  that  it  is  probable  Ingrian  Finns  feared  forced 
repatriation if they did not return voluntarily.
68 Once back in the USSR, Stalin moved 
the majority of Ingrian Finns from St Petersburg to the eastern Karelian Republic, 
central Russia (particularly the Ural Mountain regions) and even Siberia, under the 
notion  that  minorities  with  kin-state  relationships  to  their  neighbours,  and  thus 
questionable loyalty to the Soviet Union and irredentist potential, posed a security 
threat in border regions.
69  
 
When President Mauno Koivisto gave his 1990 television interview and confirmed his 
commitment to bring the Ingrian Finns into Finland, strong undercurrents of historical 
atonement featured in his reasoning, noting in particular that the Ingrian Finns were 
the  only  people  in  the  world  persecuted  for  their  ethnic  Finnish  identity.
70   This 
element of atonement, or “righting the wrongs of the past”, appears a feature of right 
to  return  policies,  as  discussed  in  chapter  one.  However,  a  separating  factor  for 
Ingrian Finns from the target groups of other right to return policies is that in 1990, 
they are not in the full sense being invited back to the homeland they were forced to 
leave. The concept of atonement for Second World War persecution in right to return 
laws, discussed at greater length in chapters four and five of this thesis, is rather 
murky in the Finnish example, as the persecution of Ingrians was not carried out by 
Finnish forces, nor did the deportation of Ingrians from Finland deprive Ingrians of 
their homeland, when (and if) the homeland of Ingrians is seen as Ingria, rather than 
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Finland. And yet, as previously noted, when the Finnish and German armies reached 
the outskirts of Leningrad (St Petersburg) and began the infamous 900-day siege, 
there  were  approximately  63,000  Ingrian  Finns  from  the  surrounding  Leningrad 
Oblast  who  left  for  Finland  as  refugees,  and  55,000  who  supposedly  voluntarily 
returned at the end of the War to the Soviet Union.
71 Recent investigations by the 
Finnish  National  Archive  suggest  the  Soviet  Union  and  Allies  may  have  exerted 
pressure on the Finnish government to forcibly repatriate them.
72 In the Soviet Union, 
the many Ingrian Finns who were deported from Ingria to distant provinces were 
effectively  punished  for  their  perceived  Finnishness.  Those  who  had  joined  or 
cooperated  with  the  Finnish  army  faced  forced  labour  sentences,  or  more  rarely, 
execution.
73 Thus, though the Soviet Union under Stalin may be constructed as the 
primary antagonist to Finland and the Ingrians as Finns, Finland’s acquiescence to the 
USSR  complicates  its  own  presentation  as  the  Ingrians’  historical  protector.  This 
suggests a more complex historical aspect to the Ingrian Return law: if Ingrians are 
being  invited  to  Finland  to  atone  for  Finland’s  inability  to  protect  this  perceived 
ethnic kin from persecution in the Second World War, this construction of Ingrian 
identity still presents Finns and Ingrians as a common people, with their political 
expression, the state of Finland, imbued with the responsibility of providing them the 
security of the national community.  
 
There is not only an unresolved aspect of complicity from the Finnish government in 
the fate of the Ingrian Finns in the USSR, but also a construction of Finns as victims 
in the Second World War despite their status, confirmed in the 1947 Moscow Peace 
Treaty,  as  Nazi  co-belligerents.
74 The  dominant  Finnish  political  and  public 
interpretations of the Second World War leave considerable room for portrayals of 
Finns as victims. As Henrik Meiander notes, the dominant post-war discourse on the 
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Winter and Continuation Wars has constructed them as necessary struggles to retain 
Finnish independence from the Soviet Union, and separate conflicts to the war with 
Nazi  Germany.
75   Finnish  Presidents  Mauno  Koivisto,  Martti  Ahtisaari  and  Tarja 
Halonen have all given statements indicating this interpretation of history, Halonen 
most directly in a 2005 speech in which she employed the term “separate war against 
the Soviets”.
76 Historian Matti Klinge similarly argues that at the public level, “the 
concept of a ‘Second Word War’ does not really exist: we were fighting our own war 
and had no part in a world war”.
77 The Winter and Continuation Wars Klinge calls a 
bellum justum in the Finnish self-image, in which Finns fought for Finland rather than 
against anyone.
78   The  discussion  of  Ingrians  as  Finns  and  as  victims  of  wartime 
suffering in the Soviet Union conforms to discursive presentations of the Winter and 
Continuation Wars as Soviet-driven conflicts wherein Finland is a relatively innocent 
party. The dominant Finnish political discourse on the Second World War effectively 
ignores any interpretations of wartime history that may present Finns as aggressors, 
and Ingrians as deprived of their homes in Ingria by Finnish forces as a result of the 
Finnish invasion of Ingria during the Siege of Leningrad. In essence, the dominant 
Finnish  construction  of  the  Second  World  War  period  stresses  both  Ingrians 
connection to Finland, entitling them to the protection of the Finnish state in the face 
of persecution from Russians within the Soviet Union, and the threat Russians may 
pose to (Ingrian) Finns based on their Finnishness, which intrinsically separates them 
from the Soviet or Russian state.  
 
Given the experience of these 55,000 Ingrians in Finland before their deportation to 
the USSR, the Second World War period attains an obvious significance to the history 
of Ingrian relations with Finland, and this is reflected in the 1990s “third wave” of 
Ingrian migration to Finland. Pirkko Malinen suggests that a reconnection to their 
Finnish “roots” may have been an important motivating factor in the immigration 
decision  of  some  older  Ingrian  Finns,  particularly  those  who  have  memories  or 
established ties from being in Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars.
79 
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These older Ingrians had also expressed some concern that they were losing their 
language, and so had come to rely on Finnish radio broadcasts for language exposure, 
thus maintaining cultural and linguistic contact with Finland.
80 Yet it is significant to 
note that the majority of Ingrian Finns moving to Finland (some 60%) were younger, 
and of working age.
81 For almost all of these younger returnees, moving to Finland 
did not translate to finding employment, but Malinen notes the poor social security 
and low wages in the new Russia compared to Finland as a motivating factor for 
drawing  these  younger  Ingrian  Finns  across  the  border,  even  if  they  would  face 
chronic unemployment upon arrival.
82 Though the experience of Ingrians during the 
Winter  and  Continuation  Wars  can  be  seen  as  a  significant  factor  in  the  Ingrian 
migration  to  Finland,  its  importance  should  therefore  not  be  taken  as  absolute. 
Interpretations  of  Ingrian  connection  to  Finland  that  stress  the  experience  of  the 
Second  World  War,  as  argued  in  chapters  four  and  five  of  this  thesis,  also  have 
enormous  significance  for  the  justification  of  the  Right  to  Return  policy  amongst 
Finnish politicians, even at the end of the policy in 2010. These interpretations also 
ignore, at least initially, alternative interpretations of the Right to Return which see it 
as  driven  by  more  practical  considerations  (labour  shortages  in  1990, 
humanitarianism).  Ingrians’  connection  to  Finland  has  also  involved  financial 
considerations,  and  a  chance  to  improve  living  standards,  along  with  potential 
rediscovery of Second World War-era ties.  
 
The movements of borders and of people between Finland and Russia/the USSR in 
the twentieth century, as indeed in the early modern era, serves to underscore the 
potential for interpretations of history that stress a national community and citizenship 
defined  by  common  language,  culture  and  ethnicity,  where  territorial  limitations 
appear malleable or even perfunctory. Finnish political interpretations of history have 
frequently stressed commonality and shared historic experiences between Finns in 
Finland  and  groups  in  Russia  and  the  USSR.  The  dominant  interpretation  of 
victimhood  in  the  “separate  struggle”  of  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars  can 
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reinforce these constructions, viewing Finnish identity as proven or strengthened by 
wartime suffering. At the same time, these interpretations of history may ignore or 
suppress events and details that promote varying or opposing historical narratives, and 
alternate interpretations of Finnish identity.   
 
B)  Finland and the Changing Political Climate of the 1980s and 1990s 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of profound geopolitical transformation 
for Europe, which also created a new foreign policy and security environment for 
Finland. Beginning in 1987 with the “Singing Revolution” independence movements 
in  Estonia,  Lithuania  and  Latvia,  the  formerly  closed  northwestern  regions  of  the 
USSR,  including  Ingria  and  Karelia,  could  re-emerge  in  the  Finnish  political 
consciousness as the veil of the Iron Curtain was lifted by glasnost-perestroika and 
the following breakup of the USSR. However, the new Russian government could 
also pose problems similar to the Soviet Union for Ingrians. Perhaps most significant 
is the perception that the Ingrian minority in Russia, as in the Soviet Union, was under 
threat from a dominant majority culture. It has been argued that the perception of 
being part of an ethnic group with cultural traditions under threat has exercised a 
potentially definitive role in how and why nationalist movements emerge. Anthony D. 
Smith argues for an “ethnic election myth”, which he defines as the belief amongst an 
ethnie “that they possess what Max Weber calls ‘irreplaceable cultural values’, and 
that their heritage must be preserved against inner corruption and external control”.
83 
Here, the belief would be that Russians posed a threat to the Finns of Ingria, as had 
the Soviets and indeed Tsarist Russia to Finns in Finland for two centuries, which was 
exacerbated  as  the  multi-national  Soviet  Union  was  replaced  by  a  more  clearly 
Russian-dominated Russian Federation.   
 
The central issue in Finnish/Russian relations is what Helena Rytövuori-Apunen calls 
Finland’s “old problem”: how Finland can present itself as a “normal European state” 
while existing next to a country that presents itself as a great power, without being 
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subjected to the political control of its larger neighbour.
84 The memory of the Winter 
and Continuation Wars looms large over subsequent Finnish relations with the Soviet 
Union  and  Russia.  For  most  of  its  post-war  history,  Finland  pursued  a  policy  of 
“active neutrality” with the USSR, in which its Cold War neutrality was guaranteed 
by agreement with the Soviet government. “Active neutrality” was the product of 
Presidents  Juho  Kusti  Paasikivi  (in  office  1949-1956)  and  the  long-serving  Urho 
Kekkonen  (in  office  1956-1982)  that  became  known  as  the  “Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
line”.
85 It  has  its  foundations  in  the  1948  Finno-Soviet  Agreement  of  Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), wherein Finland pledged its neutrality 
and agreed to resist any armed aggression against the Soviet Union through Finnish 
territory.
86 Heikki Luostarinen defines the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line as characterised 
by three features: an emphasis on periods of cultural and economic cooperation in 
Finnish-Russian relations rather than the periods of conflict, the benefits of economic 
security promised by peace with the USSR, and the new foreign policy role of Finland 
as arbiter of cooperation between the East and West spheres.
87 David Kirby writes 
that this agreement attained “quasi-canonical status in Finnish political life; all the 
major political parties subscribed to its maintenance, and few queried its usefulness or 
validity  until  the  mid  1980s”.
88 However,  particularly  in  reference  to  emphasising 
Finno-Soviet  cooperation  over  conflict,  the  Paasikivi-Kekkonen  line  subdued 
discussions  of  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars  that  criticised  or  ridiculed  the 
USSR. One such example involves the USSR’s planned taking of Helsinki in the 
Winter War – so confident was the Leningrad Communist Party Secretary Andrei 
Zhdanov  that  Helsinki  would  fall,  that  he  commissioned  a  suite  of  Finnish  folk 
themes from Dmitri Shostakovich to be played by the marching bands of the Red 
Army after the city fell.
89 After the War, this misguided confidence could potentially 
have afforded Finns an opportunity to ridicule the USSR’s cockiness. After all, Soviet 
authorities in Leningrad had themselves mocked Hitler’s overly-confident assertion 
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that their city would fall by August 1942; Hitler had had invitations printed inviting 
dignitaries to a victory banquet at the Hotel Astoria on St Isaac’s Square, and now, a 
framed copy of one such invitation hangs on the hotel lobby’s wall.
90 Yet in contrast 
to the Hotel Astoria example, there was no mocking or mirth to be had of this in Cold 
War Finland, as Shostakovich’s piece went unmentioned and unperformed in Finland 
until 2001.
91  
 
Finland’s cultivated peaceful relations with the Soviet Union under Kekkonen could 
also afford Finland a certain international status, as a neutral state, to act as peace 
mediator  between  the  USSR  and  NATO:  Helsinki  hosted  the  Strategic  Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) between the US and USSR in 1969, and the Conference on 
Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  in  1975.  Hans  Löden  argues  that 
Finland’s neutrality was essentially a strategic or realist policy response to a potential 
threat to its territorial integrity from the USSR/Russia, which distinguishes it from 
Swedish  neutrality,  a  more  normative  and  identity-based  phenomenon.
92 Sweden’s 
neutrality, therefore, has been subjected to “domestic and international accusations of 
selfishness”, whilst Finland’s has been rationalised and less subjected to internal or 
external criticism.
93 For Finland, it would appear neutrality was accepted domestically 
and internationally as a necessity, rather than a luxury.  
 
Finland’s international standing as a neutral state thus afforded the opportunity to be 
active  through  its  neutrality  in  the  international  security  context,  through  a  trust 
relationship with the USSR despite its status as a capitalist, multi-party democracy 
with links to the West. Writing in 1972, during the period of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
line  and  active  neutrality,  Finnish  political  scientist  Harto  Hakovirta  describes 
Finland’s relationship with the USSR under Kekkonen: 
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For the Soviet Union, the credibility of Finnish neutrality means first of all that the Soviet 
leaders trust Finland as a treaty partner…One reason for the Soviet Union to trust Finland as a 
friendly treaty partner is the fact that Finland has very strong incentives for behaving in a 
trustworthy fashion.
94     
 
Soviet political faith in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s allowed Finland to broker a 
major security agreement between the West and USSR in this period, the Helsinki 
Final  Act  of  1975.  Kekkonen  and  his  ambassador  to  the  UN,  Max  Jakobson, 
developed  the  idea  of  an  international  security  conference  in  Helsinki  at  a  1968 
meeting at the presidential residence in Tamminiemi, responding to meetings with the 
Soviet ambassador Aleksej Kovalev conveying the Soviet Union’s expressed desire 
for  the  Western  nations  to  recognise  East  German  statehood.
95 Foreign  Ministry 
official Risto Hyvärinen, then head of the department for political affairs, described 
the summit: 
   
The eventual balanced exploration of the conference would fit very well into the image of our 
neutrality. Helsinki would also be very suitable as a venue e.g. because of our German policy. 
Starting to promote the conference would also support our German policy because it would 
show concretely the use of our neutral approach to both German states and how exactly our 
German policy makes our country useful for such potentially important tasks for peace in 
Europe.
96  
 
Helsinki’s role on the world stage was thus burnished by its standing with the USSR, 
achieved through the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, which gave its neutrality an “active” 
dimension in international security. But this neutrality was also “active” in the sense 
that it required constant effort to maintain, particularly in the form of self-censorship 
and  willingness  to  collaborate  with  Soviet  intrigues.
97 Kirby’s  assessment  of  the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line is that it created a sense of confidence in the viability of the 
independent  Finnish  state,  but  “a  confidence  [that]  rested  upon  insecure 
foundations”,
98 suggesting a placation but not total eradication of fears of a Soviet 
threat. 
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The notion of Finnish foreign policy in the Cold War period as reflective of Finnish 
independence’s  “insecure  foundations”  beside  a  slumbering  giant  appears  to  have 
continued to some extent beyond the decline and final collapse of Soviet power in the 
1980s  and  early  90s.  The  evidence  suggests  Finland  continued  to  proceed  with 
caution when engaging with the newly independent Russian Federation in the early 
1990s. Right up to the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kekkonen’s 
successor Koivisto continued to act prudently, as unlike the Scandinavian nations, 
Finland’s official stance on the Baltic independence movements remained “seemingly 
passive and non-committal”, and Koivisto instructed Prime Minister Harri Holkeri 
and Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio to abstain from any commitments to the Baltic 
independence cause being discussed at the Nordic Council.
99 Indeed, Koivisto would 
later define his approach to foreign policy thus: 
 
From our perspective, it is of paramount importance how our neighbour relations develop. 
When I was asked in 1981 what three words would define our foreign policy line, I answered: 
good neighbour relations. 
100 
 
The fact that Koivisto calls Russia “generally, a good neighbour”,
101 mentioning also 
that “many countries have much more difficult neighbours”,
102 suggests his apparent 
willingness  to  follow  the  Paasikivi-Kekkonen  tradition  of  working  with  Finland’s 
larger neighbour. However, in the broader Finnish political landscape the collapse of 
the  Soviet  Union  and  the  temporary  weakening  of  Russian  political  influence 
removed  the  “straightjacket  of  neutrality”,  and  allowed  in  Finland  a  certain  re-
evaluation  of  Finnish  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union,  which  Christopher  S. 
Browning argues was marked by narratives of a “Faustian Pact” with the Soviets that 
betrayed Finland’s true “Western” self.
103 At this time, a previously common political 
term,  “Finlandisation”,  gained  renewed  political  saliency,  used  now  in  Finland  to 
deride previous Finnish policies towards the USSR, and particularly the Paasikivi-
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Kekkonen line, as indicative of the larger phenomenon of powerful nations exerting 
influence over, and compliance from, their smaller neighbours.
104  
 
Finlandisation as a political science concept has its origins in 1960s and 1970s West 
Germany, initially amongst political scientists and other academics. Use of the term 
goes  back  to  Richard  Löwenthal,  a  professor  of  political  science  at  the  Free 
University of Berlin in the 1960s. In December 1962, he wrote an opinion piece for 
the British magazine Encounter, in which he called for the West German government 
to assert greater firmness in its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, particularly 
with regards to the consolidation of Western European unity, rather than allow the 
Soviets, whose air of invincibility had just been undermined by the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, to dictate West German policy themselves.
105 Later, in 1966, he criticised such 
an  approach  to  Soviet  relations  as  “Finlandisation”,  the  first  use  of  the  term, 
specifically  referencing  Finland  as  an  example  where  deference  to  the  USSR 
compromised  foreign  and  military  policy  independence.
106 By  the  1970s,  in  a 
pamphlet published by the Institute for Conflict Studies in London, the term had been 
defined as describing 
 
a  country  [that]  undertakes  to  follow  neutrality  as  a  neighbour  of  a  Great  Power  which 
represents  a  different  social  order  and  uses  arrogant  political  methods. This means that the 
country's authority to decide its foreign policy is limited, but that its internal authority is almost 
complete.
107  
 
As pointed out by Ville Kivimäki, what makes this term significant, and specifically 
related to Finland rather to than any of the Central European Warsaw Pact nations, is 
that  here  foreign  policy  independence  is  given  away  voluntarily  by  a  democratic, 
Western-orientated nation.
108 Indeed, segments of the Western European media took 
up  this  comparison  between  the  Central  European  communist  states  and  Finland, 
rechristening  Finland  “Kekkosslovakia”,  a  portmanteau  of  President  Kekkonen’s 
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name and Czechoslovakia,
109 whose true level of independence from the Soviet Union 
had  been  verified  in  1968  by  the  Prague  Spring.  “Finlandisation”  as  a  negative 
assessment  of  wilfully  dovish  or  rapprochement  policy  towards  the  Soviet  Union 
became a popular political insult employed by West German conservative politicians, 
and is most often associated with Franz Josef Strauss, the Christian Social Union 
party  chairman  (1961-1988)  in  his  criticism  of  Chancellor  Willy  Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik.
110 The term would also find a measure of credence in the English-speaking 
world, used by the Sunday Telegraph in 1979 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan to criticise both British Labour MP Tony Benn and US Senator Edward 
Kennedy  for  perceived  “intellectual  and  moral  weakness”  in  the  face  of  “the 
Kremlin’s plan for European ‘Finlandisation’”.
111  
 
 
Figure 9 
Rauhanpatsas  (statue  of  peace),  Helsinki.  The  inscription 
reads  “Tämän  rauhanpatsaan  pystytti  Suomen  kansa 
rauhanomaisen rinnakkaiselon ja Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton 
ystävyyden vertauskuvaksi, 6.4.1968” [This peace statue was 
erected by the Finnish people for peaceful coexistence and as 
a  symbol  of  friendship  between  Finland  and  the  Soviet 
Union, 6 April 1968].  
Photo by Ville Vihermaa, 17 May 2009. Creative Commons 
licence for re-use.  
Available online at URL: 
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/villevihermaa/3538696433/>, 
accessed 10 September 2013.   
 
For  Finland,  however,  Finlandisation  has  a  particular  history.  Sami  Moisio 
characterises  initial  Finnish  political  reactions  to  the  term  as  an  unfair 
mischaracterisation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, failing to take into consideration 
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the  necessary  political  realism  of  post-war  Finland’s  situation.
112 The  Paasikivi-
Kekkonen line continued in the 1960s as an important foreign policy ideology in 
Finland, and indeed also found cultural and artistic expression at this time. In 1968, 
the Finnish government erected a statue by sculptor Essi Renvall on the banks of 
Helsinki South Harbour, dedicated to peace between Finland and the Soviet Union 
(see figure 9). Yet when in 1974 a Centre Party politician and war veteran, Eino 
Uusitalo, suggested that the Finnish Independence Day (6 December, commemorating 
the  1917  declaration  of  independence)  should  be  celebrated  on  a  new  date 
commemorating the peace agreement between Finland and the USSR at the end of the 
Second World War, an angry public response ensued. 
113 Though Kivimäki notes that 
many politicians in Finland in the 1960s and 1970s were war veterans, who had taken 
from  the  frontline  the  central  lesson  that  peaceful  relations  with  the  USSR  was 
essential for Finland,
114 he also argues that outside the realms of politics, Finnish 
veterans had experienced the 1960s and 70s, the highpoint of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
line, as “a humiliation of their wartime efforts”.
115  The response to Uusitalo showed 
“Finlandisation had its limits, too”.
116  
 
By the 1990s, Finnish political attitudes towards the term had become far less benign. 
According to Browning, the term was lobbed around the Finnish political landscape in 
the early 1990s as a ways of dismissing those with less stringent views against Russia, 
giving rise to a new term of “post-Finlandisation”, described as “the current Finnish 
tendency, in which Russia and everything Russian is presented in an utmost negative 
light”.
117 To some Finnish politicians of the 1990s, Finlandisation had been “a very 
real  and  malignant  Finnish  illness”  from  the  Cold  War.
118 Finnish  historian  Timo 
Vihavainen described Finlandisation in 1991 as an amoral Finnish political stance, 
whereby Finland sold its soul and betrayed its Western, democratic identity.
119 In part, 
this changing attitude towards the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line and the accompanying 
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increased use of the Finlandisation term as a negative appraisal of Finnish Cold War 
foreign policy may reflect changes in the late 1980s and 1990s to the Finnish political 
landscape. Nicholas Aylott, Magnus Blomgren and Torbjörn Bergman note that in the 
1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, successive Finnish governments were comprised of 
coalitions  dominated  by  either  Kekkonen’s  agrarian  Centre  Party,  the  Social 
Democrats, or both, to the exclusion of the centre-right National Coalition party.
120 
This was deliberate, as it was believed the National Coalition’s ideology made it 
potentially  hostile  to  the  Soviet  Union,  rendering  it  “untouchable”  as  a  coalition 
partner.
121 In the late 1980s, with the waning of Soviet interference in Finnish politics 
under  glasnost-perestroika,  such  concerns  were  muted,  and  in  1987  a  National 
Coalition-led government under Prime Minister Harri Holkeri returned the party to 
power for the first time since 1966.
122 The increased room for criticism of the USSR, 
given its decline as an acute threat to Finland, could therefore have been exacerbated 
by the return to power of a party perceived to be anti-Soviet, which in turn would 
grant further opportunities for the kind of Soviet Union- and Russia-critical post-
Finlandisation rhetoric in Finnish politics described by Browning.  
 
Indeed, the transformations in the political landscape for Europe circa 1990 have also 
spurred reassessment of how European states in general approach national identity 
post-Iron Curtain. Richard Mole writes that at the beginning of the 1990s, European 
states experienced a shift in their international relations orientation. Now “freed from 
the  constraint  of  the  balance  of  power  between  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union”, the nations of Europe were free to pursue national interests “as much in terms 
of  identity  and  culture  as  in  terms  of  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity”.
123 As 
Christopher Hill and William Wallace see it, in this context European nation states 
moved to develop such aspects of state behaviour as foreign policy based on “a shared 
sense of national identity” constructed upon “underlying assumptions…embedded in 
national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret 
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them and external and internal developments reshape them”.
124 Such constructions of 
national identity, at this point in Europe’s history, can therefore be considered as a 
response to the changing political and security circumstances, amongst other factors.  
 
One sees this phenomenon in Finland. Its foreign policy formation as the Iron Curtain 
fell,  for  instance,  transformed  from  the  more  realist  traditions  of  the  Paasikivi-
Kekkonen  line  to  the  more  ideologically  and  culturally  produced  considerations 
described  both  by  Mole  and  Hill/Wallace.  Max  Jakobson  argued  in  1980  that 
Finland’s foreign and security policy “is not based on historical or cultural ties and 
affinities  or  shared  values,  but  on  an  unsentimental  calculation  of  the  national 
interest”.
125 After the Cold War ended, and the necessity of negotiating between East 
and  West  as  an  Iron  Curtain-bordered  nation  was  removed,  Finland’s  political 
environment  was  substantially  transformed.
126 As  described  by  Browning,  Finnish 
foreign  policy  ideology  began  to  manifest  itself  as  an  identity  “normalisation”, 
presenting the Cold War as “a historical parenthesis” whose end meant Finland “has 
finally come home to the West and Europe”, particularly through accession to the EU 
in 1995.
127 In 1994, then-Prime Minister Esko Aho declared “Finland has been part of 
Europe mentally and spiritually for at least the last eight hundred years”.
128 Similarly, 
historian Tuomas M.S. Lehtonen wrote in 1999 that with entry into the EU, Finland 
“has  taken  its  natural  place  as  part  of  Western  Europe  to  which  it  is  bound  by 
centuries of history”.
129 This mirrors almost identical discourses of “returning” to the 
West and Europe presented by post-Soviet politicians in Estonia and Latvia, in which 
they presented the Soviet era as akin to a Babylonian captivity, which temporarily 
prevented the Baltic States from asserting their historic links to Western Europe.
130 
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EU membership (along with NATO membership) in 2004 was an opportunity to “re-
join” the West.
131  
 
Indeed, a further example of Finland’s change from realism to identity-based foreign 
policy ideology can be seen in its policy towards the Baltics. The unsentimental and 
realist policy on Baltic independence under Koivisto from 1988 to 1991 had been to 
remain  neutral,  classify  the  Baltic  independence  movements  as  an  internal  Soviet 
issue, and refuse to condemn the Soviet Union for the quashed uprisings and killings 
in  Vilnius  and  Riga  in  early  1991.
132 Yet  as  Browning  writes,  with  the  Soviet 
dissolution  later  that  year,  “suddenly  the  Baltic  States  no  longer  seemed  so  far 
away”.
133 The  “normalisation”  trend  of  correcting  Finland’s  “unnatural”  neutral 
position between East and West by asserting its Western credentials also extended to 
the Baltics, particularly Estonia, whose “kinship” in related language and culture was 
stressed, and whose own EU membership application Finland prioritised.
134  In 2000, 
the then head of the Finnish Foreign Ministry’s Eastern Affairs division, Ambassador 
René Nyberg, gave a speech on the Baltic Sea region in Greifswald in which he 
declared Baltic independence “represents a return to normality after the success of 
efforts to overcome the abnormal state of affairs wrongly considered ‘normal’ for so 
long”.
135   The Baltic republics' European identity was proven by “the reestablishment 
of ties built on the natural links to the opposite coast”, and on their EU membership 
applications, Nyberg stated “Northeastern Europe is where we can already discern the 
final external boundary of the EU”.
136 This is reminiscent of rhetoric on Finland’s 
own EU accession in 1995. Under Koivisto’s successor, Martti Ahtisaari (in office 
1994-2000), Finland prepared to join the EU and “re-join” the Western European 
family of nations. Moisio argues that the political rhetoric from President Ahtisaari 
echoed  the  first  post-Second  World  War  Finnish  President,  Carl  Gustaf  Emil 
Mannerheim  (in  office  1944-1946),  and  his  assessment  of  the  Winter  War  that 
Finland “showed for the rest of the world that it unavoidably belongs to the Western 
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family of nations”.
137 The post-Cold War landscape in Europe thus appeared to afford 
Finland  the  ability  to  construct  its  attitudes  towards  national  identity  based  on 
perceived cultural identification, and was unequivocal in placing itself, along with the 
Baltic States, within a Western European construction. Such changes in the discursive 
construction of identity observed in policy from the 1990s and 2000s are particularly 
fascinating to observe in Finland, as a peripheral or “border state” between Eastern 
and Western European identity conglomerates, at a time when this border was being 
revised and reconsidered.   
 
The opening up of Russian borders also brought back into view lands of historical and 
cultural significance to Finns, and indeed Rytövuori-Apunen argues that the early 
1990s  gave  Finland  the  opportunity  to  view  Russia  as  a  “Russia  of  regions”,  as 
opposed to a single closed entity, where now attention could be paid to the regions 
immediately bordering Finland.
138 A notable instance of this is found in Vyborg and 
its surroundings in the Karelian territory annexed by the USSR after the Winter and 
Continuation Wars. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Finns, particularly those 
who were born or had grown up in Vyborg, began to revisit the city and its sites of 
historic memories, especially its Finnish war graves.
139 Petri J. Raivo argues that post-
Soviet  Vyborg  has  become  an  important  spatial  reference  for  Finnish  collective 
memories of the Second World War.
140 This builds on the idea of “lieux de mémoire”, 
or  places/sites  of  memory,  developed  by  historian  Pierre  Nora,  who  argues  that 
physical locations can become infused with certain historical narratives, creating “a 
concentrated  appeal  to  memory”  for  groups  that  identify  with  these  narratives.
141 
Whilst  the  post-Soviet  “Russia  of  regions”  has  specific  implications  for  Finnish 
development  of  national  identity  through  historic  and  collective  memory 
constructions, visible Finnish commemorations of the Winter and Continuation Wars 
in Vyborg depart from the Cold War-era policy inherent in Finlandisation of avoiding 
mention of Finno-Russian conflicts. This suggests there was a new Finnish political 
willingness  to  re-imagine  and  confront  past  conflicts  with  Russia  in  a  way  never 
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possible  with  the  Soviet  Union.  Bearing  in  mind  Smith’s  concept  of  the  “ethnic 
election myth” that includes imagining the ethnic community as in need of protection 
against  a  potential  external  foe,  the  possibility  of  Russia,  with  its  troublesome 
historical  relationship  with  Finland,  appearing  a  threat  to  Finns  could  now  be 
indicated, commemorated and confronted in fairly open ways.  
 
The lifting of the Iron Curtain, still at its beginning by 1990, not only opened up 
contacts  with  Finno-Ugric  peoples  in  the  Soviet  Union,  but  also  made  Finnish 
politicians  aware  of  rising  ethno-nationalist  movements  and  tensions  in  Eastern 
Europe at this time. This was perhaps most notably expressed by the Finnish Foreign 
Minister,  Pertti  Paasio  (a  Social  Democrat,  in  office  1989-1991),  in  a  speech  in 
Washington DC in November 1989, in which he stated: 
 
The change under way in Europe affects domestic, as well as international, structures in the 
West  and  in  the  East.  It  appears  to  lead  towards  strengthened  self-consciousness  almost 
everywhere in the continent. Nationalities and nation states become more assertive in voicing 
their concerns. More room is left for differences and nuances which always have been the 
richness of Europe.
142  
 
The reference to the new “assertiveness” of nationalities and nation states as Central 
and Eastern Europe was opening its borders with the West (the Berlin Wall would fall 
the next day) suggests a degree of concern regarding the possible rise of inter-ethnic 
conflict. Paasio addressed this point more specifically in a May 1990 speech on the 
history  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (CSCE)  to  the 
Tampere Paasikivi Society: 
 
A  permanent  political  CSCE  body  could  also  assume  certain  tasks  relating  to  crisis 
management  and  endeavour  to  prevent  states  of  tension.  This  is  especially  the  case  with 
regard to conflicts concerning human rights and ethnic minorities, the occurrence of which 
will probably be unavoidable even in the future.
143  
 
Indeed,  Paasio’s  recommendations  were  satisfied  in  some  respects  with  the 
establishing  of  a  permanent  CSCE  body,  the  Organisation  for  Security  and 
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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994. The OSCE’s activities, in its own words 
founded on the notion of “a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in 
the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict 
rehabilitation”,
144 included  the  creation  of  a  High  Commissioner  on  National 
Minorities,  tasked  with  monitoring  and  managing  tensions  surrounding  ethnic 
minorities before open conflicts occur.
145  
 
It is significant to note the degree to which these threats to national minorities were 
seen as emanating from the post-communist East, with their protection to be found 
only in the West. Many key Finnish political speeches from President Koivisto at this 
time  follow  similar  constructions  of  Eastern  European  national  identity  to  Kohn, 
presenting it as ethnically essentialist and prone to marginalise or victimise ethnic 
minorities, in contrast to the more inclusive West. Koivisto stated in 1988 that “the 
conflict between East and West has overshadowed the opposition between North and 
South”.
146 He was clear in presenting Finland as part of the West, as in an address to 
the University of Toulouse in 1983 he remarked on Finland’s legal and ideological 
heritage: 
   
The old Swedish Empire was a nation focused on the sea, which had emerged in the Baltic 
Sea and of which the eastern half, occupied by Finns, formed a perfect part…It was not until 
the beginning of the 1800s that the great powers, France and Russia, during the Napoleonic 
Wars, agreed to a division of Sweden – against the will of the people…Our legal and social 
order, as well as our religious and national ideology, represent a continuity throughout the 
centuries, despite external factors threatening our existence many times.
147  
 
This notion that Finland draws its national ideology and concepts of legal and social 
order from Western Europe, and that these characteristics only appeared more sacred 
in  the  wake  of  nineteenth  century  experiences  in  the  Russian  Empire,  was  again 
repeated  by  Koivisto  in  May  1990  in  Strasbourg  at  the  Council  of  Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, where he remarked: 
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Having  been  an  integral  part  of  Sweden  for  more  than  600  years,  and  thereafter  a  non-
integrated part of Imperial Russia, Finland has cherished the Nordic traditions of liberty and 
human rights throughout her history.
148  
 
Koivisto muted somewhat his classification of Finland as firmly rooted in the Western 
European tradition in his November 1990 address to the CSCE Summit in Paris, still 
claiming  that  “[w]e  are  a  Nordic  country,  proud  of  our  Scandinavian  heritage  of 
values”, but also that Finland lay “at the crossroads of East and West…enriched by 
influences from both directions”.
149 In the same speech, he expressed concern at the 
“period of trying reform” in the Soviet Union, and specifically addressed the issue of 
national minorities, stating that “national minorities are part of the diversity of Europe 
and contribute to its richness. Their identity must be protected and the human rights of 
their  members  honoured”.
150 The  issue  of  why  national  minorities  should  be 
threatened  in  the  Soviet  Union,  but  not  in  the  Nordic  space,  was  not  specifically 
addressed by Koivisto, yet there emerges here a discourse on East-West division that 
promotes the West as comprised of homogenous, stable and democratic nation states 
with robust legal traditions, and the East as fractured, volatile and still developing. 
With  its  Swedish  heritage  of  legal  system  and  “traditions  of  liberty  and  human 
rights”, Finland is a Western European nation, without the same minority “problems” 
of the East.   
 
However, Koivisto’s presentation of Finland as linked to a Kohn-like construction of 
a more inclusive Western Europe, less hostile to ethnic minorities, included some 
remarkable statements on Finnish stability. In essence, Koivisto concluded that the 
advanced, stable society of Finland in the 1980s and 1990s owed more to Finland’s 
lack of ethnic diversity than anything else. At Urho Kekkonen’s funeral in 1986, 
Koivisto claimed that Finland “has not suffered the divisive influence of the various 
racial, religious and language factors which are still helping to exacerbate conflicts in 
many countries today”.
151 Similarly, his Toulouse speech of 1983 argued that “the 
Finnish society of today is strong. There are no agonising language, racial or other 
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social antagonisms in our country”.
152 Immigration patterns prior to 1990 appear to 
confirm to some extent this image of Finland’s relatively moderate diversity at this 
time, as shown in figure 10: the top ten nationalities for resident foreigners in Finland 
were  overwhelmingly  from  Europe  and  North  America,  with  Swedes  clearly 
dominant. The number of Swedes in Finland in 1990 is almost equal to the combined 
number  of  resident  foreigners  from  Asia,  Africa  and  North  and  South  America 
(6,169).
153 The largest intake of non-European or US/Canadian immigrants pre-1990 
occurred in the 1970s, when the government accepted a quota of 200 refugees from 
Chile and 100 from Vietnam.
154 However, there are other aspects to the diversity of 
Finland, including national minorities. For instance, in 1990 there were also 1,734 
native  speakers  of  Sami  languages  living  in  Finland.
155 Still,  cultural  diversity  in 
Finland prior to 1990 appears statistically modest.  
 
Figure 10 
Table of Ten Most Common Foreign Nationalities in Finland, 1990 
 
COUNTRY OF 
BIRTH 
POPULATION  COUNTRY OF 
BIRTH 
POPULATION 
Sweden  6,051  Poland  582 
USSR  4,181  Norway  530 
Germany  1,568  Denmark  484 
United States  1,475  Italy  395 
United Kingdom  1,365  Canada  365 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, Nationality According to Age and Sex by Region, 1990-2011, available online at URL: 
<http://pxweb2.stat.fi/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=020_vaerak_tau_101_en&ti=Nationality+according+to+age+and+se
x+by+region+1990+-+2011&path=../Database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/&lang=1&multilang=en>, accessed 21 
September 2012.  
 
Koivisto’s  discourse  suggests  that  Ingrian  migration,  given  the  apparent  ethnic 
commonality  between  Finns  and  Ingrians,  will  not  undermine  Finland’s  “stable” 
homogeneity,  but  will  afford  Ingrians  escape  from  the  problems  of  the  ethnically 
heterogeneous,  fractured  East.  To  Koivisto,  at  least,  Finland  is  not  inclusive  to 
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diversity as much as it is immune from it. The Finnish government’s position on 
minority  issues  at  the  time  was  strong  because  a)  its  Nordic  and  Western  legal 
heritage  provided  for  concepts  of  human  rights,  and  b)  because  Finland  had  no 
negative experience of national minorities itself, through a perceived lack of racial, 
linguistic or religious diversity, apparently ignoring the language conflicts and the 
background to the Åland Crisis in the 1910s and 1920s. This context lends itself to 
Finnish considerations of minority issues in the early 1990s focused on the threat 
Eastern (Soviet) powers to those Finno-Ugric peoples, including Ingrian Finns and 
Estonians, who by virtue of their common heritage within the Swedish Empire and 
their  geographic,  linguistic  and  cultural  closeness  to  Finland  could  be  embraced 
without posing a significant threat to Finland’s Western traditions and relative ethno-
cultural homogeneity. Indeed, although Finland still acted with typical caution by 
acknowledging the Baltic States’ independence somewhat later than the other Nordic 
nations,  by  May  1991  Koivisto  was  already  announcing  Finland’s  “special 
consideration”  for  Estonia,  “this  kin  nation  of  ours”.
156 The  political  thought 
surrounding changing foreign policy realities and focus on national minority issues in 
Finland prior to 1990 thus reflects the notions of the preference for “stable” ethnic 
homogeneity, as well as legal and political traditions from the Swedish era as helping 
to shape Koivisto’s reactions to the impact of the collapse of the Iron Curtain. Within 
this context, Koivisto was to make his most concrete and lasting statement on Soviet 
Union national minorities issues when he addressed the issue of the Ingrian Finns in 
1990.  
 
To  be  considered  parallel  to  the  decline  of  the  USSR  is  the  other  great  political 
change  in  Europe  of  the  early  1990s:  the  emergence  of  the  European  Union, 
established though the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which formalised the establishment of 
the  EU  as  a  common  market,  established  the  common  currency  and  introduced 
preliminary elements of political union, common citizenship, and common foreign 
and home affairs policy.
157 The Soviet Union had maintained a decidedly negative 
response  to  Finnish  participation  in  Western  organisations,  being  reluctant  to  see 
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Finland join the Nordic Council in the 1950s, as, according to a memo from the 
Soviet Embassy in Helsinki:  
 
closer military cooperation with Scandinavian countries would promote Finland's withdrawal 
from  a  line  of  neutrality  friendly  to  us  and  would  indicate  its  movement towards  the  pro-
Western policy of the Scandinavian countries.
158 
 
Similarly, the USSR successfully put pressure on Finland to withdraw from Nordek, 
the planned Nordic customs union, in 1970, leading to the eventual collapse of the 
Nordek project.
159  Political discussions in Finland of EU membership up until the 
early  1990s  viewed  it  as  impossible  due  to  the  significance  of  neutrality  and 
independence  in  Finnish  foreign  policy,  which  would  be  compromised  by  the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
160 Real interest in 
applying for membership effectively began in earnest after fellow-neutral Sweden’s 
October  1990  decision  to  seek  membership.
161 There  were  various  economic 
considerations at play, particularly considering the European Free Trade Agreement 
(EFTA), a common-market agreement of which Finland had become a full member in 
1986,  which  was  now  on  the  verge  of  being  subsumed  into  the  European 
Communities as the European Economic Area (EEA), and the decline of post-Soviet 
Russia as a market for Finnish exports. These made European integration seductive as 
a way to maintain market access and revive flagging exports.
162  
 
With  the  Soviet  Union  gone,  the  Treaty  of  Friendship,  Cooperation  and  Mutual 
Assistance,  which  had  governed  Finno-Soviet  relations  for  over  40  years,  was 
subsequently annulled and replaced with a considerably more symbolic friendship 
treaty with Russia.
163 When the Finnish government did initiate an application for EU 
membership  in  1992,  the  surrounding  political  rhetoric  emphasised  continuity  in 
Finland’s peaceful relationship with its eastern neighbour, and suggested that Finnish 
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participation in the EU and CFSP would add to Russian stability and welfare through 
relations with the broader European community.
164  
 
Kirby writes that despite the ongoing recession in early 1990s Finland, EU accession 
talks were from the Finnish perspective very much centred on national identity over 
economics.
165 Up until this point, Finnish nationalism followed on from what Kirby 
terms a Hegelian sense of self-determination: small nations like Finland could “expect 
no favours from history”, and relied upon survival through inner unity, “with one 
language  and  culture;  there  was  no  place  for  cosmopolitan  liberalism  or 
individualism”.
166 This is reflected in the observations of W.R. Mead, writing in 1991, 
who presents Finland as a nation with one of Europe’s strictest immigration policies, 
and as such, no experience of “more than a modest immigration”.
167 The result would 
be a highly homogenous population, both “biologically as well as ethnically”.
168 If the 
Soviet/Russian  threat  was  gone,  Finns  were  left  with  an  open  debate  as  to  the 
necessity  of  such  linguistic  and  cultural  sameness  and  sense  of  strong  national 
identity.  Proponents  of  European  Union  membership  argued  in  favour  of  Finland 
attaining the prestige of a Western European identity; the Finnish Social Democratic 
politician Paavo Lipponen argued in 1994 that Finnish membership in the EU would 
finally  give  Finland  “an  equal  status  in  Western  Europe  after  all  this  talk  of 
finlandisation”, as well as a Western European “maturity”.
169 Kirby writes that “with 
all  the  wild  enthusiasm  of  the  neophyte,  the  political  and  intellectual  elite  hailed 
Europe as the new focus for the nation’s identity”.
170   
 
However, set against this new talk of a European identity and equality with the great 
West European powers, there appeared lingering concerns on the ongoing relevance 
of a “Finnish” identity. Matti Peltonen notes the gulf in support for European Union 
membership  between  the  cities  and  the  countryside,  leading  to  a  conception  of 
Finland as split between “Euro-Finland” of the cities and “Forest Finland”.
171 “Forest 
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Finland” retains a level of separateness from Europe, stressing the image of the rural 
Finn as separate from the urban-dwelling European, and preservation of this tradition 
shows  a  level  of  resistance  to  any  integration  into  broader  European  identity.
172 
Concern for loss of Finnish identity’s otherness, at least at the level of ethno-cultural 
and linguistic homogeneity, played its role in the EU membership discussions, with 
the free movement of labour in the Union guaranteed in the Treaty of Maastricht 
providing a significant sticking point.
173 Concern for an influx, real or imagined, of 
foreigners into Finland and their effect on long-held notions of the concept of Finnish 
separateness, was therefore also a key component of the Finnish political landscape in 
the early 1990s, just as the policy of Right to Return status for Ingrian Finns emerged.   
 
Also  in  this  period,  Nordic  identity  parameters  were  being  re-examined,  and  the 
borders  of  Northern  Europe  as  an  identity  were  open  for  reconsideration.  Since 
Finland’s Nordic Council accession, Northern Europe as represented by this Council 
has  been  limited  to  five  member  states  (Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  Finland  and 
Iceland) and three autonomous territories (Greenland, Åland and the Faroe Islands). 
However, the break-up of the Soviet Union created new identity discourses around the 
Baltic Sea that strove to expand this conception of Northern Europe. Both the Nordic 
Council as a regional cooperation institution and the Nordic welfare state as a model 
of  social  and  economic  organisation  went  through  significant  challenges  and 
reassessments in the early 1990s. Hilson argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
by removing the security concerns associated with joining the EEC and subsequently 
the EU, made the Nordic Council initially appear obsolete.
174 Likewise, the economic 
collapse of the early 1990s in both Finland and Sweden (described in the next section 
of this chapter) precipitated what appeared to be the end of the Nordic welfare model 
itself.
175 However, Hilson goes on to argue that this period of Nordic reassessment 
was accompanied by increasing interest amongst the Nordic states in their historical 
and cultural links, which was further buoyed by the collapse of the Iron Curtain and 
the opportunity to rediscover lost ties with the broader Baltic region.
176 Similarly, 
Jóhann Páll Árnason and Björn Wittrock argue that the post-Soviet frontier between 
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the Nordic and Baltic world in North-Eastern Europe is now blurred, evidenced by 
increased economic ties extending from Sweden and Finland to Estonia and Latvia, as 
well  as  regular  summits  between  Baltic  and  Nordic  member-state  ministers.
177 
Kazimierz Musiał argues that the Nordic reorientation towards the Baltic was the 
result not only of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, which made cooperation with the 
now-independent  Baltic  states  again  possible,  but  also  of  changing  circumstances 
amongst  the  Nordic  states  that  made  previous  Nordic  attitudes  to  international 
relations  particularly  obsolete.
178  Musiał  argues  that  Nordic  regional  identity 
developed  not  only  from  the  region’s  religious  foundations  informing  welfare 
provision, but also from its relative geographical and demographic isolation, which 
allowed for comparative peace during much of the conflicts of the twentieth century 
and a largely neutral approach to the Cold War power balance. 
179 Yet by the dawn of 
the twenty-first century, the Cold War had ended, and the wider Baltic Sea region had 
become perhaps “more fitting spatial units with which the Nordic countries could 
identify”.
180 In 1992, Ole Wæver argued that the Nordic region would need to be 
“reinvented” within a larger Baltic Sea region to adapt to the changing circumstances 
of Europe.
181  
 
A final point to consider is the discussion on humanitarian concerns, born of the post-
Soviet food shortages in Russia, and their role in spurring a form of solidarity and 
concern for those across the Russian border, including perceived ethnic kin, which in 
some way recall the Heimosodat period without the calls for territorial expansion. 
Events  unfolding  across  Finland’s  eastern  border  may  have  transgressed  Finnish 
wariness  towards  immigration.  Mead  writes  that  “[f]amine  conditions  across  the 
border might well change the strictly correct relations that prevail and the two-metre-
high barbed wire fence that crosses the Russo-Finnish no man’s land could easily be 
disregarded”.
182 But there is also a suggestion that these humanitarian concerns only 
extend as far as a kind of ethnic solidarity, as he adds “Finns [cannot] forget that 
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beyond  the  boundary  there  are  kindred  ethnic  stock  –  near  at  hand  the  Ingrians, 
Karelians and Estonians: farther away, others”.
183 There appears to be some evidence 
behind this reasoning in Koivisto’s own memoirs, as he wrote that in 1990, as the 
Baltic States began to break away from the Soviet Union, he dismissed a suggestion 
from  Estonian  sociologist  Erkki  Rannik  that  Finland  support  the  creation  of  an 
autonomous  Ingrian  province  between  Estonia  and  Leningrad  as  a  buffer  zone 
between the Baltic States and the USSR, affirming that Finland’s primary concern 
was to alleviate the humanitarian situation there, both by channelling humanitarian 
assistance  to  Ingrians  and  by  providing    “the  same  kind  of  treatment  generally 
accorded to other returning Finnish immigrants”.
184   
 
In effect, the political climate in Finland by the early 1990s was open to discourses on 
Finland’s  position  as  part  of  a  broader  Western  European  identity,  now  that  the 
changing security environment made joining perceived Western European structures 
like the EU possible. This notion of Western Europe distinguished Finland from an 
Eastern Europe most readily identifiable with the USSR and Russia. Finnish ties to its 
eastern neighbour prior to glasnost-perestroika and the decline of the Iron Curtain 
could be portrayed as a forced relationship that did not reflect the “normal” status of 
Finland as a Western-orientated nation state, now that the perceived security threat 
from the USSR/Russia was seen to have declined. Views of Eastern Europe could 
become more overtly negative, and include discussions of groups like Ingrians that 
were  believed  to  be  victims  of  Russo-Soviet  aggression  and  discrimination.  The 
political climate of the early 1990s in Europe also allowed Finnish politicians the 
opportunity to re-establish links with groups like the Ingrians without fear of Soviet 
retribution,  and  view  the  relationship  between  Finland  and  Ingrians  as  a  kin-state 
relationship temporarily broken by the Iron Curtain.  
 
C)  Economic Challenges and the Finnish Recession of the 1990s  
 
By  1980,  the  post-war  Finnish  economy  had  transitioned  from  the  predominantly 
agrarian society of the pre-1950s to a predominantly urbanised wage-work society, 
                                                 
183 Ibid. p. 314.  
184 Mauno Koivisto, Witness to History: The Memoirs of Mauno Koivisto, London: Hurst and 
Company, 1997, p. 189.   
  87 
complemented by a great expansion of social security benefits and public service 
spending in the early 1970s that has come to typify the Nordic welfare state model.
185  
Finland came relatively late to this model, and indeed as noted by Pauli Kettunen, by 
the 1970s some economist circles saw the Nordic welfare state as a relic of “sheltered 
national societies” standing against the wave of globalisation.
186 This viewpoint is 
criticised by Kettunen as a shallow understanding of the Nordic model, failing to take 
into  account  how  open  the  Nordic  countries  were  to  international  investment  and 
economic  actors,  and  how  dependent  they  had  become  on  international  economic 
fluctuations.
187 Finland’s relatively late economic development compared to the other 
Nordic  countries  offered  it  a  chance  to  see  how  experiments  played  out  in 
Scandinavia, particularly Sweden, and how an international sense of the Nordic model 
as an alternative to the polarities of Western (particularly American) capitalism and 
Soviet communism developed in an attempt to find a level of harmony between the 
objectives of social equality and democracy and economic prosperity.
188  
 
However, after mid-1990, the welfare-state model underwent signigicant challenges 
in Finland. The early 1990s Finnish economic depression, beginning in the summer of 
1990, was the most severe in its post-Second World War history until the recent crisis 
of the late 2000s.
189 Prior to the 1980s, the economic policy of post-war Finland had 
been organised with reference to longterm growth goals, which were achieved in part 
by using exchange rate devaluations to ensure competitiveness (major devaluations 
took  place  in  1949,  1957  and  1967).
190 The  cost  of  this  policy,  however,  was 
increased  economic  volatility,  including  increased  rates  of  inflation  and  relatively 
high levels of unemployment.
191 In the 1980s, a succession of Social Democrat-led 
coalition  governments  under  Prime  Ministers  Kalevi  Sorsa  and  Mauno  Koivisto 
followed a program of economic reform, which included the deregulation of markets 
and the lifting of capital controls.
192 This resulted in a boom period in the late 1980s, 
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fuelled by rapid credit expansion and a real estate bubble.
193 When the bubble burst, 
combined with the shock-effect of the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which had 
been a major market for Finnish exports, Finland was plunged into “the biggest slump 
among  developed  economies  since  the  Second  World  War”,  with  close  to  20% 
unemployment (see also figures 11 and 12).
194 
 
Figure 11 
Line  Graph  of  Finnish  Average  Monthly  Unemployment  Percentage  Rate,  1989-1994  (Seasonally 
Adjusted) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Employment and Unemployment (LFS) Database, available online at URL: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database>, accessed 02 
September 2013. 
 
                                                 
193 Ibid. pp. 104-6.  
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Figure 12 
Finnish Average Monthly Unemployment Percentage Rate, 1989-1994 (Seasonally Adjusted) 
 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1989   
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
3.5  3.4  3.3  3.2  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.0  3.0  3.0  2.9  2.9 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1990 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.7  4.0 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1991   
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
4.3  4.6  5.0  5.4  5.9  6.4  6.9  7.4  7.8  8.3  8.7  9.1 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1992   
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
9.5  9.9  10.2  10.6  10.9  11.3  11.7  12.2  12.6  13.0  13.3  13.7 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1993 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
14.1  14.5  14.1  15.4  15.7  16.0  16.3  16.6  16.9  17.1  17.3  17.5 
Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment Rate, 1994 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
17.6  17.6  17.6  17.4  17.2  16.9  16.7  16.4  16.2  15.9  15.8  15.6 
 
Source:  Eurostat  Employment  and  Unemployment  (LFS)  Database,  available  online  at  URL: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database>,  accessed  02 
September 2013. 
 
The recession brought a sense of urgency to the large accumulating budget deficits, 
most of which were being incurred due to mass unemployment and the associated 
social security programs, and led to a series of cuts in a range of key social security 
benefits  that  were  carried  out  by  a  new  centre-right  coalition  government  under 
Centre Party Prime Minister Eho Asko, elected in 1991. These cuts generally attracted 
broad cross-party consensus leading up to the 1995 parliamentary election.
195 Cuts to 
welfare  were  accompanied  by  political  and  scholarly  discussions  on  the  risk  of 
developing a state-based “dependency culture”, wherein disincentivised individuals 
became  passive  benefit  recipients.
196 However,  austerity  and  undermining  of  the 
Nordic welfare state model was to prove unpopular with the Finnish electorate, as was 
demonstrated by the 1995 parliamentary election results, in which Aho’s Centre Party 
suffered  a  significant  electoral  loss  in  favour  of  left-wing  parties  like  the  Social 
Democrats, which David Arter sees as benefiting from a strong protest vote as the 
main  opposition  party.
197 Despite  the  cross  party  consensus  on  austerity,  voters 
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appeared to place the blame for cuts to social services and benefits predominantly on 
Aho  and  the  Centre  Party,
198 whereas  the  Left  Alliance,  the  only  main  party  to 
denounce austerity publically in favour of increased public spending and increased 
income taxation to salvage the welfare state, increased its vote share significantly.
199 
A broad Social Democrat-led coalition government ultimately formed with the Left 
Alliance, the centre-right National Coalition, the Greens of Finland and the Swedish 
People’s Party under Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen.  
 
In this economic context, it may at first appear surprising that the Finnish government 
would continue with legislation designed to increase the number of legal residents, 
and thereby increase the number of job-seekers or benefits claimants. Interestingly, 
Sari Pekkala and Hannu Tervo find that the Finnish economic recovery and fall in 
unemployment actually coincided with a sharp increase in migration.
200 The definition 
of “migration” used here, however, is not limited to international migration, being 
defined  rather  as  movement  to  a  municipality  from  elsewhere  within  Finland  or 
abroad.
201 Internal migration in Finland can also have significant social impacts and 
implications for welfare, including overcrowding of services in certain municipalities 
(particularly those that offer fully-subsidised healthcare) and exacerbation of urban 
poverty and social cohesion problems in the larger cities and towns. Immigration to 
Finland in the 1990s, including the Ingrian Finns, thus came at a period when the 
economic impact of migrants, particularly their impact (beneficial or otherwise) on 
post-recession  economic  recovery,  became  especially  important.  This  includes  the 
effect  of  migration  on  welfare  provisions  at  a  time  when  substantial  welfare 
expansion may have appeared unfeasible.  
 
A clear connection between inclusion in the welfare state and the significance of 
citizenship emerges in analysis of Nordic attitudes towards migration and migrants. 
Discussions  and  interpretations  of  the  welfare  model  centre  around  the  notion  of 
citizenship as guaranteeing the social protection of the welfare state. This is seen in 
political scientist and researcher on pension schemes Kari Salminen’s definition of the 
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“citizenship  model”,  which  defines  the  social  rights  inherent  in  citizenship  as 
including unconditional, flat-rate benefits.
202 More broadly, Kettunen argues that the 
concept of citizenship guaranteeing certain social rights is fundamental to the Nordic 
model,
203 and thus, provision of citizenship becomes an indicator of inclusion and 
exclusion from the benefits and social protection afforded by the Nordic welfare state. 
This  can  involve  excluding  non-citizen  migrants  from  welfare  state  protection,  as 
non-citizen  migrants  may  be  deemed  not  to  belong  to  the  welfare  state’s  core 
community. Indeed, a study conducted by Ann-Helén Bay and Axel West Pedersen 
on attitudes in the Nordic countries towards the introduction of a basic income level, 
set  against  attitudes  towards  increased  migration  from  abroad  to  the  Nordic  area, 
shows a distinct presence of attitudes towards migrants that demand their exclusion 
from the social benefits of the welfare state model.
204 The significance this model 
places on “social solidarity” and the desire to help one’s own community relies on a 
sense of national community that appears somewhat exclusivist; Bay and Pedersen 
note that many initially positive reactions amongst the polled sample towards the 
proposed  basic  income  level  are  reversed  by    “simply  pointing  out  that  an 
unconditional  basic  income  will  include  non-citizens”.
205 Likewise,  many  initially 
negative responses become positive “if it can be withheld from non-citizens”.
206 As 
Bay and Pedersen deduce, “the high degree of social solidarity that could motivate 
support for a basic income scheme does not necessarily encompass newly arrived 
immigrants  and/or  ethnic  minority  groups”.
207 If  migrants  are  deemed  likely  to 
consume  the  social  benefits  of  the  welfare  state,  this  would  make  immigration 
initiatives appear undesirable in times of economic recession to those who see social 
solidarity as predicated on notions of perceived sameness 
 
Indeed, Bay and Pedersen’s study alludes to broader discussions on the role of social 
solidarity in the Nordic welfare state, and how immigration affects this. Simply put, 
they  posit  that  there  is  a  consensus  amongst  voters  in  Nordic  countries  “that 
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immigrants do not belong to the national community and therefore do not deserve to 
receive  social  benefits  in  times  of  need”.
208 The  development  of  the  welfare  state 
model in relation to nationality came about, according to Patrick Emmenegger and 
Romana  Careja,  as  a  means  for  nineteenth-century  conservatives  like  Otto  von 
Bismarck,  Chancellor  of  Germany  in  1871-1890,  and  Eduard  Taaffe,  Minister-
President of Austria in 1868-1870 and 1879-1893, to promote the working classes’ 
loyalty to the state over the emerging radical labour movements.
209 As such, the aim 
of  welfare  policy  was  to  “provide  some  legitimacy  to  the  empire,  increase  social 
cohesion and induce national identity” as a “citizen-making through social benefits 
strategy ”.
210 Some early examples of welfare models in the Nordic countries use this 
strategy,  such  as  the  Swedish  Social  Democrats’  development  of  a  social  model 
metaphor,  Folkhemmet  or  “The  People’s  Home”,  which  sees  provision  of  state-
financed services as a means to guarantee social cohesion and stability.
211  
 
The functionality of welfare systems has become dependent on the cohesive identity 
of  the  citizen-group;  Grete  Brochmann  argues  that  citizenship  as  an  institution  is 
defined not only by its legal dimension, as the guarantor of rights and duties afforded 
the individual, but also by its less-precise social dimension, implying concepts of 
identity loyalty, belonging, trust and participation.
212 Historically, this has involved 
exclusionary or homogenising assimilation policies regarding national minorities, and 
there is indeed evidence of this in the Nordic countries, particularly regarding the 
Sami minorities in the north. Maria Wingstedt, for example, notes the nationalising 
policies in Sweden regarding the historic Sami and Tornedalen minorities, who prior 
to the 1950s did not have access to native-language education.
213 Finland, as argued 
by Päivi Harinen et al., follows the Nordic system of welfare as a universal social 
insurance,  and  as  such,  “encompasses  all  areas  of  life  …[and]  demands  of  its 
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members both cultural and social homogeneity as a condition for full membership in 
society”.
214 The  challenge  of  post-Second  World  War  migration  in  Finland,  as  a 
Nordic  welfare  state,  is  either  to  integrate  migrants  into  these  existing  strands  of 
cultural and social identity in the welfare state, or transform and expand the existing 
strands to encompass new migrants.  
 
In the initial post-Second World War era, the Nordic welfare states developed systems 
of migration that met their requirements for post-war development while maintaining 
the nationalist exclusivity of the welfare state, with a temporary migration system W. 
R.  Böhning  calls  “mercantilistic”.
215   “Guest  workers”  from  poorer  countries  in 
southern Europe, and later further afield, were recruited with the understanding that 
they would come without their families, and once their job was done, they would 
return to their homeland, and thus have no claim to the social benefits scheme.
216 
There was also significant intra-Nordic migration, particularly from Finland to the 
more developed wage-work economy in Sweden, which totalled 535,000 individual 
migrants between 1945 and 1990, peaking in the 1960s and 1970s.
217 The Finnish 
community in Sweden is still significant, and the 2009 Swedish Law on National 
Minorities and Minority Languages identifies Finnish as an official administrative 
language for 24 municipalities throughout Sweden, including Stockholm.
218 However, 
Emmenegger and Careja argue that the increasing importance given to human rights 
in liberal democracies in the more recent decades has meant the Nordic countries can 
“no  longer  treat  their  migrant  populations  as  mere  instruments  of  economic 
production”.
219 Indeed,  the  characterisation  of  post-war  Finnish  migrants  as  cheap 
unskilled  labour  in  Sweden  prompted  a  Swedish  Green  Party  politician,  Maria 
Wetterstrand, to call on the Swedish government to apologise to Finland in a 2009 
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opinion  piece  for  the  Swedish  newspaper  Dagens  Nyheter.
220 The  decline  of  the 
migrant worker system in the Nordic countries has also meant more recent migrants 
have not been excluded from social benefits, and thus at least in theory must be more 
closely integrated into the national community. This was particularly significant for 
Nordic  approaches  to  the  integration  of  refugees,  which  effectively  became  a 
significant immigrant group for Finland in the early 1990s after the arrival of asylum 
seekers from Somalia (around 5,000 in the 1990s) and the former Yugoslavia (around 
4,500 in the 1990s).
221 Since then, Pirkko Pitkäinen and Satu Kouki argue Finnish 
authorities  have  pursued  a  Nordic  approach  of  “universal  values  and  solutions” 
stressing the importance of social equality and equality of access to social services for 
migrants,  including  refugees,  as  spelled  out  in  a  1997  government  program  on 
immigration and refugee policy.
222 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, migration had 
thus become a more weighty issue in terms of its lasting impact and relation to the 
nationalist dimensions of welfare allocation.             
 
Given  this  socio-economic  situation  in  early  1990s  Finland,  the  introduction  and 
continuation of an immigration scheme on the scale of the Ingrian Finnish Right to 
Return  program  may  appear  surprising.  Ingrian  migrants  could  exacerbate  rising 
unemployment  levels,  and  add  strain  to  welfare  and  social  services  provision.  If 
considered  newcomers  to  the  national  community,  they  could  also  be  seen  as 
“undeserving”  of  welfare  assistance  by  Finnish  citizens.  However,  Wim  Van 
Oorschot defines five general criteria that influence the perception of deservingness 
for welfare allocation; 1) responsibility (how able one is to control the reasons for 
needing  social  support),  2)  level  of  need  (if  they  are  very  needy  they  will  be 
considered more deserving), 3) belonging or closeness to the national community, 4) 
conforming to expected patterns of behaviour, and 5) reciprocity (if they have earned 
the  support).
223 Several  points  here  are  of  interest  to  the  Ingrian  Finnish  case, 
particularly the fifth, given Koivisto’s explicit reference to the suffering of the Ingrian 
Finns and their wartime history, and the humanitarian element to the Right to Return 
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2009, available online at URL: <http://www.dn.se/debatt/klassforakt-i-sverige-mot-inflyttade-finnar/>, 
accessed 10 March 2014.  
221 Pitkänen and Kouki, “Meeting Foreign Cultures”, p. 105.  
222 Ibid. pp. 107-112.  
223 Wim van Oorschot, “Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria and the 
Conditionality of Solidarity among the Public”, Policy and Politics, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, pp. 33-48.   
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policy discussed earlier in this chapter. Of particular note, however, is the third point, 
being the perception of belonging to the national community, and how this relates to 
the perception of immigrants in the Nordic welfare state system. A working paper on 
the  comparative  dependence  of  immigrants  on  social  benefits  produced  by  Sari 
Pekkala  Kerr  and  William  R.  Kerr  suggests  that  there  are  several  conflicting 
interpretations  of  data  on  this  issue,  depending  on  immigrant  groups  and  host 
countries, with the most consistent result being that immigrants’ reliance on welfare is 
determined by their relative success in the labour force, which in turn is dependent on 
factors  such  as  education  level  and  language  skills.
224 The  comparatively  high 
education level of Ingrian emigrants was noted in 2002 by the Helsingin Sanomat, as 
was  the  jarring  juxtaposition  of  work  offered  to  Ingrians  compared  with  their 
qualifications from Russia (an example included a chief accountant at the Finnish-
Russian  chamber  of  commerce,  offered  work  in  Finland  as  a  seamstress  from  a 
somewhat misguidedly sympathetic Finn).
225 The issue of language is more complex, 
as most working-age Ingrians were monolingual Russian-speakers, compared to older 
Ingrians who had retained a degree of bilingualism.
226 However, a belief in “ethnic 
solidarity” and a more primordialist approach to ethnicity, would bring with it a belief 
that those with Finnish ancestry would integrate faster and acquire Finnish language 
skills  more  rapidly  than  those  without  Finnish  ancestors,  though  the  2002-2003 
amendment to the Aliens’ Act that introduced a Finnish language requirement for the 
Right to Return suggests Finnish authorities may have eventually come to accept this 
wasn’t  the  reality.
227 The  ability  of  Ingrian  Finns  as  a  group  to  circumvent  any 
negative connotations of immigration in the early 1990s recession appears to hinge on 
the  significance  afforded  to  ethnic  kinship  in  determining  belonging  and 
“deservingness” in the Nordic welfare state model.    
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A final point on the economic perception of migrants in Finland, beyond concepts of 
inclusiveness through citizenship in the welfare state, at a more functional level is the 
separation of migrants from important organisations associated with the welfare state. 
This may continue to foster a sense of detachment between migrants and the welfare 
state,  and  exacerbate  perceptions  of  migrants  as  apart  from  mainstream  Finnish 
society. Of particular note is the role of unions, which formed a particularly key actor 
in representing the labour force in both wage negotiations and political engagement, 
particularly through the use of collective agreements in setting wage levels (a process 
that, through the “corporatist” approach from the 1960s, also included the government 
in  order  to  integrate  labour  market  parties  with  government  decision-making).
228 
Union density reached its peak in Finland (at approximately 85%) in 1993, in the 
midst  of  the  recession,  particularly  as  at  this  time  unemployment  benefits  were 
dependent on insurance provided by union membership.
229 This figure has declined in 
recent  years,  and  there  is  less  impetus  for  immigrants  to  join  unions,  due  to  the 
introduction  of  an  independent  unemployment  insurance  fund  that  provides 
unemployment benefits without requiring union membership.
230 Indeed, it has been a 
challenge for unions to attract members from immigrant communities.
231 However, 
unions retain a high degree of significance in Finland, and collective agreements still 
cover around 95% of Finnish employees.
232 Exclusion from such a significant forum 
for  engagement  with  the  welfare  state  runs  the  risk  of  further  isolation  from  the 
national  community,  and  serves  to  highlight  the  role  of  economic  factors  in 
preventing some aspects of immigrant integration in the Finland of the early 1990s.  
 
Again, the ability of Ingrians to initially avoid this “othering” as immigrants in the 
potentially hostile political environment of the early 1990s Finnish recession speaks 
to  the  pervasiveness  of  perceptions  of  Ingrian  belonging  in  Finland.  Finnish 
lawmakers  appeared  ready  to  accept  Ingrians  as  part  of  the  Finnish  national 
community, and thus deserving welfare recipients, even if this came with a potentially 
significant economic cost and a likely lack of participation in unions. There must also 
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be  a  perception  that  Ingrian  migration  to  Finland  will  not  compromise  the  social 
solidarity considered intrinsic to the maintenance of the embattled but still valued 
Nordic welfare model in the early 1990s. 
 
D)  Conclusions 
 
Ingria’s history as a borderland region between various entities, broadly categorised 
as Western (Sweden, Finland) and Eastern (Russia, USSR), underlines its richness for 
studies of identity construction - its multifaceted population and history may lend it to 
various  identity  constructions.  Foreign  policy  is  one  likely  area  in  which  these 
transforming constructions were manifested, but immigration policy also provides a 
rich case for study, given the state’s unique position to define itself as a national 
community  through  citizenship  and  immigration  legislation.  Pierre  Bourdieu,  for 
instance, has written of the state’s ability to contribute to the construction of national 
identity through its practices, amongst others, of “classification systems…inscribed 
into law”.
233 In this thesis, I see immigration policy, and specifically right to return 
policies, as one such classification system inscribed into law. As will be discussed 
further in this thesis, I employ the example of Finland and its Right to Return policy 
for  Ingrian  Finns  to  study  the  construction  of  national  identity  in  policymakers’ 
language,  and  how  through  discursive  constructions  of  such  national  identity, 
policymakers are able to legitimise and delegitimise the connection of this particular 
group to the nation state.   
 
The study of Ingrian Finnish Return law, and the construction of Finnish identity it 
reflects, is one avenue through which the contested nature of Ingria on the border 
between Eastern and Western notions in identity construction becomes apparent. Here 
is  a  region  straddling  the  old  Iron  Curtain,  politically  East  of  the  Finno-Russian 
border,  which  has  also  been  described  as  a  line  of  cultural  identity  demarcation 
between East and West. Yet the Ingrian Return law is also informed by its era under a 
Western power, long ago but not without living remnants, in the form of the region’s 
community of Finnish descent. Though Ingrians had previously been discussed in 
Finnish political discourse during the Russian Civil War and the Second World War, 
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when the idea of ethnic kinship between Finland and Ingrians was promulgated, the 
issue of Ingrian Finns in post-war Finland would lie dormant until the early 1990s.  
 
In  April  1990,  when  President  Koivisto  gave  a  televised  interview  in  which  he 
publically announced Ingrian inclusion into existing Finnish Right to Return law, he 
stated  (as  paraphrased  by  Helsingin  Sanomat)  that  “Ingrians  are  Finns…Their 
ancestors were moved there once at the behest of Sweden, and they have undergone 
much  while  they  have  been  there”.
234 Koivisto’s  expansion  of  returnee  status 
launched a policy initiative that culminated in the explicit mention of Ingrians as 
returnees in Finnish immigration legislation, extending the returnee status afforded to 
those  in  Sweden  and  North  America  to  include  Ingrian  Finns.
235 Prior  to  1990, 
existing  Finnish  legislation  had  provided  Right  to  Return  status  to  more  recent 
Finnish émigrés, namely those who had left in the early and mid-twentieth century for 
Sweden and North America, up until the 1980s made up the vast majority of migrants 
arriving in Finland.
236 By the 1980s, there were at least 1.3 million individuals in 
Sweden and North America able to apply for returnee status in Finland through this 
policy, as returning emigrants or second, third and fourth generation descendants of 
Finnish  emigrants.
237 Thus,  there  already  existed  a  rich  pool  of  potential  returnee 
migrants at this time. Koivisto himself highlighted return migrants in a 1987 speech 
commemorating the 70
th anniversary of Finland’s only exclusively Swedish-language 
university, Åbo Academy in Turku, by citing the 700,000 emigrants who since the 
Second World War had departed Finland, mostly for Sweden, and the 350,000 of 
these who had returned, as evidence of Finland’s deepening shared culture and history 
with Sweden, also indicative of the relationship Finland maintained with the Finnish 
diaspora.
238 This diaspora relationship reflects a tradition of Finnish political thought 
that did not define Finns solely as Finnish citizens, but rather as a broader concept 
related  to  less  tangible  definitions  of  cultural,  ancestral  and  ideological  identity 
transmitted through the Finnish diaspora. 
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In assessing whether the Right to Return law for Ingrian Finns came about due to or 
despite the economic reality of late twentieth-century Finland, it becomes apparent 
that  economic  considerations  did  not  appear  to  play  a  major  role  in  spurring  the 
policy’s  formation.  Rather,  the  notion  of  ethnicity  and  the  perceived  ethnic  link 
between the Finnish state and Ingrians, constructed upon perceptions of historical 
connections  between  Finland  and  Ingria  dating  from  the  era  of  Swedish  rule  and 
continuing through to the twentieth century, appears to have afforded a bypass to the 
likely challenges of increased migration in a time of recession. With the opening up 
(and  later  breaking  up)  of  the  USSR,  Finland  was  presented  with  what  could  be 
termed a “historical moment”, in which it became possible to reconnect with those 
groups  considered  in  the  dominant  Finnish  political  discourse  to  be  connected  to 
Finland as “ethnic kin”, across the formerly impenetrable Soviet border. Given the 
presence in welfare state societies of the notion that those “belonging” or close to the 
national community are deserving recipients of social support in times of need, the 
political history of Ingria and its relationship with Finland seems to have afforded 
Ingrian Finns the opportunity to pursue more concrete expressions of their perceived 
connection  to  Finnishness,  including  residency,  citizenship  and  social  support  in 
Finland.  Therefore,  when  considering  both  the  political  and  economic  context  of 
Finland  by  1990,  the  key  impression  that  emerges  is  that  there  was  a  perceived 
connection between the Finnish nation state and Ingrians, drawn from a construction 
of common ethnic identity and an interpretation of history which spurred, facilitated 
and eased the introduction of the Right to Return policy.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 
Some scholars argue that national identity, as much as any other formation of identity, 
flows from psychological impulses to create, as Mole puts it, “order out of chaos”; i.e. 
the  creation  of  identity  categorisations  for  ourselves  and  others,  as  distinct  races, 
nations,  ethnicities,  classes,  generations,  etc.,  to  establish  expected  norms  of 
behaviour for our surroundings.
1 In essence, this categorisation impulse drives the 
notion of social identity theory, which asserts that human beings categorise, and are 
categorised, into groups based on two main practices: the internalisation of group 
categories (that is, as we form group categories for the world around us, we self-
categorise based on these understandings), and the accentuation of similarities within 
groups and differences between groups.
2 Tobias Theiler argues that social identity 
theory is “self-consciously abstract”, in that it does not seek to define or explore “the 
signifiers used to demarcate group boundaries or the group norms that prevail at any 
given  time…[which]  are  socially  constructed  and  therefore  culturally  specific  and 
historically contingent”.
3 Understanding the nature of the group’s social identity that 
this theory creates – how they are qualified, the nature of their boundaries and the 
purposes they serve – is best ascertained through analysis of the language the group 
uses in its self-definition. Discourse analysis emerges as a means to this end, as a 
framework for establishing how groups such as a national community are delineated, 
through concepts like citizenship or ethno-cultural identity constructions.  
 
Discourse theories, with a particular focus on poststructuralist and critical discourse 
analysis, inform the theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis, inasmuch as 
this thesis analyses the construction of national identity in the political discussions 
and  policy  language  on  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Right  to  Return  policy.  This  chapter 
explains this methodological approach as a toolkit for the discursive analysis of such 
language, and explains how this method will be used to address the core research 
problem  investigated  in  this  thesis.  This  approach  is  informed  by  my  reading  of 
Foucauldian, poststructuralist and critical discourse analysis methodologies. I have 
read the primary data for this thesis with a view to establishing what position on the 
Ingrian Return they take (the theme or themes), what constructions or elements of 
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Finnish identity are employed (the discursive resource or resources), and how this 
relates to the context in which the discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Return is being 
produced and received to create an ideology of Finnishness as an identity.   
 
A)  Approaching Identity 
 
Different disciplines provide different theorisations of identity that are pertinent to 
this  study.  In  International  Relations  theory,  Alexander  Wendt  provides  a 
constructivist approach to identity, arguing that an actor’s identity is at its base self-
ascribed, but the meaning of this identity is dependent on how it is represented by 
other actors.
4 Wendt further argues that states, as his primary unit of analysis, make 
strategic  choices  based  on  given  identities  and  interests,  which  are  produced  in 
“evolutionary”  processes  of  cultural  selection  and  socially  disseminated  through 
imitation  and  social  learning.
5 Other  constructivism  proponents,  such  as  Martha 
Finnemore,  argue  that  the  constructivist  approach  to  identity  transcends  the 
traditionally state-centric approach to International Relations, arguing that states are 
themselves embedded and “socialised” in an international structure of “meaning and 
social value” that may shape identity formation.
6 The significance of constructivism 
for the study of Ingrian Finns’ relation to Finnishness, particularly as Wendt theorises 
identity, is that identities motivate state choices and actions – states make “strategic 
choices  on  the  basis  of  given  identities  and  interests”.
7 As  this  approach  treats 
identities as given, and informing actors’ choices, applying such an understanding of 
identity to Finnish politicians’ statements on Ingrians’ Finnishness would indicate 
their actions are informed by the given parameters of Finnish identity as they exist at 
this time. Constructivism has the advantage of stressing the intersubjective nature of 
identity  construction,  in  which  identity  is  produced  and  represented  in  a  social 
environment,  and  indeed,  the  intersubjective  aspect  of  Ingrian  Finnish  identity 
construction  is  explored  in  chapter  six  of  this  study.  However,  constructivist 
approaches  do  not  address  actors’  capacity  to  renegotiate  identities  strategically, 
rather  than  make  strategic  considerations  based  on  existing  or  given  identity 
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5 Ibid. p. 336.  
6 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 
p. 2.  
7 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 336  
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constructions. As I argue in this thesis, identity constructions can be constructed and 
performed  for  strategic  purposes,  in  this  case  to  legitimise  and  delegitimise  a 
particular immigration policy.  
 
The  “renegotiable”  nature  of  identity  is  stressed  in  poststructuralist  and  critical 
constructivist  approaches  to  identity  study.  The  postructuralist  political  theorist 
Chantal Mouffe argues that there are no “natural” or “original” identities; identities 
are  instead  inherently  “nomadic”  with  parameters  that  are  constantly  being 
renegotiated through processes of “hybridisation” into emerging conglomerates like 
European identity.
8 Jacob Torfing discusses identity construction with reference to 
poststructuralist  discourse  theory,  arguing  that  “discourse  is  constructed  in  and 
through hegemonic struggles that aim to establish a political and moral-intellectual 
leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity”.
9  Identity construction 
thus has a strategic function in discourse, as a means to create what Torfing calls the 
“credible principle” by which discourse becomes hegemonic and “capture[s] people’s 
hearts and minds”.
10 To this end, the construction of identity is created rather through 
the construction of “social antagonism” provided by a “threatening Otherness” whose 
exclusion is significant to the ultimate stability and survival of the identity.
11 In this 
way, identity construction is performative, created and recreated through discursive 
practices, and thus inherently dynamic. It is also reflective of constructions of the self 
and other, reflecting for instance Iver B. Neumann’s argument that identity study 
should begin with an analysis of its parameters, i.e. the “diacritica” or divide between 
the self and other.
12 A particular example of poststructuralist analysis regarding the 
self and other divide is provided by Paasi, who links geographical understandings of 
East and West in Finland to discursive constructions of identity in Finland that placed 
Finland  within  an  identity  construct  of  Westernness,  distinct  from  Russia  as  the 
“threatening  Otherness”  described  by  Torfing.
13 Poststructuralist  approaches  to 
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identity  have  the  advantage  for  this  study  of  stressing  how  identity  is  subject  to 
shifting parameters and renegotiation, and how the self/other distinction is significant 
to the hegemonic success or viability of identity constructions in the broader social 
environment in which these discursively produced identities are received.  
 
The success or viability of identity constructions draws back to social identity theory, 
introduced earlier in this chapter. Social identity theory relates the individual’s self-
conception as belonging to a group or identity construct with the worth or value of 
this  identity  the  individual  experiences  from  it.
14 Michael  A.  Hogg  and  Dominic 
Abrams argue for a “self-esteem hypothesis”, which they argue has emerged as a 
cornerstone  of  social  identity  theory  and  the  social  psychology  of  intergroup 
relations.
15 This hypothesis posits that the positive appeal of social identity categories 
to the individual’s sense of self-esteem is key to the category’s saliency.
16 Maykel 
Verkuyten presents this idea as a distinction between the “external” nature of social 
identity, in that it can be ascribed to the individual by his or her environment, and the 
“internal” appreciation of this identity, how the individual thinks, feels, values or 
rejects  this  identity.
17  Individuals  are  more  likely  to  identify  with  social 
categorisations that have been externally proscribed to them if they have positive 
connotations to the internal sense of self. Verkuyten argues that social identity thus 
has a “dual nature” combining sociocultural constructions of identity with personal 
interpretations, and that these two elements should not be reduced to one another.
18 
Scholars in fields like social psychology studying social identity often focus on the 
subjective  experiences  of  individuals  over  the  social  construction  of  identity 
constructions themselves.
19 This thesis investigates the social construction of identity 
in the Ingrian Finnish Return law example, and the effective saliency of this identity, 
in terms of social identity theory and its focus on the internal and emotional appeal of 
                                                 
14 Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, “An Introduction to the Social Identity Approach”, in D. 
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16 Ibid. pp. 32-3.  
17 Maykel Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity, Hove: Psychology Press, 2005, pp. 60-
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the identity categorisations. The effectiveness of identity constructions in the debate 
on the Finnishness of Ingrians is dependent on the positive and emotional appeal of 
Finnishness  as  an  identity,  including  positive  narratives  of  Finns  in  history 
(particularly the Second World War) and the importance of protecting the cultural 
particularity of Finnishness (particularly the Finnish language).  
 
As  mentioned  in  chapter  one  of  this  thesis,  I  argue  here  that  the  Ingrian  Finnish 
Return law debate in Finland provides an example of strategic uses of essentialising 
identity  discourse.  This  idea  draws  from  the  postcolonial  literary  theorist  Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of “strategic essentialism”, or, as she puts it, “a strategic 
use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest”.
20 This theory 
argues  that  groups  may  perceive  advantages  to  essentialising  their  identity  into  a 
simplified notion that is more readily represented and reproduced by others.
21 Anne 
Phillips argues that, though Spivak herself has distanced herself from the strategic 
essentialism concept, the notion of groups that “‘take the risk of essence’ in order to 
have  any  political  purchase  remains  an  important  theme”  in  politics.
22 Neumann 
argues that post-Iron Curtain Europe has been particularly susceptible to the rise of 
essentialising identity discourse, as the class distinctions informed by a Marxist sense 
of  collective  relationship  to  the  means  of  production  are  evaporating,  and  being 
replaced by so many possible social identities that there is a “rush to defend the story 
of the self that revolves around the nation” as a means of creating a salient over-
arching  identity  narrative.
23 In  the  context  of  1990s  Europe  and  the  turn  to 
“hegemonic” identity politics, this has necessitated the construction of what Neumann 
terms “as if” narratives, which present identities “as if” they were essentialised, so as 
to  gain  political  saliency  and  make  the  case  for  national  identity  as  a  “context-
traversing” identity.
24 This, he argues, undermines the notion in Mouffe’s nomadic 
identities  theory  –  that  hybridisation  of  identities  will  replace  essentialising  of 
identities – as Neumann sees essentialised identities as more able to group identities 
                                                 
20 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography”, in G.C. Spivak, In 
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21 Ibid. pp. 202-11.  
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around  a  central  self/other  nexus.
25 Neumann  cites  the  EU  accession  debate  in 
Norway as one example, noting that “as if” essentialising narratives were part of the 
dominant  construction  of  European  identity  as  a  threat  to  the  Norwegian  self.
26 
Finland  presents  a  particularly  interesting  alternate  example,  as  Christopher  S. 
Browning argues that EU membership in Finland was politically constructed as a 
“Westernising” narrative that “only became meaningful in the context of a series of 
narratives emphasising EU membership as an expression of continuity of national 
identity”.
27 This  kind  of  essentialising  “Western”  identity  narrative  emerges  in 
historian  Henrik  Meinander’s  characterisation  of  the  Finnish  EU  accession  as  an 
“emotional homecoming”, arguing: 
 
it is perfectly understandable that many Finns feel that EU membership is like closing a wide 
circle, a circle that began when Finland, after 700 years under Swedish rule, became in 1809 a 
Grand  Duchy  within  the  Russian  Empire.  After  at  least  two  centuries  of  uncertainty  and 
ideological  searching,  the  Finns  are  no  more  continuously  asking  themselves  whether  their 
country belongs to Western Europe, and if that is actually the case, whether they are "on the 
brink" or rather "somewhere between" where European civilisation is concerned.
28  
 
Similarly, Tapani Vaahtoranta argues that the Finnish foreign policy establishment 
communicated their will to join the EU in such a manner that “often sounded as if 
Finland was trying to take her place in the Western civilisation in particular”.
29 At the 
time of accession in 1995, President Ahtisaari declared Finland’s “membership in the 
European Union has strengthened our European identity”.
30 In this case, essentialising 
discourse  has  the  strategic  function  of  legitimising  Finland’s  EU  accession  as  a 
binding  of  Finland  to  the  West/East  self/other  nexus.  The  EU  is  thus  not  strictly 
constructed  as  a  hybridising  identity  that  “attacks”  the  national  sense  of  self,  as 
Neumann sees in the Norwegian case, but as a component of the national identity 
itself that distinguishes it from non-Europe (Russia) as the “Other”. 
 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 214.  
26 Ibid. p. 215.  
27 Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 233.  
28 Henrik Meinander, “On the Brink or Between? The Conception of Europe in Finnish Identity”, in M. 
af Malmborg and B. Stråth (eds), The Meaning of Europe: Variety and Contention within and among 
Nations, Oxford/New York: Berg, 2002, p. 168.  
29 Tapani Vaahtoranta, “The Change in Foreign Policy During the Presidency of Mauno Koivisto 1982-
1994”, in Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy, Helsinki: Finnish Institute for International Affairs, 
1994, p. 14 (6-15).  
30 Cited in Browning, Constructivism, Narrative and Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 242.   
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The appeal of the “Western” component in the construction of Finnishness here, as 
part of the self-esteem hypothesis in social identity theory, relates to the positive and 
negative ways in which the terms “West” and “East”, respectively, have historically 
been constructed. Stuart Hall famously wrote that “‘the West’ is as much an idea as a 
fact of geography”.
31 Westernness, Hall writes, is “a type of society that developed as 
industrialised,  urbanised,  capitalist,  secular  and  modern”  as  a  result  of  specific 
economic, political, social and cultural processes following the end of the Middle 
Ages.
32 The West effectively means “modern”, and any state or society that shares 
these  characteristics  can  be  classified  as  “Western”,  wherever  they  exist  on  the 
geographical  map.
33 Hall  argues  that  one  of  the  functions  of  the  “Western” 
construction is that it “provides criteria of evaluation against which other societies are 
ranked and around which powerful positive and negative feelings cluster”.
34 In this 
sense,  there  is  an  evident  positive  self-esteem  appeal  to  the  construction  of 
Finnishness  that  stresses  its  Westernness.  The  strategic  use  of  an  essentialising 
discourse of Finnishness in the Ingrian discussion may thus appeal to the positive 
historical understanding of the West as a means to creating a positive identity that 
attracts individuals to identify with it.     
 
This provides the core considerations for identity as it is constructed and employed by 
Finnish politicians in this period (1990-2010) regarding the Ingrian Finns. It is argued 
in this thesis that strategic use of essentialising discourse in the Ingrian Finnish Return 
discussion  amongst  Finnish  politicians  construct  a  self/other  nexus  that  define 
Ingrians first as the self, then as the other, using some of the same identity parameters 
in both definitions. The self/other nexus is informed by the West/East construction, 
and  is  performed  in  the  poststructuralist  sense  by  Finnish  politicians  through 
discourse that characterises Ingrians as Finns, belonging to the cultural West, and then 
as Russians, belonging to the cultural East and thus separate from the dominant sense 
of the Finnish national self. The sense of Finnish national self is itself subject to 
renegotiation,  from  the  neutral,  Nordic  “middle  way”  between  East  and  West  as 
security entities described in chapter two, to the construction of East and West as 
                                                 
31 Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in S. Hall, D. Held, D. Hubert and K. 
Thompson (eds), Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997,  p. 186.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid.   
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cultural  entities  or  civilisations  with  Finns  in  the  West  after  1990.  This  follows 
scholarly investigation of post-Cold War Europe and the rise of identity politics, by 
investigating  how  identity  constructions  in  this  context  were  negotiated  and 
renegotiated strategically in politics.  
 
B)  Discourse Analysis, Poststructuralism and Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse  analysis  has  been  defined  by,  among  others,  Rogers  Brubaker  and 
Frederick Cooper, as analysis of language in which critical significance “may depend 
not  on  any  particular  instantiation  but  on  [language’s]  anonymous,  unnoticed 
permeation  of  our  ways  of  thinking  and  talking  and  making  sense  of  the  social 
world”.
35 This theory is perhaps most closely associated with philosopher and social 
theorist  Michel  Foucault,  who  included  in  his  preface  to  Les Mots et Les Choses 
(1966, “Words and Things”, published in English as The Order of Things) his purpose 
to investigate  
   
…language as it has been spoken, natural creatures as they have been perceived and grouped 
together, and exchanges as they have been practiced; in what way, then, our culture has made 
manifest the existence of order[.]
36 
 
A  discourse  analysis  of  a  group’s  self-definition  may  therefore  seek  to  ascertain 
through the group’s own language deeper understandings of the group’s values, its 
hierarchy and its understandings of the world and its place within it. The Foucauldian 
tradition of discourse analysis lends itself to research that examines power relations. 
As Foucault himself argued in his later works, discourses are formed and re-formed 
by struggles for hegemonic domination, and thus are dependent on power relations.
37  
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 he puts it thus: “Discourse transmits and produces 
power, it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and 
makes it possible to thwart it”.
38 Sara Mills argues that Foucault sees discourse both 
as  a  means  of  oppression  and  of  resisting  oppression.
39 Knowledge,  and  how 
knowledge is produced and maintains its status as “factual”, is a product of power in 
                                                 
35 Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’”, Theory and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, 
February 2000, p. 16.  
36 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994, p. xxi.  
37 Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 3, translation by Robert Hurley, 
New York: Pantheon, 1986, pp. 81-95.  
38 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978, p. 101.  
39 Sara Mills, Michel Foucault, New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 55.   
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Foucauldian theory that is produced and maintained by power struggles.
40 Power as 
Foucauldian  theory  sees  it  is  complex,  not  limited  to  the  relations  determined  by 
connection to the economic means of production (as in Marxist theory) or the ability 
to  define  people’s  rights,  and  what  they  are  not  allowed  to  do  (as  in  liberal 
humanism).
41 Foucault sees power as social relations, producing as well as restricting 
behaviour.
42 Discourse analysis is thus the study of how language produces, maintains 
and challenges hegemonic systems of knowledge in the social world.  
 
For  the  study  of  national  identity  construction,  several  approaches  to  discourse 
analysis are possible. A recent doctoral thesis by Nevena Nancheva analysing national 
identity constructions in Bulgaria and Macedonia in the context of Europeanisation, 
for instance, employs a poststructuralist approach, which she argues offers analytical 
possibilities  for  the  study  of  national  identity  that  transcend  “the  limitations  of 
rationalist  accounts”.
43  Poststructuralism  posits  that  the  distinction  between 
“discourse”  and  “non-discourse”  in  language  is  unsustainable,  and  that  all  social 
phenomena are also “discourses”,
44 following the notion from Jacques Derrida’s essay 
“Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” that everything 
can  be  “discourse”.
45 Ernesto  Laclau  and  Chantal  Mouffe,  proponents  of  the 
poststructuralist-informed Essex School of discourse analysis, provide an effective 
account  of  how  the  classification  of  events  as  “factual”  rather  than  discourse  is 
rejected by poststructuralism: 
 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it 
occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or expressions of ‘the wrath of God’ depends on 
the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that subjects exist externally to 
thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects 
outside any discursive condition of emergence.
46  
 
This introduces a significant element to the use of discourse analysis for this thesis, on 
the  way  in  which  historical  “fact”  is  interpreted  and  strategically  employed  in 
discursive constructions of identity. The events described in chapter two of this thesis 
may have “happened” in the literal sense – borders were changed, wars were lost, 
people were transported – but the meaning of these events to the construction of 
                                                 
40 Mills, Michel Foucault, pp. 70-1, and Sara Mills, Discourse, New York/London: Routledge, 1997, p. 
21.  
41 Mills, Discourse, p. 19.  
42 Ibid. p. 20.  
43 Nevena Nancheva, Transforming Identities in Europe: Bulgaria and Macedonia Between 
Nationalism and Europeanization, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Westminster, 2012, p. 7.  
44 Ibid. p. 58.  
45 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated by Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 1978, pp. 
351-70.  
46 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, London: Verso, 1985, p. 108.   
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identity is constituted by discursive practice. A Wittgensteinian approach to discourse 
argues  that  the  meaning  of  a  statement  is  dependent  on  its  usage  in  a  specific 
situation, and thus, discourse can only be understood within its historical context.
47 I 
follow the appraisal of context as critical to the analysis of discourse. This thesis 
investigates  discursive  constructions  of  identity  within  context  which  is  itself 
discursive, in which history is referenced, linked and employed by Finnish law- and 
policy-makers in the construction of Finnishness.  
 
In  addition  to  the  poststructuralist-informed  approaches  to  discourse  analysis,  I 
consider aspects of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA accepts that discourse is 
“language in use”, and seeks to link linguistic analysis to social analysis, particularly 
the analysis of social inequalities and exclusionary practices, as discourse produces 
and reproduces social inequalities through language use.
48 One of the key theorists on 
CDA, Norman Fairclough, asserts that discourse is essentially “constitutive”, in that it 
constitutes or constructs things instead of simply reflecting or representing them.
49 In 
CDA, discourse has three core constitutive functions: constructing social identities, 
social relationships, and systems of knowledge and belief.
50 Ruth Wodak describes 
CDA as  
 
…fundamentally  concerned  with  analysing  opaque  as  well  as  transparent  structural 
relationships  of  dominance,  discrimination,  power  and  control  as  manifested  in 
language…CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, 
constituted, legitimized and so on by language use.
51 
 
This follows on from Jürgen Habermas’ assertion of language’s role as a means of 
domination  through  legitimisation  of  power  structures.
52 The  focus  here  is  on 
exposing, through discourse analysis of a group’s language, the group’s practices of 
discrimination within its discursively constructed parameters of identity, relationships 
and knowledge and belief systems, which describe both the group itself and how it 
sees others.   
 
                                                 
47 John Richardson, Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 27.  
48 Ibid. p. 26.  
49 Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 3 
50 Ibid. p. 10. 
51 Ruth Wodak, “What CDA is about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its 
developments”, in R. Wodak and M. Meyer (eds), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, London: 
Sage Publications, 2001, p. 2.  
52 Jurgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977, p. 259.   
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CDA focuses particularly on power, and how discourse creates certain interpretations 
of the world that become ideologically dominant.
53 Ideology is here understood as 
defined by John B. Thompson, “meaning in the service of power”,
54 i.e. a way of 
thinking that creates or reinforces power structures. Fairclough argues that ideological 
constructions of reality are “built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of 
discourse  practices”,  and  as  such  “contribute  to  the  production,  reproduction  or 
transformation  of  relations  of  domination”.
55 Thus,  for  example,  in  the  Ingrian 
Finnish case, the power structures that exist within lawmakers’ ability to legislate and 
define identity through citizenship and immigration law give the constitutive meaning 
in  their  discourse  increased  ideological  weight,  to  create  ideologically  dominant 
constructions  of  Finnishness  as  it  relates  to  Ingrians.  Discourses  function 
ideologically when they create what Titus Hjelm calls “‘proper’ ways of thinking 
about  and  doing  things  -  yielding  a  one-sided  account  that  ignores  the  variety  of 
practices”.
56 Similarly, Fairclough sees the ideologies inherent in discursive practices 
as “most effective when they become naturalised, and achieve the status of ‘common 
sense’”.
57 The  power  position  of  politicians  as  policy-makers  gives  them  greater 
capacity to create ideologically dominant discursive constructions. These discursive 
constructions  may  also  become  ideologically  hegemonic  when  they  become  so 
dominant  as  to  suppress  any  alternatives.
58 In  essence,  CDA  posits  that  discourse 
constructions create ideological constructions of reality informed by the context in 
which they are produced. These ideological constructions are discursively produced 
through meaning, but there are different extents to which they can become dominant 
or hegemonic. This focus on how meanings in discourse use language to create power 
relations and ideological systems of interpreting the empirical world is a core feature 
of the CDA approach.  
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However,  Wodak  and  her  colleagues  also  note  that  approaches  to  CDA  are  not 
homogeneous,
59 and indeed Hjelm argues that each CDA research project necessitates 
an individual research design.
60 Existing approaches have been described by Wodak 
and  colleagues  as  belonging  to  various  “schools”,  including  the  British  school 
exemplified by Fairclough, which they see as closely linked to Foucauldian traditions 
of discourse analysis, with an emphasis on linguistic theory.
61 Wodak self identifies 
as part of the Viennese school, which she sees as grounded in an historical dimension 
that  integrates  as  much  available  historical  context  as  possible,  allowing  for  an 
analysis  that  traces  diachronic  change  in  discourses  over  time.
62 Fairclough  and 
Wodak are united in seeing discourse as a form of social practice,
63 yet Wodak and 
colleagues in the Viennese school emphasise how social, institutional or situational 
contexts shape discourse, arguing that “discourse constitutes social practice and is at 
the same time constituted by it”.
64 Within the field of national identity studies, Wodak 
and colleagues assert that CDA can  
 
throw  light  on  the  largely  contingent  and  imaginary  character  of  nation  and  …sharpen 
awareness  of  dogmatic,  essentialist  and  naturalising  conceptions  of  nation  and  national 
identity which…threaten or make impossible what [Habermas] has described as ‘difference-
sensitive inclusion’, that is, equal pluralistic co-existence of various ethnic groups, language 
communities, religious communities and forms of life.
65      
 
This conception of discourse analysis is most appropriate for the study of Finnish 
political discourses surrounding the Ingrian Return law, as it allows the critique of 
constructions of national identities formulated against the context of an increasingly 
pluralistic nation state with a foreign policy and economic situation also in flux. As is 
argued in this thesis, the formulations of national identity promoted in the discourses 
surrounding this law would frequently take on an essentialist and primordial approach 
to  national  identity  and  conceptualisations  of  “Finnishness”  that  ignore  potential 
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alternative  views  of  Finland  in  the  1990s  and  2000s  as  an  increasingly  diverse 
national community.   
 
Along these lines, a critical discourse analysis of the Finnish Right to Return policy 
(through its legal language and the political language used in discussion of its origin, 
justification  and  implementation)  can  be  used  to  trace  changes  in  the  constructed 
relationship between Finland as a national community of citizens and Finnishness as a 
national identity. Critical discourse analysis has already been employed successfully 
in studies that have examined constructions of national identity in political language. 
Teun  A.  van  Dijk  has  studied  exclusionary  and  racist  “othering”  in  Western 
parliamentary discourses, particularly in France and the USA, asserting that racist 
language  from  political  elites  has  the  negative  social  function  of  legitimising 
exclusivist and discriminatory language, as it may be translated into more radical or 
explicit forms by the media or public at large.
66 The politics of creating government 
legitimacy  through  democratic-majority  consent,  along  with  the  high  visibility  of 
political elites whose statements and views are then widely filtered and disseminated 
by  journalists  and  other  media  professionals  (most  notably  during  election 
campaigns), gives particular influence to political language as a far-reaching method 
of constructing exclusivist identity constructions,
67 particularly at the level of national 
identity constructions. Political language is thus a particularly significant avenue for 
CDA  research,  given  the  social  function  of  politicians,  who  may  legally  codify 
discriminatory, exclusivist or racist identity constructions at a national level.  
 
Jeff Millar’s study on national language discourses in immigration and integration 
policy in Canada is a further recent example of CDA’s use to the study of political 
language.  This  analysis  uses  CDA  methods  to  analyse  Canadian  politicians’ 
“language ideological consensus on immigration integration” in Canadian integration 
policies.
68 Millar argues that such analysis reveals a “hybrid” discourse combining a 
neo-liberal discourse on language as a skill, an academic discourse on language as 
“communicative competency”, and a research discourse on language as a factor in 
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immigrant integration.
69 Transformations in the Canadian immigration policy regime, 
Millar argues, can thus be studied as responses to changes in these discourses, which 
themselves mediate changes in social practices and institutional structures associated 
with  immigration  policy.
70 As  with  Millar’s  approach,  this  thesis  employs  an 
adaptation of CDA as a framework to analyse policy changes, viewing these changes 
as related to contextual changes. Though the discourse on national language in the 
Ingrian Return law is of also prime importance to this paper, my approach here is 
broader  than  Millar’s,  as  it  also  examines  other  constitutive  elements  of  national 
identity conveyed or employed by the political discourse on this law. In essence, this 
thesis employs a critical discourse analysis of Finland’s 1990-2010 Right to Return 
policy to describe the shifting definitions of national identity and Finnishness in this 
period,  as  Finland  (and  more  broadly,  Europe)  adapted  to  the  new  post-Soviet 
international relations context of the 1990s and 2000s, as described in the previous 
chapter, the economic challenges to come in the late 2000s, and to some extent to 
increasing migration diversity.  
 
C)  Critical Linguistic Analysis and Political Rhetoric 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion on how the thesis’ analysis will be undertaken, it is 
useful to note a significant area in which the thesis’ analytical approach may differ 
from other established CDA traditions. The critical linguistic nature of CDA has been 
described by Wodak as almost always informed by Hallidayan notions of “systemic 
functional  grammar”,  which  she  sees  as  significant  for  a  proper  understanding  of 
CDA.
71 The  linguist  Michael  Halliday  argues  that  there  is  an  explicit  relationship 
between grammatical structure and social structure that is not reflective, but rather 
symbiotic.
72 He asserts:  
 
we should say that linguistic structure is the realization of social structure, actively symbolising it 
in a process of mutual creativity. Because it stands as a metaphor for society, language has the 
property of not only transmitting the social order but also maintaining and potentially modifying 
it.
73 
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In  essence,  Hallidayan  notions  of  the  relationship  between  grammar  or  linguistic 
structure  and  the  social  structure  it  conveys  would  in  theory  necessitate  a  close 
reading of the linguistic and grammatical features of the discourse texts. In other 
words, if one takes the assertion that language and society are mutually creative and 
must be studied as mutually constitutive structures, analysis of discursively produced 
social phenomena should entail close reading of discourse. Indeed, within the field of 
analysing  discourses  on  immigration  amongst  policy-makers,  scholars  like  Luisa 
Martin  Rojo  and  Teun  A.  van  Dijk  have  already  undertaken  CDA  research  that 
employs analysis of linguistic structure, including grammar and semantic moves, in a 
case study of discourses on illegal migration in the Spanish parliament.
74  
 
However, employing political rhetoric as the primary discursive text (as this thesis 
does) does not necessarily require this specific analysis of language as a close reading 
of  linguistic  or  grammatical  structure.  Martin  Reisigl,  for  instance,  suggests  a 
“politolinguistic” framework to the analysis of political rhetoric, combining linguistic 
analysis  with  political  science  to  examine  the  way  in  which  language  is  used  to 
convey political goals.
75 This may be carried out in a variety of political fields, from 
lawmaking procedure to political administration or the various aspects of political 
campaigning.
76 Reisigl notes that this approach does not necessitate any particular 
form of linguistic analysis, and is flexible in terms of the analytical toolkit that may 
be employed to the study of political rhetoric, though he still sees linguistic analysis 
as  a  feature  of  critical  discourse  analysis.
77 Such  approaches  may  go  beyond  an 
analysis  of  strict  linguistic  structure,  as  Reisigl  offers  the  study  of  expression  of 
nonliteral  speech  –  such  as  metaphors  (nonliteral  use  of  language  to  convey 
similarity), metonymies (the use of a single characteristic to identify an object) and 
synecdoches (the use of part an object to identify it in entirety) – as a potential area of 
study within political discourses, all of which place greater emphasis on interpretation 
of meanings than structural form for discursive analysis
78  
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For the purpose of this thesis, I focus analytical attention on interpretation of meaning 
over grammatical and linguistic structures. As a non-native Finnish language user 
employing Finnish-language materials, my data has driven me towards methods of 
analysis that focus on content and meaning rather than grammatical features that are 
difficult for non-native speakers to identify. Therefore, my own linguistic background 
has shaped the methodological approach to source material in this thesis. However, to 
maintain the thoroughness of my methodological approach here, I have taken great 
care to maintain meaning and content in my translations of Finnish text to English, 
and also to provide the original Finnish citations in footnotes for Finnish-readers to 
consult. Specifically, my analysis traces changes in the meaning of various repeating 
characterisations  of  Finnish  identity  in  the  relevant  political  discourse,  which  are 
employed  for  political  ends  in  shaping  and  refining  legislative  policy.  These 
characterisations of Finnish identity are in this thesis termed “discursive resources”, 
and  are  elaborated  on  in  the  following  section.  This  approach  ascribes  to 
characterisations  of  identity  the  role  of  linguistic  device,  as  binary  classification 
points employed to delineate between “Finnish” and “Other”. This approach also has 
a practical advantage in that, for a speaker of Finnish as a second language, electing to 
employ  analysis  of  the  grammatical  structure  or  form  of  discourse  texts  may  be 
somewhat incomplete (see also section F on sources).  
 
D)  Discursive Resources 
 
The core concerns of this thesis are the construction of ethnicity and Finnish identity 
in  Finnish  immigration  policy,  and  the  use  of  primordial  or  ethnically  exclusive 
national identity constructions in modern European nations. CDA as a methodological 
approach emphasises analysis of exclusionary practices, for as Wodak and colleagues 
see CDA, its primary purpose may be described thus: 
 
The  aim  of  Critical  Discourse  Analysis  is  to  unmask  ideologically  permeated  and  often 
obscured  structures  of  power,  political  control,  and  dominance,  as  well  as  strategies  of 
discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use.
79  
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Similarly,  the  CDA  approach  described  by  Stephen  Harold  Riggins  has  been 
particularly concerned with unmasking exclusionist identity constructions that create 
the “Self” and the “Other” as outsider in the language of group definitions.
80 The 
transformation of the discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return law, from 
Ingrian  inclusion  in  1990  to  subsequent  exclusion  as  the  policy  was  reformed 
throughout the remainder of its validity, creates a shifting categorisation of Ingrians as 
first insiders in the Finnish national community, and then as the “Other” and outsider. 
There is thus a transition in language from inclusion to exclusion. The language of 
inclusion  and  exclusion  in  this  policy  avenue  may  reveal  not  only  the  nature  of 
exclusionary practices as they affect Ingrians, but also broader patterns of national 
identity  construction  that  exclude  non-Ingrian  or  non-returnee  migrants  from 
politically  salient  definitions  of  Finnishness.  The  strategies  of  discriminatory 
inclusion and exclusion in the discourses employed are presented in this thesis as 
“discursive resources”, the characteristics that are constructed as constitutive elements 
of Finnish identity, and employed as resources within the political discussion to assert 
an  ideology  of  inclusive  or  exclusive  relationship  between  Finnish  identity  and 
Ingrians. 
 
In reading the approximately 50 available parliamentary and legal texts concerning 
Ingrian  Finns  and  their  status  in  Finland,  I  have  identified  in  my  analysis  of  the 
language employed by Finnish policy-makers five core discursive resources. These 
five discursive resources cover the entire language of Finnish politicians and laws on 
Ingrian Finns, as the construction of Finnish identity in each text employs one or more 
of these discursive resources to convey Ingrian inclusion or exclusion in Finland. 
These resources are termed in this thesis as 1) the Finnish language, 2) the Lutheran 
religion, 3) an ancestral connection to ancient or pre-statehood Finland, 4) a socio-
cultural orientation towards Sweden and Western Europe, in part through the socio-
legal legacy from the Swedish Kingdom, which survived past 1809, and 5) a history 
of animosity and struggle against Russia/the USSR, from the Great Northern War of 
1700-1721 to the Winter and Continuation Wars of 1939-1944. The Ingrian Finnish 
migration to Finland, I argue, presented Finnish politicians with a chance to evaluate 
or re-evaluate Ingrian conformity to these characteristics, as well as potentially the 
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relative significance of these discursive resources as indicators of Finnish identity at 
this time.  
 
I have defined and categorised these resources based on an analysis of the primary 
and related data; all statements on the nature of Finnish identity in these data address 
at least one of these categories. These discursive resources are employed in Finnish 
political discourses on the Right to Return law, in whole or in part, as the elements of 
Finnish  identity.  I  do  not  posit  that  these  particular  discursive  resources  are 
necessarily the only indicators of Finnish identity provided or promoted by Finnish 
politicians at this time, as other representations of Finnish identity may be present in 
studies of other laws or discussions. I have limited myself to the discursive resources 
that are relevant for the Ingrian Right to Return migration discussions. One may see 
instantly limitations to these discursive resources’ applicability to Finnish identity as a 
whole, given Finland’s constitutionally recognised status, for instance, as a bilingual 
state, to say nothing of its long-established linguistic (for instance, the speakers of 
Sami  languages  and  Swedish)  and  confessional  (for  instance,  Finnish  Orthodox) 
minorities. However, these discursive resources are analysed as amalgamating (and 
then, separating) resources, as they link Ingrian Finns to (and then, disconnect them 
from) Finnish identity. Analysing how these characterisations of Finnish identity were 
employed  as  discursive  resources  to  these  ends  is  the  core  research  focus  of  this 
thesis.  
 
E)  Themes 
 
As  the  analytical  framework  employed  in  this  thesis  is  primarily  concerned  with 
analysis  of  meaning,  I  have  begun  my  analysis  by  separating  the  relevant  source 
documents  into  themes,  which  represent  at  the  most  superficial  level  what  these 
documents  are  “about”,  or  what  particular  aspect  or  rationalisation  of  the  Ingrian 
Return they aim to contribute to or challenge. These themes do not represent a formal 
“coding” of the source material, but rather more hypothetical categories that have 
guided  the  way  I  approached  analysis  of  my  primary  source  material.  This  has 
allowed me to analyse how identity is constructed through use of discursive resources 
in  the  different  ways  in  which  the  Ingrian  Return  policy  was  presented.  These 
presentations of the Ingrian Finnish Return law are organised thematically into five  
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interconnected sections that broadly represent the ways the Ingrian Finnish Return 
was discussed by policy-makers. The language of these themes is informed both by 
notions of immigrant integration, and by reference to historical connections between 
Finland and Ingrians. The analysis of the construction of Finnishness pertaining to 
Ingrians in these themes is undertaken across two chapters chronologically, with a 
focus on changes in the construction of Ingrian inclusion in Finnish national identity, 
at first in the era of the initial formation of the policy (1990-1995), and then in the era 
of subsequent reformed and limited formations of the policy (1996-2010).  
 
The themes that have emerged from my initial reading of the primary data describe 
the aim of each speech or data piece, i.e. what position it appears to advocate. All data 
I have come across referring to the Ingrian Return law conforms to at least one of 
these themes, which are frequently also interlinked. These themes have been defined 
and categorised in this thesis as follows:  
  
The theme of integration capability, which highlights the notion that immigrants who 
share common identity constructions with the receiving country will thus be easily 
integrated  into,  or  indeed  already  belong  to,  the  receiving  country’s  dominant  or 
mainstream society, especially when compared to immigrant groups whose identity is 
constructed as different or opposed to the mainstream. In the Finnish context, this 
may also be discussed as related to the negative discourse on Russians (and their 
potential  for  lower  integration  capability  than  Ingrians).  This  theme  also  involves 
notions of homeland, i.e. Finland as the homeland of Ingrian Finns over Ingria itself, 
which relates somewhat to the theme on the legacy of Sweden in this region. The 
focus of the integration capability theme is not the qualification or proof of Ingrian 
Finns’ Finnishness, but rather whether Ingrians evidently are Finnish, and should be 
automatically accepted in Finland as such.  
 
The theme of historical atonement, a significant aspect of right to return policies in 
general as highlighted in the first chapter, which posits that the modern state has 
duties  to  those  who  have  suffered  under  its  previous  incarnations.  In  the  Finnish 
context, this refers particularly to the Second World War history of Ingria, the effects 
of  the  Siege  of  Leningrad  on  the  Ingrian  Finnish  population,  and  the  post-war 
deportation of Ingrian Finnish refugees in Finland to the USSR. This also relates to  
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the theme of a negative appraisal of the Soviet Union by reflecting the Stalin-era 
persecution of ethnic minorities in the USSR, followed by the deportation of Ingrian 
refugees in Finland back to the USSR immediately after the Second World War, and 
later by Finlandisation and Soviet-appeasement within Finnish Cold War-era foreign 
policy. This theme places the onus on Finland, rather than Soviet successor states like 
Russia  or  Estonia,  to  atone  for  Ingrian  suffering  at  the  hands  of  the  Soviet 
government.  
 
The  theme  of  a  humanitarian  imperative,  which  follows  on  from  the  notion  of 
historical atonement, but also alludes to the duty of states to their perceived ethnic kin 
in contemporary situations of instability. In Russia, this includes the notion of the 
“lawless 1990s” (particularly in St Petersburg) and the early 1990s food shortages 
crisis. This theme also relates to the negative theme on Russia and the Soviet Union, 
either as the cause of this humanitarian problem, or as incapable of offering adequate 
protection  to  those  within  its  borders.  Indeed,  Finnish  diplomat  Max  Jakobson 
described the Finnish border with Russia in 1996 as follows: 
 
For centuries, the Finnish-Russian border was the cultural divide between the East and West, 
fought over time and again in repeated clashes of civilizations. For almost 80 years, it was the 
frontline of Western democracy facing Soviet communism. Today, it is the steepest welfare gap 
in Europe.
81 
 
Finnish  perceptions  of  Russia  at  this  time,  as  seen  here,  were  influenced  by 
perceptions  of  living  standards,  with  the  result  that  the  gap  between  Finland  and 
Russia now transcends cultural and political cleavages to become a gap in welfare and 
quality of life. In this theme, Finnish politicians are able to imagine Finland as a 
humanitarian provider for Ingrians, who particularly in the 1990s were vulnerable to 
deprivation in Russia. This deprivation could be driven by Ingrians’ minority status 
and  perceived  outsider  position  within  the  new  Russian-dominated  Russian 
Federation.  
 
The theme of a positive Swedish legacy, which relates to a construction of the era of 
Swedish rule in Finland as a defining period in the formation of modern Finland 
(particularly in terms of legal structure and cultural orientation towards the West). 
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This  theme  may  indicate  either  Ingria  as  linked  to  Finland  through  common 
Swedish/Western heritage (thereby relating it to the first theme on the integration 
capability of Ingrians in Finland), or Ingrian Finns as remnants of a Western nation 
now left on the “wrong” side of the border between Eastern and Western Europe 
(suggested also in the discussions on integration capability and negative relations with 
Russia/the Soviet Union). 
 
Both this positive interpretation of the Swedish period in Finland’s history and the 
negative interpretation of the Russian/Soviet periods discussed in the next section are 
examples of discursively produced interpretations that use history. “History” in this 
sense refers not only to the details of historic fact, but also to the narrative produced 
by “historians” (in this case, Finnish law-makers) using these facts. Historian Keith 
Jenkins argues that “history always conflates, it changes, it exaggerates aspects of the 
past”.
82 He goes on to write: 
 
I have argued that history is a shifting discourse constructed by historians and that from the 
existence of the past no one reading is entailed: change the gaze, shift the perspective and new 
readings appear.
83  
 
Thus,  if  one  moves  past  an  understanding  of  history  as  an  unchanging  narrative 
unrelated to the historian who reproduces it, towards an understanding of history as 
discursively produced to serve a particular discourse objective, the use of history by 
Finnish law-makers becomes a further example of discursive production of national 
identity. In essence, this discursive production of national identity is informed by 
historical themes that are grounded in a certain reading of the past.  
 
By the 1990s, the historiography of the early modern Swedish Kingdom had been re-
animated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Estonia. The 
transformation of the Baltic Sea region, creating what David J. Smith has called the 
“Nordic Near Abroad”, brought with it attempts (most notably, the creation of the 
intergovernmental Council of Baltic Sea States) to replace East-West divides in the 
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region with a new notion of “Northernness”.
84  Even beyond the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain, governments in the 1990s were expanding this idea of Northern European 
identity beyond the Nordic Council states (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway and 
Iceland)  and  into  new  territories  with  conflicting  national  identities.  The 
establishment of the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, a town in 
Schleswig-Holstein,  the  German  state  nearest  the  Danish  border,  was  in  part  a 
response to the history of identity cleavages between German and Danish-speakers 
there.
85 For the former Soviet nations, however, the concept of Northern European 
identity would also have a revisionist aspect. Estonia’s then-Foreign Minister, now 
President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves delivered a notable speech to the Swedish Institute 
for  International  Affairs  on  14  December  1999  arguing  that  Estonia,  as  well  as 
Finland, belonged to a Northern European cultural identity he termed “Yuleland”, 
based on the etymologically related words for Christmas, or Yuletide, found in the 
UK, Finland (Joulu), Estonia (Jõul), Iceland (Jól), Sweden, Denmark and Norway 
(Jul).
86 The historian Pärtel Piirimäe has argued that such new concepts of a broader 
Northern Europe are built on the long-held popular Estonian vision of the “Good Old 
Swedish Age”, marked by enlightened Swedish governance and an improvement in 
peasant living standards (the perception of the Swedish Kingdom has often been that 
of a relatively advanced democracy in early modern Europe, especially since in the 
Swedish  Kingdom,  quite  unlike  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  there  was  nominal 
representation for “peasants”, dependent on how this term is defined, to represent 
themselves in the Swedish Riksdag).
87 In post-Soviet Estonia, for instance, there were 
state-sponsored attempts to link the contemporary state to the old Swedish kingdom, 
with  its  associated  benefits  of  an  established  democratic  pedigree,  including  the 
reconstruction of the Lion of Narva, a Swedish-era monument that Stuart Burch and 
David J. Smith see as “part of a state-sponsored effort to banish the Soviet past and 
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reconnect with a past “Golden Age’’, in 2000.
88 This took place as Estonia sought to 
conversely minimise the physical reminders of its Soviet past, most infamously, the 
removal of the Bronze Soldier monument from central Tallinn in 2007, prompting 
rioting  from  the  city’s  Russian-speaking  minority.
89 Baltic  independence,  and  the 
related decline in Russian influence in the region (though still considerable), allowed 
for  a  certain  re-flowering  of  positive  Swedish  assessment  amongst  its  former 
governed territories on the Baltic, which as previously discussed, also had a long 
tradition in Finnish political discourse. Indeed, negative appraisals of the Paasikivi-
Kekkonen line and Finlandisation, as discussed in chapter two, were grounded in the 
idea, as expressed by Sami Moisio, that it relegated Finland to the status of “a vassal 
state of the Soviet Union and thereby located in ‘Eastern Europe’ – a concept that has 
been highly political since the eighteenth century”.
90 Finland’s status as a Western 
European nation, linked to Sweden, is the reverse side to this; it can be reinforced by 
a  discursive  construction  of  shared  Swedish-Finnish  (and  Ingrian)  history,  and  it 
underlines  Finland’s  claim  to  the  more  politically  desirable  status  of  a  Western 
European state.  
 
The  theme  of  a  negative  Russian/USSR  legacy,  a  counterweight  to  the  previous 
positive interpretation of history, suggests a negative construction of the periods of 
Russian  and  Soviet  control,  both  for  Ingrians  and  Finland,  including  a  negative 
construction of Russians as “the Other”, a common antagonist to Finn and Ingrian 
Finn alike.  
 
The negative reception that Russia and Russians may receive in Finland is an oft-
observed and described phenomenon: the third country report on Finland from the 
Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance in 2007 
cited Russian-speakers in Finland as an “at-risk” group, noting negative perceptions 
of Russians amongst society and within the public and political discourse.
91 Indeed, 
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the report notes the use of Finnish derogatory terms for Russian-speakers, such as the 
fairly  ubiquitous  ryssä, denoting  a  Russian  but  considered  as  a  general  insult  as 
opposed  to  the  more  neutral  term  venäläinen  Likewise,  Helsingin  Sanomat  has 
reported on the results of an extensive Gallup International poll that revealed 64% of 
Finnish respondents had a “very negative” or “somewhat negative” view of Russia 
(only amongst respondents from Kosovo was the percentage expressing a negative 
view of Russians higher).
92 The memory and public commemoration of independence 
and the Winter and Continuation Wars, strengthening the image of Russians as the 
independent Finnish nation state’s historical enemy, underscores this perception.
93 In 
essence,  this  discourse  presents  the  Cold  War  period  as  evidence  of  Russian 
otherness, in opposition to the Western/Nordic tradition to which Finns and Ingrians 
are deemed to belong, as well as highlighting the vulnerability of Ingrian Finns (and 
more  broadly,  related  Finnic-language  speaking  groups)  as  minorities  in  Russia, 
evidenced through Ingrian suffering under Soviet rule. 
 
Figure 13 
Summary of Themes and Discursive Resources 
 
 
                                                 
92 “International Poll: Anti-Russian Sentiment Runs Very Strong in Finland”, Helsingin Sanomat - 
International Edition, 11 October 2004, available online at URL:  
<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/International+poll+Anti-
Russian+sentiment+runs+very+strong+in+Finland/1076154202275>, accessed 23 May 2012.  
93 Petri J. Raivo, “This is Where They Fought: Finnish War Landscapes as a National Heritage”, in 
T.G. Ashplant, G. Dawson and E. Roper (eds), The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, 
London: Routlegde, 2000, pp. 145-64.   
  124 
 
I argue in this thesis that in each theme of discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return 
law, there was a change in the way Ingrians were presented by Finnish policymakers 
in relation to the discursive resources of Finnish identity construction. Dividing the 
analysis  of  the  discussion  on  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return  law  into  themes  thereby 
allows  the  analysis  to  address  the  various  changes  in  the  different  facets  of  this 
discussion.  
 
F)  Sources 
 
In compiling this analysis for my thesis, I have primarily drawn on the language of 
the  Ingrian  Right  to  Return  provisions  in  the  1991  Finnish  Aliens  Act  and  its 
amendments  (1996,  2002  and  2010),  as  well  as  the  parliamentary  questions  and 
committee reports from the Eduskunta, the Finnish parliament. I have also examined 
the  reports  and  recommendations  of  several  Finnish  ministries,  including  the 
Työministeriö (Ministry of Labour), Sisäasianministeriö (Ministry of Interior Affairs), 
Ulkoasiainministeriö (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Sosiaali- ja Terveysministeriö 
(Ministry of Health and Social Services), which reflect the fact that responsibility for 
immigration in Finland is spread amongst several different government bodies.
94  
 
The  Eduskunta  parliamentary  questions  and  statements  make  up  the  bulk  of  my 
primary data. Of these, the written questions (kirjalliset kysymykset) submitted by 
members  of  the  Eduskunta  to  ministers  are  the  most  common.  Generally,  these 
questions  ask  for  clarification  from  relevant  ministries  as  to  how  policy  is  being 
implemented, and whether a particular factor is being considered. Other forms of data 
from  the  Eduskunta are  budget  allocation  requests  (talousarvioaloitteet)  and  new 
budget initiatives (raha-asia-aloitteet) from Eduskunta members, which request or 
suggest funding for new or expanded programs, in this case particularly concerned 
with  integration  programs  and  pension  provisions  for  Ingrians  in  Finland.  These 
forms  of  political  data  are  employed  across  the  timeframe  of  this  thesis,  but  are 
particularly dominant for the later period of analysis (1996 – 2010). In part, this is 
reflective  of  constitutional  changes  to  Finland  at  this  time:  reforms  in  the  1990s, 
                                                 
94 Hilson, The Nordic Model, pp. 172-3.  
  125 
including 28 new amendments to the Constitutional Acts of Finland, and eventually a 
new Constitution in 2000, curtailed presidential powers in favour of the Eduskunta 
and  limited  the  significance  of  the  presidency  as  a  decision-making  institution.
95 
Thus,  whereas  explanations  of  political  decisions  by  President  Koivisto  are  of 
paramount importance in the analysis of the Return policy in its early period (see 
chapter four), the positions of subsequent Presidents Martti Ahtisaari (in office 1994-
2000)  and  Tarja  Halonen  (in  office  2000-2012)  on  the  Ingrians  are  relatively 
unknown. By this stage, the Eduskunta had become the exclusive political institution 
considering the Ingrian Return law, and thus by this stage in the thesis, analysis has 
moved to focus largely on its members and ministers.  
 
It should also be noted here that the nature of political sources in Finland impinges on 
the  analysis  possible  in  this  thesis.  Finland’s  party  system  has  traditionally  been 
dominated  by  three  parties,  the  Kansallinen Kokoomus (National  Coalition  Party), 
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (Finnish Social Democratic Party) and Suomen 
Keskusta (Finnish Centre Party). These are organised around traditional left-right and 
centre-periphery  cleavages  –  the  National  Coalition  serving  the  centre-right,  the 
Social Democrats the centre-left, and the Centre Party being traditionally agrarian and 
in favour of decentralisation from the metropole in Helsinki.
96 Though together these 
parties have garnered an average of 63% of the national vote since 1945, none has 
formed a government outright in this same period.
97 Coalition governments uniting 
two of the three major parties have been the norm, the most common being the “red-
earth” (punamulta) partnership between the Centre and Social Democrat parties,
98 
though in the period of greatest relevance to this thesis (1990-2010), there have also 
been  porvari  (bourgeois)  Centre-National  Coalition  coalitions  (1991-1995,  2007-
2011) and sinipuna (red-blue) Social Democrat-National Coalition coalitions (1995-
2003). These two-party alliances have not, however, governed alone; rather, they have 
always involved a few smaller, niche interest parties, which include those aligned to 
the environmentalist cause (Vihreä liitto, The Greens of Finland), the broadly defined 
leftist  movement  (Vasemmistoliito,  Left  Alliance),  a  particular  minority  group 
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(Svenska folkpartiet i Finland, or Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue, the Swedish 
People’s Party of Finland), and even populism (Suomen Maaseudun Puolue, Finnish 
Rural  Party,  or  more  recently,  Perussuomalaiset,  True  Finns).
99 Frequently,  and 
indeed  in  20  of  the  last  37  governments  formed  in  Finland  since  1945,  Finnish 
governments have actually involved a “surplus majority” – a coalition government 
including more parties than actually necessary to form government.
100 This is fairly 
unique in the Nordic region, and is largely informed by history and constitutional 
peculiarities  in  Finland,  including  a  constitutional  provision  (ended  in  1992)  that 
allowed a third of MPs to delay final adoption of an ordinary law until after the next 
election.
101 Prior to 1992, this meant that a successful government required more than 
an  absolute  majority,  and  was  obliged  to  include  smaller  parties  in  a  larger 
coalition.
102 From this basis, Finnish political culture has embraced the tradition of 
large  coalition  governments,  which  has  also  aided  in  balancing  cabinet 
assignments.
103  
 
From reading Eduskunta sources, one also sees these broad coalitions have an effect 
on the political language in Finland, which is considerably less adversarial than in 
largely two-party systems like the Westminster model.
104 All of the current political 
parties in Finland have experienced time in coalition government, with one notable 
exception, the True Finns.
105 Political scientists examining Finland’s party system, 
such as Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, as well as Johanna Korhonen, have recently 
begun arguing that the True Finns, who have challenged the pro-European political 
consensus  amongst  the  other  parties,  have  presented  a  challenge  to  the  Nordic 
coalition-consensus  model  in  Finland  and  could  make  the  language  of  Finnish 
political discourse more adversarial, with issue-based cleavages more apparent.
106 Yet 
these  developments  are  very  recent,  dating  primarily  from  the  True  Finns’ 
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unprecedented electoral gains in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election,
107 and are 
thus largely outside this thesis’ timeframe. By and large, the language of Finnish 
political discourse surrounding the Ingrian Finnish law shows the level of consensus 
encouraged by the party system’s broad coalition nature. It is important to note this 
here,  as  such  language  obscures  potential  party  disagreements  on  this  issue,  and 
Finnish political source documents may thus give an illusion of greater consensus 
than may actually exist on a particular issue.    
 
Indeed, the consensus-orientated nature of Finnish politics extends into the decision-
making process, which may also present a challenge to using Finnish political sources 
as  documents  for  analysis.  In  particular,  this  may  further  obscure  potential  party 
disagreements  on  policy  within  both  the  government  itself  and  the  Eduskunta. 
Finland,  like  its  Scandinavian  neighbours,  works  on  a  political  decision-making 
system of so-called Nordic “consensus democracy”, characterised in part by “a high 
degree  of  concertation  in  the  gestation  of  public  policy”.
108 Government  bills  are 
generally introduced in plenary sessions, but are then sent to inter-party specialised 
committees, where the proposed bill’s details are debated and agreed upon, before 
returning to plenary for final decision.
109 As all political parties are represented in 
these  committees,  the  bill  they  produce  would  be  unlikely  to  face  significant 
opposition by the time it is voted on in parliament. Individual members of parliament 
may also submit a Member’s Initiative as a legislative proposal, but by contrast, these 
rarely make it past the first plenary session, and are employed primarily to attract 
attention or awareness from the media or general public.
110   
 
However, of greatest significance for this research project has been that, though the 
reports  produced  by  the  relevant  committee  on  legislation  related  to  the  Ingrian 
Return policy are available to read, along with materials from experts the committee 
members have consulted, the protocols of committee meetings are not. There is thus 
no chance to find evidence here of any party disagreements that may have arisen on 
the policy in its gestation stage, and it is not possible to learn what, if any, parts of the 
                                                 
107 Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, pp. 118-9. 
108 Arter, Democracy in Scandinavia, p. 6.  
109 Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, p. 89.  
110 Kyösti Pekonen, “Two Versions of Representative Talk in Finnish Parliament”, in S. Soininen and 
T. Turkka, The Parliamentary Style of Politics, Helsinki: The Finnish Political Science Association, 
2008, p. 213.   
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policy were contentious at the time of initial debate. What one sees, rather, is that 
when politicians have publically questioned the provisions of the Right to Return 
policy (from both within and outside the government), the government has ultimately 
responded with amendments to the policy. There is no need for intense criticism of 
the policy, as virtually all parties have had a hand in its design and implementation. It 
is therefore not possible to form a conclusive schema of the Finnish political spectrum 
on  this  particular  policy  issue  based  on  the  available  documentation  from  the 
Eduskunta. I have kept this in mind when conducting the analysis in this thesis – the 
absence of strong political debate on the issue, as well as a policy development that 
follows the issues raised in parliament quite directly, may not be taken as proof that 
the national identity constructions produced by this policy are wholly uncontested.   
 
The core primary research data for this thesis is a collection of approximately 50 
statements to parliament (primarily in the form of members’ initiatives or written 
questions to government ministers) and government acts. Additionally, I have used a 
smaller  number  of  commissioned  ministerial  and  committee  reports,  and  recorded 
speeches and interviews from prominent Finnish political figures. Materials from the 
Eduskunta,  ministerial  reports  and  many  of  the  recorded  political  speeches  by 
President Koivisto and others are available either only in Finnish, or in Finnish and 
Swedish.  Quotations  from  these  sources  use  the  original  Finnish-language  texts, 
which I have translated to English (unless otherwise noted in the footnote reference 
for the citation). In the conclusion of the thesis I discuss further avenues for research 
in this field, including linguistic and structural analysis methodologies that may be 
undertaken by native or near-native Finnish speakers.  
 
Finally, I acknowledge the potential limitations to the results found in this thesis that 
arise from the limitations of conducting research on a single policy. From an analysis 
of the Ingrian Return policy, we can only know what that particular policy tells us 
about Finnish identity construction. Analysis of a different policy, or set of policies, 
could yield a different set of discursive resources to describe Finnish identity. Given 
the significance of immigration and citizenship policies in legally codifying identity 
constructions at a state level, such policies are an important data source for analysis of 
national identity construction. For Finland, the nature of the Ingrian Return law as an 
extensive immigration program responding to particularly significant changes in the  
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economic and political environments makes it particularly important for analysis. It is 
not, however, the only policy that can be analysed in such a manner. 
 
G)  Summary 
 
The  methodological  toolkit  employed  in  this  thesis  is  an  adaptation  of  discourse 
analysis  informed  by  poststructuralist  and  critical  discourse  analysis  theories, 
particularly  the  Viennese  School  of  CDA  as  expressed  primarily  by  Wodak  and 
colleagues  examining  meaning  in  political  discussions  and  policy  language  as 
production and reproduction of exclusivist and essentialist national identity concepts. 
I differ from Wodak and colleagues in my exclusive focus on meaning over linguistic 
and grammatical structures, which arises from the nature of my primary data. I follow 
CDA’s assertion that language as discourse is historical, and should be viewed within 
its context, by focusing on the changing socio-political, economic and international 
relations  situation  in  Finland  as  the  policy  was  developed,  reformulated,  and 
ultimately  cancelled.  This  includes  the  changing  context  for  Finland  both  in  the 
political development of post-Cold War Europe and the diversification of immigration 
and the Finnish citizenry, particularly explored in chapter five.  
 
I undertake this analysis by organising source documents chronologically, separated 
into an initial period of implementation (chapter four) between 1990 and 1995 and a 
later  period  of  reforms  and  restrictions  (chapter  five)  from  1996,  ultimately 
culminating in the policy’s end in 2010.  Within these two chapters, I have organised 
discussion around five identified themes in the political discussion, which indicate the 
aspect of rationale for the Ingrian Return policy the speaker is addressing at the most 
superficial  level.  I  analyse  how  each  theme  shows  change  or  consistency  in  the 
construction  of  Finnishness,  and  how  Ingrians  are  seen  to  conform  to  this,  by 
examining the discursive resources of Finnishness represented in their discussion.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINNISHNESS AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INGRIAN FINNISH 
RETURN 1990-1995 
 
This chapter explores the constructions of Finnish identity present in the political 
discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return in its initial incarnation, from early 1990 to 
1995, just before the implementation of additional requirements to the law in 1996. 
Finnish  politicians’  language  on  Ingrian  Finns  and  their  “return”  to  Finland 
immediately  after  1990  reflects  distinct  presentations  of  Finnishness  and  what  it 
specifically  entails.  As  highlighted  in  chapter  three,  I  argue  that  five  principal 
characteristics  of  Finnish  identity  emerge  within  these  discussions  –  namely  the 
Finnish language, Lutheran religion, ancestral connection to ancient or early modern 
(usually pre-Russian annexation in 1809) Finland, a cultural and political orientation 
that points westward to Scandinavia, and a history of struggle against the East, Russia 
or the Soviet Union – which are employed by Finnish politicians here as discursive 
resources  to  include  (or  potentially  exclude)  Ingrians  in  their  construction  of 
Finnishness.  
 
Political discussions on Ingrian Finnish return migration, as described in this chapter, 
began in the early 1990s with an assumption that Ingrians largely conformed to these 
characteristics and were thus part of an identification of Finnishness that goes beyond 
citizenship status to more ethno-cultural constructions of national identity. One may 
argue  that  individually,  these  strands  of  Finnish  identity  have  never  accurately 
reflected  the  Finnish  population.  Notably,  they  fail  to  include  Swedish  and  Sami 
speakers who are officially recognised by the Finnish state, and there is a Finnish 
Orthodox  Church  with  adherents  primarily  in  the  provinces  of  North  and  South 
Karelia in Eastern Finland. However, the accuracy of these identity characteristics is a 
separate  argument,  and  of  limited  significance  to  how  Finnishness  was  actually 
presented by politicians at this time.  Groups that do not conform to one identity 
characteristic may perform an important symbolic function for another. For example, 
non-native Finnish speakers like the Sami or Karelians may form an important link 
between  contemporary  Finnish  language/culture  and  its  related  Finno-Ugric 
antecedents, underscoring the characteristic of an ancestral relationship to pre-historic  
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Finland. Similarly, the Swedish-speaking community may serve as a living memento 
of Finland’s Swedish past, associated with its cultural and historical ties to the West 
and Scandinavia and the arrival of Lutheranism in Finland.  
 
Ingrians are initially discussed in the Finnish political context as largely conforming 
to  these  five  discursive  resources  of  Finnish  identity  present  in  the  political 
discussions.  With  post-1990  return  migration,  and  actual  contact  with  Ingrians, 
Finnish lawmakers appeared to acknowledge that, in fact, their conforming to many 
of these identity markers was more problematic than anticipated. Yet at this point, 
there was not yet any real challenge to the idea that Ingrian Finns were inextricably 
linked to the Finnish nation state, or that their "lost Finnishness” couldn’t be rapidly 
regained. It is a primordialist presentation of identity that, for the most part, emerges 
in these early discussions of Ingrian return migration, which presupposes a connection 
to  the  Finnish  nation  state  based  on  shared  Finnishness.  Though  these  discursive 
resources as constructions of Finnish identity may fail, as acknowledged by the mid 
1990s,  to  present  themselves  fully  within  the  new  Ingrian  Finnish  community  in 
Finland,  Finnish  lawmakers  appeared  at  this  time  to  believe  this  version  of 
Finnishness remained within the Ingrians, buried deep in spirit and soul, ready to be 
rediscovered once back on Finnish soil.  
 
This chapter discusses the political discourses on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return 
between  1990  and  1995,  in  first  part,  by  examining  the  background  to  Mauno 
Koivisto’s April 1990 statement and the initial legislation (though minimal) on this 
issue.  From  here,  the  chapter  discusses  five  distinct  but  interrelated  themes  that 
emerge in the political discussion on Ingrians, which in the immediate period assume 
Ingrian  conformity  to  the  aforementioned  five  discursive  resources  constructing 
Finnish identity, though evidence of change emerges by mid-decade. This chapter will 
therefore firstly review the Koivisto interview of 1990 and its significance in shaping 
the Right to Return policy above any concrete or specific legal provision or legislation 
on Ingrians, before proceeding to analyse each discussion theme, and the views of 
Ingrian identity (consistent, or changing) they present. Such an analysis reveals a 
rather resilient construction of Ingrians as linked to the Finnish state, which actually 
continues  even  past  acknowledgements  in  the  discourse  themes  of  the  limits  of 
Ingrian conformity to the most significant constructions of Finnish identity.    
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A)  Mauno Koivisto’s Statement and Initial Legislation on the Ingrian Return 
1990-1995 
 
Although Finnish immigration legislation around the time of the Ingrian Return law’s 
inception in the early 1990s does provide some qualifications for how returnee status 
should be allocated, the decision to include Ingrians as returnees was effectively made 
at the discretion of then President Mauno Koivisto in early 1990. By the late 1980s, 
reform  of  Finland’s  immigration  and  citizenship  laws  had  already  begun,  and  the 
Ministry of the Interior had received a report from Parliament’s Working Group on 
the Aliens Act (Ulkomaalaislakityöryhmä) in February 1989 with recommendations 
on the drafting of a new law. This report’s opinion on returnee status had clearly 
defined generational limits in its applicability, as it states when considering those 
entitled to be granted returnee status: “The committee considers those foreigners that 
have family roots in Finland, that is at least one parent being or having been a Finnish 
citizen, to be in the same position as a Finnish citizen”.
1 This formation of Finnish 
immigration policy appears most relevant for the pre-1990 context, in which returnee 
status was aimed primarily at those Finnish citizens who had left in the 1950s and 
1960s for Sweden and North America and their immediate families, as discussed in 
the second chapter of this thesis. However, by late 1989 and the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, the shifts in Finland’s international context were apparent, and were highlighted 
at  several  points  throughout  1989-1990  by  President  Koivisto  and  his  ministers. 
Discussion  of  Finland’s  immigration  policy  shifted  eastwards,  transforming  a 
discussion  of  Ingria  and  Ingrian  Finns  in  purely  humanitarian-aid  terms  into  a 
discussion on immigration and the “Finnishness” of Ingrians.   
 
Early on in the history of the Ingrian Finnish issue after the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
plans to transfer the Ingrian population from Russia based on political views of their 
cultural  heritage  and  identity  were  also  discussed  in  newly  independent  Estonia. 
Arnold Rüütel, Chairman of the Estonian Soviet from 1990-1992 (and later President 
                                                 
1 Ulkomaalaislakityöryhmä, Ulkomaalaislakityöryhmän Mietintö, Helsinki: 
Sisäasiainministeriö/Valtion Painatuskeskus, 1989, pp. 10-1. Original Finnish text: Entisen Suomen 
kansalaisen kanssa samassa asemassa työryhmä katsoo olevan ulkomaalaisen, jonka sukujuuret ovat 
Suomessa, eli jonka vanhemmista ainakin toinen on tai on ollut Suomen kansalainen.  
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from 2001-2006), floated the idea of creating an autonomous Ingrian Finnish region 
of Estonia, as he discussed in an interview with Finnish television: 
 
Because there were many Ingrians in  Estonia, I proposed a referendum on whether these 
Finno-Ugric people wanted an autonomous district in Russia or Estonia. Estonia didn’t have 
anything against the idea that Ingrians would become part of Estonia, but the people should be 
given the right to decide democratically.
2  
 
This  plan,  however,  would  ultimately  come  to  nothing.  Rüütel  describes  his 
discussions with his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin, and attempts to continue the 
plan once a new President and Prime Minister took office in Estonia in October 1992: 
 
Yeltsin said that he was unfamiliar with the situation but would look into it and we could meet 
and discuss it later. I gave President Lennart Meri and Prime Minister Mart Laar the notes 
from my discussion with Yeltsin, and I hoped that they would use them. However, it seems 
that they did not act that way.
3 
 
This discussion on planned Ingrian migration to Estonia is often overlooked in the 
discussion on the Finnish Right to Return law. Finland was not, it transpires, the only 
nation  to  set  itself  up  as  the  protector  of  perceived  ethnic  kin  in  Russia.  Indeed, 
Rüütel’s own description of Ingrians as a Finno-Ugric people (thus also related to 
Estonians in a broader Finno-Ugric identity construction), and his impression that 
Ingrians  would  live  better  amongst  their  related  kin  in  Estonia  than  in  Russia, 
parallels concurrent discussions amongst Finnish politicians presented in this chapter. 
However, the lack of interest, willingness or political capital from future Estonian 
leaders in pursuing this area has meant that the Finnish policy for Ingrian migration 
from Russia became the dominant policy program concerning Ingrians at this time.  
 
According to Seppo Tiitinen, the director of Finland’s Secret Police (Suojelupoliisi, or 
Supo) from 1978 to 1990, Koivisto’s initial concerns were humanitarian, and began to 
                                                 
2 “Jää hyvästi, Inkerinmaa”, Ulkolinja, 12 September 2013. Broadcast by YLE TV1, Finland. Based on 
Finnish translation of original Estonian interview. Original Finnish text: Koska Virossa oli paljon 
inkeriläisiä, ehdotin kansanäänestystä siitä, haluaako tämä suomalais-ugrilainen kansa autonomisen 
alueen osaksi Venäjää vai Viroa. Virolla ei ole mitään sitä vastaan, että inkeriläiset tulevat osaksi 
Viroa, mutta kansalle pitaä antaa oikeus päättää siitä demokraattisesti.  
3 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Jeltsin sanoi, ettei tunne asiaa mutta hän perehtyy siihen, minkä jälkeen 
voimme tavata uudelleen ja keskustella siitä. Annoin presidentti Lennart Merelle ja pääministeri Mart 
Laarille Jeltsinin kanssa käymieni keskustelujen muistiinpanot ja toivon, että he käyttäisivät niitä. 
Näyttää kuitenkin siltä, että he eivät toimineet niin.   
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take shape concretely in early 1990. In an interview presented on Finnish television in 
2013, Tiitinen claimed: 
 
Koivisto’s starting point was that the Ingrians, mainly the older generation, had endured much 
over the decades. Therefore, for the Finnish side it could be justified to arrange for them better 
living conditions than would be possible in the Soviet Union. On that basis, Koivisto wanted 
to  know  the  number  of  Ingrians  and  the  potential  effects  if  a  large  number  were  moved 
here…It was actually on 18
 January 1990, when Koivisto gave me the task of informing the 
Ministry of the Interior that we would be prepared to take in the Ingrians.
4  
 
 
It  was  approximately  three  months  later  that  President  Koivisto  discussed  this 
decision publicly, and advanced his own rationale for making it. On 10 April 1990, 
Koivisto gave an interview on foreign policy on the Finnish national broadcasting 
company’s current affairs talk show Ajankohtainen kakkonen. Questions focused at 
first  on  the  emerging  Baltic  republics  and  the  changing  security  circumstances  in 
Europe with a reunifying Germany, all topics Koivisto had highlighted in speeches in 
the  previous  months,  before  turning  to  the  topic  of  Koivisto’s  Ingrian  policy. 
Interviewer Ilkka Saari posed the question:   
 
Let’s go then generally to this question of public opinion’s influence on foreign policy. Is 
public opinion, or has it been, influencing the fact that Finland has now decided to take in 
Ingrians to the country?
5  
 
 
In response, Koivisto outlined his rationale for expanding the Right to Return policy 
from the generational limits outlined in the 1989 Committee Report to encompass the 
Ingrian Finns. Pausing briefly to consider his words, he replied: 
 
I don’t believe so. You see, this is a question of relatively modest proportions, at least so far. 
Perhaps it has had some influence. In any case, it’s about the fact that these are Finns, who by 
Swedish decree at the time were transferred to the area, and for example in religion are very 
                                                 
4 “Jää hyvästi, Inkerinmaa”, author’s own transcription. Original Finnish text: Koiviston lähtökohtansa 
oli se, että inkeriläiset, lähinnä vanhemman polven, olivat vuosikymmenten saatossa kokeneet kovia. 
Siksi voisi olla Suomen kannalta perusteltua järjestää heille viimeisten elinvuosien olot paremmiksi 
kuin ne Neuvostoliitossa voisivat olla. Siltä pohjalta [Koivisto] halusi tietää inkeriläisten lukumäärän 
ja myös mahdolliset vaikutukset, jos heitä alettaisiin laajemmassa määrin tänne ottaa…Se oli tosiaan 
tammikuussa, tammikuun 18. päivä 1990, kun Koivusto antoi mulle tehtäväksi ilmoittaa 
sisäministeriölle, että tulisi luoda valmius ottaa inkeriläisiä vastaan.  
5 “Ilkka Saari and Eero Ojanperä interview President Mauno Koivisto”, Ajankohtainen kakkonen, 10 
April 1990.Broadcast by YLE 2, Finland. Author’s own transcription. Original Finnish text: 
Mennäänpä sitten yleensä tähän kysymykseen kansalaismielipiteen vaikutuksesta ulkopolitiikkaan. 
Onko, tai oliko kansalaismielipiteellä vaikutusta siihen, että Suomi on nyt päättänyt ottaa maahan 
inkeriläisiä?  
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strongly Lutheran rather than Orthodox, so yes they are suitable for these Right to Return 
criteria, although they have lived there [in Ingria] for a long time.
6   
 
Despite his own assertion that the issue was of only modest importance in Finnish 
foreign policy, Koivisto’s comments on the Ingrians are significant in that they reveal 
a construction of Finnish identity tied to the West, specifically through the Lutheran 
religion,  which  separates  Finns  and  Ingrians  alike  from  Russians  in  the  Gulf  of 
Finland region. Koivisto’s aforementioned statements later that year in Paris on the 
relative stability of the Nordic region against the increasing ethnic fragmentation of 
the  Soviet  Union-in-crisis,
7 along  with  his  several  statements  linking  Finland’s 
historical ties to Scandinavia to notions of human rights and stability,
8 have indicated 
a discourse of Finland’s belonging in the Nordic region as positively distinguishing it 
from  Russia  and  the  USSR.  The  use  of  Lutheranism  and  Swedish  history  as  
discursive resources links Ingrians to this positive construction of Norden and the 
West.   
 
Finland  was  by  no  means  alone  amongst  Western  nations  in  pursuing  a  Right  to 
Return policy at this time: as noted by Liebkind et al., in the 1980s and 1990s around 
a million Soviet and ex-Soviet citizens emigrated to Israel, Germany or Greece based 
on  similar  right  to  return  policies  built  on  conceptions  of  ancestry  and  an  ethno-
culturally defined national community.
9 Here in Koivisto’s statement, however, some 
early incarnations of the central discursive resources involved in constructing Finnish 
identity are already present. The ancestral connection, the common Lutheran faith and 
to a certain extent the notion of cultural inheritance from Sweden are mentioned, and 
presented  quite  matter-of-factly  as  evidence  of  the  Finnishness  of  Ingrians.  A 
statement on the identity of Finns, which here includes Ingrians, thus emerges from 
Koivisto’s earliest approaches to Ingria, the fall of the Soviet Union and migration 
reform.  
                                                 
6 Ibid. Original Finnish text: En uskoisi. Tässähän on kysymys verrattain vaatimattomasta, 
vaatimattomista, mittasuhteista ainakin toistaiseksi. Ehkä sillä on ollut joku vaikutus. Joka tapauksessa 
on kysymys siitä, että nämä ovat suomalaisia, jotka Ruotsin vallan toimesta aikoinaan on sille alueelle 
siirretty, esimerkiksi uskonnoltaan he ovat hyvin vahvasti Luterilaisia, eivätkä Ortodoksisia, niin että 
heihin kyllä soveltuvat nämä takaisinmuuttajien kriteerit, vaikka nämä suvut ovat siellä varsin pitkään 
eläneet.   
7 Koivisto, “Speech by the President of the Republic, Mauno Kovisto, at the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe on May 9, 1990”, p. 7.  
8 Koivisto, Foreign Policy Standpoints, p. 180. 
9 Karmela Liebkind, Simo Mannila, Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, Magdalena Jaakola, Eve Kyntäjä and Anni 
Reuter, Venäläinen, virolainen, suomalainen, Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2004, pp. 23-4  
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On 22 February 1991, some ten months after the Koivisto interview on Ajankohtainen 
kakkonen,  the  Eduskunta  passed  the  new  1991  Aliens  Act,  which  reformed  the 
immigration system per the instructions of the 1989 Committee report. The core area 
of concern for Ingrian Finnish would-be returnees, Section 18, reads as follows: 
 
The conditions for granting residence permits abroad 
A temporary residence permit may be granted if 
1)  a close relative of the alien resides in Finland or if the alien has other ties to Finland, 
2)  the alien will be studying at an educational institution in Finland and his/her 
livelihood is secure, 
3)  the alien may be granted a work permit, or if his/her income in Finland is otherwise 
secured, or if 
4)  there are compelling humanitarian reasons or other special reasons for granting a 
license.
10 
 
At first glance, the legislative language appears unremarkable. There is no specific 
mention of Ingrians or other groups to draw immediate attention. However, when 
viewed with Koivisto’s decision on Ingrians and his April 1990 statement in mind, 
points one and four of the new Aliens Act appear sufficiently broad to encompass 
returnee status for the Ingrian Finns, depending on if the core argument is for the 
Ingrians’ connection to Finland, which would be covered in point one.  This comes 
despite Koivisto’s own admission that the homeland of the Ingrians had been Russia 
for “some time”. Alternatively, there are the humanitarian concerns, and the move to 
protect Ingrian Finns from inferred persecution, hostility and hardship in the USSR 
and Russian Federation, which would be covered in point four. The 1991 Aliens Act, 
although amended numerous times, and with specific effect for the Ingrian Finnish 
returnees in 1996 and 2002-2003 (as discussed in chapter five of this thesis), was the 
primary legal document codifying Finnish returnee immigration. The 1991 Act was 
replaced  in  2004  by  a  new  Aliens  Act,  though  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return  policy 
continued as a feature of Finnish immigration law until 2010.   
 
                                                 
10 “Ulkomaalaislaki”, FINLEX Valtion säädöstietopankki, available online at URL: 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1991/19910378> , accessed 1 March 2012. Original Finnish text: 
Edellytykset oleskeluluvan myöntämiselle ulkomailla. Määräaikainen oleskelulupa voidaan myöntää, 
jos: 1) ulkomaalaisen lähiomainen asuu Suomessa tai ulkomaalaisella on muu side Suomeen, 2) 
ulkomaalainen tulee opiskelemaan Suomessa olevaan oppilaitokseen ja hänen toimeentulonsa on 
turvattu, 3) ulkomaalaiselle voidaan myöntää työlupa tai hänen toimeentulonsa Suomessa on muutoin 
turvattu; taikka 4) painava humanitaarinen tai muu erityinen syy puoltaa luvan myöntämistä.   
  137 
Between 1990 and 1995, there was no specific legal language concerning the status of 
Soviet, Russian or Estonian citizens as Finnish returnees. Indeed, in November 1991 
Social Democrat parliamentarian Paavo Lipponen (who, incidentally, had worked in 
the office of Mauno Koivisto when the latter served as Prime Minister in the late 
1970s  and  early  1980s)  submitted  a  written  question  to  Parliament  on  this  issue, 
noting: 
 
For  Ingrians,  there  has  not  been  created  any  form  of  returnee  program.  State  and  local 
authorities have been forced to work on Ingrian return matters without a complete program 
and  a  clear  definition  of  returnee  status…A  lack  of  legislative  basis  has  in  part  made  it 
difficult for expatriate Finns to come and settle in Finland. Among other things, whether they 
have the right to vote is a question awaiting an answer.
11 
 
A response to Lipponen’s question came from the Labour Minister Ilkka Kanerva, yet 
Kanerva  is  brief  and  matter-of-fact  on  the  legal  basis  for  Ingrian  returnee  status, 
noting only that “Soviet Finns were designated returnees in April 1990”.
12 In light of 
later  statements  provided  by  Tiitinen,  indicating  that  the  decision  to  designate 
Ingrians as returnees was taken some months before Koivisto publically announced 
the shift in April 1990, this statement does not appear wholly accurate. No suggestion 
of plans to legally codify Ingrian return migration is given, and justification appears 
to rest uniquely on Koivisto’s own initiative.   
 
Later,  in  1993,  another  Social  Democrat,  Raimo  Vuoristo,  submitted  a  written 
question to the Interior Minister on the provisions for granting citizenship to Ingrian 
arrivals, noting the lack of a government statement regarding “on what basis return 
rights are granted, and what in fact the concept of ‘returnees’ means”.
13 Vuoristo also 
discusses the difficulties in “proving” Finnishness to the authorities, as in earlier cases 
a Soviet passport with Finnish as internal nationality was required, but post-1991, 
                                                 
11 Paavo Lipponen, “Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten paluumuuttajien aseman parantamisesta”, KK 
340/1991, Valtiopäivät 1991: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1991, p. 1. Original Finnish text: 
Inkeriläisiä varten ei ole kuitenkaan luotu minkäänlaista paluumuutto-ohjelmaa. Valtion ja kuntien 
viranomaiset ovat joutuneet toimimaan inkeriläisten paluumuuttoasioissa ilman kokonaisohjelmaa ja 
selkeää paluumuuttajan määritelmää… Säädöspohjan puutteellisuus on vaikeuttanut omalta osaltaan 
ulkosuomalaisten paluumuuttajien tulemista ja asettautumista Suomeen. Muun muassa 
äänioikeuskysymys odottaa vastausta.  
12 Ilkka Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 340/1991, Valiopäivät 1991: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 
1991, p. 2. Original Finnish text: Neuvostoliiton suomalaiset rinnastettiin paluumuuttajiin huhtikuussa 
1990. 
13 Raimo Vuoristo, “Suomen kansalaisuuden myöntämisestä inkeriläisille paluumuuttajille”, KK 
483/1993, Valtiopäivät 1993: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1993, p. 1. Original Finnish text: 
millä perusteella paluumuutto-oikeus myönnetään ja mitä itse asiassa käsite "paluumuuttaja" 
tarkoittaa.   
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Russian passports followed different formats, and for Ingrian Finns living in Estonia, 
Estonian passports were difficult (particularly for non-Estonian speakers) to obtain.
14 
Vuoristo  reported  that  Ingrians  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  were  unsure  of  what 
documentation of their Finnishness they should provide; knowledge of the Finnish 
language, membership of the Finnish Lutheran Church with a baptismal certificate, 
proof of residence as a refugee in Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars, 
or other forms of evidence?
15 The response from the minister Mauri Pekkarinen (a 
member  of  the  Centre  Party,  then  the  main  party  in  a  broad  centre-left  coalition 
government) stated that “a special law for returnees does not exist…The Aliens Act 
does not recognise the concept of a returnee”.
16 Pekkarinen argues that it is at the 
discretion of the President of Finland that decisions on returnee status are made, i.e. 
outside the scope of regular Finnish immigration law, but that irregularities in the 
current system of the Ingrian returnee program were leading to changes, including the 
provision that at least one of the returnee’s grandparents had to have been a Finnish 
citizen.
17   
 
Koivisto’s assurance that the Ingrians were “surely Finns”, and the construction of 
Finnish identity across the border in the (former) Soviet Union implied therein, was 
therefore limited to a statement from within Finland by the President of the Republic 
of  Finland.  As  such,  without  the  base  of  legal  language  on  the  Ingrian  Right  to 
Return,  the  practice  of  bringing  Ingrians  to  Finland  after  1990  suggests  a  rather 
rigidly constructed notion of Finnishness and Ingrians’ role therein, disregarding as it 
does any discrepancies in identity that could emerge from nearly 300 years of political 
separation  between  Ingrians  and  Finland.,  The  government’s  approach  to  Ingrian 
Finns over the 1990s and 2000s sheds light on how Finnish national identity, as the 
perceived  common  identity  of  Finland’s  people,  was  constructed  by  Finnish 
politicians at this time. As will be argued in this chapter, the Ingrian Finnish Return 
law shows how rigid and essentialist these constructions of Finnish identity were, 
chained  to  the  five  major  discursive  resources  (Finnish  language,  Lutheranism, 
                                                 
14 Ibid.   
15 Ibid.  
16 Mauri Pekkarinen, “Vastaus”, KK 483/1993, Valtiopäivät 1993: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 
1993, p. 2.  Original Finnish text: Paluumuuttajia koskevaa erityislakia ei ole 
olemassa…Ulkomaalaislaki ei tunne käsitettä paluumuuttaja.  
17 Ibid.    
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ancestral connection, Swedish heritage and Russian animosity) constructing Finnish 
identity in the discussions on this policy in the early 1990s.  
 
B)  Discursive  Constructions  of  Finnishness  in  the  Themes  of  the  Ingrian 
Finnish Return 
 
1)   Integration Capability 
 
The issue of Ingrian working and living conditions in Finland was swiftly taken up in 
the Eduskunta, and within weeks of Koivisto’s televised interview, several questions 
were raised in particular on provision of social welfare  to  arriving  Ingrians.  Tina 
Mäkelä of the populist and socially conservative SMP submitted her own written 
question to the government on 25 May 1990, which she prefaced by praising the 
decision to bring Ingrians to Finland: Koivisto’s initiative was to be “welcomed with 
great  satisfaction”,
18  especially  as  Ingrians  would  bring  “much-needed  help 
particularly  to  Southern  Finland’s  current  labour  shortage”.
19 What’s  more,  she 
describes these useful new arrivals as people “living in the Soviet Union [but] who 
consider themselves Finnish”.
20 The 1980s Finnish economy, as described in chapter 
two, was rapidly expanding, and the result by early 1990 was an acute labour shortage 
particularly in the capital region and Southern Finland (see figures 11 and 12: Finnish 
unemployment  as  Mäkelä  was  writing  was  still  at  a  low  of  2.9%).  The  effusive 
language employed here, noting that Ingrians (apparently) already define themselves 
as Finns, whilst simultaneously welcoming them as a positive solution to the ongoing 
labour shortage of the late 1980s, suggests some degree of assumption of “integration 
capability”  amongst  Ingrians.  The  combination  of  the  two  statements  gives  the 
impression  that  Ingrians  are  already  integrated  into  the  national  community  of 
Finland, and that their amelioration of the labour shortage in Southern Finland should 
be swift and straightforward.  
 
                                                 
18 Tina Mäkelä, “Eläketurvan järjestämisestä Suomeen muuttaville inkeriläisille”, KK 329/1990, 
Valtiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1990, p. 1. Original Finnish text: Hallituksen 
muodostamaa linjaa on tervehdittävä suurella tyydytyksellä. 
19 Ibid. Original Finnish text: He tuovat monesti kaivattua apua varsinkin Etelä-Suomessa vallitsevaan 
työvoimapulaan.  
20 Ibid. Original Finnish text: toisaalta toimenpide on kädenojennus Neuvostoliitossa asuville itsensä 
suomalaisiksi tunteville kansalaisille.   
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Paradoxically, however, Mäkelä then notes that many Ingrian immigrants will not be 
of  working  age.  She  notes  that  “those  people  coming  from  the  Soviet  Union  to 
Finland are often already relatively old, and will most likely not receive a pension 
from the Soviet Union”.
21 Thereafter, her question also becomes an issue of providing 
Ingrian Finns with coverage under the Finnish welfare state model equal to that of 
Finnish citizens themselves, at the level of a Finnish worker’s retirement pension.
22 
Here there emerge some aspects of a negative presentation of the Soviet Union (see 
further section 5), with the implication that the Soviet Union does not take care of its 
Ingrian citizens as the Finnish welfare state can. Also significant, however, is the 
presentation  of  the  Finnish  welfare  state  as  encompassing  elderly  Ingrians  in  its 
embrace. The equality Mäkelä sees between Finns and Ingrians, justifying similar 
coverage under welfare state pensions, denotes the Finnishness of Ingrians and their 
belonging within the Finnish nation state, based on their perceived Finnish identity 
and not the contribution to the Finnish welfare state they could have made through 
their labour and tax contributions.  
 
However, as Ingrians began to arrive in Finland over the course of 1990, indications 
of limits to the Ingrians’ rapid integration capability began to emerge. By October 
1990, around 1,500 Ingrians had arrived,
23 and the Minister for Social, Alcohol and 
Gender Affairs Tuulikki Hämäläinen indicated at that time that as many as 10,000 
would arrive in the next few years.
24 In September 1990, a group of parliamentarians 
from the National Coalition party expressed concern to the government at the state of 
Ingrian Finns arriving in Finland: 
 
Ingrian Finns who move to Finland come to a country that is strange and alien to them, and 
they must start their lives from scratch here.  While the first stages of their migration here 
have revealed some degree of competence in the Finnish language, and a better education than 
the average, their knowledge of Finnish society is very incomplete.
25 
                                                 
21 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Neuvostoliitosta Suomeen tulevat henkilöt ovat jossain tapauksissa jo 
suhteellisen iäkkäitä ja he eivät tule todennäköisesti saamaan Neuvostoliitosta minkäänlaista eläkettä.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Lea Kärhä, Riita Uosukainen, Tapio Holvitie, Martti Tiuri, Anna-Kaarina Luovo, Kristi Ala-Harja, 
Riitta Juoppila and Kalevi Lamminen, “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran 
perustamiseen”, RA 2063/1990, Valiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat E5, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1990, p. 2183.  
24 Tuuliiki Hämäläinen, “Vastaus”, KK 539/1990, Valiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: 
Eduskunta, 1990, p. 2.  
25 Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie et al., ““Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran 
perustamiseen”, p. 2183. Original Finnish text: Suomeen muuttavat inkerinsuomalaiset tulevat heille 
vieraaseen ja outoon maahan ja aloittavat täällä elämänsä nollapisteestä. Vaikka ensivaiheessa tänne  
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Hämäläinen  assured  concerned  National  Coalition  members  that  the  Health  and 
Social Services Ministry was providing incoming Ingrians with an advice package, 
“Tietoja Suomeen aikoville Neuvostoliiton kansalaisille” (Advice for Soviet Citizens 
Seeking to Enter Finland), which would provide them with information on life and 
getting by in Finland.
26  
  
By late 1991, the Finnish government had granted residence permits to around 5,000 
Ingrians,  2,055  of  which  permitted  the  holder  to  work.
27 Labour  Minister  Ilkka 
Kanerva, a member of the National Coalition, admitted in December 1991 that “only 
some of the Soviet Finns and Estonian Ingrians can adequately speak the Finnish 
language.  This  presents  the  Finnish  reception  system  with  new  challenges”.
28 The 
promise of a solution to labour shortages earlier mentioned by Mäkelä had also failed 
to  materialise,  as  both  Kanerva  and  Paavo  Lipponen  acknowledged  the  Ingrians’ 
difficulty to obtain work, due in part to unfamiliarity with Finnish working culture 
and employment resources.
29 Lipponen suggested in November 1991 that “it would 
be worth finding out whether Ingrians could be better assisted at their current place of 
residence  in  the  USSR”.
30 Kanerva  appeared  to  agree,  suggesting  in  his  reply  to 
Lipponen a month later: 
 
Finland should worry about the USSR’s Finnish communities and their viability. It would be 
fatal if all these communities’ young people moved to Finland. Fixed term employment, job 
training and work experience would improve the situation of Soviet Finns in their own home 
territory.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
muuttavien on todettu osaavan jonkin verran suomen kieltä ja olevan keskimääräistä paremmin 
koulutettuja, ovat heidän tietonsa suomalaisesta yhteiskunnasta hyvin puutteellisia.  
26 Hämäläinen, “Vastaus”, KK 539/1990, p. 2.  
27 Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 340/1991, p. 2.  
28 Ibid. p. 3. Original Finnish text: Ainoastaan osa Neuvostoliiton suomalaisista ja Viron inkeriläisistä 
osaa riittävästi Suomen kieltä. Tämä asettaa myös Suomen vastaanottojärjestelmälle uusia 
vaatimuksia.  
29 Lipponen, “Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten paluumuuttajien aseman parantamisesta”, p. 1.  
A group of kokoomus parliamentarians also suggested in September 1990 that “Työvoimatoimistot 
ovatkin olleet lähes ainoa virasto, jonka harteilla ovat olleet inkerinsuomalaiset paluumuuttajat 
kaikkine ongelmineen.” [The employment offices have been virtually the only agency on whose 
shoulders all the problems of Ingrian Finnish returnees have fallen]. See Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie 
et al., ““Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran perustamiseen”, p. 2183.  
30 Lipponen, “Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten paluumuuttajien aseman parantamisesta”, p. 1. Olisi syytä 
selvittää, olisiko inkeriläisiä parempi avustaa heidän nykyiseen asuinpaikkaansa Neuvostoliitossa.   
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A  draft  cooperation  agreement  between  Finland  and  Russia  clearly  refers  to  the  Soviet 
Union’s Finnish population and its status and rights, which will in turn strengthen the position 
of this population.
31 
 
This  would  appear  to  be  an  admission  of  defeat  on  the  integration  capability  of 
Ingrians;  they  appear  to  lack  the  necessary  language  and  cultural  knowledge  of 
Finland,  particularly  on  matters  related  to  employment,  to  integrate  rapidly  into 
Finnish  society  without  significant  government  assistance.  As  such,  here  the 
discussion  shifts  to  a  potential  alternative  to  return  migration,  suggesting  that 
concerns  for  the  welfare  of  Finnish  communities  in  the  Soviet  Union  should  be 
addressed without integrating Ingrians into Finnish society. The discursive resource 
that draws on the Finnish language as a key characteristic of Finnish identity is here a 
significant element in the Finnish MPs’ constructions of Ingrian belonging in Finland. 
When  Finnish  lawmakers  assumed  that  Ingrians  speak  Finnish  and  will  integrate 
rapidly, it is advocated that they should come to Finland. When the Finnish language 
capabilities of Ingrians are found to be more limited, it is suggested they may be 
better  helped  outside  of  Finland,  and  perhaps  therefore  exist  within  a  broader 
understanding of the Finnish national community but outside the Finnish nation state. 
Indeed, the discourse in Kanerva’s statement also stresses Ingrian connection to their 
“home territory” in the USSR/Russia, as though Ingrians belong in the USSR and 
Russia. Finland must remain mindful of this, departing, at least momentarily, from the 
previous discussion on Ingrians’ real or imagined connections to the Finnish state.   
 
Yet at no point in the discourse on integration at this time do parliamentarians or the 
Finnish government suggest directly that Ingrians should not be afforded a privileged 
position in immigration law. Rather, the government continues to intone a special 
status for Ingrian migrants arriving in Finland. For instance, addressing the Finnish 
language capabilities of Ingrian arrivals, Kanerva indicates that the staff at the Finnish 
consulates  in  St  Petersburg  and  Petrozavodsk  would  organise  language  training, 
usually lasting six months, for Ingrian migrants. In larger cities like Helsinki and 
                                                 
31 Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 340/1991, p. 3. Original Finnish text: Suomen tulee kantaa huolta 
Neuvostoliiton suomalaisten yhdyskunnista ja niiden elinkelpoisuudesta. Näiden yhdyskuntien kannalta 
olisi kohtalokasta, mikäli aktiivinen nuorempi sukupolvi siirtyisi laajassa mittakaavassa Suomeen. 
Määräaikainen työskentely, työharjoittelu ja työkokemuksen saanti helpottaa osaltaan Neuvostoliiton 
suomalaisten asemaa heidän kotiseuduillaan. Suomen ja Venäjän välillä neuvotellussa 
yhteistyösopimusluonnoksessa on selkeä maininta Neuvostoliiton suomalaisväestön asemasta ja 
oikeuksista, mikä osaltaan vahvistaa jatkossa tämän väestönosan asemaa. 
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Turku, they would be placed in their own language classes, whilst in smaller towns 
and municipalities they would be taught alongside other immigrant groups.
32 Perhaps 
even more significantly, Kanerva also indicates the government’s plan to decrease the 
waiting period for citizenship for Ingrian Finns from five years (the standard amount 
for immigrants in Finland) to two years, in line with citizens from the other Nordic 
countries.
33 Likewise,  parliamentarians  at  this  time  eschewed  questioning  of  the 
special status and integration capabilities of Ingrians in Finland, instead suggesting 
the government focus on the need for increased specialised assistance to Ingrians, to 
bring out their integration potential.
34 The implication remains that Ingrians are more 
connected to the Finnish language, that pillar of Finnish identity, than non-returnee 
migrants.  Bringing  Ingrian  citizenship  waiting  periods  into  line  with  those  for 
migrants  from  other  Nordic  nations  also  gives  some  impression  of  Ingrians  as 
connected, like Finns of Finland, to the broader cultural and political Nordic region.  
 
Ancestral connection also remains an important aspect in the discursive construction 
of links between Ingrians and Finland.  In October 1990, a trio of National Coalition 
parliamentarians, while listing the many integration challenges Ingrians faced upon 
arrival in Finland, also stressed that they continued to arrive in Finland drawn by “of 
course,  an  interest  in  their  Finnish  lineage”.
35 Ingrians,  they  appeared  to  believe, 
therefore  possessed  a  desire  to  integrate  that  other  immigrant  groups  lacked, 
strengthening their integration capability in relation to groups without historical links 
to Finland. Implicit in this discussion is the notion that Ingrians have a primordialist 
link to Finland that overrides any difficulties they may experience in integrating into 
Finnish  society,  which  will  no  doubt  prove  temporary.  The  view  of  Ingrians  as 
connected  to  Finnishness  through  these  shared  characteristics  thus  remains 
ideologically dominant amongst Finnish politicians. Although potential weaknesses in 
Ingrian conformity to Finnish politicians’ understanding of Finnishness, particularly 
on  language,  are  acknowledged  and  discussed,  implementation  of  the  policy 
                                                 
32 Ibid, pp. 2-3.  
33 Ibid. p. 2.  
34 See Maunu Kohijoki, Martti Korkia-Aho and Päivi Varpasuo, “Inkeriläisiä paluumuuttajia 
palvelevan Inkerikeskuksen perustamisesta”, KK 539/1990, Valiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: 
Eduskunta, 1990, p. 1, and Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie et al., “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-
asiamiehen viran perustamiseen”, p. 2183.  
35 See Kohijoki, Korkia-Aho and Varpasuo’s note that Ingrian Finns have  ”tietenkin kiinnostus 
suomalaisista sukujuurista” [of course, interest in their Finnish lineage], in “Inkeriläisiä 
paluumuuttajia palvelevan Inkerikeskuksen perustamisesta”, p. 1.   
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progresses  on  the  assumption  that  Ingrians  are  linked  to  Finnishness,  which  will 
facilitate  better  integration  in  Finland  even  if  there  is  initial  need  for  language 
training. In the discussion on integration capability in 1990-1995, there is not yet any 
substantial rejection of the ideology of Ingrian inclusion in Finnishness by Finnish 
politicians, despite substantial potential avenues for challenging Ingrians’ conformity 
to  their  construction  of  Finnishness,  particularly  based  on  language  capabilities, 
already emerging.       
 
2)  Historical Atonement 
 
On  22  May  1990,  a  large  contingent  of  National  Coalition,  SMP  and  Swedish 
People’s Party parliamentarians (including Kirsti Ala-Harja, Ben Zyskowicz, Riitta 
Uosukainen, Henrik Westerlund and Sulo Aittoniemi) submitted a written question to 
the government, evoking the troubled twentieth-century history of the Ingrian Finns, 
and in particular their fate in the Winter and Continuation Wars:  
 
  In the defence of Finland during the Winter and Continuation Wars, there were participants 
for example from Sweden. Swedish soldiers injured during the war received a small annual 
pension under the Military Injuries Act, even if they are not Finnish citizens. In these wars, 
Ingrians also served in many different positions in the army. After the war, as per the peace 
agreement, Ingrians were returned to their homeland.
36  
   
This indicates a key justification for Ingrian resettlement in Finland after 1990, as 
based on a construction of Finnish identity linked to a history of struggle against the 
USSR. As mentioned by the SMP’s Tina Mäkelä, a large section of Ingrian Finns 
expected to migrate to Finland, and amongst them Finland could expect some Ingrian 
men who had participated in combat roles during the Winter and Continuation Wars, 
as well as Ingrian refugees who had spent the war in Finland and then been repatriated 
to the Soviet Union.
37 The question from Ala-Harja et al., interestingly, refers to the 
                                                 
36 Kirsti Ala-Harja, Tapio Holvitie, Riitta Uosukainen, Henrik Westerlund, Kalevi Lamminen, Riitta 
Saastamoinen, Ben Zyskowicz, Aino Pohjanoksa, Erkki Pystynen, Matti Hokkanen and Sulo 
Aittoniemi,  “Veteraanitunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, KK 316/1990, in 
Valtiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1990, p. 1. Original Finnish text: Suomen 
puolustamiseen talvi-ja jatkosodan aikana osallistui vapaaehtoisia mm. Ruotsista. Sodassa 
vammautuneet ruotsalaissotilaat saavat sotilasvammalain mukaan pientä elinkorkoa, vaikka he eivät 
ole Suomen kansalaisia. Sotiimme osallistui myös inkeriläisiä sotilaita osana Suomen armeijaa, 
palvellen monissa eri tehtävissä. Sodan päätyttyä rauhansopimuksen mukaan inkeriläiset palautettiin 
kotimaahansa.  
37 Tina Mäkelä  “Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, KK 
330/1990, in Valtiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1990, p. 1.  
  145 
Soviet  Union,  and  not  Finland,  as  the  Ingrian  kotimaa  (homeland),
38  which 
undermines the portrayal of Ingrian immigration to Finland as a “return”, but the 
above extract of the question to parliament suggests that inclusion of Ingrians into the 
Finnish national community is justified by their service to Finland in the Winter and 
Continuation Wars. This inclusion, therefore, should necessarily come about through 
coverage of Ingrian Finnish veterans through the Military Injuries Act that (according 
to Ala-Harja et al.) already covers Finnish and Swedish citizens.  
 
The provision of residency and war pensions as a reward for Second World War 
service, or as an attempt at atonement for wartime suffering (or post-war hardship 
stemming from service), has played out in other instances, such as the 2009 decision 
in the UK parliament to grant the Nepalese Gurkhas who served in the British Army 
leave to enter and remain in the UK under The Immigration (Discharged Gurkhas) 
Bill.
39 The debate on the Gurkhas’ rights, given increased prominence in the British 
media due to the support of actress Joanna Lumley, whose father had served with the 
Gurkhas in the Second World War, was described by Liberal Democrats leader Nick 
Clegg as predicated on “a simple moral principle…if someone is prepared to die for 
this country, surely they deserve to live in this country?”
40 This same basic principle 
of honouring wartime service of non-citizens with residence permission informs the 
Finnish Ingrian example.  
 
Yet there is an additional dimension to the Ingrian Finnish case. Just three days after 
Ala-Harja et al. submitted their question, Tina Mäkelä submitted a further question to 
the  Minister  for  Health  and  Social  Services,  entitled  Rintamapalvelustunnuksen 
myöntämisestä  sotiin  osallistuneille  inkeriläisille  [Awarding  Front  Line  Veteran 
Status to Ingrian Participants in the Wars]. She begins by stating:  
                                                 
38 Ala-Harja, Holvitie, Uosukainen et al., “Veteraanitunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille 
inkeriläisille”, p. 1.  
39 Paula Fentiman, “Retired Gurkhas to hand back medals in protest”, The Independent, 19 March 
2008, available online at URL: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/retired-gurkhas-to-
hand-back-medals-in-protest-797883.html>, accessed 23 July 2012, and Audrey Gillan, “Gurkhas 
granted right to settle in the UK”, The Guardian, 21 May 2009, available online at URL: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/21/gurkhas-granted-right-to-settle-in-uk>, accessed 23 
July 2012.  
40 Nicholas Watt and Andrew Sparrow, “Gordon Brown bruised after defeat over Gurkhas, next on 
table is MPs' expenses”, The Guardian, 30 April 2009, available online at URL: 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/apr/30/gordon-brown-gurkhas-mps-expenses>, accessed 23 
July 2012.   
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 During the most recent wars, a number of Ingrians fought in the Finnish Army. After the war, 
and the deportation of Ingrians, they were almost all forced to return to the Soviet Union 
where they have often lived in difficult circumstances for much of the time since then. Some 
of them have suffered particularly from the fact that they defended Finland with a gun in 
hand.
41 
 
This aspect of the discussion on historical atonement in the Ingrian Finnish Return 
policy notes the residual effects of the Soviet-Finnish conflicts in the Second World 
War on the Ingrian Finns, and the idea of Finnish identity as defined by a history of 
struggles with Russians. The Ingrian Finnish veterans were left to live in the territory 
of their former adversaries (something the Gurkhas were unlikely to have experienced 
in post-Second World War Nepal). Not only does Mäkelä’s presentation of Ingrian 
Finnish history suggest that the Soviets, like the Finns, see Ingrians as Finnish, it also 
draws on Ingrians’ experience of suffering for their Finnishness in the post-war Soviet 
Union as an imperative to now provide Ingrians with Finnish residency.  
 
The  Stalinist-era  persecution  of  Ingrians  for  their  Finnish  identity  and  wartime 
affiliations alluded to by Mäkelä was long over by 1990 and the era of glasnost and 
perestroika. The Finnish government’s offer of return migration to Ingrians could 
obviously not relieve Ingrians from this persecution, whose worst effects had already 
been felt. By itself, historical atonement thus appears an insufficient rationale for 
launching the Right to Return policy at this time. Ingrian resettlement in 1990 does 
not,  in  this  sense,  amount  to  humanitarian  intervention  against  government 
persecution, as the persecution Ingrians faced has been endured, and was not, in 1990, 
likely to immediately reoccur. However, the obligation of Finland to deport Soviet 
refugees after the Continuation War, and the reappraisal in the 1980s and 1990s of 
Soviet  influence  in  Finnish  politics  in  the  time  of  Finlandisation  (as  discussed  in 
chapter  two  of  this  thesis),  emerges  in  the  language  employed  by  Mäkelä  –  it 
represents a betrayal of Ingrians, as loyal Finns who served their spiritual (if not 
literal) homeland in the Winter and Continuation Wars, to appease the Soviet Union 
and send them back to the USSR. This perception of Ingrians as linked to Finland and 
commonly opposed to the Soviet Union appears predicated on the discursive resource 
                                                 
41 Mäkelä, “Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, p. 1. 
Original Finnish text: Viime sotien aikana Suomen armeijassa taisteli joukko inkeriläisiä sotilaita. 
Sodan jälkeen tapahtuneen inkeriläisten pakkoluovutuksen jälkeen heidät lähes täysin palautettiin 
takaisin Neuvostoliittoon, jossa he ovat asuneet monasti hyvinkin vaikeissa oloissa siitä lähtien. Osa 
heistä on joutunut kärsimään suurestikin siitä, että he puolustivat sodan aikana Suomea ase kädessä.   
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of Finnishness as defined by its opposition to Russians and Soviets. The language 
employed by Finnish politicians like Mäkelä here makes an appeal to the concept of 
sacrifice and suffering, suggesting with emotional impact that Ingrians’ Finnishness 
has been tried and tested in the most fundamental way, in a struggle with the Soviet 
Union  that  the  dominant  Finnish  historical  interpretation  views  as  a  struggle  for 
survival. References to wartime suffering thus have a critically important function in 
establishing the ideological dominant view of Ingrians as proven Finns at this time, 
for their contribution and sacrifice to the cause of Finnish independence.   
 
Now, in 1990, Finland had an opportunity to atone for the Ingrian deportation, bring 
Ingrians to Finland and grant Ingrian veterans the war veterans’ pensions they have, 
according to this discourse, so rightly earned. Indeed, Ala-Harja et al. continue their 
written question by noting: 
   
As now the situation has changed and Ingrians have the opportunity to return to Finland as 
Finnish returnees as per the presidential statement, it would be opportune to examine the issue 
of Ingrians’ merits to the right of veteran status and veteran’s benefits.  Only those who have 
lived in Finland for five years receive the national pension. Such a long waiting time for 
Ingrian immigrants seems unreasonable.
42  
 
In  essence,  Ala-Harja  et al. also  advocate  that  Ingrian  Finns  should  be  treated  as 
Finns, as they proved their allegiance to Finnishness in the Second World War. This 
equality  of  treatment  should  be  manifested  in  provision  of  welfare  and  veteran’s 
benefits, and therefore, would suggest an extension of the Finnish welfare state to 
include Ingrians. At the very least, this faction of the National Coalition accepts the 
premise  of  Ingrian  Finns  as  separate  from  other  non-citizens  or  immigrants,  and 
belonging in Finland, based on an interpretation of Finnishness that binds Ingrians to 
the Finnish nation state and entitles them to its protection. This is predicated on the 
notion that wartime service of Ingrians proves a loyalty to Finland, and post-war 
suffering  of  Ingrians  involves  some  culpability  on  the  part  of  Finland,  which 
abandoned them to the USSR after 1944. Ingrians are united with Finns, therefore, in 
their struggle for existence in the face of their larger eastern neighbour. Wartime 
                                                 
42 Ala-Harja et al., “Veteraanitunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, p. 1. 
Original Finnish text: Koska nyt tilanteen muututtua inkeriläisillä on mahdollisuus palata suomalaisina 
paluumuuttajina Suomeen, viittaamme presidentin lausuntoon, inkeriläisten oikeus 
veteraanitunnukseen ja veteraanien saamiin etuuksiin olisi aiheellista selvittää…Kansaneläkettä saa 
Suomeen muutettuaan vasta asuttuaan täällä viisi vuotta. Näin pitkä odotusaika inkeriläisten 
maahanmuuttajien kohdalla tuntuu kohtuuttomalta.   
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suffering effectively proves Ingrians’ opposition to the Russian mainstream in the 
Soviet Union, and thus, their Finnishness.  
 
Concretely, Ala-Harja et al. asked the Finnish Minister of Health and Social Services 
for specific measures the government was intending to take for Ingrian veterans who 
participated  in  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars.
43 Mauri  Miettinen,  the  minister 
serving  under  Prime  Minister  Harri  Holkeri  (both  Holkeri  and  Miettinen  were 
members of the centre-right National Coalition, which led a coalition government 
with the Social Democrats, Swedish People’s Party and SMP), responded on 25 June 
1990, in essence assuring that a committee had been set-up in 1989 to explore the 
feasibility of expanding war veterans’ benefits to non-citizens who had participated in 
the  defence  of  Finland.  He  gave  an  identical  response  the  same  day  to  Mäkelä’s 
earlier,  similar  question.
44 However,  Miettinen  takes  issue  with  the  assertion  from 
Ala-Harja et al. that Swedes already have access to these benefits, and asserts that no 
claims from non-citizens who fought voluntarily in Finland are heard: 
 
Those citizens of foreign countries who freely participated in the wars do not have a legitimate 
claim. Veteran status has not been granted, for example, to Swedes, Estonians nor to Ingrian 
volunteers.
45 
 
The theme of historical atonement presented in Miettinen’s account of existing policy 
departs sharply from his National Coalition colleagues’ interpretation of how things 
should be. Ingrians are grouped together alongside Swedes and Estonians as allies, 
though foreigners. This grouping does, however, link Ingrians to other Nordic peoples 
rather than with Russians and the East.  
 
The  voluntary  participation  of  the  Ingrian  veterans,  underlined  in  Miettinen’s 
response, also undermines their status as hapless victims of Finland’s conflicts with 
the  Soviet  Union.  This  may  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  from  a  generally  more 
conservative party to limit welfare expenditure, particularly in the lead-up to the early 
1991 parliamentary election, despite discussions on historical atonement that were 
                                                 
43 Ibid.   
44 Mauri Miettinen, “Vastaus”, KK 316/1990 and KK 330/1990, in Valtiopäivät 1990: Asiakirjat F2, 
Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1990, p. 2 (KK 316) and p. 2 (KK 330). 
45 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Vapaaehtoisesti sotiin osallistuneet muiden maiden kansalaiset eivät ole 
oikeutettuja. Tunnusta eivät ole saaneet esimerkiksi ruotsalaiset, eestiläiset eivätkä myöskään 
inkeriläiset vapaaehtoiset.   
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presented elsewhere in the Eduskunta, even amongst members of the same party’s 
backbenchers. David Arter notes the generally parochial character of the campaign 
leading to the 1991 election, which largely ignored foreign policy considerations (the 
government’s reluctance to condemn the violent subduing of anti-Soviet protests in 
Vilnius,  or  the  Finnish  application  to  the  European  Communities)  in  favour  of 
economic considerations, including the issue of social security matters like pensions 
or study allowances in the wake of the deepening recession.
46 Thus, there may have 
been considerable political impetus to avoid expansion of pension programs at this 
time. Though early post-1990 discussions in the Eduskunta on historical atonement 
for Ingrian suffering appear to stress their Second World War links to Finland over 
Russia, and their willingness to protect a country that subsequently failed to protect 
them, there was by no means consensus on their status, or their rights, in Finnish 
political discourse itself at this point.  
 
Miettinen  presents  a  challenge  to  some  perceptions  of  the  symbolic  function  of 
Ingrian  wartime  suffering,  but  in  general,  Finnish  politicians  continued  to  discuss 
Ingrians with the assumption that this wartime experience validated their Finnishness, 
and their inclusion in the Finnish national community. By 1991, National Coalition 
parliamentarian Maunu Kohijoki had taken up the issue, continuing a discussion on 
atonement  that  Ingrian  veterans’  situation  should  be  rectified  by  equating  Ingrian 
volunteers  to  Finnish  frontline  veterans.  Kohijoki  evoked  both  the  heavy  losses 
experienced by Ingrian volunteers on the frontline, and their post-war fate as refugees 
(the lucky few who escaped to Sweden, and on to the United States, the unlucky many 
forced to return to the USSR following the Finnish surrender).
47 He added: 
 
Very few people who fought on behalf of Finland as foreign volunteers have received much praise 
for the sacrifices they made for our country's independence. Yet there are left a few thousand. As a 
concrete sign of respect and gratitude, the Finnish state should immediately begin to pay them an 
equally large (or, rather, an equally small = 199 Finnish Marks per month) veteran’s pension as 
our Finnish war veterans.
48 
                                                 
46 David Arter, “The Finnish Election of 17 March 1991: A Victory for Opposition”, West European 
Politics, Vol. 14, No.4, 1991, p. 176. 
47 Maunu Kohijoki, “Rintamamiesetuuksien myöntämisestä Suomen puolella taistelleille 
ulkomaalaisille”, KK 390/1991, Valiopäivät 1991: Asiakirjat E5, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1991, p. 1. 
48 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kovin harva Suomen puolesta taistelleista ulkomaalaisista 
vapaaehtoisista on saanut osakseen kiitosta maamme itsenäisyyden hyväksi tekemistään uhrauksista. 
Vielä heitä on jäljellä muutama tuhat. Konkreettisena kiitollisuuden ja kunnioituksen osoituksena 
Suomen valtion tulisi viipymättä ryhtyä maksamaan heille rintamalisää saman suuruisena (tai 
paremminkin yhtä pienenä = 199 mk kuukaudessa) kuin suomalaisillekin sotiemme veteraaneille.   
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This quote gives some indication of the position veterans hold in Finnish society, 
protecting Finnish independence and deserving of eternal respect and gratitude. This 
respect  and  gratitude  is  shown  to  Finnish  veterans  in  part  through  the  veterans’ 
pension. With the arrival of the Ingrian Finnish returnees, Kohijoki’s assertion that 
they  too  should  be  granted  this  symbol  of  respect  underlines  their  belonging  in 
Finland, as contributors to Finland’s defence in the Winter and Continuation Wars. 
However tenuous their “old” or ancestral connections to Finland, Ingrians veterans 
have proven, at least in the discussion on historical atonement, their loyalty to the 
Finnish nation state in the recent past. Contrasting this depiction of heroism to their 
fate,  abandoned  to  their  former  enemies  in  the  USSR,  is  an  evocative  appeal  to 
sympathy,  and  argument  for  the  need  for  Ingrian  “repatriation”  to  Finland.  To 
Kohijoki,  
 
[e]ven in these economically difficult times, some things must be set over others. As such, we 
should now deal with the matter of volunteers who fought on behalf of the independence of 
Finland, which after decades is still unresolved.
49 
 
Here again, Ingrian participation in the Second World War, and the fact that some of 
these war veterans are still alive, is presented as translating to Ingrians’ right to live in 
Finland and enjoy the comfort, respect and gratitude Finnish politicians deem them to 
have earned. The economic hardship of the early 1990s, which relates the Ingrian 
return  migration  to  a  discussion  on  humanitarianism,  is  here  also  invoked  as 
something from which Ingrian veterans should be sheltered, and the long delay in 
resolving  their  status  appears  finally  as  an  additional  burden  on  Ingrians  that  the 
Finnish state must take responsibility for and ameliorate. Again, the nature of this 
language on Ingrians appeals to collective memories of the Second World War, to 
perceptions of this conflict as the narrow escape of Finnish independence, and calls 
for gratitude for Ingrians despite the economic challenges of providing for Ingrians in 
a  time  of  recession.  This  gives  some  indication  of  the  strength  of  the  discursive 
resource  on  historical  opposition  to  Russians/Soviets  in  Finnish  lawmakers’ 
construction of Finnish identity, and the powerful function it can have in reinforcing 
the  perception  of  Ingrians  as  having  a  proven  Finnishness  –  the  Winter  and 
                                                 
49 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Taloudellisesti vaikeinakin aikoina joitakin asioita on voitava asettaa 
muiden edelle. Sellaisena tulisi nyt käsitellä Suomen itsenäisyyden puolesta taistelleiden 
ulkomaalaisten vapaaehtoisten asia, mikä vuosikymmenien takaa vielä on ratkaisematta.   
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Continuation Wars proved Ingrians would fight Russians, and therefore, even a half-
century later, they must be Finns.  
 
Despite Kohijoki’s evocative language, a January 1992 response from the then Health 
and Social Affairs minister Eeva Kuuskoski to his statement indicated that a pension 
for Ingrian veterans was not feasible.
50 A working group on veterans’ affairs had been 
set  up  and  had  reported  that,  whilst  Ingrians  should  be  recognised  for  their 
contributions in the defence of Finland in the Winter and Continuation Wars, there 
was  no  agreement  amongst  veterans  groups  and  the  government  for  extension  of 
veterans’ benefits.
51 As with the earlier query from Ala-Harja et al., the government 
indicated  that,  despite  the  rather  passionate  discourse,  the  imperative  of  historical 
atonement  would  not  go  beyond  allowing  Ingrian  settlement  in  Finland.  Ingrian 
Finnish  migration,  therefore,  was  the  primary  means  to  reward  Ingrian  wartime 
loyalty  to  Finland.  Yet  the  passionate  discourse  does  underscore  many 
parliamentarians’ conviction that Ingrians had proven their connection to Finland, and 
the ongoing belief in the emotional link between Ingrians and the Finnish nation state 
through  a  common  narrative  of  suffering  under  the  same  adversary.  Though  the 
government may have been reticent to quantify this connection monetarily through 
pension payments, it does appear, forceful and ardent, in the language of Finnish 
politicians at this time.  
 
However, as with the theme of integration capability, experience with Ingrians a few 
years into the Right to Return program seems to have challenged this narrative. SMP 
parliamentarian Sulo Aittoniemi asked the government to answer to reports that, by 
1994, there were 10,000 unemployed Ingrians in Finland living on public benefits.
52 
According to Aittoniemi, “the original aim [of the Right to Return] was to create a 
migration option for those Ingrians who, after the Second World War, were forced to 
return to the former Soviet Union, and their descendants”.
53 He thus sees the Right to 
                                                 
50 Eeva Kuuskoski, “Vastaus”, KK 390/1991, Valiopäivät 1991: Asiakirjat E5, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 
1991, p. 2. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Inkeriläisten paluumuutosta Suomeen”, KK 237/1994, Valtiopäivät 1994: 
Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1994, p. 1.  
53 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Alkuperäinen tarkoitus oli luoda muuttomahdollisuus niille inkeriläisille, 
jotka sodan jälkeen olivat pakotetut palaamaan takaisin silloiseen Neuvostoliittoon, sekä heidän 
jälkeläisilleen.   
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Return  for  Ingrians  primarily  through  the  lens  of  historical  atonement  for  this 
deportation.  The  discussions  on  the  early  1990  labour  shortage  (prior  to  rising 
unemployment after mid-1990) was a repeatedly invoked reason for an Ingrian return 
migration program, so the primacy Aittoniemi affords the atonement aspect may be 
somewhat overstated. With this in mind, Aittoniemi submitted his question to the 
government: 
 
 Is the government aware how many Ingrian Finnish returnees moving to Finland meet the 
condition of having been forced to return to the former Soviet Union, or their descendants, and 
if  the  ratio  of  legitimate  to  unauthorised  migrants  is  obvious,  what  action  does  the 
Government propose to take to bring unjustified migration to an end?
54 
 
 
The SMP, defunct since the mid-1990s, has been described by political scientists in 
Finland  as  “the  most  salient  populist  party  in  Finland  since  the  latter  part  of  the 
1960s…aimed at mobilising and catching all the social and political dissatisfaction 
wherever it might be found”, typically amongst rural workers and war veterans.
55 
Particularly  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s,  the  SMP  attempted  (with  some 
electoral success) to utilise xenophobic fears to engage potential voters.
56  Indeed, 
Kyösti Pekonen, Pertti Hynynen and Mari Kalliala argue that the SMP “has not been 
called  an  extreme  right-wing  party,  even  though  it  sometimes  would  have  been 
justified”.
57 Nationalist sentiments have in fact been employed by the SMP not only 
against  immigrants,  as  some  SMP  candidates  have  sought  support  from  Finnish-
speakers by agitating against the Swedish-speaking minority.
58 It should be noted that 
as a populist party, the SMP was not bound to any particular strain of nationalism, as 
indeed  it  had  no  permanent  ideology,  being  rather  the  party  of  the  protest  vote, 
profiting  from  any  political  dissatisfaction  it  was  able,  at  times,  to  exploit.
59 Sulo 
Aittoniemi, however, appears to have earned a particular reputation in the late 1980s 
                                                 
54 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Onko Hallitus tietoinen, miten moni Suomeen muuttava 
inkerinsuomalainen paluumuuttaja täyttää siihen kuuluvan ehdon, eli on aikanaan täältä sotien jälkeen 
pakkomuutettu silloiseen Neuvostoliittoon tai on heidän jälkeläisiään, ja jos suhde oikeutettujen ja 
oikeudettomien muuttajien välillä on ilmiselvä, mihin toimenpiteisiin Hallitus aikoo ryhtyä 
perusteettoman paluumuuton lopettamiseksi?  
55 Kyösti Pekonen, Pertti Hynynen and Mari Kalliala, “The New Radical Right Taking Shape in 
Finland”, in K. Pekonen (ed), The New Radical Right in Finland, Jyväskylä: The Finnish Political 
Science Association, 1999, p. 36.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid, p. 40.  
59 Ibid.   
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and  early  1990s  as  an  agitator  against  immigration  and  diversity  in  Finland, 
representing  a  section  of  the  SMP  for  whom  this  issue  was  of  particular  focus.
60 
Aittonemi’s  hostility  to  immigration  is  evident  in  his  question  here,  yet  his 
differentiation between Ingrians who have been forced to return to the USSR and 
others  who  may  never  have  left  the  USSR  also  belies  the  significance  of  the 
discursive resource of opposition to the Soviet Union/Russia in Finland’s national 
identity. To a parliamentarian hostile to outsiders and those deemed non-Finnish, who 
uses populist xenophobia against such groups to attract the protest vote, this particular 
characteristic appears to confer Finnish identity only on a select group of Ingrians.  
 
However, in response to Aittoniemi, Labour Minister Kanerva disputed his numbers, 
placing  the  figure  of  Ingrian  returnees  in  Finland  at  3,800  of  which  2,000  were 
currently employed.
61 More significantly perhaps, he disputed the notion of historical 
atonement’s  role  in  dividing  returnees  into  the  categories  “legitimate”  and 
“unauthorised”: 
 
When the Ingrian Finns’ return was made possible in practice, beginning at the end of 1989, it 
has never been the goal that the return would only apply to those who had been in Finland 
during  the  Second  World  War,  and  then  moved  back  to  the  Soviet  Union.  Nor  does  the 
opinion President Koivisto gave in an interview in April 1990 present this opinion, as his 
statement specifically sees an equivalence between Ingrian Finns and other expatriates and 
returnees.  
 
The  idea  presented  in  this  written  question,  that  the  original  intention  was  to  create  an 
opportunity for those returning Ingrians who after the War were forced to return to the former 
Soviet Union is therefore invalid. Thus it is not possible to speak of “legitimate and authorised 
migrants”, nor is there any criteria or conditions to take action to end “unjustified return 
migration”.
62 
 
Thus, when the discussion of Ingrians along historical atonement lines is challenged, 
and Ingrians as a group are presented as limited or unproven in their conformity to the 
                                                 
60 Pasi Saukkonen, “Finland: The Fortress Syndrome”, in B. Baumgartl and A. Favell (eds), New 
Xenophobia in Europe, London: Kluwer Law, 1995, p. 112.  
61 Ilkka Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 237/1994, Valtiopäivät 1994: Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 
1994, p. 2.  
62 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kun inkerinsuomalaisten paluumuutto käytännössä mahdollistui  ja alkoi 
vuoden 1989 lopulla, ei missään vaiheessa tehty sellaista rajausta, että paluumuuttomahdollisuus 
koskisi vain niitä, jotka olivat olleet Suomessa sodan aikana ja sen jälkeen joutuneet muuttamaan 
takaisin Neuvostoliittoon. Myöskään presidentti Koivisto ei huhtikuussa 1990 antamassaan 
haastattelulausunnossa näin tehnyt, vaan hänen lausuntonsa on nimenomaan nähtävä inkeriläisten 
rinnastamisena muihin ulkosuomalaisiin ja paluumuuttajiin. Kirjallisessa kysymyksessä esitetty käsitys 
siitä, että alkuperäinen tarkoitus oli luoda muuttomahdollisuus niille inkeriläisille, jotka sodan jälkeen 
olivat pakotetut palaamaan silloiseen Neuvostoliittoon, on siten virheellinen. Näin ollen ei voida puhua 
"oikeutetuista ja oikeudettomista muuttajista" eikä myöskään ole mitään perusteita eikä edellytyksiä 
ryhtyä toimenpiteisiin "perusteettoman paluumuuton lopettamiseksi”.   
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discursive  resource  of  opposition  to  Russia  and  the  USSR  in  this  sense,  the 
government responds by challenging the practical significance of wartime experience 
in the first case. Though parliamentarians appear to consider the Second World War 
and  the  Ingrian  deportation  to  the  Soviet  Union  as  a  strong  emotional  reason  for 
Ingrian Right to Return status, the government does not present this as an exclusivist 
criterion.  Kanerva  himself  represented  a  new  centre-right  coalition  government 
elected in March 1991, under the Centre Party’s Esko Aho as Prime Minister, which 
continued something of a departure from tradition in Finnish politics, marking only 
the second time in government for the National Coalition party since 1966, the first 
being the preceding National Coalition-Social Democrat led coalition elected in 1987 
that had broken the long-standing succession of centre-left (red-earth) coalitions.
63 As 
stated previously, this new centre-right government was dedicated to financial reform 
in the face of the new economic crisis, including reform of select social security 
payments.
64 This may go some way to explaining the new government’s reluctance to 
expand social security programs to include Ingrian returnees. Kanerva’s response, as 
well as the aforementioned reluctance of the government to extend veterans benefits 
to  Ingrian  volunteers,  suggests  a  limitation  to  the  significance  the  Finnish 
government, by the 1990s, was willing to give actual wartime service as a qualifier 
for access to the Finnish state and its benefits. Yet Kanerva’s response also highlights 
the universalist approach to Ingrian identity the Finnish government appeared to take, 
unlike Sulo Aittoniemi’s approach which separates Ingrians into veterans and non-
veterans. As something of an outlier in Finnish politics, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Aittoniemi’s  attempt  to  challenge  the  Finnishness  of  some  Ingrians  (whilst 
simultaneously  endorsing  the  Finnishness  of  others)  failed  to  influence  the  more 
mainstream  government  line  on  Ingrians’  Finnishness.  To  the  government,  all 
Ingrians regardless of their age or history are included within the concept of Finland’s 
national identity. The discursive resource that constructs Finnish identity in part as a 
narrative of struggle against the Russians is therefore not attributed individually, but 
rather  to  the  entire  Ingrian  population.  The  emotional  appeals  to  the  memory  of 
Second World War experience in Finland thus continued to serve as a potent element 
to the language of Ingrian inclusion in Finland in 1990-1995.  
 
                                                 
63 Aylott, Blomgren and Bergman, Political Parties in Multi-Level Polities, p. 90.  
64 David Arter, “The Finnish Election of 17 March 1991”, p. 177.   
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3)  The Humanitarian Imperative 
 
Throughout the post-Second World War period, the Nordic countries have established 
a tradition of humanitarianism, and an international role as “norm entrepreneurs”. 
Christine Ingebritsen argues that twentieth-century figures like Raoul Wallenberg and 
Dag  Hammarskjöld  established  a  role  for  Scandinavians  in  humanitarian 
interventionism and human rights promotion that has since become a hallmark of the 
region on a global scale, carried through to the 1980s and 1990s by figures like the 
Swedes Olof Palme and Anna Lindh, Denmark’s Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, or indeed 
Finland’s Martti Ahtisaari, Koivisto’s successor as President from 1994 to 2000, with 
extensive  United  Nations  service  and  the  2008  Nobel  Peace  Prize  to  his  name.
65 
Martha  Finnemore  and  Kathryn  Sikkink  identify  the  concept  of  an  actor  in 
international relations, the “norm entrepreneur”, that creates and promotes standards 
of behaviour for the international community,
66 and Ingebritsen argues that the Nordic 
countries  fulfil  this  position.
67 Aloof  from  international  engagement,  the  Nordic 
countries’  traditions  of  social  democracy  (particularly  in  Sweden)  and  neutrality 
(Sweden  and  Finland  both  declined  membership  in  NATO)  gave  them  a  role  in 
conflict management and peace promotion. The so-called line of “active neutrality” 
pursued by Finland post-Second World War came to greatest fruition in the 1970s 
with the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 
the  later  Organisation  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  or  OSCE)  in 
Helsinki.
68  
 
The  norms  the  Nordic  countries  promoted  include  what  Ingebritsen  calls  “global 
welfare”, a responsibility of richer nations to help poorer ones, and thus bring the 
concept of Nordic welfare to the broadest international community – “[a]s domestic 
                                                 
65 Christine Ingebritsen, Scandinavia in World Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, 
pp. 29-36. Ahtisaari, born in Vyborg in 1937 and evacuated to Kuopio following the Soviet annexation 
of the Karelian Isthmus in 1944, became well known as a humanitarian and peace-negotiator. His best-
known work was perhaps in Kosovo and the Balkans region, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2008. Ahtisaari said in 2012, “The fact that I come from a Nordic country has helped me 
tremendously in my peace assignments around the world”. See Karin Arvidsson, Does the Nordic 
Region Speak with a FORKED Tongue?, translated by Leslie Walke, Copenhagen: Nordic 
Council/Nordic Council of Ministers, 2012, p. 43.     
66 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 
International Organisation, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1999, pp. 896-9.  
67 Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics”, Cooperation 
and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2002, pp. 12-3.  
68 Ibid. p. 13.   
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institutions  took  responsibility  for  impoverished  groups  within  society,  and 
perpetuated a norm of social solidarity, the logical extension of this commitment was 
a global one”.
69 The notion of promoting humanitarianism and aid thus becomes part 
of  Finland’s  self-identification  as  part  of  the  Nordic  cultural  and  political  region, 
closely linked to its Scandinavian neighbours, in particular Sweden, to which it owes 
much of its identity construction as a Western European nation. The positive view of 
the Nordic, and by extension Western European, cultural and political region is a 
recurrent  theme  in  the  discussions  of  Ingrian  return  migration.  The  discursive 
resource  of  Finnish  identity  present  in  this  discussion  is  that  Finns  are  Western 
Europeans with a positive global influence. This positive influence can be transmitted 
as  humanitarian  assistance  to  Ingrians,  and  this  assistance  may  take  the  form  of 
providing residency in Finland.  
 
For  the  Nordic  countries,  and  particularly  for  Finland,  a  focus  of  this  culture  of 
humanitarian interventionism post-Cold War was the provision of assistance to the 
development of the neighbouring Baltic area. According to Ingebritsen, this was “a 
central element of Scandinavian foreign-policy making during the 1990s”.
70 In 1993 
and  1994,  Sweden’s  then  Prime  Minister  Carl  Bildt  published  opinion  pieces  in 
Foreign Policy and The New York Times on the topic of stability in the Baltic area, 
arguing  that  the  situation  presented  a  test  for  the  European  institutions  in  their 
commitment  and  aptitude  for  conflict-prevention,  right  on  their  own  doorstep.
71 
Specific measures for the Nordic states on this issue included not only individual 
contributions  (including  Finland’s  military  cooperation  and  training  offered  to 
Estonia’s defence forces), but also collective financial investment from the Nordic 
Council, including two million Danish crowns in aid donated in 1991 to the newly 
independent  Baltic  republics.
72 Essentially,  conflict  prevention  and  moderation  in 
post-Soviet Northern Europe also stipulated economic development of the politically 
transforming (and, in the context of friction between ethnic groups and the new Baltic 
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governments, somewhat politically unstable) Baltic Sea region as a peace-building 
tool.  As  such,  Nordic  approaches  to  humanitarian  issues  in  this  region  initially 
preferred on-site development, rather than migration. This echoes political thinking 
amongst Finnish parties at this time, some of which appeared to express reluctance to 
opening borders in the name of humanitarianism. Indeed the Finnish Centre Party, 
which  led  the  1991-1995  coalition  government,  had  established  a  specific  policy 
position  on  refugees  for  the  1990s  that  preferred  on-site  humanitarian  assistance, 
expressed in the statement “[t]he focus of our nation's refugee policy has to be helping 
refugees  on-site,  by  adding  support  to  the  international  refugee  organisations”.
73 
Despite this, Finnish political language on Ingrians at this time did contain a theme of 
humanitarianism linked to migration, suggesting that exceptions would be made for 
those distinguished by perceived links to Finland.  
 
Finnish  humanitarian  intervention  for  Ingrians  began  before  Koivisto’s  1990 
announcement, but was transformed in scope and tone after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This collapse was followed by considerable political turbulence in the early 
1990s in Russia, including the 1993 constitutional crisis and use of military force at 
the Russian parliament, as well as the rising image of St Petersburg as a lawless mob 
town,  which  came  to  a  head  with  the  assassination  of  local  politician  Galina 
Starovoytova  in  1998.
74 On  19  September  1989,  immediately  prior  to  Koivisto’s 
announcement, Social Democrat parliamentarians Jouni Backman, Timo Roos, Marja-
Liisa  Tykkyläinen,  Jukka  Gustafsson  and  Kari  Urpilainen  introduced  a  budget 
proposal  to  government  entitled  Määrärahan  osoittamisesta  inkerinsuomalaisten 
nuorten koulutusohjelmia varten [Dispersal of Appropriation to Training Programs 
for  Young  Ingrian  Finns].  Backman  et  al.  begin  by  noting  that  “the  need  for 
educational  and  cultural  programs  in  the  Ingrian  Finns’  own  language  has  grown 
strongly over the past few years”.
75 Interestingly, they do not specifically qualify the 
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reasons behind this need, nor do they state whether the Ingrians themselves have 
expressed concern at the decline of Finnish-use in their community or loss of culture. 
Rather,  the  written  question  from  Backman  et  al.  proceeds  to  detail  the  current 
programs in place for teaching of Finnish in Ingria, including student and teacher 
exchange and the provision of approximately 100,000 text books for Finnish language 
schools and language study groups.
76 Their request was for 200,000 Finnish marks 
from the state budget to be allocated for language training programs for Ingrians in 
the USSR.
77 The significance of the Finnish language as the cornerstone of Finnish 
politicians’ perception of Ingrians’ Finnishness is here again underscored, but there is 
also a somewhat unspoken assumption that Finns owe assistance to Ingrians not only 
because Ingrians are in need, but because Ingrians are part of an extended concept of 
the Finnish national community. This departs somewhat from Ingebritsen’s notion of 
Nordic humanitarianism motivated by “global welfare”, being rather more parochial 
in its aims and focus.  
 
As  the  1990s  progressed,  events  in  the  new  Russian  Federation  made  the 
humanitarian situation more serious.  Throughout 1992-1993, there were major food 
shortages in Russia, spurred by drought, and the Russian government appealed to the 
international community for aid.
78 This could have presented an avenue in which the 
discourse on humanitarian intervention could flow; i.e. that the Right to Return policy 
allowed Finland to offer protection to Ingrians from a difficult and unstable life in 
Russia.  Indeed,  the  frequently  raised  issue  of  pensions  for  Ingrians  was  often 
presented as a means to provide Ingrians with a livelihood they simply had no access 
to  in  Russia.
79   However,  beyond  this,  there  was  not  a  pronounced  focus  on  the 
humanitarian  situation  in  Russia  in  the  political  discourse  on  the  Ingrian  return 
migration.  Rather,  the  focus  appears  to  have  shifted  to  suggest  that  humanitarian 
intervention for Ingrians could best be served with Ingrians remaining in Russia and 
Estonia. In 1992, Sulo Aittoniemi suggested that immigration to Finland would not 
improve the humanitarian situation for Ingrians; he notes “on the other hand, Ingrian 
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Finns moving to Finland could easily become a minority here and remain in lower 
level  living  conditions”.
80 Aittoniemi  suggests  that  the  employment  situation  (as 
mentioned  in  his  previous  statements,  discussed  earlier)  could  not  absorb  Ingrian 
Finns with lower Finnish-language skills and levels of education, who as non-citizens 
would likely languish at the bottom of the social strata in Finland.
81 Labour Minister 
Kanerva again responded to this question, and challenged the suggestion that Ingrians 
would not be better off in Finland, appealing to a sense of hope and charity with his 
choice of words: “To Ingrian Finns, Finland represents a chance to improve their level 
and quality of living, and will also benefit the Ingrian Finnish community”.
82 As with 
the  discussion  on  historical  atonement,  the  language  employed  here  appeals  to 
emotional,  rather  than  rational,  considerations.  Finland’s  position  as  a  Nordic 
humanitarian actor would necessitate provision of assistance for vulnerable groups, 
and the hope for an improved life Finland provides for vulnerable Ingrians thus makes 
an emotional appeal to the idea of Ingrian inclusiveness in Finland. This inclusiveness 
is here built on perceptions of negative relations between Russia and Finland (the 
discursive resource of Finns as opposed to Russians) and Finland as belonging to a 
particular positive Nordic tradition (the discursive resource of Finland as a Western 
European  nation  with  a  Nordic  heritage).  This  ideology  of  Finnish  identity,  still 
including Ingrians, thus appears to retain its dominant impact at this time amongst 
Finnish politicians.     
 
Yet Kanerva indicated that he did not anticipate all Ingrian returnees would settle 
permanently in Finland, and suggested that the real humanitarian benefit would be 
through the earnings, knowledge and skills they could bring back to their Ingrian 
homeland.
83 This echoes a 1992 statement by Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen:  
 
Only few of the Ingrians arriving in Finland for a longer period have announced that they 
want to become permanent residents of Finland. Most wish to work temporarily in Finland. 
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This is not primarily immigration or resettlement, but rather, seeking to improve the living 
conditions at home.
84 
 
The government’s discussion on humanitarian intervention at this point thus appears 
to  focus  on  (voluntarily)  temporary  residence  as  a  tool  for  improving  Ingrian 
standards of living, and within the context of rising unemployment in the early 1990s 
economic crisis in Finland, this makes a certain amount of political sense. Indeed, 
Kanerva points out that “for returnees, just as other immigrant groups, the state cannot 
guarantee  any  particular  living  conditions”,
85 though  he  argues  that  there  is  no 
evidence of Ingrians falling too far behind the mainstream in this regard.
86  To some 
extent,  these  comments  follow  Aittoniemi’s  perception  of  Ingrians  as  a  migrant 
minority  group  in  Finland,  rather  than  simply  as  part  of  the  dominant  Finnish 
mainstream. However, neither Kanerva, Väyrynen nor Aittoniemi reject the notion of 
providing  assistance  for  Ingrians  based  on  their  perceived  connection  to  Finland 
outright. Indeed, in the same statement as he suggested the temporary nature of the 
Ingrian return to Finland, Foreign Minister Väyrynen also notes “[t]he connection to 
Finnishness is an important part of Ingrian identity”.
87 The nature of the discussion on 
humanitarianism  at  this  time,  therefore,  does  not  exclude  the  perceived  Finnish 
identity, or connection to Finnishness, of Ingrians.  
 
Though the theme of humanitarian intervention from the government at this stage 
appears to suggest a degree of separation between Ingrian and Finnish identity, at 
least inasmuch as Ingrians could still identify the Ingrian region as their homeland and 
do not seek to move permanently to Finland, their special status as connected to the 
Finnish  nation  state  is  nevertheless  emphasised.  The  discussion  on  humanitarian 
assistance may have been moving away from permanent resettlement in Finland for 
Ingrians as the 1990s progress, but there was still an assumption in the language of 
Finnish politicians that Ingrians were owed some assistance based on their inclusion 
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in a perception of Finnishness. Earlier assertions that Ingrians are vulnerable in Russia 
based on their Finnish identity, which is again predicated primarily on their history of 
opposition  and  otherness  to  Russians,  are  not  substantially  revisited  or  revised. 
Emotional language on the vulnerability of Ingrians as a Finnish minority in hostile, 
chaotic Russia could therefore remain an effective tool for promoting an ideology of 
Ingrian inclusion in an understanding of Finnishness by the mid 1990s.    
 
4)  The Positive Assessment of the Swedish Period 
 
The theme of a positive Swedish period in Finnish and Ingrian history is a relatively 
minor aspect of the discussion on the Ingrian Return law in 1990-1995. It is alluded to 
evocatively at times, but is not extensively expanded upon. The assessment of the 
Swedish legacy stipulates a discursive construction of Finland’s “Western” identity, 
which transformed in the 1990s from a link via Swedish cultural and legal inheritance 
to Nordic Europe, to a broader link to Western Europe and the European Union.  
 
The  specific  period  1989-1991  was  marked  by  a  decline  in  the  traditional 
international perception of Nordic identity, as Ole Wæver notes that the decline of the 
USSR had made the Nordic countries’ position as arbiters between capitalism and 
communism with the Nordic welfare state, and (for Sweden and Finland) between the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO as neutral states, appear obsolete.
88 To Wæver, the future 
was in the new Baltic region, affording small nations and regions of Northern Europe 
the  opportunity  to  develop  into  a  dynamic  region  and  avoid  being  cast  as  the 
European periphery.
89 Incidentally, this “new” region corresponds to a great extent 
with  the  old  Swedish  kingdom  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  efforts  like  Ilves’ 
“Yuleland” draw on common cultural inheritance dating from the pre-Russian era in 
forming a new identity for this region as part of the EU.  
 
The discursive resource linking Finland to the West was very much in evidence in this 
period, as the Nordic expansion of the European Union came to a head in 1995. 
Christopher  S.  Browning  argues  that  the  October  1994  referendum  on  EU 
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membership in Finland, unlike the concurrent debate in Norway, was framed within a 
discourse on Finland’s place in the East or West. Indeed, unlike Norway, where EU 
membership was painted as a threat to Norwegian identity, Finns saw EU membership 
as  “protecting,  even  enhancing  their  national  identity”,  and  as  Finland’s  “return 
home”  to  the  West  after  its  Cold  War-mandated  isolation.
90 Likewise,  the  veteran 
Finnish  diplomat  Max  Jakobson  viewed  EU  membership  as  an  affirmation  of 
Finland’s Western identity.
91 Whereas the European Union presented a new structure 
for  Finland  to  present  its  Western  European  identity,  its  pre-1809  connection  to 
Sweden had served a similar function. President Koivisto had alluded to the perpetual 
connection between Finland and Sweden in speeches in France in 1983 and 1990, and 
the status this afforded Finland as a Western, Nordic nation.
92  
 
Koivisto’s  1990  interview  posits  that  despite  being  separated  from  Swedish 
governance by a century more than Finland, Ingrians shared this heritage with Finns. 
His statement was echoed in later political discussions on the issue, such as National 
Coalition parliamentarians Kirsti Ala-Harja, Riitta Jouppila and Pentti Mäki-Hakola’s 
1991 statement, which begins: 
 
There are an estimated 60,000–100,000 Ingrian Finns in the Soviet Union, of which most live 
in the Ingrian lands of Leningrad Oblast. Ingrian Finns are not related to Finns, they are 
Finnish  themselves,  the  descendants  of  Finns  who  in  the  seventeenth  century  moved  to 
Ingria.
93 
  
This, essentially, is the extent of the discourse on the Swedish legacy in the Ingrian 
discussion. The historic connection to the seventeenth Swedish Kingdom, with its 
positive  Westward  connotations,  appears  shared  by  Finns  and  Ingrians,  thus 
simultaneously  granting  Ingrians  a  related  Finnish  identity  though  the  discursive 
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resources  of  Western,  Scandinavia-ward  orientation  and  ancestral  connection  to 
ancient Finland. This is not substantially challenged at any point between 1990 and 
1995 by the Finnish governments or parliamentarians.  
 
There is also the notion of Lutheranism, brought to Finland by the Swedish King 
Gustav Vasa in the early modern era, and specifically addressed in the 1990 Koivisto 
interview, that plays into the discussion of the positive Western/Swedish legacy in 
Finland and Ingria. Scholars such as Henrik Stenius have written on the significance 
of  the  Lutheran  tradition  in  Nordic  European  history,  and  Stenius  in  particular 
suggests its role in shaping an understanding of Nordic heritage.
94 Given Koivisto’s 
specific  1990  mention  of  Lutheranism  as  binding  Ingrians  to  Finland  or  Nordic 
Europe, and the significance Huntington, for example, gives the religious divide in 
separating Eastern and Western “civilisations”, with Finns thus as Western Europeans 
and Russians as Eastern, it is perhaps surprising that the Lutheranism of Ingrians finds 
very limited mention in the ensuing political discourse on the Ingrian Return law. 
After  Koivisto,  no  other  major  Finnish  politician  employs  the  same  discursive 
resource  to  note  Ingrian  and  Finnish  sameness,  and  Finnish/Ingrian  and  Russian 
otherness. However, there is some evidence to suggest a degree of decline in the 
significance of religion as an identity marker for Finnishness at this time. Writing in 
1990, Gustav Björkstrand notes that whilst overall Lutheran Church membership still 
remained at 90% at this time, and the majority of major political parties (barring the 
Left Alliance and Greens) did not actively support the complete separation of church 
and  state,  the  Lutheran  Church  was  experiencing  a  decline  in  membership,  and 
secularism was gaining some (limited) ground.
95 Kimmo Kääriäinen, Kati Niemelä 
and  Kimmo  Ketola  also  argue  that  the  Lutheran  Church  in  Finland  post-Second 
World War had had to respond to secularisation challenges and become more strident 
in its role as a “folk church”, separate from the state but advocating social and moral 
positions it deemed to be representative of Finnish values, such as the defence of the 
welfare state model in the 1990s.
96 The situation in Finland around 1990 thus shows 
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some indications of the rise of secularism and potential declining omnipotence of 
Lutheranism as the spiritual core of Finnish national identity constructions by the 
1990s, despite the Lutheran Church still retaining a significant social role and broad 
membership base at this time. The religious confession of Ingrians may have therefore 
been of lesser significance in promoting their Finnishness, if Finns in Finland had 
themselves a waning relationship with the Lutheran Church.  
 
The lack of mention of the need to offer religious protection to Lutheran Ingrians in 
Russia by bringing them to a majority Lutheran country, as well as any expression 
between  1990  and  1995  of  Ingrians  being  more  or  less  active  in  religious  life  in 
Finland than anticipated, also suggests that in practice, the Lutheran connection was 
relatively uncontested in parliamentary discussions on Ingrian return migration. After 
Koivisto had specified their Lutheranism inherited from the Swedish Kingdom as 
indicative of their Finnishness in April 1990, mentions of Ingrian Lutheran identity 
are by and large limited to discussions of use of Lutheran Church membership in 
Ingria  as  means  of  proving  Finnishness.
97 Thus,  Lutheranism  does  retain  some 
practical significance as a discursive resource for “proof” of Finnish identity. The lack 
of dissent from Finnish politicians on church membership as a means of providing 
this proof therefore suggests both that there is a certain degree of consensus on the 
Finnishness of Ingrians based on their connection to the Western-orientated, Swedish-
exported Lutheran tradition, and that the pro-Western discussion on common Swedish 
Stormaktstid history declined in significance in the justification of the Ingrian Finnish 
Return law after Koivisto’s April 1990 statement.  
 
5)  The Negative Assessment of Russia and the Soviet Union 
 
According to Heikki Luostarinen, the 1980s, glasnost and perestroika, and the early 
stages of the opening up of the Soviet Union transformed global perceptions of the 
USSR.
98 The Western powers, particularly the United States, had been embroiled in a 
“Second Cold War” with the Soviets in the early years of the Reagan Administration, 
yet the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev served to moderate Western perceptions of the 
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USSR and Russians in the latter half of the 1980s.
99  Finnish perceptions of the USSR 
and Russians, at once more familiar and less mystical to them than to Americans, 
Luostarinen sees as following a similar pattern of a dissolving “enemy image”.
100 The 
1948 Treaty, to Luostarinen, removed any real threat of Soviet attack on Finland, and 
particularly after the 1970s, Finland’s new-found national identity as an active neutral 
and “East-West bridgebuilder” served to dissipate any negative political discourses on 
the  Soviet  Union.
101 But  Luostarinen  was  writing  in  1989,  and  the  post-Soviet 
situation in Northern Europe would dramatically change the ways in which Finland 
was able, or believed it was able, to react to its eastern neighbour. Immediately after 
the  collapse  of  the  USSR,  Browning  argues  that  the  discourse  shifted  to  “post-
Finlandisation”, a rebuke of the silence Finland had kept in criticising Soviet leaders 
and policy in the post-war era, to a more free and, if necessary, critical approach to 
Russian affairs.
102  
 
Anni  Kangas  identifies  three  voices  in  the  Finnish  discourse  on  Finno-Russian 
relations: primordialists who see Russia as Finland’s constant enemy, instrumentalists 
who see the relationship and its use of history as constructed to serve political ends, 
and the identity-based school that focuses criticism on the distinctions made between 
Finns  and  Russians.
103 The  discussion  on  Ingrians,  with  respect  to  the  Soviet  and 
Russian  government,  shows  a  distinct  presence  of  primordialist  constructions, 
focusing in particular on Russian actions towards Ingrian refugees during and after 
the Second World War (also discussed at length in section 2, under the discussion of 
historical atonement).  
 
A case in point is SMP parliamentarian Marita Jurva (later Mäkinen)’s 1993 written 
question to Foreign Minister Paavo Väyrynen, which begins: 
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Ingrians of Finnish kin have for centuries experienced terrible human suffering, not least after 
the return of 55,000 Ingrians to the Soviet Union under Article 10 of the 1944 Armistice 
Agreement. In the USSR, they were victims of the Stalinist policy of genocide.
104  
 
Evocation of Stalinist crimes against the Ingrian population, even going so far as to 
term them genocide, is the most aggressive anti-Soviet discourse on Ingrians from a 
Finnish  parliamentarian.  Beyond  criticism  mentioned  in  previous  sections  that  the 
USSR  or  new  Russian  Federation  were  not  able  to  provide  for  their  citizens,  the 
mention of the Stalin-era fate of the Ingrians in this discussion depicts an anger in the 
Finnish political discourse on Soviet post-war actions that continued to ferment. The 
language  employed  here  is  highly  evocative  in  its  choice  of  words,  including 
accusations  of  “genocide”,  a  particularly  penetrating  term.  The  “genocidal” 
relationship  between  Soviets  and  Ingrians  contrasts  sharply  to  the  immediately 
preceding “kin” relationship between Ingrians and Finns.  
 
Similarly, a large group of National Coalition parliamentarians submitted a written 
question to Minister Väyrynen in 1992 that begins: 
 
In Russia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, and in some other parts of the former Soviet Union, there now 
live about 67,700 Ingrian Finns. This much remains from the 200,000 people who lived in 
Ingria previously for centuries. In Stalin's time, Ingrians began to be persecuted and moved 
away  from  their  former  dwelling  places.  Cultural  rights  were  taken  away,  the  Finnish 
language was banned, the churches were closed. Ingrians were exiled to Siberia even before 
the Second World War, and tens of thousands of them were executed. Since 1955, Ingrians 
have had the opportunity to return to Ingria, but the internal passport requirement (since 1959) 
is still preventing many from returning to their home.
105 
  
                                                 
104 Marita Jurva, “Inkerin virkoaminen -nimisen kansanliikkeen avustamisesta”, KK 68/1993, 
Valtiopäivät 1993: Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1993, p. 1. Original Finnish text: 
Suomenheimoiset inkeriläiset ovat vuosisatojen ajan kokeneet hirvittäviä inhimillisiä kärsimyksiä, eikä 
vähiten sen jälkeen, kun 55 000 inkeriläistä pakkopalautettiin vuoden 1944 välirauhansopimuksen 10. 
artiklan tulkinnalla Suomesta Neuvostoliittoon. Neuvostoliitossa he joutuivat stalinistisen 
kansanmurhapolitiikan uhreiksi. 
105 Jouni J. Särkijärvi, Riitta Jouppila, Riitta Saastamoinen, Anneli Taina, Tuula Linnainmaa, Päivi 
Varpasuo, Anssi Rauramo, Eeva Turunen, Sauli Niinistö, Irmeli Takala, Kimmo Sasi, Ben Zyskowicz, 
Leila Lehtinen, Väinö Saario and Oiva Savela, “Inkeriläisten auttamista koskevan 
kokonaissuunnitelman laatimisesta”, KK 71/1992, Valtiopäivät 1992: Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: 
Eduskunta, 1992, p. 1. Original Finnish text: Venäjällä, Virossa, Kazakstanissa ja eräissä muissa 
entisen Neuvostoliiton osissa asuu nykyisin noin 67,700 inkerinsuomalaista. Tämän verran on jäljellä 
parhaimmillaan lähes 200,000 henkeä käsittäneestä kansasta, joka vuosisatoja oli asunut Inkerissä. 
Stalinin aikaan inkeriläisiä ryhdyttiin vainoamaan ja heitä siirrettiin pois entisiltä asuinsijoiltaan. 
Kulttuuriset oikeudet riistettiin, suomen kielen käyttö kiellettiin, kirkot suljettiin. Inkeriläisiä 
karkotettiin Siperiaan jo ennen toista maailmansotaa, ja kymmeniätuhansia heistä teloitettiin Vuodesta 
1955 inkeriläisillä on ollut mahdollisuus palata Inkerinmaalle, mutta maansisäisen passin vaatimus 
(vuodesta 1959) estää yhä monia muuttamasta takaisin kotiseuduilleen.  
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Including also those Ingrian Finns deported from the Finnish border regions under 
Stalin to remote Siberia and Kazakhstan, this presentation of the suffering Russians 
inflicted on Ingrians gives the sense that Ingrians may not be safe amongst Russians: 
there is no direct mention of the significant change in government between Stalin and 
Gorbachev, or later Boris Yeltsin, and one is left with the impression that a threat, 
even  if  diminished,  remains.  A  focus  on  the  negative  history  between 
Soviets/Russians and Ingrians, therefore, relates closely to the discussion on historical 
atonement at this point, and emphasises the need to bring Ingrians to Finland, even if 
no real or impending threat can be deduced from the Soviet or Russian governments. 
The discursive resource of Russia and Russians as a negative influence on Finnish 
history is thus here employed as a clear rationale for bringing Ingrians, deemed as 
Finns themselves, to Finland. Despite changes in Finland’s relationship to Russia by 
the early 1990s, the persistence of this discursive resource continued to shape the 
Finnish approach to Ingrians at this time.  
 
However, as with the assessment of the Swedish legacy, discussions on Soviet history 
in  the  Finnish  parliament  on  Ingrian  matters  should  be  viewed  as  secondary, 
employed to add weight to other discussions as the core debate on Ingrian Finnish 
return migration. Reflections on the Swedish and Soviet legacies in the region, more 
broadly related to Finnish identity than focused sharply on the Ingrian issue, were not 
challenged by the arrival of Ingrian returnees, and the Finnish government did not 
appear to have sought to justify the Right to Return policy solely along these lines, 
although  they  influenced  other  discussions  on  the  policy  to  varying  extent.  The 
Russian  example  in  particular  allowed  Finnish  politicians  to  play  to  overarching 
popular negative attitudes towards the USSR and Russia, particularly as Finland’s 
adversary  in  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars,  along  with  generally  negative 
historical  assessments  of  Stalin  himself,  to  reinforce  an  ideologically  dominant 
perception of Finnishness in the period of post-Finlandisation in 1990-1995 that at 
this  time  includes  Ingrians.  The  discursive  construction  of  Finnishness  as  in 
opposition  to  Russianness  extends  to  Ingrians  through  their  shared  history  of 
opposition to Russians/Soviets, is therefore still an important element in the early 
discussion on the Ingrian Right to Return and the constructions of Finnish identity 
therein.  
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C) Conclusions 
 
Mauno Koivisto’s April 1990 statement on the Ingrian Finns introduced discursive 
constructions of Finnish identity, and launched a political discussion that inferred the 
connection  of  Ingrians  to  a  set  of  core  characteristics  of  Finnish  identity.  Taking 
Finland’s  largely  Finnish-speaking,  Lutheran  population,  with  long  ancestral 
connections  to  the  land  and  a  Western,  rather  than  Eastern,  European  political 
orientation as the cornerstones of Finnish identity, Finnish politicians initially took for 
granted  that  Ingrian  Finnish  returnees  would  also  conform  to  these  identity 
constructions. Yet the way in which various aspects of the political discussion on 
Ingrian  migration  to  Finland  presented  here  –  namely  the  notions  of  integration 
capability, historical atonement, humanitarian intervention and views of the Swedish 
and Soviet influence on the region – shift over the period 1990-1995 reflects the 
reality that Ingrians did not easily fit the identity categories Finnish politicians held to 
describe  Finnishness.  It  is  the  notion  that  Ingrians  belong  within  the  dominant 
constructions of Finnish identity, rather than the validity of these discursive resources 
as a whole, that is re-examined somewhat here. This gives some indication of the 
pervasiveness  of  these  discursive  resources  in  defining  Finnishness  for  Finnish 
lawmakers at this time, despite challenges from the experience of Ingrians, still held 
to be Finns, in Finland by the mid 1990s.  
 
In  particular,  within  the  discussions  on  integration,  atonement  and  humanitarian 
intervention,  cases  are  presented  both  from  parliamentarians  and  the  government 
ministries that acknowledge a disparity between the Finnish ideal of Ingrians and the 
reality.  The  discussion  on  humanitarian  intervention,  for  example,  acknowledged 
Ingrians’ connection to their homeland of Ingria in Russia, rather than Finland, and 
disparities in language competency in particular that would make long-term residency 
and integration in Finland difficult and potentially unhelpful to improving Ingrian 
standards of living. This discussion thus becomes a question of short-term residency 
as a temporary escape for Ingrians from a difficult transitional period in Russia and 
Estonia.  The  discussion  on  historical  atonement  also  shows  elements  from  the 
populist wing (which was initially enthusiastic about this Ingrian return migration) 
that emphasise the Finnishness of Ingrians based primarily on their service to Finland 
in  the  Second  World  War,  separating  Ingrian  veterans  from  other  Ingrians  and  
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opening an avenue for questioning of non-veterans’ relative Finnishness, thus creating 
a  “hierarchy”  of  Finnishness  in  Ingrians,  though  this  diverges  from  the  then 
government’s  official  line.  Discussions  on  integration  also  begin  to  question 
preconceived  notions  of  Ingrians’  connection  to  the  Finnish  language,  which 
exacerbate  concerns  for  labour  market  integration  at  a  time  of  increasing 
unemployment.  
 
Yet  the  discourses  on  these  notions  do  not  yet  cancel  completely  the  concept  of 
Ingrian  connectedness  to  Finland,  nor  the  appropriateness  of  special  treatment  of 
Ingrians  in  immigration  policy  based  on  this  concept.  For  the  most  part,  the 
discussions on Ingrian Finnish return migration overall continue to present the notion 
that Ingrians conform to the discursive resources shaping discussion and construction 
of Finnish identity here. For instance, the humanitarian intervention and historical 
atonement discussions still appear focused on the notion that Ingrians are owed some 
assistance from the Finnish state, based on their kin-relationship to Finland and their 
service  and  suffering  for  this  relationship  in  the  post-war  Soviet  Union.  This  is 
communicated  through  particularly  emotive  and  evocative  language  from  Finnish 
politicians,  which  plays  particularly  on  wartime  memories  in  Finland,  as  well  as 
narratives of Ingrian suffering under Stalin in the USSR. Particularly in the post-
Finlandisation context of early 1990s Finland, this was an effective discursive method 
in  forging  the  ideological  dominance  of  Ingrian  inclusion  in  Finland,  relating 
interpretations of Ingrians’ history to dominant perceptions of Finnish history with the 
USSR, particularly the “separate struggle” for Finnish independence.  
 
Thus, constructions of Finnish national identity inherent in this policy before 1996 
appear  to  conform  to  an  ethno-culturally  essentialist  ideology  of  Finnish  national 
identity, viewing Finnishness as a broader concept of identity beyond the status of 
citizenship. Though some scholars of national identity in Europe continue to follow 
the model of an East-West divide in Europe, particularly viewing the ethno-cultural 
Eastern model of identity as informed by the legacy of communist governments and 
absence of civil society, analysis of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in this initial 
period  shows  ethno-cultural  ideologies  of  national  identity  transcend  the  old  Iron 
Curtain and find credence also in a self-identifying Western European democracy.  
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Finland also represents a logical inconsistency between definitions of Eastern and 
Western Europe as culturally separated or distinct “civilisations” defined primarily by 
religious  and  cultural  differences.  Finnish  politicians’  perception  of  Finland’s 
“Westernness”  appears  more  readily  the  result  of  historic  narratives  devised  and 
employed to create identity borders for politically expedient purposes, in this case a 
claim  to  the  perceived  prestige  of  Western  Europeanness,  integration  into  the 
European Union and maintenance of national independence against a larger neighbour 
with an expansionist history in the twentieth century.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINNISHNESS IN THE REFORMING OF THE INGRIAN FINNISH RETURN 
POLICY 1996-2010 
 
This chapter examines the constructions of Finnishness in the Ingrian Finnish Right to 
Return as the policy was altered, reformed and ultimately cancelled. The transitions in 
the Ingrian Finnish Return policy begin with the first introduction of specific criteria 
to define and limit returnee status in 1996, and end with the final decision to close the 
Ingrian Right to Return in 2010. In both 1996 and 2002-2003 new regulations and 
criteria  were  introduced,  by  which  applicants  would  be  assessed  to  qualify  for 
returnee  status.  These  regulations  included  concrete  definitions  and  limitations  of 
Finnish ancestry and Finnish language capability to be proven before departure for 
Finland, which can be viewed as an attempt to weed out those amongst the Ingrian 
Finns whose Finnish lineal ancestry was deemed too distant, or dedication to learning 
the Finnish language too weak (in essence, those who failed to conform to two of the 
five core identity characteristics used as discursive resources to connect Ingrians to 
Finnishness  in  1990-1995).  This  represents  something  of  a  departure  from  the 
government  line  in  1990-1995,  when  creating  a  split  between  “deserving”  and 
“undeserving”  Ingrian  return  migrants  was  specifically  rejected.  The  reform  and 
ultimate cancellation of the Ingrian Finnish Return policy shows the resilience of 
some characteristics of Finnishness used by politicians to describe Finnish identity, 
even if Ingrians, previously held to be Finnish, did not conform to them. Indeed, the 
changes  in  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return  policy  to  its  cancellation  also  show  the 
willingness of Finnish politicians to exclude Ingrians rather than renegotiate some of 
their perceptions of Finnishness. Effectively, the realisation that Ingrian Finns failed 
to  comply  completely  with  some  identity  features,  despite  previous  assumptions, 
spurred  a  gradual  decline  in  the  perceived  “Finnishness”  of  Ingrians  in  Finnish 
politicians’ discussions, rather than a re-evaluation of what “Finnishness” was.  
 
I argue in this chapter that, in essence, analysis of the changing discussions on the 
Ingrian  Finnish  Return  policy  suggests  that  Finnish  political  decision  makers  re-
evaluated Ingrian, but not Finnish, identity. I see language capabilities as playing a 
major part in the limitations to returnee status introduced over this period, reflecting 
the symbolic weight the Finnish language holds as a cornerstone of Finnish identity,  
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even in an officially bilingual nation. I further argue that Finnish political figures also 
questioned Ingrians’ ideological orientation towards Western Europe and the validity 
of their ancestral connection to Finland. Thus, regulations were introduced that sought 
to restrict ancestral descent to within living memory (two generations, along the lines 
of a “grandmother clause”) rather than less-readily proven connections potentially 
spanning many centuries. This indicates some degree of challenge to the construction 
of Finnishness as purely a community of descent, which had been used as a discursive 
resource to link Finns and Ingrians to a common identity in 1990-1995. Now, in 
1996-2010 Ingrians would increasingly be portrayed as fundamentally separate from 
the mainstream of Finnish identity, which continued to be defined to varying extents 
through other core discursive resources – Finnish language, positive connection to 
Sweden/Scandinavia  and  Western  Europe,  and  negative  connection  to  Russia/the 
Soviet Union, as in the policy’s earlier years.  
 
This chapter progresses by examining the same five themes of the Ingrian Finnish 
Return presented in the previous chapter, which continued to dominate the political 
discussion  on  Ingrian  returnees  after  1996,  but  under  different  circumstances. 
Economic developments in early-1990s Finland had already made some of the cases 
made in 1990 for Ingrian Finnish return migration redundant or antiquated by 1991. 
In particular, the economic collapse between 1990 and 1993, in which Finland’s GDP 
declined 12%, ended the years of labour shortages in southern Finland and saw a 
sharp increase in unemployment.
1 Belief in the relative “usefulness” of Ingrians for 
the labour market had declined before 1996, and though the rate of unemployment 
had begun to generally decline from 1994 (at a high of around 18%), by 1998 it still 
sat at over 10%, compared to a 1990 low of less than 3%.
2 (See also figure 14). The 
case for bringing Ingrians to Finland for economic purposes was now more difficult to 
make – Ingrian resettlement would now occur despite, rather than because of, the 
                                                 
1 Jaakko Pehkonen and Aki Kangasharju, “Employment and Output Growth in the 1990s”, in J. Kalela, 
J. Kiander, U. Kivikuru, H.A. Loikkanen and J. Simpura (eds), Down from the Heavens, Up from the 
Ashes: The Finnish Economic Crisis of the 1990s in the Light of Economic and Social Research, 
Helsinki: Valtion Taloudellinen Tutkimuskeskus, 2001, p. 217.  
2 Seppo Honkapohja and Erkki Koskela, “The Economic Crisis of the 1990s in Finland”, in J. Kalela, J. 
Kiander, U. Kivikuru, H.A. Loikkanen and J. Simpura (eds), Down from the Heavens, Up from the 
Ashes: The Finnish Economic Crisis of the 1990s in the Light of Economic and Social Research, 
Helsinki: Valtion Taloudellinen Tutkimuskeskus, 2001, p. 59.   
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labour  market  situation  in  Finland,  and  its  numbers  would  need  to  be  carefully 
managed.  
 
Figure 14 
Line  Graph  of  Finnish  Average  Yearly  Unemployment  Percentage  Rate,  1994-2010  (Seasonally 
Adjusted) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Employment and Unemployment (LFS) Database, available online at URL: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/employment_unemployment_lfs/data/database>, 
accessed 17 March 2014. 
 
The  global  economic  recession  of  2008  also  impacted  Finland,  and  again 
unemployment figures rose (see figure 14), this time from 6.2% in April 2008 to 8.2% 
in May 2009 (although this increase was less than the average across the European 
Union  member  states).
3 In  2009,  Labour  Minister  Anni  Sinnemäki  predicted  the 
unemployment rate would exceed 10% by 2010.
4 In the end, the rate averaged 8.4% 
in 2010, less than anticipated by Sinnemäki (see figure 14). Economic concerns, thus 
perhaps worse in anticipation than in reality, would also impact upon the rationale for 
the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return made towards the end of the policy, with the 
experience  of  labour  shortages  in  the  first  year  of  the  Right  to  Return  policy  set 
against  the  ongoing  reality  of  labour  integration  challenges  amidst  rising 
unemployment, calling into question the feasibility of continuing the policy beyond 
2010.   
                                                 
3 European Commission Bureau of Statistics (Eurostat), “Impact of the Economic Crisis on 
Unemployment”, May 2009, available online at URL: 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Impact_of_the_economic_crisis_on_u
nemployment>, accessed 29 November 2012.    
4 “Nearly One in Ten Now Unemployed”, YLE Uutiset, 21 July 2009, available online at URL: 
<http://yle.fi/uutiset/nearly_one_in_ten_now_unemployed/5287331>, accessed 29 November 2012.  
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The  global  recession  also  focused  Finnish  public  and  political  discussion  on  the 
Eurozone bailouts for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland in the late 2000s, and the 
rise of a potential new identity divide in Europe, between North and South rather than 
East and West. Former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan opined 
that cultural differences between the North, including Germany and Finland, and the 
South,  including  Greece  and  Portugal,  were  a  major  contributor  to  the  disparity 
between  the  two  regions  in  sovereign  debt  accumulation  and  vulnerability  to 
prolonged recession.
5 This notion very clearly entered the public discussion of Europe 
in Finland by late 2010, when the Republic of Ireland’s bailout was being negotiated. 
The Financial Times noted that Finnish political support for an Irish bailout was made 
conditional on strict Irish financial policy reform (particularly in matters related to its 
low  corporate  tax  rate),  and  characterised  the  surrounding  public  and  political 
discourse on the bailout as stressing Finland’s own fiscal prudence in comparison to 
other  European  states’  recklessness.
6 European  Commissioner  for  Economic  and 
Monetary  Affairs  Olli  Rehn,  himself  from  Finland,  expressed  concern  that  public 
debates between North and South could undermine a joint European recovery plan.
7  
 
However, this new North-South cleavage should not be taken as a replacement for the 
more established East-West divide that has ideologically influenced discussion of the 
Ingrian Return law in Finland. Firstly, it should be noted, as Giandomenico Majone 
does,  that  whatever  economic  disparities  exist  between  North  and  South  in  the 
Eurozone pale in comparison to the divergence between West and East in the broader 
European Union. Greece, Spain and Portugal joined the EU in the 1980s with income 
levels of approximately 65% of the EU average, whereas the post-communist 2004 
candidates joined with income levels at an average of 40%.
8 The greatest per capita 
income gap in Europe is between Luxembourg and Romania – the Romanian average 
                                                 
5Alan Greenspan, “Europe’s Crisis is All About the North-South Split”, The Financial Times, 6 
October 2011, available online at URL: <http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-
list/2011/10/06/europe%E2%80%99s-crisis-is-all-about-the-north-south-split/#axzz2ss6Ga5QX>, 
accessed 8 February 2014.   
6 Peter Spiegel, Stanley Pignal and Andrew Ward, “Bail-out Deepens EU’s North-South Divide”, The 
Financial Times, 7 December 2010, available online at URL: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dd84da2-
022f-11e0-aa40-00144feabdc0.html>, accessed 8 February 2014.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Giandomenico Majone, “Rethinking European Integration After the Debt Crisis”, University College 
London European Institute Working Paper, No. 3, 2012, available online at URL: 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/analysis-publications/publications/WP3.pdf>, accessed 8 
February 2014, p. 9.   
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is less than a tenth of Luxembourg’s.
9 Perhaps more significantly, the East vs. West 
divide retains a cultural dimension which, unlike the North-South divide, paints one 
side as more European than the other. This idea still found expression in the 2000s in 
Europe, for instance in a 2005 article by Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas that 
identified France and Germany as “Core Europe”, the focal point of a new emerging 
European identity growing in counterweight to the United States.
10 The idea of Core 
Europe was criticised by those outside its boundaries, such as Peter Esterházy, who 
argued that it created a notion of “first-class” and “second-class” Europeans, divided 
between core-West and peripheral-East.
11 This disparity in levels of Europeanness is a 
crucial difference between discursive constructions of European identity in the old 
East-West and new North-South divides, as the North-South divide does not appear to 
function as an identity marker for the overall notion of Europeanness.  
 
In Finnish politics, the recession and Eurozone bailouts had a particular effect on how 
the  idea  of  Europe  was  employed.  Positive  depictions  of  the  EU  and  the 
“Westernising”  narrative  from  the  early  1990s  were  replaced  by  a  degree  of 
Euroscepticism, with the True Finns obtaining an historic 14.9% gain in the vote 
share in 2011 (the largest increase in Finnish parliamentary history) running on an 
anti-European integration platform.
12 However, this electoral success should not be 
viewed  as  a  specific  challenge  to  the  positive  construction  of  Finland’s  (West) 
European identity. Indeed, Douglas R. Holmes argues that European identity may be 
employed by right-wing populist parties to further ethnically or culturally exclusionist 
conceptions of national identity, nested in an overarching European identity that is 
disseminated through exclusivist discursive resources like shared Christian religion or 
shared historical experience.
13 Similarly, Michael Bruter argues that nationalists may 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, “Feb. 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a 
Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe”, in D. Levy, M. Pensky and J. Torpey (eds), Old 
Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War, London and New 
York: Versio, 2005, p. 6.  
11 Peter Esterházy, “How Big is the European Dwarf?”, in D. Levy, M. Pensky and J. Torpey (eds), Old 
Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War, London and New 
York: Versio, 2005, pp. 74-5.  
12 Piia Elonen, “Eduskuntavaalit olivat ennätystehdas”, Helsingin Sanomat, 19 April 2011, available 
online at URL: 
<http://www.hs.fi/politiikka/artikkeli/Eduskuntavaalit+olivat+enn%C3%A4tystehdas/1135265521654
>, accessed 1 October 2013.  
13 Douglas R. Holmes, “Experimental Identities (after Maastricht)”, in J.T. Checkel and P.J. 
Katzenstein (eds), European Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 52-80.   
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construct  an  “ethno-European”  identity  based  on  “any  form  of  common  history; 
moral, religious, or ethnic traditions; philosophical, political, and moral norms and 
values”.
14 For  populist  parties,  the  argument  is  effectively  that  European  identity 
exists, but should be directed at rejection of multiculturalism and immigration from 
the non-West rather than erosion of the power of national governments.
15 Cas Mudde 
sees the 2000s generation of Eurosceptic anti-immigration parties as self-described 
defenders of the “Europeanness” of their national identity, particularly with reference 
to  European  immigration  from  North  Africa,  Turkey  and  the  Middle  East.
16 
Interestingly, Niko Pyrhönen argues that Finnish anti-immigration populists in the late 
2000s  framed  their  stance  particularly  through  discursive  constructions  of 
immigration  as  a  challenge  to  Finland’s  Nordic  identity  through  its  welfare  state 
model,
17 which  demonstrates  the  same  principles  within  a  smaller  supranational 
identity  nest.  Construction  of  Europe  and  European  as  identities  may  similarly 
become  a  significant  aspect  of  national  identity  construction,  conveyed  using 
similarly exclusivist discursive resources. This may be seen in the Ingrian Finnish 
Return law example, as the notion of Europe specifically constructed in opposition to 
Russia  is  discursively  employed  by  policymakers  to  legitimise  the  migration  of 
Ingrians as Finns to Finland, or alternatively, delegitimise their migration as Russians 
to Finland.  
 
Whilst the Right to Return policy was subjected to changing economic and political 
circumstances in Finland from 1996 to 2010, one matter of relative continuity within 
domestic politics from Mauno Koivisto’s presidency onwards was the way in which 
Finland’s experience in the Winter and Continuation Wars was presented. Koivisto’s 
successors  as  President,  Martti  Ahtisaari  and  Tarja  Halonen,  both  also  Social 
Democrats, advocated a view of the military conflicts between the USSR and Finland 
between  1939-1944  as  a  “separate  war”,  wherein  Finland  struggled  for  its  own 
                                                 
14 Michael Bruter, “Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic 
and Cultural European Identity”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 10, 2003, p. 1156.  
15Cas Mudde, “The Single-Issue Party Thesis: Extreme Right Parties and the Immigration Issue”, West 
European Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1999, pp. 182-97.  
16 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 162.  
17 Niko Pyrhönen, “‘This Welfare of Ours’: Justifying Public Advocacy for Anti-Immigration Politics 
in Finland During the Late 2000s”, in H. Vad Jønsson, E. Onasch, S. Pellander and M. Wickström 
(eds), Migration and Welfare States: Policies, Discourses and Institutions, Helsinki: Nordic Centre of 
Excellence NordWel, 2013, pp. 90-137.   
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survival, rather than as part of the larger European theatre of the Second World War.
18 
This relates to the construction of Finnish identity as a Western nation separate and 
opposed  to  the  East.  Indeed,  the  personal  experiences  of  Koivisto’s  immediate 
successor  Martti  Ahtisaari  (in  office  1994-2000),  who  was  born  in  Viipuri  and 
evacuated  to  Kuopio  in  Savonia  after  the  Soviet  annexation  of  eastern  Finnish 
Karelia,  kept  the  legacy  of  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars  in  public  view.
19 
Ahtisaari himself referenced the role this aspect of his personal history had played in 
shaping his worldview in his acceptance speech for the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize, in 
which he states: 
   
I too was a child affected by a war. I was only two years old when, as a result of an agreement 
on spheres of interest between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union, war broke out, 
forcing my family to leave soon thereafter the town of Viipuri. Like several hundred thousand 
fellow Karelians, we became refugees in our own country as great power politics caused the 
borders of Finland to be redrawn and left my home town as part of the Soviet Union. This 
childhood  experience  contributed  to  my  commitment  to  working  on  the  resolution  of 
conflicts.
20 
 
Here, the Finnish discussion of humanitarianism continues to be viewed through the 
prism of Finland’s Winter and Continuation War experiences with the Soviet Union, 
despite the passing of more than 60 years. Ahtisaari’s successor, Tarja Halonen (in 
office  2000-2012),  attracted  controversy  in  2005  for  referring  to  Finland’s 
participation in the Second World War as a separate struggle to Germany’s, although 
Finland had signed the 1947 Paris Peace treaty as a German co-belligerent.
21 Her 
statements may be less delicately worded than Ahtisaari’s, but both still subscribe to 
the notion that Finland was a victim, rather than aggressor, in the Second World War. 
For  the  Ingrians,  who  like  Finns  from  Soviet-annexed  Karelia  were  portrayed  as 
victims of the USSR’s invasion and intimidation of Finland, this ongoing construction 
of Second World War history in Finland’s political culture gives life to their return 
migration. Whereas other discussions on the Ingrian Right to Return policy shifted 
against changing political and economic situations, this discussion, and its legislative 
results  for  Ingrians,  remains  relatively  constant  in  its  advocacy  for  inclusion  in 
Finland.   
                                                 
18 Henrik Meinander, “A Separate Story?”, p. 66. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Martti Ahtisaari, “Nobel Lecture”, 10 December 2008, available online at URL: 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2008/ahtisaari-lecture_en.html>, accessed 30 
November 2012.  
21 Meinander, “A Separate Story?”, p. 66.   
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At the same time, this period saw the rise of the populist True Finns party, a successor 
to the previous populist SMP, and led by former SMP-member Timo Soini. The True 
Finns continued to raise the Karelian issue on populist-nationalist grounds, and Soini, 
as  the  party’s  presidential  candidate  in  the  2006  elections,  pledged  to  pursue  the 
return of Karelia from Russia, emphatically stating “Karelia is a part of Finland. I 
agree, and hope that it will one day return to Finland”.
22 A second 2006 presidential 
candidate, the independent Arto Lahti, also advocated the return of Karelia.
23 Karelia 
has a symbolic function, beyond any (unlikely) concrete actions for its return. It is 
evocative of the Finnish struggle for survival against the Russo-Soviet threat, and an 
indicator  of  Finland’s  fate  under  the  Russians  in  a  there-but-for-the-grace-of-God 
scenario: Karelian Finns had been made to suffer throughout the conflict between 
Finland and the Soviet Union, and the loss of Karelia remains a reminder of this 
moment of existential threat, as well as (less directly) the loss of homes and dispersal 
of Finnish-speakers from the eastern Baltic region. The change in border also recalls 
the argument from Paasi (discussed in chapter one) that the Finno-Russian border has 
a symbolic and ideological function as a stronghold dividing Western and Eastern 
peoples. Evacuation of Karelians as Westerners was required once the border was 
shifted and the region fell to the Eastern invaders. With the True Finns persistent in 
keeping  Karelia  within  the  political  discourse,  the  discussion  on  atonement  for 
Ingria’s Second World War history could also remain potent. Indeed, as is seen in the 
analysis  of  this  theme,  this  is  one  discussion  in  which  attitudes  remain  largely 
unchanged from 1990 to 2010. 
 
Further political changes in Finland, however, did alter the discussion on the Ingrian 
return migration. Significantly, on 1 January 1995 Finland had become a member of 
the European Union, which brought with it new obligations and regulations affecting 
immigration, settlement and movement of peoples, as well as placing Finland in a 
new position, and presenting it with new tools, to engage with its eastern neighbour. 
The 1995 enlargement has been popularly referred to as the “Nordic” enlargement, 
given the expansion of the EU at this time to include Sweden and Finland (along with 
                                                 
22 “Timo Soini kalastaa protestiääniä”. Original Finnish text: Karjala on osa Suomea. Kannatan ja 
toivon, että se joskus palaa osaksi Suomea.   
23 “Lahti haluaisi Karjalan takaisin”, Yle Uutiset, 6 January 2006, available online at URL: 
<http://yle.fi/uutiset/lahti_haluaisi_karjalan_takaisin/5221780>, accessed 30 November 2012.   
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Austria, a similarly neutral state that had not joined NATO), alongside simultaneous 
accession talks with Norway (though Norwegians ultimately rejected membership in a 
1994  referendum).
24 Indeed,  the  Finnish-Swedish  EU  enlargement  brought  about 
renewed focus on the Nordic and Baltic region in Europe, including the creation of 
the so-called “Northern Dimension” – a policy for EU-Russian cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea region that was spearheaded by Finland. The origins of this policy came 
during  Finnish  accession  negotiations  in  1994,  when  Foreign  Minister  Heikki 
Haavisto told members of the European press: 
 
New Nordic members, if and when they join, will bring with them a whole new northern 
dimension to the EU…The implications of the northern dimension to the Union are gradually 
being recognised in Brussels and EU capitals.
25 
 
This  was  echoed  shortly  after  in  Brussels  by  Prime  Minister  Esko  Aho,  who 
summarised the positive contributions of the new Nordic EU States as: 
 
1)  A geographical extension to the North; 
2)  Well established welfare societies with deeply rooted democratic traditions,  
3)  Strong  economies  adapted  to  unfavourable  conditions  with  sound  ecological 
approaches 
4)  An extension to the east and northeast, a geographical proximity to and traditions in 
dealing with Russia and the Baltic States.
26  
 
The Northern Dimension policy, which was formally announced in 1997, planned 
from  1999  and  finally  reached  full  fruition  in  2006,  represented  a  particular  new 
avenue through which Finland could address its relationship with Russia, perhaps 
emboldened with a new confidence born from the backing of the rest of the EU. Yet it 
does not necessarily represent a departure from some of the discussions present in the 
earlier 1990s, as evidenced by Aho’s second point on the positive traditions of Nordic 
nations  as  bastions  of  democracy.  The  Nordic  nations  have  become  accustomed 
through their geography to dealing with Russia, which may stretch into the North of 
Europe but is not constructed as culturally Nordic, as per Aho’s fourth point. This 
distinction is clearer in English than in Finnish or the Scandinavian languages, which 
                                                 
24 “European Union: Nordic Expansion”, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, 18 March 1994, available 
online at URL: <http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB15962>, accessed 22 May 2013.  
25 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, The Northern Dimension: A Finnish Perspective, Helsinki: 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Unit for the Northern Dimension, 2007, p. 10.  
26 Ibid. p. 11.   
  180 
do not have a separate term for the Nordic region beyond “the north”: in Swedish, 
Norden, in Finnish pohjoismaat - northern countries.  
The circumstances for Ingrian Finnish returnees were then further affected by the 1 
May 2004 accession of Estonia to European Union membership, negating to some 
extent (but perhaps not completely, given the ongoing controversy in Estonia over 
officially  stateless  non-Estonian  speakers  without  passports)  the  need  for  Ingrian 
Finns from Estonia to obtain residence permits to resettle in Finland.  
 
Figure 15 
Table of persons of select most-common non-EU nationalities resident in Finland, for years 1990 and 
1995-2000 
 
COUNTRY  1990  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Estonia  N/A  8,446  9,038  9,689  10,340  10,652  10,839 
Former USSR  4,181  6,163  5,187  4,675  3,628  2,966  2,447 
Former Yugoslavia  75  2,407  2,527  2,541  2,518  2,521  2,371 
Russian Federation  N/A  9,720  11,810  14,316  16,861  18,575  20,552 
Somalia  44  4,044  4,555  5,238  5,371  4,410  4,190 
United States  1,475  1,844  1,833  1,905  2,001  2,063  2,010 
Iraq  107  1,341  1,855  2,435  2,670  2,960  3,102 
Vietnam  292  2,084  2,143  2,171  1,965  1,840  1814 
 
Source: Statistics Finland, Nationality According to Age and Sex by Region, 1990-2011, available online at URL: 
<http://pxweb2.stat.fi/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=020_vaerak_tau_101_en&ti=Nationality+according+to+age+and+se
x+by+region+1990+-+2011&path=../Database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/&lang=1&multilang=en>  accessed  21 
September 2012.  
 
The years 1996 to 2010 also saw increased migration to Finland, partially as a result 
of  EU  membership.  Humanitarian  and  refugee  programs  also  brought  to  Finland 
asylum  seekers  from  conflict  zones  in  Eastern  Europe  and  Africa  (particularly 
Somalia, with the Somali community becoming a small but significant minority in 
Finland  by  the  mid  1990s  –  see  figure  15,  showing  the  number  of  Somali-born 
Finnish  residents  peaking  in  1998,  though  it  begins  to  decline  thereafter).
27 The 
Somali community’s regional concentration in the major cities, particularly in the 
eastern and northeastern districts of Helsinki, has also increased their visibility as a 
new community in Finland.
28 Though Finland remained less diverse than many other 
EU members in terms of the percentage of its inhabitants with migrant backgrounds 
                                                 
27 See figure 15, statistics from Statistics Finland, Nationality according to age and sex and region 
1990-2011, available online at URL: 
<http://pxweb2.stat.fi/Dialog/varval.asp?ma=020_vaerak_tau_101_en&ti=Nationality+according+to+a
ge+and+sex+by+region+1990+-
+2011&path=../Database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/&lang=1&multilang=en> accessed 21 September 2012.   
28 Marja Tiilikaunen, Abdirashid Ismail, Elina Tuusa, Maryan Abdulakarim and Abdurasak Adam, 
Somalis in Helsinki: At Home in Europe, New York: Open Society Foundations, 2013, pp. 27, 75-6.   
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during this period,
29 the changing demographics of Finland did present a new context 
in which the Right to Return policy could be viewed at this time, particularly in its 
impact on the status of non-returnee immigrants and their descendants as Finnish.  
 
Figure 16 
Foreign-Born Population as Percentage of Total Population in European states, 31 December 2008
30 
 
 
 
Source:  Eurostat,  Migrants  in  Europe:  A  Statistical  Portrait  of  the  First  and  Second  Generation,  Brussels: 
European Union, 2011, p. 2.  
 
Analysis of the discussions in Finnish political sources, particularly the questions and 
answers delivered in the Eduskunta, the major ministerial reports, the language of 
agreements and treaties and of course the relevant amendments to the Aliens Act 
restricting the definition of returnees, are presented in this chapter as an indication of 
a decline in the constructions of Finnish identity that stress ancestral and genealogical 
links to ancient Finland and Lutheranism. In place, there is a reassessment amongst 
Finnish  lawmakers  of  Ingrian  Finnishness,  based  on  the  remaining  discursive 
resources: the Finnish language, Western cultural orientation and opposition to the 
East/Russia. These discursive constructions of Finnishness serve as exclusionary and 
essentialist identity definitions, which now potentially exclude Ingrians from their 
definition of the Finnish national community but also, within the context of increasing 
                                                 
29 See figure 16, statistics from Eurostat, Migrants in Europe: A Statistical Portrait of the First and 
Second Generation, Brussels: European Union, 2011, p. 24 
30 Finland, represented as FI, is at less than 5%, ranking 19 out of the 23 states included in the survey.  
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immigrant diversity, risk excluding other new communities in Finland. Thus, though 
the decline of the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return program appears to accompany a 
decline in the ancient and inherited aspects of identity in relation to citizenship and 
belonging in the modern Finnish nation, at least in relation to the earlier years of the 
policy’s  existence,  the  discussion  still  presents  some  elements  of  exclusionist  or 
ethno-culturally essentialist national identity constructions.  
 
A)  Finnishness in the Changing Discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return 
   
1)  Integration Capability 
 
The mid-1990s changes in the discussion on the Ingrian Finnish Return law were 
connected to the assumption of Ingrian integration capability in Finland. By 1 August 
1996, new regulations governing the resettlement of Ingrian Finns in Finland came 
into force, as outlined in the Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain 
muuttamisesta [Government Bill to Parliament on Amending the Aliens Act]. The 
preamble to the amendment, which gives an overview of the situation and justification 
for change at some length, specifically ties the question of Ingrian Finnish migration 
to that of first and second generation Finns in Sweden and North America returning to 
Finland, noting: 
 
Returnees are expatriate Finns who have moved to Finland. In 1990, around 625,000 first and 
second generation expatriate Finns lived abroad. More than half of these lived in Sweden, and 
a third in North America. Counting third and fourth generation expatriate Finns, the number is 
around 1.2 million. 
 
In  the  1980s,  around  120,000  people  immigrated  to  Finland,  of  which  around  90%  were 
returnees. In recent years, Finland’s net immigration has fallen steadily. Without the return 
migration  of  Ingrian  Finns  and  Swedish  Finns,  emigration  from  Finland  would  outweigh 
immigration.
31 
 
                                                 
31 Suomen Eduskunta, “Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, HE 
56/1996, available online at URL: 
<http://217.71.145.20/TRIPviewer/show.asp?tunniste=HE+56/1996&base=erhe&palvelin=www.edusk
unta.fi&f=WP> accessed 12 November 2012. Original Finnish text: Paluumuuttajat ovat Suomeen 
muuttavia ulkosuomalaisia. Ulkomailla asui vuonna 1990 noin 625 000 ensimmäisen ja toisen polven 
ulkosuomalaista. Yli puolet heistä asui Ruotsissa ja kolmasosa Pohjois-Amerikassa. Kolmas ja neljäs 
sukupolvi mukaan lukien ulkosuomalaisia on noin 1,2 miljoonaa. Suomeen muutti 1980-luvulla noin 
120 000 henkilöä, joista noin 90 % oli paluumuuttajia. Viime vuosina Suomen nettomahanmuutto on 
jatkuvasti supistunut. Ilman inkerinsuomalaisten ja ruotsinsuomalaisten paluumuuttoa Suomi olisi tällä 
hetkellä muuttotappiomaa  
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Including Ingrian Finns with Finns from Sweden in the return migration figures ties 
Ingrian return migration with other forms of return migration based on much more 
recent  (largely
  first  and  second
,  generation,  maximum  third  and  fourth)  Finnish 
descent. Indeed, the preamble further states on the Ingrian Finnish matter: 
 
The government had discussed the matter with the President and came to the conclusion that 
there is no need to take legislative action, but rather, the Ingrian Finnish return migration 
would be taken as part of the general return migration law.
32 
 
This  new  amendment,  therefore,  represents  the  first  instance  of  legislation  that 
concretely designates Ingrian Finns as belonging to the Finnish diaspora groups for 
which the Right to Return migration law had been introduced. This status for Ingrian 
Finns had previously been effectively taken for granted.  
 
However, the 1996 Aliens Act amendment serves to undermine in several respects the 
notion that Ingrian Finnish return migration is equivalent to return migration from 
Sweden or North America, and that the same assumptions of integration capability for 
these returnees could be taken for granted in Ingrian Finns. The 1996 amendment, 
specifically addressed to return migrants from the former Soviet Union, provides a 
residence permit for migrants on the following conditions: 
 
1)  if the applicant himself/herself, or his/her parents, or at least 2 out of four grandparents, 
has been noted in his/her documents as a Finnish national, or 
2)  if  the  applicant  has  other  evidence  of  other  cohesive  connections  to  Finland  and 
Finnishness, but he/she does not possess documentation to qualify under paragraph 1.
33   
 
The new amendments appear to bring the criteria for Ingrians closer to the standard of 
other returnee groups, with the particular limitation on generational connection to 
Finland at least serving to bring Ingrian ancestral connection to Finnish citizenship to 
within  living  memory.  This  excludes  those  whose  ancestral  connections  to  any 
political incarnation of Finland ended during the Swedish era. Thus, the construction 
                                                 
32 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Hallitus oli keskustellut asiasta presidentin kanssa ja tällöin oli tultu 
siihen johtopäätökseen, että ei ole tarpeen ryhtyä lainsäädäntötoimiin vaan inkerinsuomalaisten 
paluumuuttoon suhtaudutaan kuten paluumuuttoon yleensä.  
33 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, 28 June 1996, available online at URL: 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/1996/19960511>, accessed 12 November 2012. Original Finnish 
text: 1) jos hakija on itse, toinen hänen vanhemmistaan tai ainakin kaksi hänen neljästä 
isovanhemmastaan on tai on ollut merkittynä asiakirjaan kansallisuudeltaan suomalaiseksi; tai 2) jos 
hakijalla on muu yhteenkuuluvuutta osoittava side Suomeen ja suomalaisuuteen, mutta hän ei kykene 
asiakirjoilla osoittamaan täyttävänsä 1 kohdan edellytyksiä.   
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of Finland as a national community of ancestral descent appears to show some signs 
of limitation: the Finnishness inherent in ancestry appears to expire or diminish after 
many  generations  living  outside  the  Finnish  nation  state  and  Finnish  national 
community. Yet the language of this amendment is noticeably vague. There is no 
definite  requirement  that  one  grandparent  hold  or  have  held  Finnish  citizenship. 
Rather, the grandparent should have proof of a “cohesive connection to Finland and 
Finnishness”. The exact nature of such a connection, and what form the proof of it 
should take, is left unspecified.  
 
Indeed,  though  ancestral  connection  appears  to  be  the  core  concern  of  this 
amendment,  the  lack  of  specificity  on  how  long  Ingrians  or  their  parents  and 
grandparents had lived in Finland, and the exceptions listed in paragraph two, with its 
more general provisions on connections to Finland and Finnishness, still allow those 
whose familial connection to Finland may be brief or undocumented to pursue the 
status of returnee. The specifics of paragraph two, as outlined in the preamble for the 
bill to parliament, stress integration capability, particularly in the field of language 
competence, as on a par with documented living experience in Finland. The preamble 
states that connection to Finland and Finnishness may be proven by fluency in Finnish 
or Swedish, as well as knowledge of Finnish society and culture.
34 In some respects, 
familiarity with Finnish society and language is afforded greater significance than 
ancestral  connection  –  those  who  qualify  under  paragraph  1  are  still  expected  to 
complete training in adapting to life in Finland before migrating.
35 Questioning the 
Finnish language capabilities of Ingrians, particularly younger Ingrians, had already 
arisen in the Finnish political discourse after 1990 (see for example the quotes from 
then Labour Minister Ilkka Kanerva in the discussion on integration capability in 
chapter  four).    The  continuation  of  this  discussion,  and  its  translation  into  new 
reforms in 1996, thus suggests the waning in significance of ancestral connections to 
ancient  Finland  vis-à-vis  proficiency  in  Finland’s  national  languages  as  a  key 
discursive resource in constructing belonging to the Finnish national community. The 
jus sanguinis construction of Finland as a national community of ancestral descent 
thus appears to be of lesser import than other core discursive resources in proving 
Finnishness, although its significance is not completely ignored, as Ingrians could still 
                                                 
34 Suomen Eduskunta, “Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”.  
35 Ibid.   
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prove their Finnish identity through the Finnish ancestry, or ethnic identity, of their 
grandparent (i.e. the grandparent did not have to be a Finnish citizen, just noted as of 
Finnish origin).  Ancestral connection as a discursive resource to convey connection 
to Finnishness therefore does not completely exit the Finnish political discussion on 
Ingrians.  The  assumption  present  in  the  earlier  discussions  that  even  non-Finnish 
speaking Ingrians possess greater integration capability than other migrants through 
their ancient ancestral connection to Finland is not completely diminished.  
 
Parliamentary discussions on the Ingrians in the mid- to late 1990s in large part reflect 
the  sentiment  of  the  restrictions  introduced  in  1996,  and  refute  earlier  notions  of 
Ingrian integration capability based on Finnish ancestry. One such instance is a 1998 
question  to  the  government  from  a  quartet  of  National  Coalition  parliamentarians 
(Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén), who wrote: 
 
Today, however, only about a fifth of Ingrian returnees coming to Finland can speak Finnish, 
and  for  many  the  connection  to  Finland  is  actually  very  weak.  Their  ability  to  gain 
employment in Finland is also very poor. This situation has led to Finland likely gaining an 
unemployed and monolingual Russian minority that is threatened with deep social exclusion. 
There is already alarming news of Ingrian youths spiralling into drugs and related crimes.
36 
 
It  is  significant  to  note  the  clear  and  definite  classification  of  Ingrians  as  a 
monolingual  Russian  minority,  and  the  way  in  which  lack  of  Finnish  language 
abilities is here directly and immediately translated to a “very weak” connection to 
Finland. Their ancestral connections to Finland are here also generally described as 
weak: multigenerational and centuries-long gaps in the Ingrian connection to Finland 
now appear to be too tenuous to guarantee Finnish identity. As has been relatively 
common in the Finnish political discussions on Ingrians, the politicians’ language 
here  appeals  to  some  degree  of  sympathy  for  Ingrians,  but  in  a  rather  new  way. 
Ingrians are now seen as a vulnerable minority in Finland, rather than in Russia. 
Failed  integration  capability,  born  of  Ingrians’  apparent  lack  of  “Finnishness”  as 
                                                 
36 Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”, 
KVN 43/1998, available online at URL: 
<http://217.71.145.20/TRIPviewer/show.asp?tunniste=KVN+43/1998&base=erkys&palvelin=www.ed
uskunta.fi&f=WP>, accessed 4 November 2012. Original Finnish text: Kuitenkin tänä päivänä 
Suomeen tulevista inkeriläisistä paluumuuttajista vain noin viidesosa osaa suomen kieltä ja monen 
yhteys Suomeen on tosiasiallisesti hyvin vähäinen. Heidän mahdollisuutensa saada Suomessa työtä 
ovat muutoinkin hyvin heikot. Tämä tilanne on johtamassa siihen, että Suomeen uhkaa syntyä työtön ja 
kielitaidoton venäläinen vähemmistö, jota uhkaa syvä yhteiskunnallinen syrjäytyminen. 
Inkeriläisnuorten huumekierteestä ja siihen liittyvästä rikollisuudesta on jo olemassa hälyttävää tietoa.   
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defined  by  speaking  the  Finnish  language,  has  been  deleterious  for  Ingrians,  and 
necessitates a re-examination of the Right to Return policy.  
 
That this comment came from National Coalition parliamentarians also speaks to the 
fact that in this period, the National Coalition party would adopt a policy platform on 
immigration  for  the  period  2003-2007  that  specifically  addressed  the  language 
capability of migrants, which should be considered in labour migration decisions, and 
stated that labour migration and refugee migration policies should be kept separate.
37 
The Ingrian Finnish Return policy was not quite one or the other, and could rather be 
interpreted as an instance where labour and humanitarian issues became conflated. 
Considering National Coalition thinking on migration at this time, statements from 
their  parliamentarians  questioning  the  language  abilities  of  Ingrians  suggests  the 
centre-right in Finnish politics saw Ingrian migration as labour migration. Labour 
migration is discussed as partly dependent on language abilities for integration, and it 
is  here  argued  that  Finnish  language  abilities  amongst  Ingrian  Finns  have  been 
mistakenly assumed as uniformly well-developed. Thus, Ingrian migration as labour 
migration is ill-conceived.  
 
The decline in Finnish lawmakers’ faith in Ingrian integration capability becomes 
more specifically linked to language with the next wave of amendments to the Right 
to Return clause in the Aliens Act, drafted by the government in 2002. The third point 
of the first section of amendments, which came into force on 1 April 2003, states that 
applicants may be granted Right to Return status on the following basis: 
 
if  the  applicant  himself/herself,  one  of  his/her  parents,  or  at  least  two  of  his/her  four 
grandparents  is  or  has  been  documented  as  of  Finnish  nationality,  and  the  applicant  has 
sufficient knowledge of Finnish or Swedish.
38 
 
This section, taking the previous 1996 amendment on generational ties to Finland, 
thus  further  adds  language  capability  into  its  restrictions.  The  importance  of 
                                                 
37 Kansallinen Kokoomus, Kokoomuksen lähiajan tavoiteohjelma 2003-2007, 2002, available online at 
URL: <http://www.fsd.uta.fi/pohtiva/ohjelma?tunniste=koktavoite2002>, accessed 12 September 2013.  
38 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, 13 March 2003, available online at URL: 
<http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2003/20030218>, accessed 21 November 2012. Original Finnish 
text: jos hakija itse, toinen hänen vanhemmistaan tai ainakin kaksi hänen neljästä isovanhemmastaan 
on tai on ollut merkittynä asiakirjaan kansallisuudeltaan suomalaiseksi ja hakijalla on riittävä suomen 
tai ruotsin kielen taito.     
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integration into Finnish society through one of Finland’s national languages, implied 
in the previous amendments, is now specifically stated and legally codified. This is a 
significant  departure  from  previous  discussions  assuming  Finnish-language 
competence from Ingrians based on their Finnish ancestry, as with this amendment, 
Ingrians  could  prove  competence  by  studying  either  Finnish  or  Swedish  to  claim 
returnee status.  
 
The amendment of 2002-2003 further notes that the issuing of a Right to Return 
residence permit is conditional on three points, the second of which states: 
as  referred  to  in  paragraph  one,  subparagraph  3  of  the  amended  law,  applicants  must 
participate  in  an  organised  returnee  orientation  program  in  their  country  of  origin  and 
complete a language exam organised by the Finnish authorities to show sufficient knowledge 
of Finnish or Swedish at the skill level of A2 in the European Union’s Common European 
Framework  language  proficiency  rating  scale,  unless  circumstances  prevent  the  returnee 
orientation program or language test from reasonably being completed.
39 
 
Thus  the  minimum  requirements  for  language  capability  are  specifically  set,  and 
proof  is  now  required  before  the  returnee  moves  to  Finland.  The  A2  skill  level 
indicated by the amendment is not particularly advanced, suggesting perhaps more a 
nominal  demonstration  of  willingness  or  commitment  to  learn  one  of  Finland’s 
national languages prior to immigration. Neither the Parliamentary Committee set up 
to  draft  this  legislation  in  October  2002,  nor  the  commissioned  opinion  of  the 
Eduskunta’s Constitutional Law Committee, offer any justification or reasoning for 
the introduction of such language restrictions, beyond stating that the restrictions do 
not violate the right of those of Finnish origin to return to Finland, and that returnee 
residence permits should be considered different from other residence permits granted 
to non-returnee immigrants.
40 At this stage, even with the limited Finnish-language 
competency  of  Ingrians  noted,  Finnish  legal  language  on  immigration  still  grants 
                                                 
39 Ibid. Original Finnish text: edellä 1 momentin 3 kohdassa tarkoitetussa tapauksessa hakija osallistuu 
lähtömaassa järjestettyyn paluumuuttovalmennukseen ja esittää Suomen viranomaisen järjestämän 
kielikokeen suorittamisesta todistuksen, jonka perusteella hänellä on sellainen suomen tai ruotsin 
kielen taito, joka vastaa Euroopan neuvoston yleiseurooppalaisen viitekehyksen mukaisen kielitaidon 
arviointiasteikon taitotasoa A2, jollei paluumuuttovalmennukseen tai kielikokeeseen osallistumista ole 
pidettävä hakijan olosuhteet huomioon ottaen kohtuuttomana. 
40 Perustuslakivaliokunta, “Perustusvaliokunnan lausunto”, PeVL 52/2002, available online at URL: 
<http://www.eduskunta.fi/faktatmp/utatmp/akxtmp/pevl_52_2002_p.shtml> accessed 23 November 
2012, and Hallintovaliokunta, “Hallintovaliokunnan mietintö”, HaVM 15/2002, available online at 
URL: <http://www.eduskunta.fi/faktatmp/utatmp/akxtmp/havm_15_2002_p.shtml>, accessed 23 
November 2012.   
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them a privileged position as returnee migrants, built on a still-held belief in Ingrians’ 
Finnishness.    
 
The final decision to close the application queue for Right to Return migrants came in 
2010. The 1991 Aliens Act had by this time been replaced by a new version in 2004, 
though  the  sections  on  the  Right  to  Return  for  Ingrians  had  remained  essentially 
unchanged.
41 In the preamble to the 2010 amendment that cancelled the Return policy 
for Ingrians (though return migration for Winter and Continuation War veterans and 
deported refugees remained), the government cited two principal justifications for its 
action: that it was reasonable to assume that in twenty years, all those with serious 
intention of moving to Finland would have done so, and also that legitimate concerns 
of  the  ability  of  Ingrians  to  integrate  into  the  labour  market  by  this  time  made 
continuation of the policy unfeasible.
42  
 
Though the situation had been reviewed in 2005-2006, it was seen by the government 
at that time (before the late 2000s recession) that Ingrian migration would assist in 
preventing a labour crisis as the baby-boomer generation entered retirement.
43 After 
the recession in 2008, however, concerns were raised on the continuation of labour 
market integration. Finland recorded two periods of falling production in consecutive 
quarters in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, spurred by the global financial recession and 
associated weak market for exports,
44 in addition to the rising unemployment rate 
noted in figure 14. The global recession of the late 2000s has had a particular political 
effect, described by Larry M. Bartels as “retrospective economic voting”, by which 
electorates  “simply,  and  perhaps  simplemindedly,  punished  incumbents  of  every 
stripe for economic hard times”.
45 In Finland, this meant the rejection of the Centre 
Party-led  coalition  under  Matti  Vanhanen,  and  later  Mari  Kiviniemi,  in  the  first 
                                                 
41 Suomen Eduskunta, “Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain 48 §:n muuttamisesta”, 
HE 252/2010, available online at URL: 
<http://217.71.145.20/TRIPviewer/show.asp?tunniste=HE+252/2010&base=erhe&palvelin=www.edus
kunta.fi&f=WORD>, accessed 28 November 2012.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Richard Milne, “Pro-austerity Finland Falls into Triple-Dip Recession”, The Financial Times, 5 June 
2013, available online at URL: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/90df0994-cde5-11e2-8313-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2ws4U9JgW>, accessed 12March 2014. 
45 Larry M. Bartels, “Political Effects of the Great Recession”, The ANNALS of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, Vol. 650, No. 1, 2013, p. 49.   
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parliamentary election following the onset of the crisis, in early 2011.
46 The National 
Coalition  under  Jyrki  Katainen  took  over  as  the  leading  party  with  the  Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, Left Alliance, Greens and Swedish People’s Party 
in a broad left-right coalition government.
47 Perhaps the most dramatic result of this 
election was the substantial electoral gains for the True Finns party, who had openly 
run on a platform criticising excess spending on bailouts for the Eurozone’s most 
embattled economies (described in more detail in the introduction to this chapter).
48 
Increased public debt had been a core issue of the campaign over 2010 and early 
2011, and the True Finns were able to profit most from the public’s substantially 
conservative  fiscal  attitude.
49 In  this  political  environment,  though  faced  with  the 
perhaps  insurmountable  prospect  of  electoral  defeat,  the  Vanhanen-Kiviniemi 
governments nevertheless may have found it prudent to limit the influx of foreigners 
by bringing the Right to Return policy to an end.  
 
Significantly, the language of the 2010 decision specifically mentions the economic 
situation since 2008, and the corresponding difficulties for labour market integration 
in a time of high unemployment, as a rationale for ending the Return program, which 
is  explicitly  linked  to  Ingrians’  perceived  perception  as  ethnic  Finns.  The  2010 
decision states that “the purpose of return migration has been to permit the migration 
of  people  who  have  embraced  the  Finnish  identity  and  who  have  a  cohesive 
relationship with Finland”.
50 However, on the potential labour integration of Ingrians, 
the  decision  states  that  “it  was  seen  that  closely  regulated  labour  migration 
increasingly grounded in ethnic criteria for Ingrian Finns was no longer necessary, 
and  should  come  to  an  end”.
51 These  contrasting  citations  suggest  that  one’s 
Finnishness is dependent on labour integration, in which the amendment suggests the 
Ingrians  have  not  been  sufficiently  successful,  particularly  based  on  Ingrians’ 
                                                 
46 Hannu Nurmi and Lasse Nurmi, “The Parliamentary Election in Finland, April 2011”, Electoral 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2012, pp. 234-5.  
47 Ibid. pp. 236-8.  
48 Ibid. pp. 235-8.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Suomen Eduskunta, “Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi ulkomaalaislain 48 §:n muuttamisesta”, 
HE 252/2010. Original Finnish text: Paluumuuttojärjestelmän tarkoituksena on ollut mahdollistaa 
sellaisten henkilöiden muutto, jotka ovat omaksuneet suomalaisen identiteetin ja joilla on 
yhteenkuuluvuus Suomeen. 
51 Ibid. Original Finnish text: nähtiin, että työvoiman maahanmuuton yleistyessä etnisiin kriteereihin 
perustuva inkerinsuomalaisten tarkoin säädelty ja säännelty paluumuuttojärjestelmä on tullut tiensä 
päähän eikä sen ylläpitämistä nykyisessä muodossaan pidetty tarpeellisena.  
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language capabilities, which the amendment acknowledges have frequently required 
considerable time and financial resources from the Finnish state to improve.
52 The 
queue would be closed with effect from 1 June 2011, though those with applications 
still in process could still be granted residence permission.
53 Thus Finnish politicians’ 
concerns over Ingrian Finnish integration capability, exacerbated by the political and 
economic situation in Finland by the late 2000s, were expressed in language that 
highlighted  disparities  between  Ingrians  and  the  politicians’  perception  of 
Finnishness, particularly on language capabilities.  
 
The 2010 amendment, while acknowledging the significance of Finnishness to the 
Right to Return program, thus also gives a final indication of how Finnishness can be 
limited.  The  2010  cancellation  indicates  the  government  no  longer  believes  that 
remaining Ingrians from Russia speak Finnish, or are committed and able to learn a 
Finnish national language particularly quickly. Isolated from the national community 
by language barriers, the relative Finnishness of Ingrians thus appears diminished. 
The discussion transformed from the initial period of 1990-1995, starting with the 
notion of Ingrian Finns’ greater integration capability, to the latter period of 1996-
2010, in which problems with language and employment integration dominate the 
political  language  on  the  issue.  This  demonstrates  a  key  observation  in  the 
construction of Finnish identity through this migration policy – the significance of 
language as an integration requirement remains, or indeed even strengthens, but is 
notably transformed in the Ingrian Finnish example from a discussion of Ingrians’ 
assumed Finnish capabilities to an implementation of a commitment from Ingrians to 
learn either Finnish or Swedish, suggesting Finnish politicians have relinquished the 
notion that Ingrians already speak Finnish or will increase their Finnish capabilities 
rapidly. Now, they are required to study one of the Finnish national languages and 
individually  prove  their  own  ability  to  integrate  in  Finland.  Though  the  political 
discussion  on  Ingrian  language  capabilities  notes  their  lack  of  both  Finnish  and 
Swedish capabilities, the lack of Finnish language knowledge amongst the Ingrian 
Finns appears both a surprise and a disappointment to Finnish lawmakers. Finnish, as 
Finland’s dominant, indigenous and unique national language, has held a particular 
place in the construction of Finnish national identity since the nineteenth century, as 
                                                 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid.   
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described in chapter one of this thesis. As a discursive resource in the construction of 
Finnish national identity, according to which every native Finnish speaker is seen as a 
Finn, though not all Finns are native Finnish speakers, this was a core rationale for the 
definition of Ingrians as part of the Finnish identity discussed at the beginning of the 
Ingrian Return policy in the early 1990s. The amendment in 2002-2003 in particular 
shows  this  assumption  has  gone.  Without  these  previously  assumed  language 
competencies, the notions of Ingrians’ belonging in Finnish society, and their speedy 
and easy integration into its labour markets, appears greatly diminished, and hastened 
the 2010 decision to end the policy.  
   
2)  Historical Atonement 
 
In 1998, National Coalition politicians Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz 
and Suvi Lindén stated to the government that “initially Ingrian migration permission 
was  right  in  taking  into  view  Ingrians’  perceived  historical  wrongs”.
54 To  some 
extent, this attitude towards providing compensation to Ingrians for wartime suffering 
continued strong past 1996, indicative of the role war memory still plays in Finnish 
politics.
55 Funding for Ingrian veterans was requested, for instance, by then-Christian 
League
56 parliamentarian Bjarne Kallis from 2000 to 2009, in budget initiatives to the 
Eduskunta that  called  for  increased  funding  to  the  Ingrian  and  Karelian  veterans 
associations.
57 Likewise, in 2002, Christian Democrat parliamentarian Leea Hiltunen 
expressed  her  support  for  the  new  stricter  language  restrictions  for  returnee 
immigrants, and approved of the fact that the new restrictions would not affect the 
return of Ingrian Winter and Continuation War veterans and deported refugees, as she 
wrote in a September 2002 question: 
 
                                                 
54 Kimmo Sasi, Ilkka Kanerva, Ben Zyskowicz and Suvi Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly 
tyksistä”, KVN 43/1998, available online at URL: 
<http://217.71.145.20/TRIPviewer/temp/TUNNISTE_KVN_43_1998_fi.html>,  accessed 21 October 
2013. Original Finnish text: Alun perin inkeriläisten maahanmuuton salliminen oli oikein ottaen 
huomioon inkeriläisten kokemat historialliset vääryydet.  
55 Meinander, “A Separate Story?”, pp. 55-77.  
56 Suomen Kristillinen Liitto, Finnish Christian League, which became Kristillisdemokraatit, the 
Christian Democrats, in 2001.  
57 Bjarne Kallis, “Määrärahan osoittaminen Inkeriläisten ja karjalaisten heimoveteraanien yhdistys 
r.y.:lle”, TAA 418/2000, Valiopäivät 2000: Asiakirjat E2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 2000, p. 1. and TAA 
200/2009, Valiopäivät 2009: Asiakirjat E3, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 2009, p. 1.   
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 It is also fair that these conditions do not apply to those who were part of the Ingrian 
Finnish deportations of 1943-1944, or those who served during the Second World 
War in the Finnish army.
58 
 
Indeed, the 2002-2003 amendments to the Right to Return law, entering into force in 
2003,  begin  by  specifically  stating  that  returnee  status  may  be  granted  on  these 
conditions: 
 
1)  if the applicant belonged to the Ingrian emigrants who between 1943 and 1944 
were transferred to Finland and then after the War returned to the Soviet Union 
2)  if the applicant has served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 1945.
59  
 
The notion of historical atonement for Ingrian wartime suffering thus appears to retain 
a lasting importance in the Ingrian Finnish Return discourse, and remains a key focus 
of Finnish legislation on the issue in the late 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Indeed, at points later in the period of the Ingrian Finnish return migration, Second 
World War history emerged dramatically in the public and political discourse, and 
continued to effect the discussion on Ingrians. In 2003, Finnish historian Elina Sana 
published a prize-winning study of Second World War deportations from Finland, 
Luovutetut (The Deported), in which she detailed many previously unacknowledged 
deportations of political and Jewish refugees from Finland to Germany.
60 Sana, then 
publishing under her maiden name of Suominen, had already in 1979 authored a high-
profile  work,  Kuoleman  laiva  (Ship  of  Death),  on  forced  repatriation  of  Jewish 
refugees from Finland, identifying an undercurrent of anti-Semitism in mid-century 
Finland as a partial cause, despite efforts of some groups (including the Finnish Social 
Democrats  and  Helsinki  Jewish  Congregation)  to  halt  them.
61 In  particular,  Sana 
honed in on the wartime head of Finland’s State Police, Arno Kalervo Anthoni, and 
                                                 
58 Leea Hiltunen, “Maahanmuuttokriteerit täyttävien inkeriläisten maahanmuuttohakemusten käsittelyn 
nopeuttaminen”, KK788/2002, available online at URL: 
<http://www.eduskunta.fi/faktatmp/utatmp/akxtmp/kk_788_2002_p.shtml>, accessed 3 November 
2012. Original Finnish text: Oikeudenmukaista on myös se, että nämä maahanmuuton edellytykset eivät 
koske niitä, jotka ovat kuuluneet inkeriläiseen siirtoväkeen vuosina 1943-1944 tai palvelleet toisen 
maailmansodan aikana Suomen armeijassa.  
59 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, 13 March 2003. Original Finnish text: 1) 
jos hakija on kuulunut Inkerin siirtoväkeen, joka vuosina 1943 ja 1944 siirrettiin Suomeen ja sodan 
päätyttyä palautettiin Neuvostoliittoon; 2) jos hakija on palvellut Suomen armeijassa vuosien 
1939―1945 aikana. 
60 “Elina Sana Wins Tieto-Finlandia Prize for Book on Wartime Expulsions”, Helsingin Sanomat – 
International Edition, 9 January 2004, available online at URL: 
<http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20040109IE3>, accessed 27 November 2012. 
61 Elina Suominen, Kuoleman laiva S/S Höhenhörn: Juutalaispakolaisten kohtalo Suomessa, 
Porvoo/Helsinki/Juva: WSOY, 1979, p. 11.   
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noted that the post-war Polish government had requested that Anthoni, as well as 
Finland’s Interior Minister Toivo Johannes Horelli, be indicted as war criminals for 
their role in the deportations, although they never were.
62  Her newer work expanded 
significantly on such events, stating that some 2,829 prisoners of war, including 525 
political refugees and 74 Jews, were deported to Germany from camps at Köyliö and 
Naarajärvi  in  Finland,  following  government  directives  in  1941  and  1942.
63 The 
Simon  Wiesenthal  Centre,  dedicated  to  justice  for  wartime  atrocities  committed 
against Jews, called for an investigation into her findings, and the issue of wartime 
responsibility in Finland again entered the public discourse.
64 Antero Holmila argues 
that this, in the new millennium, was the first time in which the issue of the Second 
World War and Holocaust culpability finally entered the Finnish political discourse in 
a meaningful way.
65  
 
To some extent, the success of Sofi Oksanen’s 2007 play Puhdistus (Purge) and its 
2008 novelisation also kept these issues in the public consciousness, as the novel 
gives a fictional depiction of an Estonian nationalist, Hans Pekk, who fights with 
German  forces  in  Finland  against  the  Soviets,  whilst  his  supporters  remain 
conspicuously silent when Jews from their home village are deported.
66 The novel 
was successful internationally, and brought international attention to this period of 
history; for instance, Jacob Silverman criticised Oksanen in his review for failing to 
go  further  into  the  issue  of  collaboration  in  the  Holocaust.
67 Noting  the  public 
response to Sana’s work as well as the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s call for further 
research,  a  group  of  National  Coalition  parliamentarians  (along  with  Raimo 
Vistbacka, of the True Finns) wrote to Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen adding their 
voices to the call for further research with particular attention to the fate of wartime 
Ingrian  refugees  in  Finland,  given  the  pertinence  of  their  experience  to  Right  to 
                                                 
62 Ibid. p. 10.  
63 Elina Sana, Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset Gestapolle, Helsinki: WSOY, 2003, p. 340-6.  
64  “Elina Sana Wins Tieto-Finlandia Prize for Book on Wartime Expulsions”, Helsingin Sanomat.   
65 Antero Holmila, “Varieties of Silence: Collective Memory of the Holocaust in Finland”, in T. 
Kinnunen and V. Kivimäki (eds), Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations, Leiden: 
Brill, 2012, p. 552.  
66 Sofi Oksanen, Purge, translated by Lola Rogers, New York: Black Cat, 2010, pp. 128-140.  
67 Jacob Silverman, “Rebels and Collaborators”, The New Republic, 19 May 2010, available online at 
URL: <http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/rebels-and-collaborators>, accessed 18 February 
2014.   
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Return  migration.
68 Vanhanen’s  response  notes  that  a  well-known  professor  of 
history, Heikki Ylikangas, had been commissioned by the government and Academy 
of Finland to research further into the 1944 Armistice Agreement with the USSR and 
subsequent transfer of populations.
69  
 
By 2010, when the end of return migration for Ingrians had been announced, the 
amendment to the Aliens Act actually retained residence permission for two groups 
specified in the 2002-2003 amendment: the Ingrian emigrants transferred to the USSR 
in 1943-1944, and those who had served in the Finnish Army between 1939 and 
1945.
70 Notable is the removal from the previous 2002-2003 amendment of language 
that had left open the Right to Return for all those who could prove connections to 
Finland and a degree of Finnish or Swedish language capabilities. The Parliamentary 
Committee convened for this amendment noted that, though the orientation program 
for returnees would no longer be required (deemed unnecessary), proof of language 
proficiency  would  still  be  required.
71  Army  veterans  from  the  Winter  and 
Continuation Wars, as well as those deported from Finland after the Wars, thus still 
retained their position within the construction of Finnish identity, as the experience of 
these conflicts remained a major crucible for Finnish identity for politicians. Those 
who threw in their lot with Finland over the USSR have proven their conformity to 
the construction of Finnish identity as culturally and politically orientated towards the 
West, and away from the Soviet Union. By 2010, and the end of the Return policy for 
most  other  Ingrians,  those  with  documented  Second  World  War-era  service  or 
suffering in the face of Soviet aggression were still held to have proven their own 
Finnishness.  The  discussion  on  historical  atonement,  though  now  more  narrowly 
defined, thus trumps all others in relating the Ingrian Finnish Return to constructions 
of Finnish identity based on the significance of the discursive resource of struggle 
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Eduskunta, 2004, p. 1. 
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against Russia. The ideological dominance of this discursive resource, which deems 
the Winter and Continuation Wars to be wars of survival, appears to have weathered 
the challenges of academic reassessments of Second World War history and Finnish 
culpability.  
 
3)  The Humanitarian Imperative 
 
By early 1996, the discourse on the humanitarian imperative for Ingrians had already 
shifted from return migration, which was now seen as unfeasible or undesirable, to a 
more on-site program that channelled assistance and funds to Ingria itself. On the one 
hand,  segments  of  the  Finnish  political  spectrum  continued  to  advocate  return 
migration  as  a  humanitarian  form  of  immigration  policy.  The  Finnish  Christian 
League, for instance, mentioned both return migrants and refugees as humanitarian 
migration  recipients  in  their  1998  policy  platform.
72 In  2006,  as  the  Christian 
Democrats,  this  party  specifically  pledged  to  continue  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return 
policy, addressing it as a major element of their policy platform on immigration, in 
which they claim that “it is natural that Finland takes migrants of Finnish origin, 
because they are already somewhat familiar with Finnish language and culture”.
73 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  focus  of  this  discourse  in  1996-2010  for  other  parties  in 
Finland became the need to provide assistance to Ingrians without depriving Ingria of 
its Ingrian Finnish population, which was presented as approaching the same “ethnic 
cleansing” that Stalin had engendered a half-century earlier, and for which the Finnish 
state had taken some responsibility. Though the notion of historical atonement as 
discussed in the previous section remains more or less unchanged in the period 1996-
2010 in its focus on military service during the Winter and Continuation Wars and 
Stalin-era persecution and suffering amongst Ingrians, the perceived need to avoid an 
unintentional  repetition  of  Ingrian  removal  from  Ingria  significantly  alters  the 
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concurrent discourse on humanitarian intervention in Ingria. An early example of this 
comes from Hannu Kemppainen, a Centre Party parliamentarian who at several points 
in 1996 raised the issue of Ingrian Finns that had been placed in the Klooga detention 
camp in Estonia, and deported to Finland in 1942-1943, then returned after the War.
74 
The Russian and Estonian governments had agreed to grant increased social security 
benefits to those who could obtain proof from Finland that they had been deported 
from Klooga to Finland, and Kemppainen called for the Finnish National Archives to 
allow greater access for Ingrians to such records, beginning in his March 1996 written 
question: 
 
The Russian and Estonian governments grant social security benefits to those Ingrian Finns 
and Izhorians who were transferred to Finland in 1943-1944 via Klooga camp in Estonia. A 
certificate of this transfer can be obtained from the Finnish National Archives. The certificate 
costs 75 Finnish Marks, and for many elderly Ingrians, this is prohibitively high. Pensioners, 
for instance, have daily budgets of just 2 Finnish Marks.
75 
 
Of particular note here in the first instance is Kemppainen’s differentiation between 
Inkerin  suomalaiset  (Ingrian  Finns)  and  inkerikot  (Izhorians,  the  descendants  of 
earlier Finno-Ugric settlers of Ingria). The distinction between the two is not made 
readily apparent here, as the Finnish terms are closely related. This effectively creates 
a link between Ingrians and the earlier settlers and thus giving some suggestion that 
Ingrian Finns, like Izhorians, are related to, but distinct from, Finns of Finland as part 
of an over-arching “Finno-Ugric” identity, and that they are specifically defined by 
their connection to the Ingrian region. The discussion on humanitarian concern for 
Ingrians,  however,  has  here  shifted  to  a  greater  degree  of  responsibility  for  the 
Estonian and Russian governments, who are criticised somewhat for providing low or 
inadequate pensions to Ingrians – Finland’s role is now auxiliary, in assisting with 
documentation  to  give  Ingrians  greater  access  to  funds  in  their  homelands.  The 
response Kemppainen’s initial question received from the minister in charge of the 
National Archives, Education Minister Olli-Pekka Heinonen, specified that the large 
number  of  Ingrians  seeking  this  documentation  (around  2,000  in  1995)  had 
                                                 
74 Hannu Kemppainen, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttajien arkistotodistuksista perittävistä maksuista”, KK 
186/1996, Valiopäivät 1996: Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1996, p. 1. 
75 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Venäjän ja Viron valtiot antavat sosiaalietuuksia niille Inkerin 
suomalaisille ja inkerikoille, jotka siirrettiin Suomeen vuosina 1943-1944 Virossa sijainneen Kloogan 
leirin kautta. Todistuksen tästä siirrosta antaa Suomen Kansallisarkisto. Todistus on maksullinen, siitä 
peritään 75 markkaa. Monelle inkeriläisvanhukselle maksu on kohtuuttoman korkea. Eläkeläisellä 
saattaa olla käytettävissä juokseviin menoihin vain kaksi markkaa päivässä.   
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overwhelmed the archival staff and made waiving the standard fee impossible (though 
Heinonen does suggest possible alternative measures, such as giving diplomatic staff 
from Tallinn and St Petersburg access to the archives, or suggesting Russian and 
Estonian authorities use documentation from their own archives, which also possess 
the  lists  of  persons  detained  at  Klooga).
76 Yet  Kemppainen  remains  adamant  the 
National Archives should waive their fees for Ingrians, reasoning that: 
 
The difficulty in obtaining these Klooga certificates is preventing these deserving people from 
accessing enormous amounts of social benefits. Making these benefits easier to obtain for 
return migrants in their country of origin would likely reduce the pressure they feel to move to 
Finland. It would therefore be considerably cheaper to the Finnish state if these potential 
returnees could continue living in their own familiar communities.
77 
 
“Cheaper”  introduces  an  aspect  of  cost-effectiveness  directly  into  discussions  of 
humanitarian provision in this context. This is a notable departure from much of the 
previous language on Ingrians from Finnish politicians, which had placed emphasis 
on sympathy for Ingrians’ current and historic difficulties as a means to creating a 
dominant impression of Ingrians as those who had suffered, and continued to suffer, 
for their Finnishness. Now, however, the Finnish political discussion of humanitarian 
concerns is not immune to financial concerns.  
 
Financial concerns in Finland were further pertinent in political discussions after the 
1990s economic downturn. Kemppainen is more explicit in citing this, amongst other 
reasons, for his support of the Klooga camp Ingrians, stating in an October 1996 
written question: 
 
The launch of the Ingrian Return policy is generally seen in the public’s opinion as payment 
for the experience of displacement for around 65,000 Ingrians during the Second World War, 
forced to move from Finland to Siberia and scattered far from their homes. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, repatriation appeared to be justified in Finland because of the need for labour. 
Now, with mass unemployment here, the situation is quite different.
78 
                                                 
76 Olli-Pekka Heinonen, “Vastaus”, KK 186/1996, Valiopäivät 1996: Asiakirjat F1, Helsinki: 
Eduskunta, 1996, p. 1. 
77 Hannu Kemppainen, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttajien arkistotodistuksista perittävistä maksuista”, KK 
384/1996, Valiopäivät 1996: Asiakirjat F2, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1996, p. 1. Original Finnish text: 
Näiden Klooga-todistusten saamisen vaikeus on aiheuttanut sen, että näihin etuihin oikeutetuilta 
ihmisryhmiltä ovat jääneet saamatta yhteenlaskettuina erittäin suuret sosiaalietuusmäärät. Tällaisten 
etuuksien helpompi saaminen paluumuuttajien lähtömaissa olisi omiaan vähentämään paineita 
muuttaa Suomeen. Suomen valtiolle olisi paljon edullisempaa, jos nämä potentiaaliset muuttajat 
voisivat jatkaa asumistaan omilla tutuilla asuinalueillaan.  
78 Hannu Kemppainen, “Inkeriläisten elinolosuhteiden parantamisesta lähialueyhteistyön avulla”, KK 
666/1996, Valiopäivät 1996: Asiakirjat F3, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1996, p. 1. Original Finnish text: 
Inkeriläisten paluumuuton käynnistymistä on yleisessä mielipiteessä pidetty kunniavelan maksuna  
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Here  Kemppainen  specifically  references  the  role  economic  and  employment 
concerns played in the Ingrian Return policy at its time of formation in 1990. As 
much  as  providing  residence  and  employment  in  Finland  for  Ingrians  can  be 
constructed as a form of humanitarian aid, this is further evidence of the shift in the 
mid-1990s from return migration towards more cost-effective forms of humanitarian 
aid, not reliant on residency in Finland, for Ingrians. This discussion of cost-effective 
humanitarianism could find particular salience in periods of economic difficulty. The 
humanitarian imperative had not disappeared from the discussion on Ingrians, yet the 
economic realities of mid-1990s Finland did appear to have muted it.  
 
At the same time, Kemppainen’s call for humanitarian aid to Ingrians in their home 
territory of Ingria does appear to present a new construction of Ingrian identity as 
related  to,  but  distinct  from,  Finnishness.  It  departs  from  earlier  presentations  of 
Ingrians as Finns in favour of a more complex identity with a culture related to, but 
distinct from, mainstream Finnish society, and thus worthy of protection as a minority 
culture in Russia and Estonia. The discussion now focuses on Ingria, not Finland, as 
the homeland of the Ingrian Finns, and stresses the need to keep an Ingrian Finnish 
presence in the region. Kemppainen’s October 1996 written question notes: 
 
Though the return migration certainly meant well for the Ingrian population, it has begun 
negative trends in the migrants’ regions of origin, especially Ingria. The recovery of their own 
language and culture began with perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now 
this kind of return migration activity has seen an alarming decline in the most active part of 
the Ingrian population, including cultural and administrative figures, many of whom have 
moved or are expected to move to Finland. At worst, such developments will lead to an ethnic 
cleansing of the area.
79 
 
The  reference  to  ethnic  cleansing  (etninen  puhdistus)  is  particularly  evocative, 
recalling the Stalinist deportations and the mid twentieth-century suffering of Ingrians 
in the Soviet Union. In the context of the 1990s, ethnic cleansing was a particularly 
                                                                                                                                         
inkeriläisten kokemien pakkosiirtojen takia. 65,000 inkeriläistä joutui sodan jälkeen siirtymään 
Suomesta Venäjälle ja hajalleen aina Siperiaan asti. Paluumuuton alkaessa 1990-luvun alussa muutto 
näytti perustellulta myös Suomessa koetun työvoimatarpeen takia. Nyt massatyöttömyyden aikana 
tilanne on aivan toinen.  
79 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Vaikka paluumuutolla tarkoitettiin varmasti hyvää inkeriläisväestölle, 
siitä käynnistyi muuttajien lähtöalueilla, erityisesti Inkerinmaalla, negatiivinen kehitys. Oman kielen ja 
kulttuurin elpyminen oli perestroikan käynnistymisen ja Neuvostoliiton romahduksen jälkeen lähtenyt 
vireään alkuun. Paluumuuton myötä tällainen aktiviteetti on huolestuttavasti laskenut, koska aktiivisin 
osa väestöstä ja inkeriläiskulttuurin kehittäjistä ja ylläpitäjistä on muuttanut tai odottaa muuttoa 
Suomeen. Pahimmillaan tällainen kehitys johtaa lähtöalueella etniseen puhdistukseen.   
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charged  term,  given  the  events  in  Yugoslavia  and  Rwanda.
80   Indeed,  Clotilde 
Pégorier argues that the 1990s saw the term emerge as an “international crime” in 
academic and popular discourse.
81 The link between these tribulations and the current 
Ingrian migration gives the impression that the Right to Return policy could have the 
unimagined  effect  of  achieving  Stalin’s  goal  of  destroying  Ingrian  culture  and 
removing its vestiges from the Ingrian region. Kemppainen notes the uniqueness of 
Ingrian language and culture as distinct from Finland’s mainstream; to some extent a 
challenge to the presumption of Ingrians’ presumed conformity to the key discursive 
resources  that  comprised  the  prevailing  constructions  of  Finnish  identity  (their 
identity  being  distinct  from  Finland’s,  but  very  much  Finnish-related),  though  his 
concern  for  Ingrians  does  underline  a  perceived  connection  between  Finland  and 
Ingrian Finns.  
 
Kemppainen  was  by  no  means  alone  in  this  theme  of  targeting  humanitarian 
assistance  to  Ingria  rather  than  bringing  Ingrians  to  Finland.  Sulo  Aittoniemi,  the 
former  SMP  politician  whose  contributions  to  the  discussion  on  Ingrian  return 
migration are discussed in greater detail in this chapter’s section on the anti-Russian 
theme, had joined the Centre Party briefly before forming his own party, Alkiolaisen 
keskustaryhmän (Alkionian Centre Group), in 1999. He argued in a September 2001 
budget  initiative  that  providing  200,000  Finnish  Marks  in  funding  to  Ingrian 
retirement communities in Russia would improve Ingrians’ quality of life more than 
their  immigration  to  Finland.
82 Other  contributions  to  this  discourse  on  Ingrian 
humanitarian need questioned the extent to which the Right to Return policy should 
be viewed as akin to asylum status. The National Coalition parliamentarians Sasi, 
Zyskowicz, Kanerva and Lindén reminded the government in 1998 that “Ingrians are 
not asylum seeking refugees, but rather immigrants”.
83 This appears a direct challenge 
to the notion of Ingrian Finnish migration as a form of humanitarianism, given that 
Ingrians were by the mid-1990s no longer directly persecuted in Russia.  
 
                                                 
80 Clotilde Pégorier, Ethnic Cleansing: A Legal Qualification, Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, p. 1.   
81 Ibid.  
82 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittaminen inkerinsuomalaisten olosuhteiden parantamiseen heidän 
kotiseudullaan”, TAA 378/2001, Valiopäivät 2001: Asiakirjat E1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 2001, p. 1. 
83 Sasi et al., “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly tyksistä”. Original Finnish text: On todettava, että 
inkeriläiset eivät ole turvapaikkaa tarvitsevia pakolaisia vaan maahan muuttajia.  
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However, the discussion on humanitarian intervention for Ingrians takes an interesting 
turn in a 2005 question to parliament from Greens MP Heidi Hautala. She states: 
 
In the last 15 years, Finland has received more than 25,000 Ingrian Finnish returnees from 
Russia and Estonia. Now it turns out that at least 200 Ingrians, mostly very young returnees, 
have been deported to Russia for committing offences in Finland. These young people have 
been expelled to Russia, and to circumstances to which they have no prior knowledge…Is it 
not time to consider that this is a major humanitarian problem in Finland…?
84 
 
This presentation of humanitarianism actually shifts focus to Ingrians now living in 
Finland, relates at least in part to problems of their integration into Finnish society, 
and even recalls (though not directly) previous deportations of Ingrians that form the 
heart  of  the  historical  atonement  discourse  discussed  in  the  previous  section. 
Hautala’s  statement  is  significant  in  that  it  presents  humanitarianism  and  Finnish 
responsibility for Ingrians as directed towards those Ingrians living in Finland, rather 
than those living in Ingria. Ingrians in Ingria had been the target of humanitarian 
discussions up until this point, and Hautala’s statement gives some new indication 
that by the mid-2000s, with an Ingrian community in Finland that appeared, at least 
according  to  Hautala’s  statement  and  the  deportation  figures  she  cites,  to  be 
struggling, the focus of Finnish aid to Ingrians should be constructed as aid to an 
immigrant minority in Finland rather than a (perceived) Finnish immigrant minority 
in Russia. There is some acknowledgement, though veiled, that Ingrians are a Russian 
minority in Finland, separate from the Finnish mainstream.  
 
Both this and Kemppainen’s discussion of aid to Ingria challenged the notion that 
Ingrians belong in Finland. Since the humanitarian discussion had been focused so 
much  on  Ingrians’  compatriot  relationship  to  Finland,  the  notion  that  they  are 
different  in  some  respects  from  the  Finnish  mainstream,  as  framed  by  the  five 
discursive  resources  of  Finnish  identity,  now  challenges  this  assumption.  The 
transformation in the political discussion of humanitarian interventionism relates to 
challenges in the political discussion on integration, with the inference given that 
                                                 
84 Heidi Hautala, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttajien maastakarkottaminen”, PTK 139/2005, available 
online at URL: <http://www.eduskunta.fi/faktatmp/utatmp/akxtmp/puh_139_2005_vp_3_1_9_p.shtm>, 
accessed 27 November 2012. Original Finnish text: Viidentoista vuoden kuluessa Suomeen on 
saapunut yli 25 000 inkerinsuomalaista paluumuuttajaa Venäjältä ja Virosta. Nyt on käynyt ilmi, että 
ainakin 200 inkeriläistä, etupäässä hyvin nuorta paluumuuttajaa on rikosten vuoksi karkotettu 
Suomesta. Nämä nuoret on karkotettu Venäjälle sellaisiin oloihin, joista heillä ei ole minkäänlaista 
kokemusta eikä tietoa aikaisemmasta…Eikö nyt olisi aika pohtia, että tässä on melkoinen 
humanitäärinen ongelma Suomella…?    
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Ingrians  don’t  integrate  into  Finnish  society,  and  thus  don’t  conform  to  the  main 
discursive resources shaping constructions of Finnish identity here.  Therefore, return 
migration to Finland is ineffective as a humanitarian act. 
 
The  notion  is  implicit  in  Finnish  politicians  new  presentation  of  humanitarian 
intervention  for  Ingrians  that  Ingrians’  language  and  cultural  orientation  could  be 
more orientated towards Russia than Finland, and that the Finnish government must 
adjust its activities on Ingrian matters to reflect this fact. The connection between 
Ingrians and Finland is not altogether nullified, as there is still an assumption present 
in this discussion that Finland should offer aid to Ingrians resident either in Finland or 
Ingria based on a perceived kin-relationship, but the notion of offering residence as a 
humanitarian gesture appears now out of fashion. In particular, Finnish politicians’ 
statements on Ingrian humanitarianism in difficult economic times, especially in the 
1990s recession, highlight the “unfeasibility” of return migration as a humanitarian 
gesture,  promoting  instead  the  more  cost-effective  alternatives  that  place  Ingrians 
somewhat outside the Finnish national community. Given the end of the policy in the 
late 2000s, when economic difficulties were again a reality, this could be an effective 
discourse for Finnish politicians to now exclude Ingrians from their perception of the 
Finnish national community.  
   
4)  The Positive Assessment of the Swedish Period 
 
Discussions  of  Finland’s  Nordic  credentials,  its  links  to  Sweden  and  the  rest  of 
Scandinavia, and the Nordic dimensions to its identity enter an interesting period in 
the 2000s. Nordic identity was a particularly enlivened discussion in 2010, when the 
Swedish  historian  Gunnar  Wetterberg  published  The  United  Nordic  Federation, 
which advocated a quasi-federal system in the Nordic region.
85 Wetterberg called his 
plan  for  a  United  Nordic  Federation  “a  realistic  utopia…capable  of  transcending 
borders – both geographic and political”.
86 Though this work has yet to translate into 
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86 Gunnar Wetterberg, The United Nordic Federation, Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010, 
p. 28.   
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any concrete policy changes, Johan Strang writes that it has “captured the imagination 
of the media, commentators and intellectuals”.
87  
 
Traditional views of Norden see it as constructed around a regional core, that of the 
Scandinavian Peninsula (Sweden and Norway) and Finland.
88 Norbert Götz argues 
that the idea of the Nordic region is built on common structures (Nordic languages, 
Lutheran religion and political culture), but driven by elites and political actors “with 
collective  material  and  immaterial  interests”.
89 whilst  Henrik  Stenius  sees  it  as 
constructed upon a similar worldview, born of common experiences, or “a common 
Erfahrungsraum”.
90 However, rather than see it as an organic grouping of nations 
sharing common identity markers, Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen define Norden as a 
model  of  social  organisation  constructed  as  a  response  to  specific  political 
requirements, and the Nordic model as a specifically social-democratic model which 
embeds  the  historically-derived  concept  of  Norden  as  a  “foundation  myth”.
91 
Wetterberg’s plan for a Nordic federation could be seen as an attempt to replace 
stalling European integration with a new focus on Norden, uniting the Nordic Council 
member-states  in  a  union  based  on  common  identity  constructed  on  narratives  of 
Norden’s historical and socio-political “otherness”. 
 
In contrast to the East vs. West divides in discourses on Finland’s EU membership in 
the  early  1990s,  based  on  spatial  and  temporal  narratives  of  “homecoming”  to 
Finland’s  former  “natural”  state  as  part  of  a  broadly  defined  Western  Europe,
92 
Joenniemi  argues  that  Finland’s  ongoing  adherence  to  the  Nordic  principles  of 
neutrality, in the face of the European discussions of a Common Security Policy and 
the  expansion  of  NATO,  shows  Finland  pursuing  “an  option  beyond  a  bifurcated 
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East-West construction”.
93 In this line of thinking, the Nordic region is neither East 
nor West, as these concepts are seen largely as defence and security alliances, and 
Nordic Europe is characterised by its peace and neutrality. Joenniemi also argues that 
the collapse of the Iron Curtain along Finland’s eastern frontier allowed for a de-
securitised view of the border, in which adjacent municipalities were encouraged to 
develop  beneficial  trans-border  ties,  and  the  earlier  view  of  this  boundary  as 
delineating  two  profoundly  contrasting  entities  was  reduced.
94 David  J.  Smith 
suggests that Finnish politics in the 2000s worked with the notion that there were 
significant  financial  benefits  Finnish  businesses  could  pursue  through  increased 
cooperation  between  the  EU  and  Russia,
95 and  David  Arter  likewise  argues  that 
northwestern Russia has become part of the Nordic “near abroad”, borrowing the 
Soviet-Russian terminology for its European neighbours.
96 This new “near abroad” 
identity construction views the new post-Soviet northwestern Russia as a resource 
periphery for the more economically developed Nordic region, rather than as a new or 
re-connected  part  of  the  Nordic  region  itself.
97 This  understanding  of  Northern 
Europe, with Nordic core and new post-Soviet “near abroad” periphery, thus appears 
to  replace  the  early-1990s  constructions  of  an  East-West  identity  divide  between 
Finland,  as  part  of  Western  Europe,  and  Russia  with  a  new  discourse  of  Nordic 
particularism.  However,  this  construction  still  presents  a  notion  of  separateness 
between the Nordics and Russia. Browning argues that efforts to include Russia in the 
“New Northern Europe” have most often constructed a narrative of Russian equality, 
but  difference,  to  the  Western  European/EU  states  on  its  border,  which  still 
reproduces a narrative of Russian exclusion from Europe and a hierarchical discourse 
of  Eastern  European  otherness.
98   Nevertheless,  discussions  of  Nordic  identity 
certainly entered a dynamic period in the 2000s.  
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Given  the  context  of  interest  in  Nordic  identity  and  the  particular  history  of  this 
region, it is perhaps surprising that the positive discourse on Finland and Ingria as part 
of the Swedish sphere of power is notable in its absence in the period 1996-2010, 
despite, for instance, the bicentenary of the 1809 Russian annexation in 2009. Not 
once after 1995 is this period of history brought up by Finnish politicians as a means 
to  explain,  justify  or  question  the  Ingrian  Right  to  Return,  which  is  significant 
considering Koivisto’s mention of the Swedish Kingdom in 1990. This suggests that 
despite a new focus on Norden at this time, which was constructed on narratives of 
the shared historical particularity of the Nordic states, this discussion in Finland did 
not extend to those communities from across the Russian border whose connection to 
Nordic history was no longer significantly promoted in Finnish political discourse.  
 
There is also no mention of Ingrian Finns’ religious connection to Finland and their 
common heritage of Lutheranism dating from the Swedish epoch, although Götz cites 
Lutheranism  as  a  key  structure  of  Nordic  identity  construction.
99 There  were, 
however,  considerable  developments  at  this  time  in  the  relationship  between  the 
Lutheran Church of Finland and the Finnish state. A new law on freedom of religion 
had come into force in 2003, in part a reaction to the increase in religious diversity 
that  had  come  from  growing  migrant  communities,  which  guaranteed  religious 
education in public schools for groups with at least three pupils.
100 A push towards 
greater religious plurality also spurred debates in the mid-2000s on further separation 
of the church and state in Finland, which, although ultimately unsuccessful in the face 
of  broad  political  opposition,  led  to  one  significant  political  party,  the  Greens, 
adopting the separation of church and state in its 2006 election manifesto, albeit with 
some  contentiousness.
101
   In  this  environment,  it  was  perhaps  less  significant  to 
question the relative Lutheranness of Ingrians as proving Finnishness. It is therefore 
perhaps not surprising that Lutheranism was not employed as a discursive resource of 
Finnishness in the late 1990s and 2000s. Whether or not Ingrians were Lutherans 
could  be  set  aside  in  the  political  discussion  on  Ingrian  return  migration,  which 
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moved  on  to  discussions  of  how  language  and  cultural  orientation  might  now 
differentiate between Finns and Ingrians.  
 
As seen in the discussion on integration capability, the legislation on the Ingrian Right 
to  Return  increasingly,  in  three  stages,  restricted  access  to  residence  based  on 
language, privileging to some extent this discursive resource of Finnish identity above 
others, particularly ancestral connections to Finland that dated back to the Swedish 
Stormaktstiden. Indeed, the first amendment to the Right to Return clause of the 1991 
Aliens Act in 1996 specifically attempted to reduce this ancient connection to Finland 
as grounds for return migration, limiting valid ancestral links to Finland to, at most, 
two generations.
102 The eventual cancellation of Right to Return status in 2010 for all 
but those with their own direct experience within the Finnish nation state during the 
Winter and Continuation Wars then completely removed all significance afforded to 
ancient  ancestral  connections  to  Finland.
103 To  this  end,  one  sees  particular 
diminishment  in  the  significance  afforded  to  ancient  connections  to  the  pre-1809 
conceptions  of  Finland  in  the  construction  of  Finnish  identity,  as  has  also  been 
discussed in the section on integration capability. This connection could no longer be 
taken for granted as stand-alone proof of Ingrian connection to Finnishness by 1996, 
suggesting  ancestral  descent  is  a  lesser  discursive  resource  in  Finnish  identity, 
although it has not been completely insignificant.  
 
5)  The Negative Assessment of Russia  
 
Tuomas Forsberg and Hanna Ojanen have argued that the key issue for Finland’s 
sense  of  security  and  defence  policy  has  been  the  relationship  with  its  Eastern 
neighbour,  which  continues  to  be  coloured  by  memories  of  conflict.
104 With  the 
accession of Finland to the EU, Forsberg and Ojanen argue that the dynamics of this 
relationship have changed – the notion of Russia deciding Finland’s fate in a Munich 
1938-style conference with Europe seems impossible, but by 2000 Russia remained a 
                                                 
102 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, 28 June 1996. 
103 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain 48 §:n muuttamisesta”, EV 220/2010.  
104 Tuomas Forsberg and Hanna Ojanen, “Finland’s New Policy: Using the EU for Stability in the 
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“factor  of  uncertainty”.
105 However,  European  Union  membership  has  provided 
Finland  a  blueprint  for  containing  the  perceived  Russian  threat  and  limiting  the 
potential for conflict, especially through fostering of economic interdependence, for 
“integration  is  seen  as  a  peace  strategy  underlying  the  European  Union.  If  it  has 
worked  in  Western  Europe,  it  should  work  for  Europe  as  a  whole”.
106 The  major 
avenue for this was the Northern Dimension policy, the agreement between the EU, 
Norway, Iceland and Russia described by Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister of Finland 
during its initial negotiation, as essentially a plan “to integrate Russia into Europe as a 
democracy and a market economy”.
107 The Northern Dimension policy was a Finnish 
initiative, initiated in 1999 and agreed upon by the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia at 
the Northern Dimension Summit in Helsinki in 2006 during the Finnish presidency of 
the  European  Union,  which  sought  to  build  a  framework  for  increased  economic 
integration and cooperation, primarily through existing institutions, in Northern and 
Baltic Europe.
108 The Political Declaration of the Northern Dimension Policy, signed 
in 2006, includes language in its preamble that specifically notes the significance of 
economic  integration  and  cooperation  for  stability  in  the  region,  as  the  agreeing 
parties declared they were 
 
reaffirming their shared responsibility for the prosperity of Northern Europe, its sustainable 
development, and the well-being of its population, and their commitment to create favourable 
conditions  for  the  development  of  the  region  and  for  further  strengthening  of  mutually 
beneficial  multilateral  cooperation  in  Northern  Europe,  including  cross-border  and  sub-
regional cooperation.
109  
 
Likewise,  under  “Objectives”  in  the  Northern  Dimension  Framework  Document, 
which stipulates the avenues and mechanisms for regional cooperation between the 
EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia in Northern Europe, point 10 reads: 
 
The Northern Dimension policy will aim at providing a common framework for the promotion 
of  dialogue  and  concrete  cooperation,  strengthening  stability,  well-being  and  intensified 
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108 European Union External Action Service, “Northern Dimension”, available online at URL: 
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economic  cooperation,  promotion  of  economic  integration  and  competitiveness  and 
sustainable development in Northern Europe.
110 
 
Indeed,  amongst  the  six  “priority  sectors”  (point  19)  outlined  by  the  Framework 
Document, the first is “economic cooperation”, which would include “promotion of 
trade,  investments,  customs,  SMEs,  business,  innovation,  well-functioning  labour 
markets, financial services, [and] infrastructure”.
111 Thus by 2006, with introduction 
of a new foreign policy initiative that employed the backing of the broader European 
Union, Finland appeared to have arrived at a new consensus on the potential of a 
Russian threat: the late 1990s and 2000s presented an opportunity to neutralise Russia 
through  a  program  of  building  economic  dependence.  In  this  way,  the  Northern 
Dimension policy was as much constructed on security as humanitarian concerns. The 
negative perception of Russia in a sense persists, but new mechanisms to muzzle the 
threat were instigated. 
 
However, there have also been instances in the 2000s where integration with Russia 
may have acted to fuel the perception of Russia as a threat to Finnish and European 
stability. Most notably, Russia’s position as a major natural gas exporter has created 
what Øistein Harsem and Dag Harald Claes call a “highly asymmetric” structural 
relationship  with  Europe,  wherein  Russia  is  able  to  leverage  its  gas  reserves,  the 
particular importance of gas for everyday basic needs, and the difficulty in finding 
immediate energy substitutes for gas-fuelled technology (exacerbating the effects of 
even a short-term shut-down) as political clout in Europe.
112 As Harsem and Claes 
surmise, “even though Russia is dependent on the income from gas exports to the 
European market, the European gas consumer seems relatively more dependent on 
Russian gas supplies”.
113 Significantly, they also note the disparity in effect a Russian 
gas shut-down would have on different EU member states, given their different levels 
of  dependency  on  Russian  gas  imports.
114   Finland  is  at  the  most  extreme  end; 
completely integrated into the Russian gas export market, it relies on this source for 
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100% of its gas supplies.
115 At several points in the 1990s and 2000s, Russia shut 
down energy exports to neighbouring countries. There were early 1990s disruptions to 
exports in Ukraine during a Russian-Ukrainian dispute over ownership of the Black 
Sea Fleet stationed in Crimea, and a June 1993 gas cut-off to Estonia, which the state-
owned Russian news agency RIA Novosti openly described as retaliation for state 
discrimination  against  Russian  speakers  living  in  Estonia.
116 More  recently,  in 
January 2007, exports to Belarus were temporarily suspended over a price dispute.
117 
Russia also cut gas exports twice to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, officially over price 
disputes,  though  Karen  Smith  Stegen  suggests  Russian  displeasure  with  then 
Ukrainian  President  Viktor  Yushchenko,  who  unseated  the  Kremlin-endorsed 
incumbent  in  the  Orange  Revolution  in  2004  and  supported  Georgia  in  its  2008 
conflict with Russia, as likely having influenced the decision.
118 Particularly after the 
2009  Ukrainian  shutdown,  European  governments  appeared  to  recognise  the 
vulnerability of their gas supply to Russian-Ukrainian disputes if Ukraine continued 
to serve as a transit country, and several governments, including Finland, dropped 
their environmental concerns to the building of an alternative submerged pipeline, 
Nord  Stream.
119 However,  though  Nord  Stream  may  insulate  Finland  from  future 
energy conflicts between Russia and a third party, these conflicts show post-Soviet 
Russia is also able to act as a destabilising agent in Europe, and Finnish total reliance 
on Russian gas makes it particularly vulnerable to such actions from Russia should 
any new Finno-Russian disputes arise.  
 
As  such,  Harsem  and  Claes  have  characterised  Finnish  attitudes  to  Russia  in  the 
2000s as those of a “friendly pragmatist”, placing business interests above political 
goals  and  striving  to  maintain  a  close  relationship.
120 This  is  reminiscent  of  the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, and suggests something of a continuity in the way Russia is 
politically  constructed  in  Finland:  outwardly  as  a  positive  trading  partner,  but 
inwardly as a potential security threat. By the late 2000s, the potential pitfalls of the 
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Northern Dimension strategy of increasing economic integration with Russia become 
apparent, especially if the economic integration were to prove as asymmetrical as 
energy  integration.  Therefore,  economic  integration  and  trade  links  might  not 
necessarily  ameliorate  the  significance  of  the  perceived  Russian  threat  in  Finnish 
political discourse.  
 
The Northern Dimension also involved expanding the EU’s presence in the Baltic Sea 
through Baltic States’ membership, seen in Finland as an expansion of the “sphere of 
European stability” in the North.
121 Indeed, this is echoed in the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs’ own published account of Lipponen’s 1997 speech in the northern 
city of Rovaniemi, laying out the idea of the Northern Dimension as “based on the 
wish to increase stability in Northern Europe and in the Union as a whole. One of the 
key objectives was to bring the Baltic States closer to the EU, an aim that also served 
Finland’s  security  policy  objectives”.
122 However,  parallel  to  the  expansion  of  the 
European Union was the expansion of NATO – the Baltic States joined on 29 March 
2004, just weeks before their accession to the EU. Discourses in the Baltic States on 
NATO differ sharply to the Finnish political debate on membership, as evidenced by 
Latvian  President  Vaira  Vīķe-Freiberga’s  address  to  the  2002  NATO  Summit  in 
Prague: 
  
For us in Latvia, it comes as a sign of international justice, to put an end once and for all to the 
last vestiges of the Second World War, to the last sequels of what started with the Molotov-
Ribbentrop  Pact  in  1939,  to  the  consequences  of  the  decisions  taken  in  Tehran  and  in 
Yalta…We do not want to be in some sort of grey zone of political uncertainty, we would like 
to enjoy the full sunshine of the liberty and rights that NATO has been defending so long.
123  
 
This presentation of NATO membership as “re-joining” the West and undoing the 
Soviet-era expansion and aggression at the heart of the negative discourse on Russia 
was not replicated in Finland at this time. Finnish attitudes towards NATO as a means 
to  maintaining  security  from  a  potential  Russian  threat  were  moot,  as  the  2004 
Finnish  government’s  white  paper  on  defence  policy  stated  it  would  not  pursue 
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joining, without firmly closing the door to future membership.
124 The potential for 
membership had continued to emerge periodically in political discussions through the 
1990s, such as in early 1996 after the Bosnian crisis and the question of Finnish 
involvement in peacekeeping missions, though Prime Minister Lipponen stressed that 
Finnish participation in NATO-led peacekeeping missions would not necessarily be a 
stepping-stone  to  membership.
125   Tarja  Halonen,  the  Social  Democratic  Foreign 
Minister who became President in 2000, has been somewhat ambiguous in her own 
statements on NATO’s role in Northern Europe, supporting the Baltic expansion but 
not treating Finnish membership as a viable option.
126 Finnish public opinion in 2000 
continued to favour non-alignment, seen as a key issue in determining the presidential 
election,  which  favoured  non-alignment  advocates  Halonen  and  former  Prime 
Minister  Esko  Aho,  the  second  round  candidates,  over  pro-NATO  figures  like 
Defence Minister Elisabeth Rehn, defeated in the first round.
127  
 
Indeed,  NATO  expansion  in  the  Baltics  presented  a  challenge,  and  perhaps  a 
counterexample,  for  Finland.  NATO’s  Baltic  expansion  had  the  potential  to  set 
dividing lines in Northern Europe between East and West and raise security concerns 
for Russia, whose conventional military power and room to manoeuvre in the Baltic 
region may have been diminished since Soviet times, but in the late 1990s still very 
much existed.
128 Finland avoiding NATO membership itself may have pacified Russia 
somewhat, particularly when viewed against Russian statements on the Baltic States. 
In August 2010, for instance, the Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitri Rogozin 
issued a statement in which he called Estonian fear of Russia “clear paranoia”, and 
pointed to Finland, “which managed to become a bridge between the East and the 
West in the most complicated period for the continent, [and] could be a good example 
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for  Estonia”.
129 Whenever  Finnish  membership  in  NATO  has  been  raised  (most 
recently, in the summer of 2012), Russian political and military figures including 
President  Vladimir  Putin
130 and  commander  of  armed  forces  General  Nikolai 
Makarov
131 have issued warnings that such a move could provoke Russian concerns, 
or even conflict. Finnish Minister of Defence Stefan Wallin, like Rehn a Swedish 
People’s  Party  member  with  pro-NATO  sensibilities,  has  responded  that  “Finland 
evaluates its relationship with NATO in a manner consistent with its government 
policy program on the basis of its own security and defence policy interests”,
132 a 
diplomatic retort that suggests perhaps a careful manoeuvring to avoid such Russian 
reactions, but also a degree of assertiveness (albeit gradual and carefully presented) in 
Finland’s  transition  from  the  Paasikivi-Kekkonen  line  to  shaping  its  own  security 
priorities. This assertiveness included, at the very end of this period, the development 
of NORDEFCO, the Nordic Defence Cooperation, which was introduced following a 
2009 report by the former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg.
133 The 
USSR had already delayed Finland joining the Nordic Council, and had vetoed efforts 
at  advanced  intra-Nordic  cooperation  like  Nordek,  but  when  the  post-Cold  War 
international  security  climate  removed  the  taboo  of  defence  cooperation  for  the 
Nordics  NORDEFCO  was  able  to  go  ahead.
134 Nordic  cooperation  at  this  level, 
previously  deemed  impossible  due  to  Soviet  objections,  was  now  being  openly 
discussed as a possibility.  
 
There  has  thus  been  a  degree  of  departure  from  previous  Finnish  perceptions  of 
Russia. In the early 2000s, it could be seen as less threatening, more open and more 
integrated into the European economy, which has prompted changing foreign and 
security policy approaches including increased integration and cooperation (at time of 
writing  in  2014,  given  the  Crimean  Crisis,  this  image  may  have  changed 
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considerably).  However,  despite  this  degree  of  change  in  the  Finnish  political 
perception of Russia from the 1990s to the new millennium, the notion of Russia as a 
threat does not completely disappear. The ongoing political discussions on Russia in 
Finland have addressed subduing the Russian threat through integration measures in 
the European Union and Nordic region, and avoiding antagonism over the ongoing 
NATO  question.  Thus  by  the  2000s,  Finnish  political  discussions  on  Russia  still 
appeared to view it as a security policy focus, albeit in a somewhat new context.   
 
Indeed, in some respects this new context has allowed for a more direct presentation 
of negative attitudes towards Russia. In the 2000s, some Finnish politicians, perhaps 
most notably the Greens MP Heidi Hautala, have shown greater freedom in criticising 
Russia. The negative discourses on Russia in more recent years differ from earlier 
discourses in their more direct, undisguised criticisms of Russian internal politics, 
showing that fear of Russia as a threat to Finnish independence is waning. Hautala, a 
former Environment Minister, openly criticised Russian environmental and energy 
policy in the mid-2000s,
135 and in her 2008 book Venäjä-teesit: Vakaus vai Vapaus 
(The  Russia  Theses:  Stability  or  Freedom),  in  which  she  censures  the  status  of 
democracy in Putin’s Russia and writes that “Finland’s parliament and Russia’s Duma 
have the same historic origin, but we have since moved in different directions”.
136 
Finnish mistrust of Russia is still evident, but is presented in a direct manner that 
suggests the end of the traditional Russian threat, i.e. that Russia should be viewed as 
a potential source of instability rather than a traditional military threat.  
 
How, then, does this transforming discussion on Russia translate to the Finnish debate 
on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return? In one sense, it appears to have mollified the 
argument for a return migration to rescue Ingrians from a Russian threat to Finnish 
kinfolk. This is evidenced in the rhetoric of Sulo Aittoniemi, by the mid-1990s a 
member of the agrarian Centre Party but with a background in the SMP (defunct since 
1995), whose primary support base comprised older small-scale farmers resettled in 
Finland  from  Karelia  under  state-sponsored  programs  following  the  Soviet 
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annexation, many of whom felt the Finnish government in the era of Finlandisation 
had ignored them.
137 Hence, a somewhat reflexive anti-Russian sentiment from an-
SMP  politician  would  not  seem  altogether  surprising.  Aittoniemi  began  his 
commentary on the Ingrian Return law in September 1996 with a talousarvioaloite 
(budget initiative) to the Eduskunta stating: 
 
In  recent  years,  as  many  as  20,000  so-called  Ingrian  Finns  have  moved  from  Russia  to 
Finland. The decision to allow and promote the return at this scale was a bad error. Ingrian 
Finns have not found what they came looking for in Finland, and many desperately long to 
return to their former homes, if the conditions would at least be tolerable. Their wishes are to 
both Finland and Ingrian Finns’ advantage.  
 
Based on the above considerations, it is suggested that the Parliament would take from the 
state budget for 1997 80,000,000 Finnish marks for those Ingrian Finnish returnees willing to 
return to Russia to facilitate their return and improve their conditions, particularly the housing 
situation.
138 
 
The language employed here is in marked contrast to previous, more compassionate 
language from other politicians calling for sympathy to Ingrians, even if the call to 
improve living situations for Ingrians is still present at the end of this statement. 
Reference  to  Ingrians  as  “so-called  Ingrian  Finns”  directly  challenges  previous 
assertions  that  Ingrians  belong  within  the  Finnish  national  community.  Thus  the 
suggestion shifts from bringing Ingrians to Finland under the Right to Return policy, 
to assisting homesick émigrés in repatriation to Russia. Whilst the new discussions on 
the humanitarian imperative to assist Ingrians in Russia rather than bring them to 
Finland is very much present in Aittoniemi’s initiative here, the presentation of Russia 
as the Ingrian homeland is also significant, depicted here as the Ingrians’ longed-for 
home that was left for purely economic reasons, rather than any sense of threat or 
being driven out, nor of any emotional connection to Finland. There is a distinction, 
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therefore, between the “new” Russia that Aittoniemi presents as the Ingrian homeland 
and the “old” Soviet Russia marked by deportations and discrimination under Stalin.   
 
However, in Aittoniemi’s presentation of the Ingrian Finns, concurrent statements on 
the nature of returnees themselves reveal an ongoing negative discourse on Russia 
and  Russians,  but  one  which  paints  Ingrians  as  influenced  by,  or  connected  to, 
negative stereotypes of 1990s Russian behaviour. In a 1997 written question to the 
Interior Minister Jan-Erik Enestam, Aittoniemi writes: 
 
The Right to Return mission has later been judged a clear failure. Among other things, it has 
attracted only elderly Ingrians who are no longer rooted in Finland. They are knocking their 
walking sticks against the asphalt, crying and craving to go back to their old homes. On the 
other  hand,  for  many  of  these  returnees  willing  to  move  here,  there  is  the  possibility  of 
abusing the Right to Return without justification. Some pursue criminal activity, for instance 
trafficking. Very few have adapted to the labour market.
139  
 
This statement continues the notion that Ingria, rather than Finland, is the traditional 
Ingrian  Finnish  homeland,  as  well  as  the  overriding  economic  and  labour  market 
concerns with increased migration at this time. However, Aittoniemi also plays into 
pervasive  turn-of-the-millennium  perceptions  of  Russian  criminality  in  Finland. 
Helsingin Sanomat similarly ran articles concerning Russian mafia infiltration into 
Finland,  with  particular  reference  to  trafficking  of  prostitutes  from  Estonia  to 
Helsinki’s  western  Lauttasaari  district,
140 and  the  rise  of  the  Estonian-Russian 
prostitution ring in Helsinki organised by the mafia organisation “Obtshak” (Russian 
for  “Common  Wealth”).
141 Aittoniemi’s  statement  also  specifically  notes  criminal 
trafficking  activity  as  an  issue  for  Ingrians.  He  was  even  more  specific  in  his 
accusations in a November 1997 question to parliament, accusing Inkerin-Liitto, the 
Ingrian community’s cultural organisation collaborating with the Finnish Consulate-
General in St Petersburg in processing Right to Return applicants, of being a KGB 
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infiltration front, and both the Inkerin-Liitto chairman Eero Pellinen and St Petersburg 
Consul-General  Ludmila  Zaturina  of  being  KGB  double  agents.
142 His  distrust  of 
Inkerin-Liitto appears born of his belief that “NGO activities for instance in Russia 
are in no way comparable to those of Finnish organisations”,
143 thus suggesting that 
Inkerin-Liitto is an organisation of Russians, rather than Finns. Aittoniemi himself 
questioned the Finnishness of Ingrians in a 2002 statement, claiming that “a large part 
of the Ingrian Finns coming to Finland do not have any roots in Finnishness”.
144 The 
negative  assessment  of  Russians  therefore  extends  here  to  Ingrians,  and  hence, 
Ingrians are presented now as Russians, or at least more connected to Russia than 
Finland. The particular negative view of Russians in Finland at this time was thus 
used in political discussions on Ingrians here to exclude Ingrians from Finnishness by 
re-defining them as Russians. This is a key discursive resource of Finnishness; that 
Finns  and  Russians  are  different  and  in  opposition.  This  now  informs  language 
excluding  Ingrians  from  Finland,  where  it  had  in  other  discussions,  such  as  the 
discussions on war veterans and historical atonement, linked them.  
 
To some extent, this view was opposed by the parties on the left. During oral question 
time  in  the  Eduskunta on  12  September  2002,  Social  Democrat  Liisa  Jaakonsaari 
complained  of  a  xenophobic  atmosphere  (muukalaisvihamielistä ilmapiiriä)  in  the 
discussions  on  reform  to  immigration  laws.
145 Similarly,  Outi  Ojala  of  the  Left 
Alliance  criticised  xenophobic  attitudes  towards  immigrant  language  capabilities, 
specifically  referencing  Ingrian  returnees,  in  the  Eduskunta  in  February  2002.
146 
Indeed, though the period 1996-2010 was marked by a somewhat waning negative 
view of Russia as a geopolitical threat in Finland, negative language on Russians 
remained  an  aspect  of  political  discussions  around  the  Ingrian  Return  that  some 
                                                 
142 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttoon liittyvien perusteiden selvittämisestä”, KK 
1108/1997, Valiopäivät 1997: Asiakirjat F5, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 1997, p. 1. 
143 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kansalaisjärjestötoimintaa esimerkiksi Venäjällä ei voi mitenkään 
verrata suomalaiseen yhdistystoimintaan.  
144 Sulo Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittaminen inkerinsuomalaisten elinolojen kohentamiseen heidän 
synnyinseuduillaan”, TAA 415/2002, Valiopäivät 2002: Asiakirjat E1, Helsinki: Eduskunta, 2002, p. 1. 
Original Finnish text: Suuri osa tänne tulleista inkerinsuomalaisista ei omaa mitään juuria 
suomalaisuuden suuntaan.  
145 Liisa Jaakonsaari, “Ulkomaalaislain kokonaisuudistus”, SKT 93/2002, available online at URL: 
<http://puheenvuorot.kansanmuisti.fi/istunnot/93-2002/7790-ulkomaalaislain-kokonaisuudistus>,  
accessed 26 November 2012.    
146 Outi Ojala, “Maahanmuuttajien kielikoulutus”, PTK 9/2002, available online at URL: 
<http://puheenvuorot.kansanmuisti.fi/istunnot/9-2002/8264-maahanmuuttajien-
kielikoulutus/111511>, accessed 26 November 2012.    
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politicians saw as problematic. Yet both those critical of Ingrians, and those defensive 
of them, now make their arguments with the assumption that Ingrians are foreigners, 
and specifically Russians, in Finland.  
 
B)  Conclusions 
 
Political discussions on the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return from 1996 and 2010 were 
characterised by increasing indications that the Ingrian community did not conform to 
many  of  the  dominant  understandings  of  Finnish  identity  held  by  Finnish 
policymakers. This is shown both in the amendments to the policy in 1996, 2002-
2003 and 2010, which restricted and ultimately ended the influx of Ingrian return 
migrants  based  on  identity  considerations,  as  well  as  in  the  characterisation  of 
Ingrians by individual Finnish MPs, which increasingly saw a separation between 
Ingrians  and  the  Finnish  national  community  as  the  MPs  understood  it.    The 
amendment  documents  and  the  statements  from  Finnish  politicians  are  both 
characterised by discursive constructions of Finnishness that now exclude Ingrians 
from the Finnish community to some extent, although a degree of connection is often 
still acknowledged. However, it is significant to note that transformations in the way 
Finnish  politicians  viewed  Ingrians  do  not  necessarily  translate  to  broad 
transformations  in  how  Finnish  politicians  view  Finnishness.  Of  the  five  core 
discursive  resources  on  Finnish  identity  employed  to  connect  Ingrians  to  Finland 
discussed previously in chapter four, most are not extensively disputed as relevant to 
the definition of Finnishness. Finnish language, Western European orientation and 
opposition to the East are still taken as core aspects of Finnishness, though now, 
Finnish political language increasingly sees these characteristics as separating, rather 
than  linking,  Ingrians  and  Finnishness.  The  remaining  discursive  resources,  on 
Lutheranism  and  ancestry,  are  now  either  ignored  or  minimised  as  legitimate 
characteristics  of  Finnishness.  Thus  in  effect,  Finnish  politicians’  renegotiation  of 
Finnishness  was  comparatively  lesser  than  their  reclassification  of  Ingrians’ 
Finnishness.  The  Finnish  language  and  cultural  orientation  towards  the  West  and 
away from the East could still be used as discursive resources of Finnishness past the 
cancellation of the Ingrian Right to Return policy.  
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Primarily,  the  constructions  of  Finnishness  based  on  language  and  on  attitudes 
towards Russia show a reversal in how Ingrians were viewed by Finnish politicians. 
Broadly speaking, the experience of Ingrians in Finland had shown Finnish authorities 
that Ingrians did not often speak advanced Finnish, and remained to some extent 
culturally orientated towards Russia. Thus, Ingrian returnees in Finland could present 
a challenge to these identity characteristics when employed as discursive resources to 
describe Finnishness. If one believes Ingrians are indeed also Finns, the importance of 
language and of attitude towards Russia should therefore be afforded limited or no 
importance in shaping this understanding of Finnishness. Yet this does not appear to 
be the line of thought pursued by Finnish policymakers. Rather, these constructions of 
Finnishness  retain  their  significance,  and  continue  to  limit  the  dominant 
understanding of Finnishness in these political discussions, now to the exclusion of 
Ingrians.  
 
By  contrast,  other  constructions  of  Finnishness  previously  deployed  as  discursive 
resources  to  include  Ingrians  in  the  Finnish  national  community  appear  to  have 
diminished from the political discussion. Over the period 1996-2010, there was no 
reference to the discursive resources of Ingrians as connected to Finland through their 
Lutheran  religion,  despite  the  fact  that  this  element  of  Finnishness  was  initially 
highlighted by Mauno Koivisto when he first addressed his justification for the policy 
in April 1990. Amendments to the law in 1996 limiting generational ties to Finland to 
within  recent  memory,  and  to  the  modern  Finnish  Republic,  rather  than  the 
seventeenth-century  Swedish  Kingdom,  suggests  there  are  limits  to  the  political 
salience of connections based on potentially centuries-old familial or cultural ties, 
which ignore the realities of Ingrians’ lives in Russia and/or the Soviet Union, in the 
political discussions on Ingrian Finns.  
 
Rather than view Ingrians as displaced members of the Finnish national community, 
Finnish policy makers came to formulate new perceptions of Ingrians. On the more 
populist end of the political spectrum, Ingrians could be characterised as effectively 
Russians,  and  thus  well  outside  their  understanding  of  Finnish  identity.  Other 
politicians have advocated a more multi-faceted interpretation of Ingrian identity, as 
influenced by both Finnish and Russian elements, and thus uniquely Ingrian, serving 
as  an  identity  bridge  between  Finnishness  and  Russianness  in  the  region.  This  
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challenges  somewhat  the  perception  of  the  Finno-Russian  border  as  a  strict 
delineating  line  between  opposing  Eastern  and  Western  cultures.  However, 
discussions  on  Ingrians’  identity  as  distinct  from  both  Finnish  and  Russian 
mainstreams  still  places  Ingrians  outside  the  construction  of  mainstream  Finnish 
identity, and fails to acknowledge the potential for “Russianness” as existing within 
the Finnish national community. The ongoing significance of a historical atonement 
theme  related  to  the  Winter  and  Continuation  Wars  in  the  discussion  on  Ingrian 
migration,  which  is  informed  by  discursive  resources  of  Finland’s  Westward 
orientation and difficult relationship with Russia, shows that traditional perceptions of 
the divide between East and West are still significant to Finnish politicians and still 
emerge in Finnish policy on Ingrians.  Ingrian veterans of the Finnish Army, and 
those refugees deported back to the USSR from Finland after the Moscow Peace 
Treaty, survived the 2010 cancellation of the Ingrian Finnish Return law, and are still 
permitted  residency  in  Finland,  as  they  are  presented  as  having  proven  their 
commitment to Finland over the USSR or Russia. 
 
As  such,  the  changes  in  the  Ingrian  Finnish  Return  law,  including  its  ultimate 
cancellation in 2010, should not be taken as an indication of a general rejection of 
ethno-cultural understandings of Finnish identity by Finnish politicians at this time. 
These ethno-cultural understandings of Finnishness continue to find political credence 
in Finland, and continue to promote an exclusionary and essentialist perception of 
Finnish national identity. The key change between 1990-1995 and 1996-2010 is that 
this exclusion has increasingly extended to Ingrians in the later period. As the 1990s 
and 2000s was a period of substantial increases in immigration and ethno-cultural 
diversity in Finland, this understanding of Finnish identity may become increasingly 
problematic.  The  cleft  between  Finnishness  as  a  citizenship  and  Finnishness  as  a 
discursively  produced  national  identity  in  Finnish  political  discussions,  like  the 
discussion on the Ingrian Right to Return policy, can function as an alienating force 
for some communities living in Finland at this time. Now, this alienation may also 
extend to Ingrians.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
INGRIAN REPRESENTATIONS OF IDENTITY: INFLUENCE AND 
CORRELATION WITH FINNISH POLITICIAL DISCOURSE? 
 
Previous  scholarly  investigations  of  Ingrian  migration  to  Finland  after  1990  with 
reference to identity and Finnishness have largely been carried out by researchers at 
Finnish institutions. There is therefore a body of data from Finnish researchers on 
how  Ingrians  themselves  view  their  identity  and  relationship  to  Finnishness  and 
Finnish society as a receiving or kin-state environment. This body of study was not 
directly  referenced  by  Finnish  politicians  in  their  discussions  on  Ingrians  and  the 
Right  to  Return  law.  However,  at  several  times  Finnish  politicians  claimed  to  be 
basing their statements and intentions regarding the Right to Return for Ingrians on 
Ingrians’  own  self-perception  as  (at  first)  Finnish  or  (later)  not  Finnish.  Notable 
examples  of  this  discussed  in  previous  chapters  include  Sulo  Aittoniemi’s  1996 
assertion that “Ingrian Finns have not found what they came looking for in Finland, 
and many desperately long to return to their former homes, if the conditions would at 
least be tolerable”
1 and his 1997 view that Ingrians were “crying and craving to go 
back  to  their  old  homes”,
2 as  well  as  the  contentions  from  National  Coalition 
parliamentarians in 1990 that Finland was “strange and alien” to Ingrians,
3 and in 
1998 that Ingrians felt only a “very weak” connection to Finland that had prompted 
“deep social exclusion” after migration.
4 On the other (inclusive) side, there is the 
claim  expressed  in  1992  by  then-Foreign  Minister  Paavo  Väyrynen  that  “[t]he 
connection  to  Finnishness  is  an  important  part  of  Ingrian  identity”,
5 and  Tina 
Mäkelä’s  1990  belief  that  Ingrian  Finnish  return  migrants  “consider  themselves 
Finnish”.
6 Assertions of Ingrian Finns’ own construction of their identity as connected 
to Finnishness or otherwise were thus a feature of Finnish politicians’ language on the 
Ingrian Finnish Right to Return law. Given the available data and studies on how 
Ingrians view or have constructed their own identities in the same period, one is able 
                                                 
1 Aittoniemi, “Määrärahan osoittamisesta Venäjälle palaamaan halukkaiden inkerinsuomalaisten 
elinolosuhteiden parantamiseen”, p. 56. 
2 Aittoniemi, “Inkerinsuomalaisten maahanmuutosta”, p. 1. 
3 Kärhä, Uosukainen, Holvitie et al., ““Määrärahan osoittamisesta Inkeri-asiamiehen viran 
perustamiseen”, p. 2183. 
4 Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”. 
5 Väyrynen, “Vastaus”, KK 71/1992, p. 2.  
6 Mäkelä, “Eläketurvan järjestämisestä Suomeen muuttaville inkeriläisille”, p. 1.   
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to contrast the discursive construction of Ingrianness (as Finnishness, Russianness, 
neither, or a combination of the two) provided from within the Ingrian community 
against the discursive constructions put forward by Finnish politicians of either an 
inclusive or exclusive statement of Finnishness concerning Ingrians. This gives some 
idea of the intersubjectivity of identity construction between Finnish politicians and 
their  constructions  of  Finnishness  with  reference  to  Ingrians,  and  the  Ingrian 
community’s own ideas of identity and connection to Finland.  
 
It is not, however, possible to ascertain a causal relationship from the available data: 
how  much,  if  at  all,  Ingrian  statements  of  their  own  identity  directly  influenced 
Finnish  politicians’  language  on  this  issue.  Assertions  from  parliamentarians  on 
Ingrian self-identification as either part or not part of their idea of Finnishness do not 
cite specific sources or studies that show Ingrian attitudes to their own identity, their 
connection  to  Finnishness  or  the  role  identity  considerations  have  played  in  their 
decisions  to  migrate  to  Finland,  or  indeed  to  remain  in  Russia  or  Estonia.  It  is 
therefore not the contention of this chapter that Ingrians were (or weren’t) able to 
directly  influence  the  language  on  inclusion  and  exclusion  from  Finnish  political 
figures.  Rather,  this  chapter  provides  some  idea  of  whether  Ingrians  and  Finnish 
parliamentarians were effectively talking about identity in similar ways, and if/how 
the statements of Finnish politicians on Ingrians affected Ingrians’ discourses on their 
identity. This gives some idea of the intersubjectivity of Finnish politicians’ assertions 
of  Ingrian  identity,  in  its  relationship  to  the  discursive  constructions  of  identity 
produced from this community in the same time period, though direct links between 
discursive constructions of Ingrians’ identity from Ingrians and Finnish politicians’ 
discursive  constructions  of  Finnish  identity  as  it  pertains  to  Ingrians  may  not  be 
directly established through analysis of Finnish politicians’ language on this issue.   
 
Concretely, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse if/how Ingrians’ language on 
their  identity  and  connection  to  Finnishness  correlate  to  the  discourse  in  Finnish 
politics, including the change from inclusion to exclusion in the later part of this 
period.  To this end, I have identified two areas for analysis in this chapter. Firstly, I 
analyse the discursive construction of Ingrian identity promoted in the editorials of 
Uutisia Inkeristä (News from Ingria), an online newsletter run by the Inkeri-Liitto 
(Ingrian  League),  an  Ingrian  NGO  in  St  Petersburg.  These  editorials  provide  an  
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insight into local media discourses on Ingrian identity and the Ingrian perception of 
the Right to Return policy, particularly in the later stages of its reform and ultimate 
cancellation.  Secondly,  I  examine  the  discourses  on  Ingrian  identity  provided  by 
Ingrian  Finnish  return  migrants  in  Finland  (and,  to  some  extent,  Ingrians  that 
remained in Russia and Estonia) in interview and survey data collected by researchers 
for study of Ingrian attitudes towards identity and return migration.  Essentially, I 
argue  that  Ingrian  Finns’  construction  of  identity  engages  with  concepts  of 
Finnishness, Russianness and Ingrianness as a middle-option at different times and in 
different  ways,  without  necessarily  conforming  to  Finnish  political  perceptions  of 
Finnishness  and  Russianness  as  mutually  exclusive  and  opposing  identity 
categorisations.  This  indicates  that  there  was  only  limited  correlation  between 
Ingrians’  own  views  and  the  language  of  Finnish  politicians.  In  particular,  the 
ongoing use by Finnish politicians of discursive resources like the Finnish language 
and negative constructions of Russia/Russians as “othering” arguments for Ingrian 
exclusion in the late 1990s and 2000s, based on a perception of Ingrians as Russians 
and not Finns, contrasts with language from Ingrians’ themselves that presents more 
multi-faceted approaches to identity that include elements of sameness and otherness 
between their identity and Finnishness. 
 
A)  Uutisia Inkeristä: A Case Study of the Discussion on Ingrian Finnishness in 
Local Ingrian Media 
 
Uutisia  Inkeristä  is  an  online  newsletter  produced  by  an  Ingrian  community 
organization based in St Petersburg, Inkerin-Liitto (Ingrian League). Its editorials are 
primarily written by Wladimir Kokko, a prominent Ingrian Finnish community leader, 
founder and director of the Inkerin-Liitto, who remained in St Petersburg after the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Inkerin-Liitto is  particularly  linked  to  the  Right  to 
Return law in Finland, as this organisation was responsible for teaching language and 
orientation courses for return migration applicants in Russia, and indeed this role was 
referenced  in  the  Finnish  political  discussion  on  Ingrians,  most  notably  by  Sulo 
Aittoniemi in 1997.
7 There are obvious limits to what interpretations can be drawn 
from the Uutisia Inkeristä editorials, given that they were primarily written by one 
                                                 
7 Aittoniemi, “Inkeriläisten paluumuuttoon liittyvien perusteiden selvittämisestä”, KK 1108/1997, p. 1.   
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man. Effectively, these editorials can only present Kokko’s opinions. However, given 
Inkerin-Liitto’s relationship to the Right to Return program, and Kokko’s influence as 
a prominent Ingrian community leader in the St Petersburg region, these editorials do 
have an audience amongst Ingrians, including those planning to return migrate to 
Finland,  and  thus  have  some  significance  in  reflecting  significant  narratives  of 
identity in the Ingrian community.  
 
Kokko has given clear indications of the identity characteristics he sees as defining 
Ingrianness: in a interview for a 2013 Finnish television documentary, he stated “three 
things unite us [Ingrians]: the Finnish language, Lutheranism and a love of the Ingrian 
land”.
8 Significantly,  Kokko  here  employs  two  of  the  same  discursive  resources 
(language and religion) that feature in Finnish politicians’ language, but here rather as 
distinguishing features of Ingrianness rather than unifying features for Ingrians to 
Finnishness. Ingrianness and Finnishness may be constructed in part through the same 
discursive resources as Finnishness, but in this construction as effectively separate 
identities. Language and religion are joined with a territorially-linked construction of 
identity,  and  this  connection  Kokko  sees  between  territory  and  people  in  his 
construction  of  Ingrianness  is  underscored  by  the  name  of  his  organisation’s 
newsletter - the title “News from Ingria” presents this news as a bulletin from the 
homeland going out to the diaspora. Indeed, Kokko has rejected the term “return” to 
describe the 1990s migration of Ingrians to Finland, and the presentation of Finland as 
Ingrians’ true homeland. In the same 2013 interview, he stated that “the true return 
migration is the Ingrian Finnish return from Siberia to the Ingrian homeland. This is 
the true return migration”.
9 This introduces a territorial aspect to his construction of 
Ingrian  identity,  which  is  further  discussed  later  in  this  section.  Kokko  engages 
substantially with language and religion as discursive resources of Ingrian identity, 
which present aspects of commonality with Finnishness, whilst the territorial element 
stresses an element of Ingrians’ otherness from Finns of Finland.  
 
On the Finnish language, Kokko elaborates extensively in a 2008 editorial for Uutisia 
Inkeristä,  entitled  Suomen  kieli  ja  inkeriläisyys  [The  Finnish  Language  and 
                                                 
8 “Jää hyvästi, Inkerinmaa”, author’s own transcription. Original Finnish text: Kolme asiaa meitä 
yhdistää: suomen kieli, luterilaisuus ja rakkaus Inkerinmaata kohtaan.  
9 Ibid. Original Finnish text: oikea paluumuutto on inkerinsuomalaisen muutto Siperiasta koti-inkeriin. 
Tämä on se oikea paluumuutto.  
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Ingrianness]. Here, Kokko firstly states his characterisation of Ingrian identity, with 
the same discursive resources he mentioned in the 2013 interview: 
 
What factors have created the Ingrian Finnish nation? There are in my opinion three factors: 
1) the Finnish language, which distinguished them from the Russian majority, 2) Lutheranism, 
which distinguished them from other Finnish-speaking minorities in Ingria, and 3) belonging 
in  Ingria,  which  spurred  the  nation’s  rapid  development  at  the  turn  of  the  nineteenth  to 
twentieth centuries, and which determined their tragic fate in the last century.
10 
 
It should firstly be noted that Kokko describes Ingrians as a nation [kansa]. Language 
and religion as discursive resources of Ingrianness are used here to define Ingrians as 
a  nation  separate  from  Russians,  and  from  other  (presumably  Orthodox)  Finnish-
speaking  communities  in  Ingria,  although  it  is  not  readily  apparent  whom  these 
Orthodox Finnish-speaking communities in Ingria would be. He may be referring to 
Izhorians (Izhors, also periodically referred to as Ingrians or native Ingrians), Votians 
(Votes)  or  Vepsians  (Veps).  These  are  minority  groups  in  northwestern  Russia 
speaking languages closely related to Finnish, but often treated officially as distinct 
languages rather than dialects of Finnish. Vepsian was listed as a separate language to 
Finnish in the 1989 Soviet Census’ survey of mother-tongues in the USSR,
11 and Ott 
Kurs notes the brief rise of Izhorian as a standardised written language in the 1930s, 
and  the  research  conducted  by  linguists  from  Estonia  on  Votian  and  Izhorian  as 
endangered  languages  with  their  own  regional  variations  and  dialects  in  the  later 
twentieth century after Stalin’s mass repressions.
12 Particularly as Kokko’s editorial 
concerns the role of the Finnish language in defining Ingrianness and differentiating 
Ingrian Finns from other groups in the region, his broad approach to the definition of 
Finnish language, encompassing those held in other sources to be related but distinct 
Finno-Ugric languages, appears somewhat surprising. In Kokko’s discourse, Ingrian 
Finns at once appear as separate (through religion) and joined (through language) to 
other  minority  groups  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland  region,  and  this  itself  can  serve  a 
strategic goal of linking Ingrian Finns to a broader community of what he sees as 
                                                 
10 Wladimir Kokko, “Suomen kieli ja inkeriläisyys”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 2/08, 2 March 2008, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0208.html>, accessed 6 October 2014. 
Original Finnish text: Mitkä tekijät ovat luoneet inkerinsuomalaisista kansan? Niitä on minusta kolme: 
1) suomen kieli, joka erotti heidät Venäjän kansallisenemmistöstä, 2) luterilaisuus, joka erotti heidät 
Inkerinmaan muista suomenkielisista ja 3) kuuluvuus Inkeriin, joka edesauttoi kansan nopeaa kehitystä 
1800 ja 1900-lukujen vaihteessa sekä määräsi kansan traagista kohtaloa viime vuosisadalla. 
11 Ott Kurs, “Indigenous Finnic Population of NW Russia”, GeoJournal, Vol. 34, No. 4, December 
1994, p. 449.  
12 Kurs, “Ingria: The Broken Landbridge Between Finland and Russia”, pp. 108-9.   
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Finnish-speaking groups in northwestern Russia, within a broader identity based on 
the  Finnish  language  that  encompasses  several  distinct  Finnish-speaking  groups, 
including Finns of Finland, Ingrian Finns, Izhorians, Votians and others. In this sense, 
there  is  continuity  to  his  construction  of  Ingrianness  that  it  is  distinct  from 
Finnishness, though based on several points of commonality.  
 
Kokko continues in this editorial to write on the Finnish language and Ingrianness, 
and whether local dialects of standard Finnish (kirjakieli, or written language) should 
play a definitive role in defining Ingrians’ identity: 
 
Every Finn grows up knowing two languages, the “mother-tongue”  (regional  dialect)  and 
Finnish (standard Finnish). The correct answer is of course standard Finnish. It connects us – 
remember it’s after all what we speak with Ingrian Finns from other countries when we meet 
at summer festivals. The regional dialects are spoken languages, which change very quickly. 
Ingrian Finns in Sweden have mixed up all the Ingrian Finnish dialects, and from this a new 
“common dialect” has formed. Young Ingrian Finns no longer learn Ingrian dialects, and 
speak only standard Finnish.  
 
Dialect is not a national identity, but a local identity. I remember how my grandfather from 
Keltto  used  to  laugh  when  my  grandmother  from  Venjoki  used  the  “wrong  language”. 
Standard Finnish is again the bridge between us and the Finnishness of Finland, which is more 
and more significant for our small minority, in danger of losing its identity.
13 
 
Significantly, this extract specifies standard Finnish as the most important unifying 
language for Ingrianness. Ingrian dialects are not presented here as playing a defining 
role for Ingrianness, as Kokko sees them as both too local (differentiating between 
different towns or parishes) and too impermanent to shape or unify Ingrianness as an 
identity. It is also significant to note the connection Kokko sees between Finland (and 
Finns of Finland) and Ingrian Finns through common use of standard Finnish; he sees 
Finland’s Finnishness as playing an increasing role in protecting Ingrian identity. This 
is highly reminiscent of discourses from Finnish politicians in the later 1990s and 
2000s, who saw Finland as playing a protective role for Finnish-speaking minorities 
and  their  culture  in  Russia.  There  is  thus  a  degree  of  correlation  in  how  Kokko 
                                                 
13 Kokko, “Suomen kieli ja inkeriläisyys”. Original Finnish text: Joka suomalainenhan osaa kehdosta 
asti kahta kieltä – «äidinkieltä» (seudun murretta) ja «suomea» (kirjakieltä). Oikea vastaus on 
epäilemättä – suomen kirjakieli. Juuri se yhdistää, muistakaa mitä puhumme kesäjuhlissa, kun 
kokoontuvat inkerinsuomalaiset eri maista. Murre on puhutun kielen muoto, joka muuttuu hyvin 
nopeasti. Ruotsin inkerinsuomalaisilla kaikki inkerinmurteet sekaantuivat ja on syntynyt uusi 
«yhteismurre», nuorilta koulutetuilta inkerinsuomalaisilta murre on kadonnut kokonaan ja he puhuvat 
vain kirjakieltä. Murre ei ole kansallis- vaan paikallisidentiteetin merkki. Muistelen kuinka kelttolaista 
isoisääni nauratti venjokelaisen mummoni käyttämä «väärä kieli». Taas kirjakieli on silta myös 
Suomen suomalaisuuteen, jonka vaikutus meidän vähälukuiseen ja identiteettiänsä menettävään 
vähemmistöömme on kasvamassa yhä ratkaisevammaksi.   
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constructs  Ingrian  identity,  through  use  of  Finnish,  and  how  Inrgianness  it  was 
presented by Finnish politicians at this time, as separate but related to Finland, with 
the Finnish government in position to provide some support for the survival of the 
Finnish language in this region. There appears a degree of consensus that the Finnish 
language  connects  Finland  and  Ingrians,  but  stops  short  of  Ingrian  inclusion  in 
Finland’s national community. However, there is no mention in this editorial of how 
this  connection  could  be  limited  by  the  limited  Finnish  language  skills  of  many 
Ingrians,  which  was  a  key  narrative  in  the  “connected  but  separate”  argument 
amongst Finnish politicians in the late 1990s and 2000s.
14    
 
Kokko did, however, write on the decline of Finnish language skills amongst Ingrians, 
in other editorials, for instance in a 2006 piece entitled Inkeriläisyys ja kieliongelma 
[Ingrianness  and  the  Language  Problem].  Here,  he  writes  that  “[i]n  the  current 
situation, whilst in Russia, Estonia and Sweden Ingrian Finns make up only a small 
minority, the Finnish language is forgotten. There's no doubt that this also shows a 
partial loss of identity”.
15 The need for an external force to guarantee the survival of 
the Finnish language amongst Ingrians, and thus Ingrian identity, is here underlined. 
This role need not, and indeed to Kokko’s mind should not, be undertaken through 
providing a return migration program. When, for instance, Finnish Centre party MP 
Hannu Kemppainen questioned the Ingrian Finnish Right to Return policy in 1996, he 
portrayed the migration of Ingrians to Finland as a loss of Ingrian culture, even an 
“ethnic cleansing” of Ingrian culture from northwestern Russia.
16 His construction of 
Ingrians is, like Kokko’s, as a distinct community for whom Finland still holds some 
responsibility as a larger, closely related group. This responsibility is predicated on 
notions  of  connections  like  the  Finnish  language,  and  Kokko’s  use  of  Finnish 
language as a discursive resource to construct Ingriannness is here reminiscent of this 
element of Finnish politicians’ language.   
 
                                                 
14 See for example Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”, KVN 
43/1998.  
15 Wladimir Kokko, “Inkeriläisyys ja kieliongelma”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 8/06, 1 September 2006, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0806.html>, accessed 20 October 2014. 
Original Finnish text: Nykytilanteessa, kun Venäjällä, Virossa ja Ruotsissa inkerinsuomalaiset 
muodostavat vain vähälukuisen vähemmistön, suomen kielen unohtuminen siellä epäilemättä osoittaa 
myös entisen identiteetin osittaista menettämistä. 
16 Kemppainen, “Inkeriläisten elinolosuhteiden parantamisesta lähialueyhteistyön avulla”, KK 
666/1996, p. 1.   
  226 
In  2010,  Kokko  authored  an  editorial  in  Uutisia  Inkeristä  entitled 
“Inkerinsuomalaisten  tragedia”  [The  Tragedy  of  the  Ingrian  Finns],  in  which  he 
likens the twentieth century history of the Ingrians to a Shakespearean tragedy.
17 In 
particular,  he  links  Ingrian  history  to  Hamlet, with  the  theme  of  a  breakdown  of 
relations between generations, and asks “can there be anything more terrible than 
when  children  and  parents  don’t  understand  each  other,  the  work  of  the  older 
generations being lost rather than carried on by the next generation, so people won’t 
learn  anything  of  their  history?”
18 The  transmission  of  Ingrian  history  and  culture 
from generation to generation he now sees as being hindered by two factors – the loss 
of Finnish language capacities during the Stalinist period, and the migration of Ingrian 
Finns to Finland.
19 On the effects of Stalinist repression, he writes: 
 
During the Stalin period, the persecuted Ingrian Finns were afraid to speak Finnish to their 
children, tell them the stories of their families, and even changed their last names so their 
children wouldn’t grow up as Finnish. The connection with the past was so broken, that many 
born in Ingria lacked language skills, and even didn’t feel themselves Finnish.
20  
 
The decline of the Finnish language amongst Ingrians after Stalin, to the point where 
Ingrians would be considered as a largely Russian-speaking community by Finnish 
parliamentarians,  is  here  presented  as  a  decline  of  Ingrianness.  The  reference  to 
“connection with the past” denotes an evidently primordialist construction of identity, 
with language here serving as a hereditary indicator of identity. Loss of language 
skills compromises the identity’s further generational survival. Interestingly, however, 
Kokko also connects the loss of Ingrian identity in this editorial with the Right to 
Return migration of Ingrians to Finland. Writing on young Ingrians now living in 
Finland and attending Finnish schools, Kokko states: 
 
Those in the Finnish comprehensive schools grow up undoubtedly to become real Finns of 
Finland, for whom the concept of Ingria is quite unknown and who speak something else than 
their Russian-speaking parents. At some point, these children start to become alienated from 
                                                 
17 Wladimir Kokko, “Inkerinsuomalaisten tragedia”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 11/10, 2 December 2010, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset1110.html>, accessed 10 October 2014.  
18 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Voiko olla jotakin kauheampaa, kun lapset ja vanhemmat eivät ymmärrä 
toisiansa, kun vanhemman sukupolven luoma tuhoutuu eikä siirry tulevalle sukupolvelle, kun kansa ei 
opi mitään omasta historiastaan? 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Stalinin aikoina vainotut inkerinsuomalaiset pelkäsivät puhua suomea 
lapsilleen, eivät kertoneet heille perheensä tarinoita, jopa muuttivat sukunimet, jotteivat lapsista 
kasvaisi suomalaisia. Aikojen yhteys näin katkesi, ilmestyi paljon kielitaidottomia inkeriläissyntyisiä, 
jotka eivät tunne itsensä suomalaisiksi.  
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their  strange  faija  (father)  and  mutsi  (mother)  who  don’t  even  know  what  do  do  with 
themselves in contemporary Finnish society.
21  
 
As previously, the primordialist role language takes in creating Ingrian identity is 
underscored  here  as  an  element  of  identity  passed  down  by  family  through  the 
generations, with particular use in this excerpt of the colloquial words for father and 
mother associated more with the Helsinki-orientated stadin slangi [city slang]. The 
effect is to portray young Ingrian Finns as aspiring to the urban culture of Southern 
Finland, foreign to their parents and to Ingrian Finns in Ingria, and thus an example 
of, in one sense, language as a dividing feature between Finns of Finland and Ingrian 
Finns. Again, Kokko differentiates between Ingrianness and Finnishness, recalling 
similar  arguments  made  by  Finnish  politicians  in  the  later  period  of  the  Right  to 
Return law, and links the loss of the Finnish language under Stalin with the Right to 
Return migration, in a similar vein to Kemppainen’s discussion of a new “ethnic 
cleansing” of Ingria and loss of Ingrian culture in the 1990s and 2000s.  
 
Yet, Kokko’s own admission that some descendants of Ingrians today are primarily 
Russian-speakers  raises  a  question  for  his  own  construction  of  Ingrianness  as 
predicated on the Finnish language. Some Finnish politicians and authorities initially 
held similarly primordialist views of the Finnish language and its role in identity for 
Finnishness as an innate aspect of identity transmitted through the bloodline. The 
initial integration programs for Ingrian returnees supposed Ingrians would take less 
time  than  other  migrants  to  learn  Finnish.
22 However,  this  line  of  argument  was 
abandoned by the 2000s, and indeed the reforms of 2002-2003 specifically addressed 
concerns on the limits to Finnish language capabilities amongst Ingrian returnees.
23 
Thus, while there are significant points of commonality in how the Finnish language 
was used to define Finnishness for Finnish politicians, and how it has been used by 
Kokko to define Ingrianness, Kokko continues with a primordialist construction of the 
Finnish language’s role in identity beyond its briefer use in Finland. Kokko does not 
                                                 
21 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Suomalaista peruskoulua käyneestä kasvaa epäilemättä oikea 
suomensuomalainen, jolle Inkeri-käsite oi aivan tuntematon ja joka puhuu täysin toista, kuin hänen 
venäjänkieliset vanhempansa, kieltä. Jossakin vaiheessa nämä lapset alkavat vieraantua niistä 
oudoista faijasta ja mutsista, jotka eivät edes osaa käytäytyä oiken nyky-Suomen yhteiskunnassa.  
22 See for example Kanerva, “Vastaus”, KK 340/1991, pp. 2-3, and the discussion on language 
provisions for Ingrian return migrants and the reduction in waiting times for citizenship from 5 to 2 
years.  
23 Suomen Eduskunta, “Laki ulkomaalaislain muuttamisesta”, 13 March 2003.  
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take into account the effects of the modern use of Russian amongst Ingrians in his 
construction of identity, beyond stating that some he describes as Ingrian are Russian-
speakers,  as  part  of  his  Ingrian  “tragedy”.  Kokko  therefore  merges  the  Finnish 
language with ancestry in his construction of Ingrianness, rather than taking a more 
functional approach to Finnish language as a unifying identity marker of Ingrianness. 
Whereas ancestral or generational links became less significant in Finnish politicians’ 
discussions of identity as discourse was increasingly used to exclude Ingrians from 
Finnishness, for Kokko at least, ancestry retained significance in defining Ingrianness. 
However,  there  is  a  key  difference  in  how  ancestry  is  strategically  employed  by 
Kokko and by Finnish parliamentarians. In Finland, it was initially to link Ingrians to 
Finland  and  Finnishness,  drawing  on  their  seventeenth  century  migration  from 
Finland and thus, the ancestral links they draw back (across 400 years) to Finns of 
Swedish-Finland. To Kokko, ancestry is strategically employed to draw contemporary 
Russian-speakers  back  to  their  Finnish-speaking  ancestors  in  Ingria,  going  back  a 
much shorter period. In effect, parliamentarians and Kokko were discussing ancestry 
in very different ways.  
 
Kokko followed his 2008 editorial in Uutisia Inkeristä on the Finnish language with 
one  on  the  role  Lutheranism  has  played  in  shaping  Ingrian  identity,  entitled 
Luterilaisuus ja inkeriläisyys [Lutheranism and Ingrianness]. This editorial begins by 
referencing  Lutheranism  as  a  historic  link  between  Ingrians  and  the  seventeenth 
century  Swedish  kingdom,  in  a  similar  vein  to  Mauno  Koivisto’s  statement  on 
Lutheranism as a legacy of the Swedish period in his April 1990 interview. Kokko 
writes: 
 
The current geographical concept of Ingria was formed during the Swedish reign, when the 
Kingdom’s borders were drawn from the Treaty of Stolbova, and the parishes on the southern 
isthmus  [between  the  Gulf  of  Finland  and  Lake  Lagoda]  were  attached  to  form  a  new 
province. Orthodox populations fled the Swedish forces, and Lutherans from Finland moved 
in. From the offspring of these Lutheran immigrants later came the Ingrian Finns. Thus, the 
birth  of  our  nation  and  the  emergence  of  Protestant  Christianity  from  Martin  Luther  are 
intrinsically related to each other.
24  
                                                 
24 Wladimir Kokko, “Luterilaisuus ja inkeriläisyys”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 3/08, 1 April 2008, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0308.html>, accessed 11 October 2014.  
Original Finnish text: Nykyinen maantieteellinen käsite Inkeristä on muodostunut Ruotsin vallan 
aikana, kun vedettiin Stolbovan rauhan mukainen valtakunnan raja ja eteläkannaksella olleet pitäjät 
liitettiin uuteen maakuntaan. Ruotsin valtaa paeten maasta muutti pois paljon ortodokseja ja tänne 
muutti Suomesta luterilaisia. Tänne muuttaneiden luterilaisten jälkeläisistä myöhemmin ovat tulleetkin  
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These  historical  links  between  Ingrians  and  the  Swedish  kingdom  through 
Lutheranism  appear  to  follow  similar  primordialist  ideas  of  identity  as  Kokko’s 
discussion  of  the  Finnish  language  and  identity.  Lutheranism  is  also  portrayed  as 
transmitted through descent from the early Lutheran settlers of Ingria to contemporary 
Ingrian Finns, and is thus also an intrinsic and immutable element of Ingrianness. This 
is particularly underscored by the presentation of Lutheranism as the “birth moment” 
for  Ingrianness  –  the  idea  that  Ingrianness  could  not  exist  without  the  rise  of 
Lutheranism.  
 
Kokko has presented the re-founding of the Lutheran Church of Ingria and restoration 
of ruined Lutheran religious buildings like the Kupanitsa temple in 1991 (see figure 
17) as a re-birth of Ingrianness in Ingria, stating in a 1999 address at the University of 
Gothenburg in Sweden that “[t]he renewed activity of the churches was a visible sign 
of  the  will  of  Ingrian  Finns  to  survive”.
25 This  departs  somewhat  from  the  very 
limited  use  of  Lutheranism  as  a  discursive  resource  of  Finnishness  by  Finnish 
politicians in their discussion on Ingrians, which was effectively limited to Koivisto’s 
April  1990  interview.  Lutheranism  was  a  very  marginal  discursive  resource  of 
identity  in  that  discussion,  used  strategically  by  Koivisto  to  include  Ingrians  in 
Finnishness, but never really engaged with by other Finnish politicians and not used 
to exclude Ingrians from Finnishness at the end of the Right to Return policy, as the 
Finnish language was. I argued in chapter five of this thesis that this may be partly a 
response of a decline in some of the Finnish Lutheran Church’s social and political 
influence in Finland in the 2000s. Arguments for the significance of Lutheranism as a 
core element of identity for Ingrians from Ingrian sources like Kokko and Uutisia 
Inkeristä therefore do not correlate extensively with Finnish politicians’ concurrent 
discussions of identity and Ingrians at this time. Lutheranism appears a significant 
discursive  resource  for  Kokko  to  define  the  parameters  of  Ingrianness,  and  not 
necessarily to directly connect Ingrians to Finnishness.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
inkerinsuomalaiset. Näin ollen kansamme syntyminen ja Martti Lutherin puhdistama kristinusko 
liittyvät katkaisemattomasti toisiinsa. 
25 Wladimir Kokko, Ingrian Finns and the Quirks of Soviet and Post-Soviet Nationality Policy, 
Gothenburg: Findk-ugriska seminariets rapportserie, 1999, p. 19.   
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Figure 17 
The restored Lutheran Kupanitsa temple in Gubanitsy, Leningrad Oblast, Russia, showing the date of restoration 
(1991) below the central belltower.   
Photo by XS_XXXL, 5 January 2009.  
Available online at URL: <https://ssl.panoramio.com/photo/30932688>, accessed 11 October 2014.  
 
It is also significant to note that, compared to his construction of the role the Finnish 
language plays in Ingrianness, Kokko appears more willing to engage with arguments 
that  Lutheranism’s  significance  for  identity  amongst  contemporary  Ingrians  has 
declined. In the 2008 editorial, he also writes: 
 
Personally, I know dozens of Ingrian Finns, who have been influenced by the [Orthodox] 
majority in recent years to choose the Orthodox faith. Others have tried their luck with new 
exotic religions. Thousands have stayed outside the church…Lutheranism is still the most 
common  religious  denomination  for  Ingrian  Finns,  and  it  is  decisively  influential  for  the 
formation  of  Ingrian  identity,  but  now  you  cannot  say  that  Ingrian  Finnish  automatically 
means Lutheran…And you can no longer say that membership of the Lutheran Church of 
Ingria  automatically  means  Finnish,  as  our  church  has  declared  itself  multicultural  and 
multilingual.
26  
 
                                                 
26 Kokko, “Luterilaisuus ja inkeriläisyys”, original Finnish text: Henkilökohtaisesti tunnen kymmeniä 
inkerinsuomalaisia, jotka enemmistön vaikutuksessa ovat valinneet viime vuosina ortodoksisen 
uskonnon. Toiset lähtivät onkimaan onnea uusiin eksoottisimpiin uskontokuntiin. Tuhansia on jäänyt 
kirkon ulkopuolelle…Kyllä luterilaisuus on edelleen yleisin uskontokunta inkerinsuomalaisten 
keskuudessa, se on melko ratkaisevasti vaikuttanut inkerinsuomalasten identiteetin muodostumiseen, 
mutta nykyään ei voi sanoa, että inkerinsuomalainen automaattisesti tarkoittaa luterilaista…Eikä voi 
sanoa enää, että Inkerin kirkon jäsen automaattisesti tarkoittaa suomalaista, kirkkomme on julistanut 
itsensä monikulttuuriseksi ja monikieliseksi. 
Copywrited image removed from electronic version of thesis  
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This discussion of Lutheranism appears to some extent to correlate with the waning 
influence of the Church in the discussion of Finnishness amongst Finnish politicians 
discussing Ingrians in the 1990s and 2000s. Of course, modern St Petersburg and 
Leningrad Oblast are different environments to Finland, where the Finnish Lutheran 
Church still predominates amongst the general population. Lutheran Ingrians live in a 
largely Russian Orthodox environment, and indeed this relates to Kokko’s perception 
of Ingrianness as vulnerable to being lost amongst the Russian majority,
27 which here 
translates to Ingrians joining the Orthodox faith, along with those who have remained 
non-confessional  or  affiliated  to  “exotic”  non-traditional  religions  in  the  region. 
Referring to followers of non-traditional religions in Ingria as “trying their luck” also 
lends an air of insincerity in their religious conviction, suggesting they are less serious 
and their faith should be taken less seriously than Lutheranism. Lutheranism thus does 
have a significant strategic function here to differentiate Ingrians from the Russian 
majority, rather than link Ingrians with the Lutheran majority in Finland.  
 
Despite  this  acknowledgement  of  the  waning  influence  of  Lutheranism  in  Ingria, 
Kokko  appears  to  see  a  kind  of  secular  role  for  the  Lutheran  Church  as  a  “folk 
church” in the construction of Ingrian identity, which he expresses in other editorials 
for Uutisia Inkeristä. He writes in a Christmas-themed editorial from 2008 that “I 
have gotten to understand how much of an impact Christianity has had on European 
culture  in  general,  and  how  those  of  us  outside  the  church  can  not  live  without 
Christian values”.
28 In this editorial, he likens the celebration of Christian holidays 
like  Christmas  to  a  transmission  of  Ingrian  (Lutheran)  culture  from  generation  to 
generation, through a personal narrative of himself, as a self-identified secular person, 
continuing the religious Christmas customs of his grandfather.
29 Kokko also makes a 
similar argument in a 2009 editorial on Ingrian traditions: 
 
Many Ingrian Finnish folklore traditions have developed over the centuries from Christian 
customs. Christmas in Ingria a hundred years ago was celebrated in almost the same way as 
                                                 
27 See for example the description of Ingrians as a small community whose survival is in danger in 
Kokko, “Suomen kieli ja inkeriläisyys”. 
28 Wladimir Kokko, “Joulukuva elämässäni”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 12/08, 28 December 2008, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset1208.html>, accessed 11 October 2014. 
Original Finnish text: Sain ymmärtää kuinka paljon vaikutusta kiristinuskonto on tehnyt 
eurooppalaiseen kulttuuriin ylipäätänsä, emmekä maalliset kirkon ulkopuolella olevat pysty elämään 
ilman kristittyjen arvoja. 
29 Ibid.   
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other Christians in Central and Northern Europe. Ingrian Finnish folk songs in their multitude 
and their folk lyrics in large part are purely spiritual works. Thus, the Lutheran way of life and 
philosophy are a substantial part of Ingrian Finnish culture and belongs to their traditions.
30  
 
Lutheranism is thus explicitly linked to Ingrian folklore and folk culture, which serves 
as a discursive link to Central and Northern Europe, and thus a distinguishing feature 
from the surrounding Orthodox majority. In some sense, there is thus here an appeal 
to the notion of a cultural separation between Lutheranism and Orthodoxy, echoing 
Samuel Huntington’s thesis nearly two decades earlier. However, Kokko’s argument 
for  Lutheranism  as  an  element  of  Ingrian  Finnish  folk  culture  also  echoes  the 
development of the Lutheran Church in Finland as a “folk church” in the 1990s and 
2000s,  though  more  as  a  social  and  moral  advocate  for  “Finnish  values”  than  a 
safeguard  of  cultural  traditions  and  celebrations  like  Christmas.
31 This  line  of 
argument  was  not  substantially  engaged  with  by  Finnish  politicians  discussing 
Ingrians. There were no statements of the need to protect Ingrian Finns’ Lutheran-
informed cultural values and traditions from the Orthodox majority. Kokko’s own 
argument appears to suggest Ingrians themselves are responsible for maintaining their 
culture and traditions in Ingria, as there is no suggestion that these traditions could be 
better maintained amongst a Lutheran majority in Finland. Thus, Kokko appears to 
afford  a  larger  and  more  defined  role  for  Lutheranism  in  the  construction  of 
Ingrianness than Finnish politicians appeared to for Finnishness in their discussions 
on the Right to Return, but this does not necessarily translated to a sense of threat to 
Ingrianness as a minority identity in Ingria, nor advocacy for Ingrian emigration to 
Finland.  
 
Effectively, Kokko’s discussion of the role language and religion play in defining 
Ingrianness correlate in part with the way these discursive resources were used to 
define  an  inclusive  relationship  between  Ingrians  and  Finnishness  by  Finnish 
politicians at the start of the Right to Return policy. Both Finnish politicians at that 
                                                 
30 Wladimir Kokko, “Inkeriläisperinne: mikä se on?”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 2/09, 2 March 2009, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0209.html>, accessed 28 October 2014. 
Original Finnish text: Monet ikivanhat folkloriperinteet ovat vuosisatojen kuluessa kehittyneet 
inkerinsuomalaisilla kristillisiksi tavoiksi. Joulua Inkerissä sata vuotta sitten vietettiin melkein samalla 
tavalla kuin muilla kristityillä Keski- ja Pohjois-Euroopassa. Inkerinsuomalaisten kansanlaulujen 
paljoudessa ja heidän kansanrunoudessaan on runsaasti puhtaasti hengellisiä teoksia. Siis luterilaiset 
elämäntavat ja elämänkatsomus ovat olennaisia osuuksia inkerinsuomalaisten kulttuuria ja kuuluvat 
heidän perinteisiin. 
31 Kääriäinen, Niemelä and Ketola, Religion in Finland, pp. 60-1.  
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time and Kokko hold that Ingrians are Finnish-speakers and Lutherans, and that these 
are significant markers of their identity. Critically, however, Finnish politicians in 
favour of the Right to Return policy in the early 1990s saw these markers of identity 
as tying Ingrians to Finland, whereas Kokko sees a spatial element to Ingrian identity 
that specifically links them to the old territory of Ingria. Indeed, Kokko devotes an 
entire editorial in 2007 to the changing historical borders of Ingria, and notes the 
challenges for Inkerin-Liitto in the present day to continue to promote the unity of 
Ingrian peoples and the Ingrian homeland now split between two federal districts of 
Russia    –  Leningrad  Oblast  and  the  Federal  City  of  St  Petersburg.
32 Kokko  thus 
endorses a territorial element to Ingrianness, and links Ingrian belongingness to Ingria 
rather than to Finland. He appears to reject perceptions of the Finno-Russian border as 
a clear dividing line between Finns and Russians as distinct or opposing civilizations, 
identities or communities, being instead rather inline with the 1990s/2000s view of 
this frontier as a more porous, “soft” border than it had been as part of the Iron 
Curtain.  
 
However, several of Kokko’s editorials in Uutisia Inkeristä do make key distinctions 
between Russians on one side, and Ingrians and Finns on the other, employing some 
of the same discursive uses of history (particularly Second World War history) as 
Finnish politicians. He mentions his own family history during the Second World War 
in the 2007 editorial Inkerinsuomalaisena Venajällä [As an Ingrian Finn in Russia], in 
which he writes “People were expelled [from Ingria] for one reason only: because 
they were Finnish. A Finnish origin was enough to be a criminal offence; it was in 
fact  a  crime.  Finnishness  was  a  curse  in  the  USSR  of  the  1940s”.
33 He  makes 
particular use of history in a 2009 editorial commemorating the 200-year anniversary 
of the Finnish War of 1809, Mitä oikein tapahtui 200 vuotta sitten? [What Really 
Happened 200 Years Ago?], in which he gives a historical narrative of Finland’s 
transition from Swedish territory, with a particularly fluid eastern frontier, to a Grand 
Duchy  under  the  Russian  Tsar,  to  then  the  growth  of  nationalism  and  the 
                                                 
32 Wladimir Kokko, “Historiallisista rajoista”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 8/07, 5 September 2007, available 
online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0807.html>, accessed 28 October 2014.  
33 Wladimir Kokko, “Inkerinsuomalaisena Venäjällä”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 3/07, 3 April 2007, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0307.html>,  accessed 28 October 2014. 
Original Finnish text: Ihmiset karkotettiin vain yhdestä syystä, koska he olivat suomalaisia. 
Suomalainen syntyperä oli riittävä syy rangaistavaksi, se oli rikos siinänsä. Suomalaisuus oli 
kirouksena 40-luvun Neuvostoliitossa.  
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independence movement at the turn of the 1900s.
34 He also recalls the Fennoman 
motto that “[Finland] was no longer Swedish and it would never be Russia”.
35 The 
effect of this language here is that Finland’s historical narrative shows the identity 
divide between Finns and Russians. Finns were once part of Sweden, but will never 
be Russians: the separation between Russians and Finns is definitive, while the links 
to Sweden are more changed by history but far less impossible.  
 
In  a  2010  editorial  commemorating  the  90
th  anniversary  of  the  Dorpat  Peace 
Agreement, Kokko recalls the guarantees made by the Bolshevik government in the 
USSR for national minority groups like the Ingrian Finns.
36 He then moves to the 
betrayal of this agreement after 1937-1938 and the start of Stalinist oppression: 
 
Again,  on  the  language  and  culture  side  in  the  Ingria  of  1920-1936  a  lot  was  done,  and 
Finnish–language education had been developed better than ever. The supportive minority 
nationality policy, however, came to a bloody halt in 1937-1938, when education in Russian 
became mandatory all over Ingria and the remaining Lutheran churches were closed.
37  
 
The  final  sentence  of  this  editorial  describes  the  start  of  the  Winter  War  on  30 
November 1939, when “the Soviet Union attacked Finland”, as the final end of the 
Dorpat Peace Agreement.
38 This construction of inter-war history has the significant 
discursive function of portraying Stalin’s USSR as the enemy to Ingrianness, with 
particular focus on the Finnish language and Lutheran churches as Kokko’s oft-cited 
core elements of Ingrian identity. This recalls many of the arguments made by Finnish 
politicians in the early years of the Ingrian Finnish Return policy, when negative 
discursive representations of the USSR in Second World War history were discussed 
with particular reference to the fate of Ingrian Finns.  Key examples are the 1990 calls 
from Tina Mäkelä and a contingent of SMP, National Coalition and Swedish People’s 
Party MPs for frontline veterans’ benefits for Ingrian volunteers in the Second World 
                                                 
34 Wladimir Kokko, ‘Mitä oikein tapahtui 200 vuotta sitten?”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 10/09, 1 
November 2009, available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset1009.html>, accessed 2 
November 2014.  
35 Ibid. Original Finnish next: [Suomi] ettei se ollut enää ruotsalainen eikä siitä tullutkaan koskaan 
venäläinen.  
36 Wladimir Kokko, “Tarton rauha: 90 vuotta”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 9/10, 1 October 2010, available 
online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0910.html>, accessed 3 November 2014.  
37 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Taas kieli- ja kulttuuripuolella Inkerissä vuosina 1920-36 tehtiin todella 
paljon, suomenkielisten oppilaitoisten verkosto oli kehittynyt paremmin kuin koskaan. 
Vähemmistökansallisuuksia tukeva politiikka kuitenkin lopetettiin verisinä 1937-38, kun opiskelu 
kaikkialla Inkerissä muuttui venäjänkieliseksi ja loput luterilaiset kirkot pantiin kiinni. 
38 Ibid.   
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War,
39 discussed in chapter four. However, the detail here is that Ingrians suffered in 
the USSR because of their connection to Finland, for they had defended Finland from 
Soviet attack, as Mäkelä puts it, with “Finnish gun in hand”.
40 By contrast, Kokko’s 
discourse focuses on oppression of Ingrian identity as an internal other in the USSR, 
without  particular  reference  to  Ingrians’  connections  to  Finland  as  a  kin-state 
relationship.  This  demonstrates  the  crucial  difference  in  the  approach  Finnish 
politicians and Kokko take to constructing Ingrianness: although they involve many 
of  the  same  discursive  resources  of  identity,  for  Finnish  politicians  it  is  seen  in 
relation  to  Finnishness,  whereas  for  Kokko,  Ingrianness  is  seen  in  relation  to  the 
dominant Russian majority.  
 
 
Figure 18 
The Ingrian flag 
Created by Tsujigiri, 29 December 2004. Released 
to the public domain. 
Available online at URL: 
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ingria_fla
g_large.png>, accessed 2 November 2014.  
 
 
Kokko’s constructions of the USSR/Russia are not limited to historical examples. 
Kokko  explores  similar  constructions  of  contemporary  Russia  in  relation  to 
Ingrianness  in  an  editorial  on  the  Ingrian  flag  (see  figure  18).  He  notes  the 
significance of the flag in key moments for Ingrian history, including when it flew on 
8 September 1919 in Kirjasalo and again for the first time on Laskiainen, the Finnish 
Shrove Tuesday celebration, in the early Spring of 1989.
41  In the wake of a Russian 
government  crackdown  on  extremist  symbols  following  the  11  September  2001 
attacks in the USA, the Russian State Duma proposed banning all flags with crosses, 
including  the  Ingrian  flag.
42 Kokko  ridicules  this  proposal,  noting  the  problems  it 
                                                 
39 Ala-Harja et al., “Veteraanitunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, p. 1, and 
Mäkelä, “Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, p. 1. 
40 Mäkelä  “Rintamapalvelustunnuksen myöntämisestä sotiin osallistuneille inkeriläisille”, p. 1. 
41 Wladimir Kokko, “Inkerinsuomalaisten lippu kieltoon Venäjällä?”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 8/09, 1 
September 2009, available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0809.html>, accessed 2 
November 2014.  
42 Ibid.   
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might cause when a Nordic head of state visits Russia.
43 He also likens it to other 
Russian crackdowns on national minorities’ culture: 
 
In all its wisdom, the State Duma knows how to make the most astonishing decisions. Do you 
remember the law that forced Russian indigenous people to write their own languages in the 
Cyrillic alphabet? This law is in effect, but has not influenced in any way what appears in the 
Petrozavodsk Karelian, Finnish and Vepsian language newspapers.
44       
 
The Russian State Duma comes across as a somewhat ineffectual enemy to Ingrians 
as a minority group in Russia. They have unsuccessfully attempted to subdue a core 
aspect of Ingrian identity (the Finnish language), and thus echo, though in a less 
immediately destructive way, the Stalinist-era Russification policies of the USSR. 
However, the potential banning of the Ingrian flag adds an interesting element. Social 
psychologists Julia C. Baker et al. note that flags serve as an important symbol in 
social  identity  theory,  serving  to  identify  in-group  belonging  and  positively 
differentiate  the  group  from  out-groups.
45 Baker  et al. argue  that  in  certain  social 
contexts and circumstances, flags threaten intergroup relations, particularly if they are 
linked  to  concepts  of  nationalism  and  national  supremacy.
46 Banning  national 
minority groups’ flags follows from this, creating a hostile image of the dominant 
national  group.  Linking  the  Ingrian  flags’  potential  banning  to  other  attempts  to 
subdue  Ingrian  identity  in  Russia  serves  to  underscore  this  interpretation  of 
contemporary  Russia  as  an  enemy  to  Ingrianness.  This  follows  on  from  similar 
discourses from Finnish politicians in the 2000s that have portrayed Russia in this 
way,  linking  contemporary  Russia  to  historical  narratives  of  an  enemy  image, 
particularly  involving  the  Second  World  War  period.  The  discursive  resource  of 
negative portrayals of contemporary Russia is thus also employed amongst the Ingrian 
community, exemplified by Kokko, to discursively construct identity. To this end, it 
is  significant  to  note  that  Kokko  maintains  a  construction  of  separation  between 
Ingrians  and  Russians  in  Ingria  at  a  time  when  Finnish  politicians  like  Sulo 
Aittoniemi were increasingly attributing negative Finnish perceptions of Russians to 
                                                 
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Kaikessa viisaudessaan duuma osaa tehdä mitä ihmeellisimpiä päätöksiä. 
Muistatteko lain, joka pakotti Venäjän kantakansoja käyttämään kyriliikkaa omissa kielissään. Tämä 
laki on voimassa muttei vaikuttanut millään tavalla Petroskoissa ilmestyvään karjalais-, suomalais– ja 
vepsäläislehdistöön. 
45 Julia C. Becker, Anne Anders-Comberg, Ulrich Wagner, Oliver Christ and David A. Butz, “Beware 
of National Symbols: How Flags Can threaten Intergroup Relations”, Social Psychology, Vo. 43, No. 1, 
2012, p. 3.  
46 Ibid. pp. 3-6.   
  237 
Ingrians.
47 Ingrians were also being discussed in Finland as a Russian-orientated and 
Russian-speaking minority group,
48 as discussed in chapter five. This shows a critical 
difference in discursive representations of Ingrianness between Finnish politicians and 
Kokko. Although the Finnish language, Lutheranism and perceptions of Russia are 
discursively employed to define both Finnishness and Ingrianness by both, Kokko 
maintains  a  separation  between  Ingrianness  and  Finnishness  without  linking 
Ingrianness to a Russian-orientated identity, as seen in Finnish politicians language. 
Kokko’s arguments correlate more with arguments in the Finnish political discussion 
that Ingrians are not displaced Finns, but a minority in Russia with certain points of 
commonality and connection to Finland.  
 
Given these differences in identity construction, and given Kokko’s own questioning 
of the 1990s-2000s Ingrian migration to Finland as a “return”, his reaction to the end 
of the Ingrian Finnish Return law in 2010 is surprising. In early 2010, he describes the 
Finnish Ministry of the Interior’s statement of intention to end the law as a reaction to 
problems with the waiting queue system, overburdened with 5,000-6,000 applicants, 
and argues the decision as a “punishment of the innocent”.
49 He rejects the distance 
this decision places between Ingrians and Finland, and specifically argues that Ingrian 
return migrants have a unique benefit to the Finnish state: 
 
But who will serve the Finnish labour market better than Ingrian Finns? They are orientated to 
Finland, they have some of the cultural and linguistic capacity to live in Finnish society, they 
have a good educational background, and they agree to work in areas for which Finns can no 
longer be found. I am quite sure that the nurses from the Philippines and farm workers to the 
EU from Bulgaria are worse options for the Finnish labour market.
50  
 
Here, Kokko engages is many of the same strategic uses of essentialising discourse as 
Finnish  politicians  early  in  the  1990s.  He  links  Ingrians  to  Finnishness  through 
common cultural, linguistic and cultural orientation discursive resources. Although 
much of Kokko’s previous discussions present some degree of separation between 
                                                 
47 Aittoniemi, “Inkerinsuomalaisten maahanmuutosta”, p. 1. 
48 Sasi, Kanerva, Zyskowicz and Lindén, “Inkeriläisten maahanmuuttoedelly”.  
49 Wladimir Kokko, “Suomen hallitus suunnittelee inkeriläispaluumuuton lopettamista. Kannanotto 1. 
MIKSI?”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 1/10, 31 January 2010, available online at URL: 
<http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0110.html>, accessed 6 November 2014.  
50 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Mutta ketkä kelpaavat Suomen työmarkkinoille paremmin kuin inkerin-
suomalaiset? He ovat Suomeen orientoituja, heillä on joitakin kulttuuri– ja kielitaitovalmiuksia asua 
suomalaisessa yhteiskunnassa, heillä on hyvä taustakoulutus ja he suostuvat aloille, joille suomalaisia 
halukkaita ei enää löydy. Olen ihan varma, että lähihoitajat Filippineiltä ja maatalouslomittajat EU:n 
Bulgariasta ovat huonompia vaihtoehtoja Suomen työmarkkinoille.  
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Ingrianness and Finnishness, particularly though discussion of a spatial element to 
Ingrianness linked to the Ingrian territory rather than Finland, here Kokko draws on 
an argument of inclusion in Finland, at a time when the political discussion in Finland 
had  moved  to  Ingrian  exclusion.  The  Finnish  discussion  on  Ingrian  exclusion  in 
Finland  thus  appears  to  have  the  effect  of  re-enforcing  Kokko’s  construction  of 
Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness, using essentialising discourse. Kokko’s mention 
of Filipino and Bulgarian immigrants as incongruous with Finnishness in particular 
underscores  his  essentialising  discursive  construction  of  Finnish  identity  here. 
Kokko’s language also presents elements of a hierarchical view of immigration to 
Finland, where Ingrians should be afforded a privileged position in Finnish policy 
because of common elements of identity.  
 
In  his  second  editorial  on  the  end  of  the  Ingrian  Return  law  in  2010,  Kokko 
particularly explores historical atonement arguments for the Return law. He writes: 
 
One would just have to decide that those who were in Finland during 1943-1944, and who were 
persecuted in the Soviet Union for being Finnish between 1930-1953, who wish to return to 
Finland, would be accepted as "returning migrants" without delay. The evacuation to Finland 
was accurately archived, and those persecution on political grounds in the ex-Soviet Union have 
a “rehabilitation certificate” in hand. I understand that Finland does not bear responsibility for 
Stalin’s persecutions, but this is the only example in history of people who were persecuted for 
their  Finnishness.  Maybe  Finland  could  show  mercy  to  the  survivors  of  the  “Finnish 
Holocaust”.
51  
 
The discussion on historical atonement, as I argue in chapters four and five, was 
amongst  the  most  significant  themes  in  Finnish  political  discourse  on  Ingrians. 
Ingrian veterans were the only group who continued to apply for residence permits 
once the Right to Return queue was closed. Kokko does mention or appear aware of 
this in this editorial. However, the Finnish government’s perceieved rejection of the 
connection between Ingrians and Finland prompts Kokko here to engage with this 
theme, in which he makes particular use of narratives of Second World War history to 
                                                 
51 Wladimir Kokko, “Suomen hallitus suunnittelee inkeriläispaluumuuton lopettamista. Kannanotto 2. 
MITÄ PITÄISI TEHDÄ”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 2/2010, 1 March 2010, available online at URL: 
<http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0210.html>, accessed 6 November 2010. Original Finnish text: Pitäisi 
vain päättää, että ilman mitään jonoa paluumuuttajiksi pääsevät sinne aikovat vuosina 1943-44 
Suomessa olleet ja suomalaisuutensa takia Neuvostoliittossa 1930-1953 vainotut. Suomessa 
evakkoväestä on tarkat arkistot, poliittisista syistä vainotuilla ex-Neuvostoliiton alueelta on 
”rehabilitoilitointitodistus” käsissä. Ymmärrän, että Suomella ei ole vastuuta Stalinin vainoista, mutta 
historiassa se on ainoa esimerkki siitä, että ihmisiä vainottiin juuri heidän suomalaisuutensa takia. 
Ehkä Suomi voitaisi osoittaa armoansa ”suomalaisten holokaustista” selviytyneille.  
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criticise the government’s change of policy. The choice of “Finnish Holocaust” to 
describe the Stalinist persecution of Ingrians is particularly evocative. This kind of 
language  has  the  particular  effect  of  conveying  intense  persecution,  and  even 
extermination, while placing Ingrians’ experiences in this period with events in the 
Second World War that have become a cornerstone of post-war European politics, 
identity and discussion of history. However, here again Kokko also presents a Finnish 
identity  for  Ingrians,  which  is  somewhat  incongruous  with  other  presentations  he 
gives of an Ingrian identity linked to an Ingrian homeland, and indicates the particular 
effect this change in Finnish policy could have on perceptions of Ingrians’ Finnish 
identity credentials from an Ingrian source.  
 
Kokko  explores  the  notions  of  Ingrianness  and  Finnishness  as  separate  or  same 
identities  in  an  April  2010  editorial  to  commemorate  the  20-year  anniversary  of 
Koivisto’s  significant  television  interview.  In  this  editorial,  Kokko  describes  the 
primary reasons why Ingrian Finns migrated to Finland. He notes an investigation 
from the 1990s, which showed the most significant reason was uncertainty about the 
future of Russia, followed by desire for improved living standards.
52 Reconnecting 
with Finnish culture, and raising children as Finns, ranked only third.
53 By the late 
2000s,  the  situation  was  altered,  and  economic  differences  between  Finland  and 
Russia were less stark.
54 Still, Kokko sees those in the migration queue as motivated 
by a desire to escape corruption and limited democracy in Russia.
55 Kokko himself is 
critical of these motivations, which he sees as a “pretty weak foundation to build a 
happy future in a new country”.
56 In his opinion, Ingrians should move to Finland 
because they want to live in Finland, not merely to escape living in Russia.
57 Here, 
Kokko  decries  a  lack  of  identity-considerations  amongst  Ingrian  return  migrants, 
which  gives  the  impression  that  his  own  characterisation  of  Ingrians’  identity  is 
somewhat idealistic, and not representative of what the Ingrian community at large 
holds to be significant. Indeed, given the motivations for migration to Finland Kokko 
                                                 
52 Wladimir Kokko, “Koiviston lausuma ja inkeriläisyys”, Uutisia Inkeristä, No. 4/10, 3 May 2010, 
available online at URL: <http://www.inkeri.spb.ru/uutiset0410.html>, accessed 10 November 2014.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. Original Finnish text: aika heikko perusta rakentaakseen onnellista tulevaisuutta uudessa 
kotimaassa  
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cites, one may question the notion of whether the concept of an Ingrian identity is 
actually  salient  within  the  community  itself.  Instead,  return  migrants  may  just  be 
those  seeking  to  benefit  from  Finnish  immigration  law  to  improve  their  personal 
circumstances, without substantially engaging in the identity discourse embedded in 
the law and its justification.   
 
However, Kokko’s editorial also notes the complexities in identity construction for 
Ingrians, particularly concerning the role of Finland. He describes Ingrians’ initial 
reaction in 1990 to the Right to Return law at the Inkerin-Liitto that they were now 
seen by the Finnish government as Finns: 
 
For many, “return migration” felt strange, as we sang at that time “Mun isänmaani Inkeri, ma 
sinne kaipaan ain [My  fatherland  Ingria,  I  always  long  for  there].  Young  and  naive,  we 
thought that the dispersed Ingrian Finns of the world only dreamed of moving to their home 
villages in Ingria.
58  
 
This extract illustrates Kokko’s discursive construction of Ingrian identity as separate 
from  Finnishness  and  Finland,  particularly  informed  by  a  territorial  aspect  –  the 
Ingrian homeland serves as a key discursive construction of Ingrian identity here, and 
this  was  not  substantially  engaged  with  by  Finnish  politicians  discussing  Ingrian 
identity. Kokko elaborates on Ingrian’s connection to Finland further in this editorial: 
 
For me personally it was hard to understand that now I have two native lands, but at some 
point I found a compromise decision that two is better than none. I know that, due to their 
deportation, Ingrian Finns felt themselves a homeless nation.
59  
 
Now, Kokko appears to modify his own statement on the significance of Ingria as a 
homeland for Ingrians, to now characterise Ingrian Finns as a “homeless nation” with 
links to modern Ingria and Finland: two homelands to replace the lost homeland of 
pre-war Ingria. This further suggests an interesting effect of the change to Ingrian 
exclusion in Finland on the identity discourse presented by Kokko. Kokko now seeks 
to underline Ingrians’ Finnishness, moving away from his previous use of a territorial 
                                                 
58 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Monille «paluumuutto Suomeen» tuntui oudolta, mehän lauloimme 
silloin: «Mun isänmaani Inkeri, mä sinne kaipaan ain». Nuorina ja sinisilmäsinä luulimme, että 
maailman inkerinsuomalaiset vain unelmoivat muuttoa kotikyliinsä Inkeriin. 
59 Ibid. Original Finnish text: Minun henkilökohtaisesti oli vaikea ymmärtää, että nyt minulla on kaksi 
synnyinmaata, mutta jossakin vaiheessa löysin kompromissipäätöksen, että kaksi on parempi kuin ei 
yhtään. Tiedän, että karkotuspaikoissa ollessaan inkerisuomalaiset tunsivat itsensä aivan kodittomaksi 
kansaksi.  
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discursive resource. In one sense, this brings Kokko’s characterisation of Ingrians 
more  into  line  with  Finnish  politicians’  statements  from  the  early  1990s,  which 
included  Ingrians  within  Finnishness.  Kokko  also  appears  to  be  employing  this 
characterisation  for  the  same  policy  function  –  to  legitimise  Ingrian  migration  to 
Finland. The crucial difference is that Kokko’s characterisation comes later on, when 
Ingrian inclusion has become out-moded in Finland. In another sense, this extract also 
gives indication of a more complex, multi-faceted approach to identity construction 
amongst  Ingrians  than  the  more  bifurcated,  in-or-out  approach  to  Finnishness 
presented  by  Finnish  politicians  in  relation  to  Ingrians.  Ingrians  may,  in  Kokko’s 
mind, feel an attachment to Finnishness while at the same time preserving a sense of 
difference from Finland’s Finns through their Ingrianness.  
 
Kokko’s  discursive  construction  of  Ingrian  identity  appears  to  mirror  Finnish 
politicians’ construction of Finnishness in many ways – the construction is informed 
by the Finnish language and the Lutheran religion in particular, with some reference 
also to historical perceptions of the USSR/Russia as an “Other”. However, much of 
Kokko’s construction of Ingrianness also preserves a sense of otherness from Finns of 
Finland, particularly informed by the symbolic influence he affords to the Ingrian 
territory as the real Ingrian kotimaa, or homeland. By 2010, when Kokko defends the 
Finnishness of Ingrians in the wake of the decision on the end of the Return policy, he 
moves  to  a  discourse  of  Ingrian  identity  that  preserves  both  a  connection  to 
Finnishness and a separate identity as Ingrians. Kokko does present the view cited by 
Finnish politicians that Ingrianness is not the same as Finnishness, but he does not 
endorse the notion that the Ingrian community is not connected to Finnishness in a 
meaningful way, and that Ingrians do not deserve a privileged position in Finnish 
immigration law because of this connection. This indicates a significant way in which 
the discursive construction of Finnishness that excludes Ingrians in Finland, which 
became dominant in the late 1990s and 2000s, affected the discourse on identity in an 
Ingrian source.  
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B)  Surveys  of  Ingrian  Attitudes  Towards  Identity,  Finnishness  and  Return 
Migration 
 
Attitudes of Ingrians themselves towards their identity and connection to Finland have 
been a significant avenue of research for Finnish social scientists, many of which use 
survey and interview data from Ingrian migrants in Finland to study their views of 
identity.  Ismo  Söderling,  director  of  research  at  the  Finnish  Migration  Institute, 
provides a summary of Finnish-language research on Ingrians in the 1990s and 2000s, 
generally  characterising  the  scholarly  interest  as  micro-level  studies  of  identity, 
particularly  the  notion  of  self-ascribed  bicultural  or  monocultural  identities  in 
Ingrians.
60 One  example  is  Sanna  Iskanius’  1999  study  of  Finnish  language 
acquisition  amongst  Russian-speaking  school  children,  predominantly  returnee 
migrants, and its relation to attitudes towards identity.
61 Iskanius argues that Russian-
speaking children in 1990s Finland developed a self-perception as Finnish-speaking 
Russians, positively identifying with the Finnish language but viewing themselves as 
distinct from Finns and mainstream Finnish culture.
62 This idea of a multi-faceted 
approach  to  identity  that  blurs  divisions  between  Finnishness  and  Russianness  is 
significant  to  understanding  Ingrians’  views  of  their  own  identity.  It  emerges  in 
varying  forms  from  Ingrians’  discussions  of  identity  that  have  been  recorded  and 
analysed by social scientists working with Ingrians.  
 
Helena Miettinen provides an analysis of how Ingrians engage with the characteristics 
of Ingrianness in discussion on their identity. Interestingly, she cites the exact same 
identity characteristics as Wladimir Kokko as dominating this discussion: the Finnish 
language, Lutheran church and connections to the Ingrian homeland.
63 However, she 
further argues that whilst these views are the prevailing social representation of what 
Ingrianness is, they are not necessarily the way in which people identifying as Ingrian 
see  themselves.
64 She  is  particularly  critical  of  the  overlooked  role  generational 
                                                 
60 Ismo Söderling, Suomen siirtolaisuustutkimus ja inkeriläiset, Turku: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, 2012, p. 
4.  
61 Sanna Iskanius, Venäjää äidinkielenään puhuvien maahanmuuttajanuorten kieli-identiteetti ja 
etninen identiteetti, unpublished masters thesis, University of Jyväskylä, 1999, pp. 1-21.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Helena Miettinen, Menetetyt: kodit, elämät, unelmat, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of 
Helsinki, 2004, p. 88.  
64 Ibid.   
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differences  play  in  the  construction  of  Ingrianness,  whereby  elements  like  the 
historical narrative of Ingrians in the Stalinist period and Second World War play a 
significantly more substantial role for the older generation who lived through them.
65 
Younger Ingrians, she notes, more readily associate their identity with Russia over 
Finland.
66 For  these  younger  Ingrians,  without  direct  experience  of  discrimination 
from Soviet authorities based on their perceived connection to Finland, Russia and 
Russianness may carry significantly less negative connotations. Some researchers on 
Ingrians also reject the notion expressed for instance by Kokko that Ingrian identity is 
connected to the concept of an Ingrian homeland. Lauri Honko argues that the shifts 
in borders and populations in Ingria may problematise the construction of an Ingrian 
homeland,  or  indeed  an  Ingrian  ethos  or  culture.
67 Indeed,  Ingria  as  a  defined 
geographical territory disappeared from maps in the early eighteenth century, and 
Markku Teinonen reflects on this when citing interviews with Ingrians– one woman 
born in 1929 tells him “I don’t understand what it means. I’m a Finn and was brought 
up in Russia. There is no such area as Ingria!”.
68 Teinonen cites this as evidence to his 
argument: 
 
The  significance  of  the  historical  Ingria  or  the  geographical  Ingria  should  in  fact  not  be 
overemphasised in examining what the region we call Ingria actually means in the minds of 
the Finns living there, or what it means to people’s identity… Amongst the Finns living in the 
region, Ingria is a very vague historical and geographical concept.
69  
 
Yet Teinonen is not completely convincing in this argument. Ingrian Finns may avoid 
or  reject  the  description  of  their  homeland  as  “Ingria”,  but  the  significance  of 
geography in defining their identity is still significant, and this is shown in other data 
Teinonen presents. He notes particularly a 1993 poem published by an Ingrian Finnish 
author, entitled “Toksova in the Olden Days”, a highly romanticised portrait of the 
town of Toksovo, (in Finnish Toksova, formerly Korpiselkä), in northern Leningrad 
Oblast.
70 Teinonen  sees  this  as  evidence  of  a  “local”  over  Ingrian  identity,  with 
“Ingria” used more as a general term to describe the areas of northwest Russia and 
                                                 
65 Ibid. p. 91.  
66 Ibid. p. 88.  
67 Lauri Honko, “Inkerin tutkimus tiehaarassa. – Inkerin teillä”, in P. Laaksonen and S.L. Mettomäki 
(eds), Kalevalaseiran vuosikirja 69-70, Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1990, p. 117.  
68 Markku Teinonen, “The Present as a Mirror to the Past: What it Means to be an Ingrian-Finn in 
Northwest Russia Today”, in M. Teinonen and T.J. Virtanen (eds), Inrgians and Neighbours: Focus on 
the Eastern Baltic Sea Region, Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 1999, p. 103 
69 Ibid. p. 102 
70 Ibid. p. 104  
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Estonia  with  significant  historical  Finnish  settlements.
71  However,  the  real 
significance  of  this  data  for  the  study  of  identity  constructions,  particularly  with 
reference to the Right to Return law, is the emphasis on the local environment in 
northwestern Russia and Estonia over Finland as the spiritual homeland of Ingrians. 
The Right to Return law was constructed on a notion that Ingrians’ Finnishness bound 
them  to  Finland,  with  Finland  positioned  as  the  Finnish  homeland.  Discourse 
evidence from Ingrians themselves suggests the territorial connection to Finland is not 
a  significant  element  in  language  from  the  Ingrian  community  on  their  identity. 
Teinonen cites one woman, born in 1926, who states: 
 
I suppose we’re Ingrians. We speak Finnish, but we’ve never lived in Finland. Of course our 
ancestors are in Finland. They must have come here a long time ago. We don’t know where 
we came from, where our family began.
72  
 
This  excerpt  effectively  challenges  discursive  resource  of  ancestry  as  a  means  to 
connect  Ingrians  to  Finland.  This  correlates  to  later  discursive  representations  of 
ancestry as not significant in denoting Ingrians’ Finnishness from Finnish politicians 
in the late 1990s and 2000s. In this discourse, however, it is a discursive resource of 
ties to the Ingrian homeland that challenges the significance of ancestry. This is also 
featured prominently in the discourse from Wladimir Kokko in Uutisia Inkeristä. This 
is missing from the discussion in Finnish politics, where the discussion took on an 
increased focus on language and cultural orientation to undermine Ingrians’ ancestral 
connestion as a salient argument for their Finnishness.  
 
Like  Kokko,  however,  the  Ingrian  respondents  in  Teinonen’s  interviews  make 
particular use of the Finnish language and Finnish Lutheran Church as discursive 
resources in constructing their identity. Teinonen notes the use of language both as a 
signifier of ethnic identity, and as a historical link to the past, carried on through 
ancestry, or as he puts it, “the idea of a continuum stretching from the past to the 
present and on into the future”.
73  He argues that private use of Finnish amongst the 
Ingrian  community  in  the  Soviet  Union,  particularly  in  times  when  public  use  of 
Finnish was difficult, was a survival strategy of Ingrians’ “hidden social identity”,
74 
                                                 
71 Ibid. pp. 103-4 
72 Ibid. p. 106.  
73 Ibid. p. 112.  
74 Ibid. p. 113.   
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borrowing the phrase from Peter Niedermüller’s analysis of identity construction in 
Habsburg  Central  Europe.
75 Like  Kokko,  the  Ingrians  in  Teinonen’s  study  often 
identify their own local dialects as part of their largely local-orientated identity, which 
complicates  the  characterisation  of  their  language  as  “Ingrian”,  when  no  uniform 
Ingrian  Finnish  dialect  exists.
76 One  respondent  in  particular  gives  an  example  of 
differences between northern and southern Ingrian dialects as they say “three and a 
half”; “kolme ja puoli” or three and a half in the north, and “kol poulen kans” or three 
with a half in the south.
77 Kokko has suggested that standard Finnish or kirjakieli 
should be the lingua franca of Ingrian Finns, but Teinonen notes that in practice, 
many  Ingrians  communicate  in  Russian,  the  language  in  which  the  majority  of 
Ingrians he interviewed are most comfortable speaking.
78 Thus, the Finnish language 
should feature less prominently in these Ingrian communities’ discursive construction 
of an Ingrian identity, if they hold Ingrians to have a specifically Ingrian identity. 
Lauri Honko argues, however, that language capacity is only part of the way in which 
individuals may identify with a particular language, as language can function as a 
symbol  of  the  cultural  identity  rather  than  as  only  a  practical  tool  of  ingroup 
communication.
79 He calls this “extralinguistic identity”.
80 Ingrians may therefore be 
able  to  identify  with  the  Finnish  language  as  an  aspect  of  their  cultural  identity, 
although in practice they may speak little. Indeed, Teinonen notes the response from 
may older Ingrians that their grandchildren should learn Finnish as a second language 
to continue their link to the past, and the old Finnish settlement of Ingria.
81 Thus, 
effectively,  Ingrian  community  sources  do  indicate  constructions  of  their  identity 
using the Finnish language as a discursive resource.  
 
Similarly,  the  Lutheran  church  in  Ingria  also  features  as  an  important  discursive 
resource of Ingrianness amongst the Ingrian interviewees in Teinonen’s study. Like 
language,  religion  appears  to  have  functioned  as  a  survival  strategy  for  Ingrians’ 
                                                 
75 Peter Niedermüller, “The Search for Identity: Central Europe Between Tradition and 
Modernisation”, in R. Kvideland (ed), Tradition and Modernisation: Plenary Papers Read at the 4
th 
International Congress of the Société Internationale d’Ethnologie et de Folklore, Turku: Nordic 
Institute of Folklore, 1992, pp. 114-8.  
76 Teinonen, “The Present as a Mirror of the Past”, p. 112.  
77 Ibid. p. 113.  
78 Ibid. p. 114.  
79 Lauri Honko, “Traditions in the Construction of Cultural Identity and Strategies of Ethnic Survival”, 
European Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1995, p. 141.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Teinonen, “The Present as a Mirror of the Past”, pp. 113-4.   
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hidden  social  identity,  as  one  Ingrian  interviewee  born  in  1926  cites  relatively 
clandestine Lutheran Christmas celebrations in Soviet times, which Teinonen argues 
allowed  a  continuing  sense  of  community  amongst  Ingrians  who  used  religious 
celebrations as a chance for social gathering.
82 The 1990 Soviet law on the freedom of 
conscience  and  religious  communities,  which  as  Teinonen  puts  it  “signified  the 
official approval of religion”,
83 allowed for Ingrians to “come out” as Lutherans, and 
the Ingrian church to physically re-establish its presence in the region.  Like Kokko, 
Teinonen  sees  this  as  particularly  represented  by  the  restoration  of  the  Lutheran 
church in Kupatsina (figure 17), which he describes as “now considered a symbol of 
modern Ingria”.
84 Teinonen also notes that the use of the Ingrian Finnish church as a 
point of identity connection between Ingrians and Finland has caused problems with 
the  broader  community  in  the  region.  Humanitarian  aid  from  Finland  is  often 
channelled through the church, which itself has received funding from Finland to 
restore dilapidated Lutheran church buildings.
85 In particular, flea markets organised 
by the church using items donated by charities in Finland, with money raised being 
used to support the work of the church, were met with suspicion and resentment from 
the Russian Orthodox community, who argued that the economic conditions in 1990s 
Russia  were  equally  precarious  for  all,  and  the  humanitarian  aid  from  Finland 
afforded  the  Ingrian  Lutheran  congregation  was  unfair.
86 In  practice,  the  Ingrian 
church can act as a link to Finland, as Teinonen notes the practice of Finns from 
Finland acting as godparents at Ingrian baptism ceremonies.
87 This indicates ways in 
which  the  Lutheran  Church  could  be  represented  as  a  link  between  Ingrians  and 
Finland,  and  denote  Ingrians’  connections  to  Finnishness  and  otherness  from  the 
Russian Orthodox majority. These representations were apparently also featured in 
Russians’  language  on  Ingrians  at  this  time  in  the  1990s.  This  departs  from  the 
discussion  on  Ingrians  in  Finnish  politics  after  Koivisto,  where  Lutheranism  is 
mentioned very rarely as a discursive resource linking Ingrians to Finland.  
 
While Ingrians in the 1990s may have constructed their connection to Finnishness 
using  Lutheranism  and  Finnish  language  as  discursive  resources,  research  into 
                                                 
82 Ibid. pp. 115-6.  
83 Ibid. p. 116.  
84 Ibid. p. 109 
85 Ibid. pp. 115-7.  
86 Ibid. pp. 116-7.  
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Ingrians’ attitudes towards the Right to Return reveals a complex and interwoven 
interpretation of this connection. Sociologist Eve Kyntäjä, working with Ingrian Finns 
in Estonia circa 1998, provides an excerpt of an interview with an Estonian-born 
Ingrian Finnish woman, aged 38: 
 
The  Finns  don’t  like  us,  although  we  ourselves  are  Finnish,  but  not  really,  not 
actually…Besides, Finns living in Finland are somehow different from us, they aren’t on the 
same wavelength, they still consider us their eastern neighbours, they are cautious and speak 
to us like children…My goodness, why should I move there? My home is here in Estonia!
88 
       
Although Kyntäjä notes such opinions of migrating to Finland were likely to come 
from the more prosperous Ingrians who stood to gain little from this move,
89 this 
quote  nevertheless  suggests  a  relatively  layered  approach  to  the  Ingrian  identity, 
encompassing  a  self-definition  as  Finnish  with  a  distinction  from  Finns  living  in 
Finland. The interviewee sees herself as Finnish, and indeed Ingrian Finns as Finnish, 
but the experience of living in Estonia, physically removed from Finland, has spurred 
an identity gulf between herself and Finns living in Finland. She is separate from 
Finns of Finland as much in her own eyes as she is in theirs. Also of note is her view 
that Finns continue to see Ingrians as their “eastern neighbours”, distinct from the 
westward  cultural  and  political  orientation  of  Finland.  Her  final  point,  that  her 
homeland is Estonia, also notes the disparity between ethnic identity and concept of 
homeland  –  it  is  possible  in  this  woman’s  eyes  to  be  Finnish  but  without  ties  to 
Finland, or rather, to be a Finnish part of Estonia. Sanna Rimpiläinen argues against 
use  of  the  term  “Ingrian  Finns”  altogether,  suggesting  that  it  “presumes  a  clear 
division of peoples to the ‘genuine’ and ‘ingenuine’ Ingrian Finns” based on personal 
and non-comparable beliefs and circumstances like place of birth or homeland.
90 A 
better term, in her mind, is ‘people of Ingrian Finnish origin’, a more flexible term 
that allows for multiple identities that would reflect the status of many Ingrian Finns 
who identify strongly as Russian or Estonian, but are aware of, or interested in, their 
Finnish ancestry.
91 This multi-layered discourse differs from the discussion in Finnish 
                                                 
88 Eve Kyntäjä, Viron sosiaalinen kehitys ja inkerinsuomalaisten paluumuutto Suomeen, Helsinki: 
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89 Ibid.   
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91 Ibid.   
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politics,  which  was  more  orientated  towards  establishing  in-group/out-group 
classifications for Ingrians, and often presented Finnishness as antithetical to other 
identities (particularly Russian) and more connected to Finland as homeland.   
 
Beyond this, the experience of Ingrian Finns living in Finland in the later period of 
the Right to Return is a further area in which Ingrians’ interpretations of the Finnish 
political  discourse  on  their  connection  to  Finnishness  can  be  studied.  Here,  the 
rejection of both purely Russian or Finnish identity constructions by Ingrian Finns is a 
recurrent aspect to the study of how they discursively present their own identity and 
relationship to Finnishness. This includes the construction of a third or middle identity 
between Finnish and Russian, which may be presented as specifically Ingrian. For 
Ingrian return migrants in Finland, Ekaterina Protassova finds evidence that “Ingrian” 
as  a  term  for  defining  identity  may  have  the  strategic  function  of  differentiating 
oneself  from  the  Finnish  mainstream,  as  she  notes  an  interview  with  an  Ingrian 
migrant in Finland who defines herself as Finnish in Russia and Ingrian in Finland.
92 
Ingrians may be viewed as Finnish in Russia, but their experience of living in the 
USSR, Russia or Estonia has its own influence on the way they discursively construct 
their identity, particularly after migrating to Finland, as an environment in which they 
may also feel a minority. Mika Lähteenmäki and Marjatta Vanhala-Anizewski argue 
that the official discourse on Ingrians as Finns in the 1990s was not represented in the 
way Ingrians were received in Finland, where they were largely labelled as Russians 
on the basis of their origin in the former Soviet Union and their linguistic and cultural 
orientation  towards  Russia,  particularly  as  they  made  up  the  largest-subgroup  of 
migrants from Russia and Russian speakers in Finland.
93 This suggests the Finnish 
political discourse on Ingrians experienced a change towards Ingrian exclusion after 
discursive constructions of Ingrian otherness had become dominant in other aewas of 
society.  This  was  largely  based  on  a  discursive  strategy  that  stressed  Ingrians’ 
Russianness,  and  indeed,  Lähteenmäki  and  Vanhala-Anizewski  argue  that  the 
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propensity for viewing Ingrians as Russians in Finland was so strong, it frequently 
extended to Ingrians from Estonia whose first language was Estonian.
94  
 
Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Anizewski draw on data from a small-group survey of 22 
Russian-speaking immigrants in Finland, including Ingrian Finns, and find that most 
respondents give a multi-faceted impression of their identity, informed by a variety of 
definitions  of  homeland,  native  language  and  other  core  identity  markers.
95 One 
respondent, when asked whether Finland was his/her native country, replied “I mainly 
consider myself as a Finn. In Estonia I feel I’m Estonian, while in Russia I feel I’m 
Russian. It really depends on the situation. However, in the end my home country is 
Estonia”.
96  This is reminiscent of aspects of the identity construction in the extract 
from  Kyntäjä  cited  previously,  and  gives  further  indication  of  complex  identity 
formations, which are based on situational and impermanent factors and show the 
malleability  of  identity  in  this  community.  These  situational  factors  may  include 
representations  of  Ingrians  as  foreigners  in  Finland  based  on  their  connections  to 
Estonia and Russia.  To this end, native language plays a significant role, as some 
respondents did not necessarily identify their first language as their native language, 
instead  citing  their  best  or  most  fluent  language  as  their  “mother  tongue”.
97 This 
definition may be influenced by further results Lähteenmäki and Vanhala-Anizewski 
find  on  Russian-speaking  immigrants’  experiences  speaking  Russian  in  public  in 
Finland,  which  the  majority  of  respondents  found  had  an  distancing  effect  from 
Finnish  bystanders,  who  were  perceived  to  link  the  Russian  language  to  negative 
constructions of Russians as the “Other” in Finland.
98 One respondent notes, “I do not 
want to speak Russian in public on all occasions, because Russians have a certain 
reputation and I do not want to be identified with them”.
99 Negative constructions of 
Russians and Russia in Finland, which was a significant aspect of the Finnish political 
discourse on Ingrian return migrations, thus also have an influence on hybrid identity 
construction amongst Russian-speaking immigrants like Ingrians in Finland.  
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A further interesting example of how Ingrians’ negotiated negative perceptions of 
themselves as Russians in late 1990s and 2000s Finland is given by an early 2000s 
interview  by  Ekaterina  Protassova  with  Anna  P.,  who  was  born  in  Karelia  to  a 
Finnish-speaking family of Ingrian and Karelian origin.
100 Anna P. states: 
 
I don’t feel any ethnic belonging at all. With Russians, I feel myself non-Russian, with Finns, 
I am not a Finn. I feel myself a European, because my mother tongue is Russian and I know 
Russian culture, I know French culture well, I understand the Finnish character well, and from 
childhood on, I was surrounded by Finnish culture…Knowing positive and negative sides of 
the Russian character, shortcomings and merits of the Finnish character, I am greatly satisfied 
that I am nether Finn nor Russian. Thanks to my Karelian mother (and we lived in Karelia) I 
was always self-reliant (in contrast to my Ingrian friends) and confident in my rights. Well, 
additionally, in contrast to many others who lived in Russia, we had nothing to hide.
101   
 
Two interesting strains emerge from this extract. The first is the positive discursive 
representation of Europe as a supranational identity, particularly as in this case it 
allows  Anna  P.  to  identify  with  cultures  with  which  she  has  some  experience  or 
affinity but not necessarily family connections – in this case, French. The second is 
the negative discursive representation of both Russian and Finnish as identities. The 
final part of the extract gives some indication that Anna P. experienced Finnishness as 
a negative identity in the Soviet Union, and was grateful that the Karelian side of her 
family background allowed her to minimise her connections to Finnishness in the 
post-war USSR. The notion that communities in this region would wish to avoid 
identity  constructions  that  could  be  readily  linked  to  histories  of  conflict  and 
discrimination, has made an alternative European identity constructions appear more 
attractive  here.  This  approach  to  identity  is  not  readily  engaged  with  my  Finnish 
politicians,  were  the  dominant  construction  of  European  identity  in  particular  is 
employed  as  an  aspect  of,  rather  than  alternative  to,  Finnish  identity,  mostly  to 
separate  Finnishness  from  Russianness  as  indicative  of  the  Eastern  “Other”. 
Characterising Ingrian return migrants as Russian over Finnish, which was frequently 
the  case  in  the  post-1996  political  discussion  in  Finland,  does  not  substantially 
correlate  with  this  rejection  of  both  these  categorisations  as  reflective  of  Ingrian 
identity, nor discursive constructions of Russianness that do not see it as antithetical 
to Europeanness. Europeanness is used quite differently as a discursive resource in 
this excerpt than in the Finnish political discussions.  
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Olga  Davydova  and  Kaija  Heikkinen  have  also  studied  Ingrian  views  on  their 
connection to Finnishness in the late 1990s and 2000s, as the Right to Return law 
changed. They cite an interesting quote from a Finnish consul in Russia, last name 
Pietiläinen,  in  1999  to  describe  the  change  in  official  perceptions  of  Ingrians  in 
Finland after Ingrian return migrants began arriving in Finland:  
 
I  expected  to  find  energetic  Finnish-speaking  Finns,  but  to  my  surprise  these  are  mostly 
people who are encultured into Russian culture. Only something like 10 percept are something 
like Ingrian grandmas…The others are Russians in practise, but officially they have the status 
of a person of Finnish origin.
102  
 
This  quote  illustrates  well  the  changing  discursive  representation  of  Ingrians’ 
connection to Finnishness in the later 1990s and 2000s from Finnish politicians and 
officials, in which the ancestry that had previously linked Ingrians to Finland was 
downplayed,  and  language  and  cultural  orientation  discursive  arguments  that  had 
previously been employed to justify the Right to Return policy were now reversed to 
construct Ingrians as Russians, and thus outside the community of Finnishness. In 
2000, at a similar time to these changes to Finnish political discussions on the Ingrian 
Return  law,  Davydova  and  Heikkinen  conducted  interviews  with  45  people  in 
Petrozavodsk undertaking the preparatory course for return migration as Ingrians to 
Finland.
103 They  describe  two  kinds  of  discursive  strategies  as  dominating  the 
language in these interviews – “orientation speech” which seeks to create links to 
Finland, and “experiential speech” which expresses differences between Ingrians and 
Finns  of  Finland  based  on  personal  experiences.
104 In  orientation  speech,  family 
connections and ancestry are a particularly important discursive resource for creating 
links to Finland, as evidenced by one excerpt from a 60-year old man, who describes 
his attraction to Finland as “through blood. And a desire to find my father’s relatives. 
I have cousins there. A wish to meet them and deal with them”.
105 A 40-year old man 
describes  his  ethnic  identity  as  a  mix  of  “pure  Finn”  on  his  mother’s  side  and 
Vologdan  on  his  father’s,  which  Davydova  and  Heikkinen  see  as  a  strategy  for 
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solving the problem of mixed ancestry by stressing the “purity” of the mixed lines and 
ranking one higher, depending on the situation.
106 For those who speak Finnish (and 
Davydova and Heikkinen note the interviews were conducted in Russian, the group’s 
best  language)
107 the  Finnish  language  can  also  serve  as  a  discursive  resource  in 
orientation speech to create links with Finland, and one 50-year old woman argues 
that  speaking  fluent  Finnish  in  the  Oulu  dialect  with  her  mother  at  the  Finnish 
consulate-general  in  St  Petersburg  was  critical  to  proving  her  Finnishness  to  the 
Finnish  authorities  and  succeeding  in  her  application  for  return  migration.
108 
Experiential  speech  as  a  means  of  underscoring  differences  between  Ingrians  and 
Finns  of  Finland  make  interesting  use  of  the  discursive  resource  of  religious 
experience to note Ingrian otherness in this group, as one 50-year old woman notes 
she feels closer to Orthodoxy “because I live in Russia”, and another similarly-aged 
woman notes she celebrates both Finnish and Russian religious holidays. 
109 Links to 
Russian  Orthodoxy  and  Russian  Orthodox  celebrations  are  informed  by  Ingrians’ 
experiences living amongst a Russian Orthodox majority, and are here employed to 
suggest a point of otherness between Ingrians and Finns of Finland that is effectively 
seen as inconsequential to their return migration. Davydova and Heikkinen cite these 
attitudes as indicating that “[i]n the context of remigration, it appears as if matters of 
inherited tradition are perceived as less important and more flexible than inherited 
origins”.
110 The absence of consequential discussion on Ingrians’ faith amongst the 
Finnish politicians at this time also indicates this discursive element was relatively 
unimportant in proving or disproving Finnishness in the later period of the Right to 
Return policy. The orientation speech/experiential speech model presented here is one 
particular way of presenting the more complex attitude towards Ingrian identity and 
relation to Finnishness, in which points of commonality are employed at the same 
time  as  points  of  otherness  are  noted.  Ingrians’  connection  to  Finnishness  and 
Russianness appear to feature simultaneously in their discussions of self-identity in 
this particular study. Again, this departs from Finnish political discussions at the time 
that tended to view Finnishness and Russianness as mutually exclusive and opposing 
identity constructs.   
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Sirkku Varjonen, Linda Arnold and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti have also investigated the 
self-perception of Ingrian return migrants before and after migrating to Finland, as to 
how they identify with the concept of Finnish identity particularly at the end of the 
policy in the late 2000s.
111 Their study uses focus group data to contrast Ingrian self-
perceptions and definitions of Finnishness before and after migration, finding that 
Ingrians generally self-identified as Finns while still living in Russia, but developed 
more complex, multifaceted self-labels after arrival in Finland, placing themselves in 
a longitudinal schemata of Finnish-to-Russian identity dependent on the surrounding 
dominant culture.
112 Finnish identity in Russia is particularly based on the discursive 
resource of negative perceptions of Russia and Russians, with Ingrians in Russia self-
identifying as Finns because Russianness carries the negative connotation of, amongst 
other things, deceitfulness and irritability.
113 They also simultaneously recast Russian 
negative portrayals of Finns as slow-witted as instead positive traits like propensity to 
be thorough, calm and with a strong work ethic.
114 Unlike in the Finnish political 
context, this discursive argument makes use of personal characteristics of Russians, 
informed by living amongst a Russian majority, and not historical events like the 
Second  World  War  to  create  a  negative  impression  of  Russianness  and  positive 
identification with Finnishness. However, negative constructions of Russianness exist 
in both discussions.  
 
By contrast, when the same group was re-interviewed after migration to Finland, the 
conversation  is  dominated  by  their  sense  of  otherness  from  Finnish  mainstream 
culture. One respondent identifies with a Filipino woman in her Finnish language 
course,  who  she  believes  has  been  excluded  from  Finnishness  based  on  racial 
constructions,  and  will  thus  never  be  accepted  as  Finnish  because  of  her 
appearance.
115  She  sees  her  own  experience  in  this  kind  of  essentialising 
discrimination, claiming “when I heard that, I understood that she’s right. I’ll never be 
Finnish here, I’ll always be Russian here. Although I know where my roots are, that 
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I’m Ingrian. And that’s the truth”.
116 This shows some particular effects of Finnish 
discursive  representations  of  Ingrians  as  connected  to  Russianess  as  a  negative 
identity, in that it promotes a reconsideration of self-identity as more distant from 
Finnishness, though still not Russian. The authors note that other respondents also 
employ the term Ingrian to describe themselves after migrating to Finland, including 
those who before migration had employed different self-labels like Finnish.
117 The 
authors categorise the language from their data group as belonging to “repertoires” of 
biology  (stressing  ancestry  and  inherited  trains  of  Finnishness),  socialization 
(stressing learned behaviour from one’s social and cultural context), and intergroup 
relations  (stressing  perception  of  one’s  group  from  the  broader  social  milieu).
118 
Discursive  resources  of  language  and  religion  often  belong  in  the  repertoire  of 
socialization,  informed  by  connection  to  Russianness,  whilst  negative  attitudes 
towards Russia and Russians and the discursive “othering” of Russianness in Finland 
belongs in ingroup relations, effectively replacing negative attitudes towards Finland 
and  Finnishness  in  Russia  as  a  discursive  resource  for  identity  construction  as  a 
vulnerable minority in the post-migration context.
119 These experiences also show the   
how  Finnish  discursive  representations  of  Ingrian  identity  are  interpreted  and 
negoatiated by Ingrians, this time inside Finland. One potential discursive strategy for 
avoiding  the  negative  perception  as  Russian  in  Finiand,  whilst  acknowledging  a 
divide between themselves and Finnishness, is to self-identify more as “Ingrian”.  
 
Related research by Tuuli-Anna Mähönen and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti investigates self-
perception  of  Ingrians  as  Finns  also  argues  that  Ingrians’  views  of  their  own 
Finnishness  are  dependent  on  their  experiences  and  anticipated  experiences  of 
discrimination from mainstream society in Finland.
120 This is informed by negative 
discursive representations of Russians and Russianness. The study employs data from 
interviews of Ingrians participating in Finnish-language courses for return migrants in 
Russia  in  2008,  and  follow-up  interviews  with  the  same  return  migrants  after 
                                                 
116 Ibid. pp. 121-2 
117 Ibid. p. 122.  
118 Ibid. pp. 126-8.  
119 Ibid pp. 127-8.  
120 Tuuli-Anna Mähönen and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, “Anticipated and Perceived Intergroup Relations as 
Predictors of Immigrants’ Identification Patterns: A Follow-up Study”, European Psychologist, Vol. 
17, No. 2, 2012, 120-30.   
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migration to Finland in 2009-2010.
121 Again, particularly in the post-migration stage, 
the authors find that Ingrian discursive respresantions of their identity noted their 
percieved  ethnic  discrimination  as  a  negative  result  of  national  identification,  and 
their  perceived  low  status  in  Finland  as  connected  to  their  Russian  minority 
identification.
122 This provides some further indication of the appeal of a third identity 
category, as Ingrian rather than specifically Russian or Finnish, also indicated in the 
study by Värynen, Arnold and Jasinskaja-Lahti. The authors also find that anticipation 
of  discrimination  in  the  pre-migration  stage  is  influenced  by  perceptions  of  their 
identity groups’ permeability, i.e. that they are considered as Finns in Russia and 
Russians in Finland.
123  Again, this indicates  an impact of negative discourses on 
Russianess in Finland on how Ingrians discursively represent their identity.  
 
Much of these same attitudes towards identity are reflected in research undertaken by 
Pirjo Takalo on Ingrian return migration for the Health and Social Services Ministry 
in  1994,  which  found  that  Ingrians  often  take  a  “multi-faceted”  approach  to 
integration that included identification with Russian or Estonian groups, as well as 
Finnish, in Finland.
124 Takalo’s report has greatest potential for influencing Finnish 
politicians’ attitudes towards Ingrians’ identity and conformity to their construction of 
Finnishness, as it was directly commissioned by the Finnish government’s ministry. 
Thus,  when  analysing  Finnish  politicians’  identity  constructions  in  relation  to 
Ingrians, there is some potential for intersubjectivity between Ingrian perceptions of 
their identity upwards to Finnish politicians considering the future of o the Right to 
Return  law.  However,  constructions  of  more  complex  notion  of  Finnishness, 
Ingrianness  and  third-culture  identity  are  largely  not  apparent  in  the  political 
discussion  on  Ingrians.  As  such,  without  a  strong  and  unifying  self-perception  as 
connected  to  Finland  amongst  the  Ingrians  themselves,  Finnish  political 
representations  of  bringing  Ingrians  to  Finland  after  1990  suggests  that  Ingrians’ 
connection to the rather rigidly constructed notion of Finnishness was taken without 
account for the discrepancies in identity that could emerge from nearly 300 years of 
                                                 
121 Ibid. pp. 123-4.  
122 Ibid. p. 127.  
123 Ibid.  
124 Pirjo Takalo, Inkerinsuomalaiset Paluumuuttajina: Selvitys inkerinsuomalaisten integraatiosta ja 
viranomaispalvelujen käytöstä, Helsinki: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, 1994, pp. 30-3.    
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political separation between Ingrians and Finland, and which were found to influence 
Ingrian attitudes towards identity particularly after migrating to Finland. 
 
C)  Conclusions 
 
Ingrian descriptions and discussions of their identity and connection to Finland and 
Finnishness  differ  substantially  from  how  this  connection  was  discursively 
constructed  by  Finnish  politicians.  The  role  of  Lutheranism  in  the  discursive 
construction of this connection appears to have played a much more significant role to 
Ingrians than it did in Finnish politicis, as evidenced by both the discourse provided 
by  the  Uutisia Inkeristä editorials  and  studies  of  Ingrian  communities  in  Russia. 
Language was also used as a discursive resource somewhat differently by Ingrians to 
construct this connection, as Ingrians do not appear to have held their sometimes 
limited Finnish language skills as decisive in how much the Finnish language could 
be viewed as a constitutive element of their identity. Ingrians, particularly those who 
migranted  to  Finland  at  this  time,  also  discursively  construct  their  relationship  to 
Russianness in different ways to how the Russianness of Ingrians was represented by 
Finnish  politicians,  as  they  do  not  always  view  connections  to  Russianness  as 
undermining connections to Finnishness. Thus, though many of the same discursive 
resources are engaged with by the Ingrian sources investigated here, these discursive 
resources are employed in ways that do not substantially correlate with their use in 
Finnish political discourse. Finnishness is discursively constructed in many respects 
as a different concept for Ingrians than for Finnish politicians in 1990-2010.  
 
This chapter has also investigated the interpretations of Finnish political constructions 
of  Ingrian  connection  to  Finnishness  to  how  Ingrians  discursively  construct  this 
relationship  themselves.  The  analysis  of  Wladimir  Kokko’s  views  of  Ingrian 
connection  to  Finnishness  in  the  2010  editorials  of  Uutisia  Inkeristä  shows  one 
particular  effect  –  that  the  Finnish  closure  of  the  Return  queue,  confirming  the 
effective exclusion of Ingrians from Finnishness, spurred him to increasingly assert 
the  Finnishness  of  Ingrians,  including  by  engaging  in  essentialist  identity 
constructions that placed other migrants (Filipinos and Bulgarians) behind Ingrians as 
appropriate or desirable for Finland. Kokko also moved away from many discursive 
arguments  he  had  previously  made,  including  a  rejection  of  the  term  “return”  to  
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describe the Ingrian migration to Finland in 1990-2010, in favour of describing a 
“return” of Ingrians from Siberia to Ingria after the Stalinist period.  
 
Scholarly investigations of Ingrian identity employing interview and survey data from 
the  Ingrian  community  also  shows  a  complex  relationship  to  Finnishness,  and 
interesting  effects  of  Finnish  characterisations  of  Ingrians  as  not  belonging  in 
Finnishness at the end of the policy on their own constructions of identity. Ingrians’ 
discourses  on  their  identity  have  responded  to  their  negative  categorisation  as 
Russian,  for  example,  by  stressing  Ingrianness  as  a  third,  middle  option  between 
Finnishness  and  Russianness  as  identity  categorisations.  At  other  times,  Ingrians 
engage with elements of both Finnishness and Russianness, arguing that elements of 
their Finnishness, particularly ancestry, mark them as Finnish in Russia, while their 
reliance on the Russian language marks them as Russian in Finland. In Finland, they 
seek to underplay the Russian aspects of their identity by avoiding public use of the 
Russian language. Attitudes towards Russianness can be complex, influenced both to 
some extent by the negative construction of Russia and Russians used by Finnish 
politicians  in  their  discussion  of  Finnishness,  and  by  other  experiences  of  living 
amongst a Russian majority. To some extent, this may be influenced by generational 
differences, as the negative perception of Russians from the Second World War and 
Stalinist period wanes over time from the generation most directly effected by it to the 
younger  generations  for  whom  it  carries  less  personal  connotations.  In  any  case, 
Ingrian  discussions  of  identity  provided  by  Finnish  scholars  have  negotiated  their 
perception as Russian in late 1990s and 2000s Finland by blurring the distinction 
between constructions of Finnishness and Russianness.  
 
Therefore, whilst there were significant points of departure from how Ingrians and 
Finnish  politicians  discursively  represent  and/or  challenge  a  connection  between 
Ingrians and Finnishness, Finnish politicians’ exclusion of Ingrians in the later period 
of the Return policy, particularly the cancelation in 2010, does appear to precipitate 
some renegotiations of identity discourse from Ingrians themselves.   
  258 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In 2000, Diego Marani, a translator and policy officer in the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General  for  Interpretation,  released  a  novel  (translated  from  Italian  to 
English  in  2011)  entitled  New Finnish Grammar. This  novel  tells  the  story  of  an 
unknown, mostly mute and amnesiac solder, pulled unconscious from the Adriatic 
Sea during the Second World War, who is believed to be Finnish on the basis of a 
name sewn into his jacket. He is taken to Helsinki and taught the Finnish language, in 
the belief that he will recover his Finnish identity.
1 His teacher tells him 
 
If you were once Finnish, at some point you will find all this within you, because all this is not 
stored in your memory, it cannot be mislaid. It is in your blood, your guts. We are what 
remains of something extremely ancient, something that is bigger than ourselves and is not of 
this world.
2   
 
In  this  novel,  Finnish  language  becomes  the  particular  vessel  of  a  primordialist 
understanding of Finnish identity, accompanying and expressing an ancestral link to 
ancient times. The teacher goes on to tell his student “when you can read the Kalevala 
you will be a real Finn; when you can feel the rhythm of its songs your hair will stand 
on end and you will truly be one of us!”
3 However, in the denouement of the novel, 
the unknown soldier feels incapable of reconnecting to his lost identity and meets a 
tragic end, only for it to be posthumously revealed that he was in fact an Italian 
soldier on mission disguised as a German.
4 This leaves the narrator to muse “we come 
into this world in one place only, and only there do we belong”.
5 This novel, written 
by  a  professional  linguist  with  responsibilities  for  language  policy  in  Europe, 
addresses several aspects of the conceptions of Finnish identity explored in this thesis, 
including the role of language in the definition of the national community and the 
notion of both national identity and language itself as inherited genetically, fused with 
jus sanguinis conceptions of Finnishness. Though the characters in Marani’s work see 
Finnish  identity  as  immutable  and  inherited,  as  explored  in  this  thesis,  national 
                                                 
1 Diego Marani, New Finnish Grammar, translated by Judith Landry, Sawtry: Dedalus, 2011, pp. 32-6.  
2 Ibid. p. 54.  
3 Ibid. p. 70.  
4 Ibid. pp. 183-6.  
5 Ibid. p. 186.   
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policymakers  in  Finland  have  found  Finnishness  a  more  complex  concept  to 
construct.  
 
There is a divide between how the Finnish national community is legally defined 
through citizenship, and how Finnish national identity is discursively constructed in 
political discussions. This thesis has argued that political discussions on the Ingrian 
Finnish Return law in Finland defined Finnish national identity based on discursive 
resources  of  language,  religion,  ancestry,  and  historically  informed  notions  of 
Western and Eastern Europe. However, these discursive resources were not always of 
equal importance in creating an ideology of Finnish identity. The particular context of 
Ingrian  Finns’  return  migration  has  prompted  some  focus  on  certain  discursive 
resources over others. In general, an analysis of these discursive resources over the 
complete history of the Ingrian Finnish Return law between 1990 and 2010, as the 
policy was reformed and ultimately cancelled, shows that in particular, language and 
notions  of  belonging  to  the  West  and  being  separate  from  the  East  retain  strong 
saliency  in  Finnish  politicians’  construction  of  Finnishness  across  this  period.  As 
Ingrians were found not to conform to the identity norms promoted by the Return 
policy as much as previously imagined (as evidenced by two rounds of amendments 
to the policy introduced in 1996 and 2002-2003), Finnish politicians did not abandon 
these discursive resources of Finnish identity. Rather, some of the same discursive 
resources employed to justify the Ingrian Return law in 1990 were later employed to 
argue for an end to it in the 2000s. Thus, the idea of Finnishness promoted by Finnish 
policymakers is more resilient than their belief in the inclusion of Ingrian Finns in the 
Finnish national community. 
 
This final chapter of the thesis provides a summary of the core results of this study 
and  their  significance  for  the  field,  as  well  as  suggestions  for  future  research  on 
national identity construction that build on these results.  
 
A)  Key Concepts and Arguments 
 
As argued in the first chapter of this thesis, in nation states the relationship between 
definitions of the state as a community of citizens defined by legal status, and the 
nation as an “imagined” community of the kind described by Benedict Anderson,  
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defined by notions of kinship and solidarity,
6 can be complex and problematic. In the 
Finnish case, this relationship can be explored through the Ingrian Right to Return 
law’s provision for residency and a path to citizenship based on the target group’s 
perceived  connection  to  Finnishness  and  the  Finnish  nation.  In  this  case,  the  two 
conceptions  appear  linked,  the  one  informing  the  other.  Ingrian  belonging  to  the 
imagined community of Finnishness was initially used to justify their migration to 
and legal inclusion in Finland.  
 
There is a certain tension between the concepts of national identity and citizenship, 
which is explored in this case through discursive constructions of identity based on 
perceptions of ethnic and cultural links, and a construction of identity based on a 
citizenship  community  that  is  potentially  more  inclusive  of  cultural  and  ancestral 
diversity. As Stuart Hall argues,  
 
We need to be able to insist that rights of citizenship and the incommensurabilities of cultural 
difference are respected and that the one is made a condition of the other… Since cultural 
diversity is, increasingly, the fate of the modern world, and ethnic absolutism a regressive 
feature of late-modernity, the greatest danger now arises from forms of national and cultural 
identity- new or old- which attempt to secure their identity by adopting closed versions of 
culture or community[.]
7 
 
 Exclusionary  and  essentialising  constructions  of  the  imagined  community  risk 
diverging from the potential diversity of the citizenry and marginalising those who do 
not conform to ethno-cultural conceptions of national identity associated with their 
citizenship status.  As noted in chapter five of this thesis, particularly with reference 
to  figures  14  and  15  showing  the  increase  in  migration  diversity  to  Finland, 
essentialist  discursive  constructions  of  Finnishness  depart  from  alternative 
constructions of the Finnish national community that stress potential ethno-cultural 
diversity.  The  Ingrian  example  indicates  Finnish  policymakers  still  gave  some 
credence to an ethno-cultural understanding of Finnishness, although by the end of the 
2000s this was less defined by ancestry. Finnish politicians were willing to exclude 
those  who  do  not  conform  to  other  significant  features  in  their  understanding  of 
Finnishness, such as language and cultural orientation towards the “West” and away 
                                                 
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 6. 
7 Stuart Hall, “Culture, Community, Nation”, Culture Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1993, pp. 360-1.   
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from Russia. This understanding of Finnishness ultimately excluded Ingrians, whose 
relative inclusion had previously been taken for granted. 
 
As the Finnish nation state took shape in the nineteenth century, the notion of Finnish 
identity as a community of Finnish-speakers was promoted by certain Finnish leaders, 
described  by  historian  Derek  Fewster.
8 Although  the  notion  that  the  Finnish 
community is in any way limited to Finnish speakers appears to overlook the status of 
Swedish as one of Finland’s national languages, as well as the significance of race 
and class discourses at this time, the Finnish language was interpreted by nineteenth-
century nationalists as a symbolic identity link to early Finno-Ugric settlers in the 
region pre-dating Swedish rule,
9 which relates to the notion explored by Anthony D. 
Smith  of  national  identity  constructed  on  a  “great  myth  of  ethnic  descent”.
10 
Language and descent played a particular role in the development of Finnish national 
identity  in  the  nineteenth  century  through  the  publication  and  promotion  of  the 
Kalevala, which Smith cites as a specific example of creating links through language 
between  contemporary  national  identity  and  an  ancient,  mythic  past.
11 Both  the 
Finnish language and the notion of the national community as the descendants of 
ancient ancestors feature prominently in the early Finnish political discussions on the 
Ingrian Return law. They have been cited in this thesis as two of the five relevant 
discursive  resources  for  constructing  Finnishness  in  these  particular  political 
discussions.  However,  by  the  end  of  the  Ingrian  Return  policy,  they  differ 
considerably in their importance for Finnish politicians in proving Finnishness for 
Ingrians.  By  not  speaking  Finnish  at  a  native  level,  Ingrians  are  now  outside  the 
dominant understanding of Finnishness amongst Finnish politicians. Their ancestral 
connections to ancient Finland are deemed less important, and limits are introduced to 
the  validity  of  ancestral  connections  for  obtaining  Right  to  Return  status.  This 
suggests  a  re-evaluation  of  the  Finnish  national  community  as  a  community  of 
putative  descent,  and  a  continued  construction  of  Finnishness  as  informed  by  the 
Finnish language.  
 
                                                 
8 Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, p. 403-4.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, p. 404, and Smith, National Identity, p. 24.  
11 Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, p. 17, 181.   
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As Europe responded to the collapse of the Iron Curtain as an ideological dividing 
line between two identity spheres, West and East, Samuel Huntington famously put 
forward the culturalist thesis that a new identity cleavage was emerging, informed by 
a cultural-religious division between Catholic/Protestant West and Orthodox/Islamic 
East.
12 This  new  dividing  line  was  drawn  by  Huntington  down  the  Finno-Russian 
border, positing the two neighbours on the bulwark of their respective civilisation 
identities.
13 As with the discussion on language and national identity in Finland, this 
construction essentialises Finnish identity to a direct correlation with Lutheranism, 
notably ignoring or downplaying the existence of an established and state-recognised 
Finnish Orthodox Church. Analysis of the identity discourses in the Ingrian Finnish 
Return law shows religion actually had a very limited role in defining Finnishness for 
Finnish politicians, and particularly in the later years of the policy, was not mentioned 
at all. A division between East and West is very much present in Finnish politicians’ 
discussion of Finnish identity and Ingrians, but this is defined by historically informed 
perceptions of Russia as an enemy-image in Finland. The discursive construction of 
national  identity  amongst  Finnish  lawmakers  at  this  time  sets  Russians  as 
fundamentally separate from Finns, particularly through discursive representations of 
Second World War history. Other experiences of Finnish historical memory, such as 
the Swedish Stormaktstid and its socio-cultural legacy, are also employed, but this is 
inconsistent. Finnish politicians begin to challenge Ingrians’ Finnishness especially 
once Ingrians are seen to be largely monolingual Russian-speakers with a perceived 
cultural orientation towards Russia. This pivot is most visible amongst the populist 
wing of Finnish politics, particularly the SMP and its former members, who greeted 
the Ingrians enthusiastically as Finns in the early 1990s, but later decried them in 
sometimes  colourful  language  (most  notably  employed  by  Sulo  Aittoniemi,  cited 
several times in chapter five) as Russians later in the decade and into the 2000s. Even 
as Russia was being re-examined in the post-Cold War European security landscape, 
Finnish lawmakers did not completely reject their view of Russia and Russians as 
fundamentally opposite to the Western European and Nordic geopolitical space they 
saw Finland as belonging to. Ingrians could therefore be connected to Finnishness in 
this way only if they were not connected to Russianness. The lasting significance 
given to some Ingrians’ experience as veterans fighting the Soviet army in the Second 
                                                 
12 Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, pp. 29-31.  
13 Ibid.   
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World War, which is held as proving their Finnishness through opposition to the 
USSR/Russia,  highlights  the  ongoing  significance  of  East  vs.  West  identity 
constructions in Finnish politics at this time.   
 
However, it is also significant to note more moderate constructions of Ingrian identity 
presented elsewhere in the Finnish political spectrum at this time, which also rejected 
the  notion  of  Ingrians  as  Finns  based  on  their  linguistic  and  cultural  orientation 
towards Russia and the East, but attempted to form a new “third” categorisation as 
neither Finns nor Russians. Instead, they saw Ingrians as having a separate identity 
influenced  by  connections  to  both  Russia  and  Finland.  Reassessing  Ingrian 
conformity to the discursive resources of Finnishness that specify cultural orientation 
towards the West, and suspicion of the East, thus does not necessitate transformations 
in  absolute  values.  As  described  in  chapter  two,  historical  discussions  of  Finnish 
national identity in the early twentieth century have also described various sukulaiset, 
or perceived related Finno-Ugric peoples, including Estonians, Karelians and Maris, 
who  have  been  viewed  in  Finland  as  related  to,  but  distinct  from,  Finns  as  a 
nationality. Ingrians were not initially included in this concept of related sukulaiset, as 
they were rather portrayed as Finns at least up until the later years of the Ingrian 
Return law. The more moderate reassessment of Ingrian identity as connected to both 
Russia  and  Finland  suggests  some  room  for  Ingrian  inclusion  in  such  an 
understanding  of  broader  Finno-Ugric  identities  in  the  Finno-Russian  borderlands. 
Thus,  there  may  be  some  allowance  for  grey-shaded  areas  in  the  line  of  cultural 
division between East and West, Finns and Russians, amongst sections of the Finnish 
policymaking community.  
 
Indeed, the analysis provided in chapter six of how Ingrians themselves constructed 
their  identity  and  connection  to  Finnishness  in  1990-2010,  and  how  their 
constructions negotiated the Finnish political rejection of this connection in 2010, 
shows  that  Ingrians  surveyed  at  this  time  rejected  constructions  of  themselves  as 
either completely Finnish or Russian, and increasingly strove to discursively represent 
Ingrian identity as connected to but still distinct from Finnishness. The editorials of 
the  Ingrian  newspaper  Uutisia  Inkeristä,  another  key  source  for  analysis  in  this 
chapter, provide a different reaction, in which the connection between Ingrians and 
Finnishness, which before 2010 had been viewed in a somewhat critical light, was  
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now at the core of Ingrian identity construction. These findings suggest Ingrians view 
the Finnish connection as a positive identity feature, which they attempt to defend 
using  different  discursive  strategies  at  the  time  when  the  discourse  provided  by 
Finnish politicians is undermining this connection.  
 
B)  Avenues for Further Research 
 
As described in detail in chapter three, critical discourse analysis (CDA) scholars like 
Ruth Wodak and colleagues have studied national identity as it is produced through 
discourse.
14   They  argue  that  discourses  on  national  identity  emphasise  “national 
uniqueness  and  intra-national  uniformity,  and  largely  tend  to  ignore  intra-national 
differences”.
15 This construction of an essentialising national identity, they argue, is 
produced and reproduced at four core levels: amongst political élites, by the media, in 
small social groups and in the quasi-private sphere.
16 Analysing national identity with 
reference to these four levels of data production allows one “to survey the broadest 
possible range of identity constructs and their dialectical interrelations, as well as 
identify  in  detail  the  re-contextualisation  of  important  concepts  and  arguments”.
17 
Indeed, the production of national identity discourse at any level does not take place 
within a vacuum, and is both informed by and informs discourse production at other 
levels.  A  complete  investigation  of  national  identity  construction  surrounding  the 
Ingrian case, for example, should therefore engage with all levels of data.  
 
However,  detailed  analysis  of  such  a  broad  variety  of  material,  which  would 
necessitate  different  methods  of  data  collection  and  analysis,  is  an  extensive 
undertaking that is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis has contributed the first 
level of analysis to the construction of Ingrians’ connection to Finnishness, focusing 
on discursive production of identity norms at the political level, with some discussion 
of  how  these  identity  constructions  relate  to  Ingrians’  own  construction  of  their 
connection to Finnishness. This research could be built on by comparing the findings 
presented to an analysis of focus group or survey data that specifically asks Ingrians 
about how they view their connection to Finnishness after the 2010 end of the Return 
                                                 
14 Wodak et al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity, p. 186. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. pp. 187-8.  
17 Ibid. p. 187.   
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policy, to investigate in further detail how the identity constructions of political elites 
relate  to  those  found  at  these  other  levels.  The  overall  investigation  of  national 
identity construction should therefore be interdisciplinary, encompassing the political 
perspective presented here, along with media studies and disciplines that focus on 
individual or small-group level identity construction, such as social psychology. 
 
Beyond this particular line of further research, the analysis provided in this thesis also 
offers  opportunities  for  further  study  of  how  essentialist  identity  discourses  are 
strategically employed in politics. In particular, this thesis provides an example of 
how constructions of an East-West divide have been employed by policymakers in 
their discursive production of national identity. Lines between Eastern and Western 
Europe  continue  past  the  divide  between  Finland  and  Russia,  and  through  the 
European  continent.  There  are  multiple  case-study  possibilities  for  a  comparative 
investigation of the strategic use and political saliency of the East vs. West theory 
elsewhere in Europe, including the post-Soviet transitions of the Baltic republics, the 
European  Union  expansion  into  the  Balkans  in  the  2000s,  or  perhaps  even  more 
significantly, the 2013-2014 Ukraine Euromaidan protests against the rejection of an 
EU-Ukraine agreement, which were unfolding as this thesis was being completed.
18 It 
is worth noting, for example, that journalists Michael Crowley and Simon Shuster 
have  described  the  protest  movement  as  having  “explicitly  rejected  the  political 
values Putin has championed in favour of a West European democratic model”.
19 The 
president of the National Endowment for Democracy Carl Gershman, for instance, 
strategically  employs  the  East/West  discourse  to  criticise  Russian  influence  in 
Ukraine for a The Washington Post editorial, arguing that “Ukraine’s choice to join 
Europe will accelerate the demise of the ideology of Russian imperialism that Putin 
represents”.
20 Other  commentators,  such  as  the  Ukrainian  author  Andrey  Kurkov, 
have conversely rejected the discourse on a West and East division in values with 
                                                 
18 Carmen Fishwick and Nassos Stylianou, “Ukraine Demonstrations: ‘We Are Asking for a Better 
Future’”, The Guardian, 11 December 2013, available online at URL: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/11/ukraine-protests-demonstrations-kiev-police->, 
accessed 21 February 2014.  
19 Michael Crowley and Simon Shuster, “Kiev’s Russian Roulette”, Time, 27 February 2014, available 
online at URL: <http://time.com/10215/kievs-russian-roulette/> , accessed 10 March 2014.  
20 Carl Gershman, “Former Soviet states stand up to Russia. Witll the U.S.?”, The Washington Post, 26 
September 2013, available online at URL: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/former-soviet-
states-stand-up-to-russia-will-the-us/2013/09/26/b5ad2be4-246a-11e3-b75d-
5b7f66349852_story.html>, accessed 8 December 2014.   
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respect to this conflict, arguing that differences between East-West are not cultural, 
but rather informed by regional economic and industrial disparities between the West 
and  the  East,  which  has  made  the  East  more  accessible  to  Kremlin-endorsed 
oligarchs.
21 Finnish policymakers’ strategic use of the divide between East and West 
could therefore become the first part of a broader study of this identity discourse has 
been  engaged  with  and  strategically  employed  in  the  countries  along  a  percieved 
East/West dividing line. 
 
C)  Final Remarks 
 
As has become evident in the discussion of Ingrians and the Ingrian Return law in the 
1990s and 2000s, Finnish policymakers have endorsed the primordialist significance 
of the Finnish language in the construction of Finnish identity, but largely no longer 
endorse, as Marani’s characters do, the idea that national identity can be transmitted 
through several generations and centuries of living outside the national community. 
Ingrians  are  only  deemed  part  of  the  Finnish  national  community  when  they  are 
believed to speak Finnish, though their status as descendants of Finnish émigrés is 
unchanged. Moreover, notions of Finnish identity based on cultural inheritance from 
Sweden and Western Europe and a history of struggles against its eastern neighbour 
also informed the political discussion on Ingrians, as Ingrian language capabilities 
were  reassessed.    Nineteenth-century  Fennoman  politicians  argued  that  Finnish 
identity exists as a national community of Finnish speakers.
22 Their argument still 
finds a degree of echo amongst Finnish lawmakers at the turn of the millennium.    
                                                 
21 Andrey Kurkov, “What the West Doesn’t Understand About Ukraine’s Politics”, Time, 27 February 
2014, available online at URL: <http://time.com/10032/ukraine-donbass-yanukovych-kurkov/>, 
accessed 10 March 2014.  
22 Fewster, Visions of Past Glory, p. 403-4.  
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF MENTIONED FINNISH POLITICAL PARTIES 
 
Finnish Party Name  Abbreviation  English 
Translation 
Notes 
Alkiolaisen 
keskustaryhmän 
  Alkionian Centre 
Group (author’s 
own translation) 
Founded by former 
SMP and Centre Party 
member Sulo 
Aittoniemi, existed 
from 1999-2003. 
Named for early 
twentieth-century 
Centre Party leader 
Santeri Alkio and his 
political ideology 
“alkiolaisuus”.  
Kansallinen Kokoomus  Kok.  National Coalition   
Perussuomalaiset  PS  The True Finns  Since August 2011, 
Perussuomalaiset 
have adopted the 
official English-
language name “The 
Finns Party”. 
However, as this 
name-change takes 
place outside the main 
period of study in this 
thesis, and the 
previous name 
continues to dominate 
in many English-
language sources, it is 
also employed in this 
thesis.  
Suomen Keskusta  Kesk.  Centre Party of 
Finland 
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Suomen 
Kristillisdemokraatit 
KD  Christian 
Democrats of 
Finland 
Prior to 2001, the 
party’s Finnish name 
was Suomen 
Kristillinen Liitto 
(SKL). 
Suomen Maaseuden 
Puolue 
SMP  Finnish Rural 
Party 
Defunct since 1995. 
The SMP’s final party 
secretary (Timo Soini) 
and chairman (Raimo 
Vistbacka) founded 
The True Finns in the 
same year.  
Suomen ruotsalainen 
kansanpuolue 
RKP  Swedish People’s 
Party of Finland 
Frequently also 
referred to by its 
official Swedish 
name, Svenska 
folkpartiet i Finland. 
Suomen 
Sosialidemokraattinen 
Puolue	 ﾠ
SDP	 ﾠ Social Democratic 
Party of Finland	 ﾠ
 
 
Vasemmistoliitto  Vas.  Left Alliance   
Vihreä liitto  Vihr.  The Greens of 
Finland (official 
English name) 
Also referred to in 
some English-
language sources as 
The Greens League, a 
literal translation of its 
Finnish name.  
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APPENDIX II 
TIMELINE OF THE INGRIAN FINNISH RETURN POLICY 
 
Year  Ingrian Finnish Return 
Policy  
Finnish 
Government 
Finnish 
Presidency 
1990  In January, Mauno Koivisto 
instructs the Finnish 
Immigration Service to 
begin processing residency 
permits for Ingrians as 
return migrants.  
 
In April, the Ingrian Return 
policy enters public 
discussion following a TV 
interview with President 
Koivisto. 
Holkeri Government 
(Kok.). 
Coalition partners 
SDP, RKP and 
SMP. 
Mauno Koivisto 
(SDP) 
1991  The 1991 Aliens Act is 
passed, including provisions 
for return migrants.  
From April -  
Aho Government 
(Kesk.). 
Coalition partners 
Kok. RKP, SKL 
1992   
1993   
1994   
From March - 
Martti Ahtisaari 
(SDP) 
1995   
From April -  
First Lipponen 
Government (SDP). 
Coalition partners 
Kok., Vas., Vihr., 
RKP. 
1996  Amendments to the Right to 
Return Policy are 
introduced – applicants 
must now demonstrate 
knowledge of Finnish or 
Swedish language before 
migrating.   
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1997   
1998   
1999   
From April -  
Second Lipponen 
Government (SDP). 
Coalition partners 
Kok. Vas., RKP, 
Vihr. 
2000   
From March - 
Tarja Halonen 
(SDP) 
2001   
2002  Further amendments are 
introduced to the Ingrian 
Return Policy, requiring 
applicants to prove a 
Finnish connection through 
at least one grandparent. 
2003  The 2002 amendments 
come into force.   From April - 
Jäätteenmäki/First 
Vanhanen 
Government 
(Kesk.).  
Coalition partners 
SDP, RKP  
2004  A new Aliens Act is passed, 
retaining the current Return 
policy provisions.  
2005   
2006   
2007   
From April -  
Second 
Vanhanen/Kiviniemi 
Government 
(Kesk.). 
Coalition partners 
Kok., Vihr., RKP. 
2008   
2009   
2010  The migration queue for 
Ingrian returnees is closed.  
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APPENDIX III 
THE VOLGA GERMANS 
 
In  this  annex,  a  brief  history  and  analysis  of  the  Volga  Germans  is  provided  for 
context and comparison to the Ingrian Finns. The Volga Germans (Wolgadeutsche) 
were the focus of a larger-scale Right to Return migration policy to Germany, which 
has been studied in greater detail, particularly in the comparison to Germany’s other, 
non-returnee  migrant  communities.  As  this  thesis  has  investigated  the  intersecting 
relationship between the concepts of ethnicity, national identity and citizenship within 
a case study of a particular Right to Return policy, using Finland and the Ingrian 
Return law, a brief comparison with another significant Return policy in Europe may 
provide some significant further insights into the relationship between this genre of 
migration policy and the increasing diversity of migrant communities in Europe.  
 
Right to return policies, which grant immigration and citizenship preferences to those 
who  are  (or  are  descended  from)  the  ethnic  kin  of  receiving  states,  are  fairly 
ubiquitous in Europe. In the 1990s in particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe spawned right to return policies 
that varied from permanent citizenship law provisions to resettlement programs of 
limited duration, which were implemented in the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway,
1 Poland, Serbia and Hungary. The Estonian Right 
to  Return  law,  for  example,  grants  citizenship  to  those  forced  out  of  Estonia  as 
political refugees by the Soviet Union and their descendants,
2 while the German Right 
                                                 
1 Norway has a Right to Return policy for Kola Norwegians, descendants of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century settlers of the Kola Peninsula in far northwest Russia. Applicants must normally 
prove at least two grandparents were Norwegian citizens to gain residency. The required ancestral 
connection is therefore expected to be considerably shorter than in the Ingrian Finnish example. See 
Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, “A-8/2006 Ikrafttredelse av lov 
10.06.2005 nr. 51 om statsborgerskap og statsborgerforskriften, samt av endringer I rettshjelpsloven og 
utlendingsforskriften”, 11 August 2006, available online at URL: 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/documents/rundskriv/2006/a-82006-ikrafttredelse-av-lov-
10062005-n.html?id=272460>, accessed 26 April 2014. In addition to their more recent ancestral 
connections, Kola Norwegians are distinguished from Ingrians by their smaller number: about 200 
were living in Norway by 2004. See Jan Gunnar Furuly, “Kolanordmenn lever på sosialen”, 
Afterposten, 11 June 2004, available online at URL: 
<http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/article807148.ece#.U1vmyq2SyW6>, accessed 26 April 
2014. 
2 Republic of Estonia, “Citizenship Act”, 19 January 1995, available online at URL: 
<http://www.minelres.lv/NationalLegislation/Estonia/Estonia_Citizenship_English.htm>, accessed 2 
October 2010.  
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to Return is introduced in Article 116 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz), and 
grants  citizenship  to  those  forced  out  by  Nazism  or  any  previous  political 
persecution.
3 These laws and programs specifically mention, or target, groups that fall 
into two broad categories: 
 
a)  Those that faced expulsion and forced exile in the twentieth century, 
such as nationalists from Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia who fled the 
Soviet Union, or German refugees escaping the Nazis; and 
b)  Those that found themselves on the “wrong” side of borders drawn 
up after the collapse of multi-ethnic or multi-lingual states, such as 
the Hungarians of Slovakia or the Czechs of Volhynia in Ukraine 
after the breakdown of the Habsburg Empire post-First World War.  
 
The  Finnish  example  fails  to  comply  fully  with  either  of  these  categories.  The 
German example in particular presents the modern Federal Republic of Germany as 
the successor state of the Third Reich, with a moral impetus to right the wrongs of the 
Nazis, and in doing so reverse the expulsion of those deprived of their citizenship 
between 1939 and 1945.
4 The Baltic countries consider themselves the continuation 
of the pre-war independent states, interrupted but not replaced by Soviet occupation, 
and offer returnee citizenship to those the Soviets pushed out.
5 But the Ingrian Finns, 
as the target group of the Finnish Right to Return policy, have not lived in what is 
now Finnish territory since the seventeenth century. Four centuries of separation have 
ensured  there  is  no  first-hand  memory  amongst  Ingrians  of  living  as  citizens  of 
Finland  or  its  predecessor  states,  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Finland  or  the  Swedish 
Kingdom. Moreover, the suffering of Ingrian Finns in the twentieth century came 
particularly under Stalin, whose government Finland cannot imagine itself to be the 
successor to. This would apparently negate the argument for a Right to Return law 
based on the state’s assumption of guilt for historic crimes (though, as described in 
                                                 
3 Parliamentary Council of the German Bundestag, Basic Law of the Republic of Germany, translated 
by Christian Tomuschat and David P. Currie, Berlin: German Bundestag Public Relations Division, 
2008, p. 80. 
4 Patrick Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2007, p. 383.  
5 Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence, 
London/New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 274-5.   
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chapters four and five, Finnish politicians did develop their own discussion on Finnish 
responsibility and atonement for Ingrian suffering).   
 
On  the  second  category,  concerning  the  altering  of  borders,  the  frontier  changes 
around Ingria occurred centuries before 1990 (the changes brought on by the Winter 
and  Continuation  Wars  did  not  reach  into  Ingria).
6 The  decline  of  a  recognisably 
multi-ethnic  state  that  marks  the  aforementioned  Hungarian  or  Czech  cases  does 
present itself in the Ingrian example (in this case, the decline of the Swedish Kingdom 
at the turn of the eighteenth century, followed by the collapse of the Russian Empire 
in the early twentieth century). However, the break-up of these states here did not 
alter the political separation between Finland and Ingria, as both the Swedes and 
Russians governed them as (or as part of) different sub-national entities (see chapter 
two).  
 
The analysis presented in this thesis of the political discourse on the Ingrian Return 
policy, and how it presents ethnicity in relation to Finnish citizenship and national 
identity, reflects a conception of the nation and its citizenry as ethnically defined. This 
idea of the nation and citizenship is at the crux of all Right to Return policies, and is 
particularly evident in Finland. The term “suomalainen” (“Finnish”) presented in this 
discourse appears not to distinguish clearly between citizens of Finland and so-called 
“ethnic  Finns”,  and  thus  this  terminology  becomes  murky  and  overlapping.  A 
comparison with the German Right to Return policy, which shows key features of this 
genre of immigration law, but in relative contrast to Finland has not escaped previous 
extensive  critical  analysis,  reflects  the  peculiarities  of  the  Finnish  case,  and  its 
comparatively tenuous presentation of the traditional historical atonement aspects of 
right to return policies. 
 
Up  until  the  Russian  Revolution,  Volga  Germans  were  a  largely  self-contained 
community  situated  along  the  Volga  River  between  Tsaritsyn  (now  Volgograd, 
known  in  the  Soviet  period  as  Stalingrad)  and  Samara.  They  were  largely 
monolingual  German-speakers  with  their  own  dialects  of  Hessian  and  Palatine 
                                                 
6 Anssi Paasi, “Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border”, in P. 
Ganster and D.E. Lorey (eds), Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World, Lanham, MD: SR 
Books, 2005, pp. 117-36.   
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origins, indicative of their origin in western Germany.
7 Hesse, today a federal state in 
the western-central regions of Germany along the rivers Rhine and Main, was prior to 
the First World War itself divided between two principalities (Hesse-Darmstadt and 
Hesse-Kassel), and had been the theatre of conflict in several major wars over the 
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
8 Major battles of the Thirty Years 
War (1618-1648), particularly the Hessenkrieg (Hessian War, 1645-1648), as well as 
the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) and the Seven Years War (1754-1763), 
were all fought in the region, in part due to its strategic position between France, 
Prussia and Austria. This resulted in violence and severe burdens of taxation and 
conscription (Hesse-Kassel was also notorious for conscripting men and renting them 
to  other  nations  as  mercenaries.
9 The  ghost  of  one  such  mercenary,  sent  to 
Revolutionary  America,  appears  in  fiction  as  the  famed  headless  horseman  of 
Washington Irving’s 1790 story The Legend of Sleepy Hollow
10). Catherine the Great, 
the German-born Tsarina of Russia who took the throne in 1762, almost immediately 
attempted to take advantage of fresh discontent in the western German principalities 
from the Seven Years War by attracting them to settle in the southern Volga region, 
then a sparsely inhabited, uncultivated area she hoped to shore up as the southern 
perimeter of her empire.
11  
 
On  22  July,  Catherine  issued  her  Manifesto  of  1763,  inviting  all  foreigners  of 
Christian faith to settle in the southern Volga region.
12 At the same time, Catherine 
established  the  Chancellery  for  the  Guardianship  of  Foreigners,  which  the  Volga 
Germans  called  the  Tutel  Kanzlei  (Tutelary  Chancellery),  to  administer  the 
resettlement,  and  actively  recruit  settlers  from  the  most  deprived  areas  of  Hesse-
Kassel  and  Hesse-Darmstadt.
13 There,  field  agents  from  the  Tutelary  Chancellery 
came  to  be  known  as  Menschenfänger (people  catchers)  or  Seelenverkäufer (soul 
sellers).
14 Within three years, approximately 30,000 Germans had emigrated to the 
lower Volga lands, establishing the German-speaking population of the region before 
                                                 
7 Fred C. Koch, The Volga Germans: In Russia and the Americas, from 1763 to the Present, University 
Park/London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977, p. 1.  
8 Ibid. p. 5.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Washington Irving, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow, Minneapolis: Filiquarian Publishing, 2006, p. 7.  
11 Koch, The Volga Germans, pp. 4-6.  
12 Ibid. p. 12.  
13 Ibid. pp. 6-7.  
14 Ibid. p. 7.  
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the  German  kings,  alarmed  at  the  depopulation  of  their  own  lands,  forbade 
participation of their citizens in the Russian colonisation program.
15  
 
Though  Catherine  had  welcomed  the  German  settlers,  shifting  moods  in  Russia 
towards Germans and Germany affected the Volga Germans’ peace and position in 
Russia  across  later  generations  of  the  Russian  Monarchy.  Catherine’s  great-great-
grandson Alexander III (reigned 1881-1894) pursued an ethnically exclusivist “Russia 
for Russians” vision that specifically targeted the German-speaking communities, and 
was here supported by his Danish-born wife Maria Fedorovna, who was severely 
critical  of  Germans  following  the  Prussian  invasion  of  her  homeland  in  the 
Schleswig-Holstein War of 1864.
16 Russification under Alexander III included a loss 
of  many  of  the  autonomy  privileges  for  Germans  established  by  Catherine’s 
Manifesto,  particularly  exemption  from  military  conscription,  and  precipitated  an 
exodus  of  Volga  Germans  to  the  New  World  in  the  later  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century.
17 However,  by  1913  there  remained  approximately  1.5  million  German-
speaking residents in Russia, and 192 German-dominant towns in the lower Volga 
region.
18 The  following  year,  with  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  these 
populations  immediately  became  a  national  security  threat  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Slavophile factions in the Russian government.
19 As described by Koch, “[i]t was 
incomprehensible to many Russians that these Volga Germans, as a national minority, 
could be loyal to the Russian crown and at the same time hold to their language, their 
religion, and most of their ethnic culture”.
20 The enclosed and Germanic identity of 
the  communities  came  largely  through  education  in  the  German  language  basic 
schools  (the  Volkschüle)  and  membership  of  evangelical  Lutheran  or  Catholic 
churches, which came to an end with the implementation of a law banning instruction 
in German in 1914 (the law was repealed by the Communists four years later, but had 
already  closed  most  of  the  Volkschüle in  region),  and  the  Communist  banning  of 
religious  education  in  1918.
21 This  new  law  thus  capped  off  several  decades  of 
suspicion and attack on the perceived “Germanness” of the lower Volga settlers.  
                                                 
15 Ibid. p. 8.  
16 Ibid. p. 197.  
17 Ibid. pp. 202-3.  
18 Ibid. p. 155.  
19 Ibid. pp. 155-6.  
20 Ibid. pp. 240-1.  
21 Ibid. p. I56.   
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Though the early years of the Soviet Union curtailed the religious freedoms of the 
Volga German settlers, their language and ethnic identity was initially less of an issue 
than it had been during the First World War, at least formally. In 1924, shortly before 
Lenin’s  death,  the  Volga  German  Autonomous  Soviet  Socialist  Republic  was 
established, promising a degree of autonomy for the German-speaking population, 
though  in  practice  it  delivered  a  rather  tyrannical  government  under  Russian 
communist  “advisors”.
22 When  the  Germans  again  invaded  in  1941,  the  USSR’s 
German population faced its greatest threat. Hitler’s forces reached the Volga German 
homeland in southern Russia quickly, and Stalin’s reaction, described by Koch as 
“restrictive  and  punitive”,  swiftly  put  an  end  to  any  idea  of  Volga  German 
autonomy.
23 A  decree  dated  28  August  1941  from  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet dictated the expulsion of Volga Germans from their homeland to territories 
around the Urals and northern Kazakhstan, announcing: 
 
According to reliable reports by military authorities, there are in the Volga province among its 
German population thousands and ten thousands of diversionists and spies who, upon a signal 
from Germany, are to commit acts of sabotage in the areas occupied by the Volga Germans. None 
of the Germans living in the Volga district has informed the Soviet authorities of such a large 
number  of  diversionists  and  spies  among  the  Volga  Germans,  consequently,  the  German 
population on the Volga is concealing in its midst existing enemies of the Soviet people and the 
Soviet  Power…[I]n  order  to  forestall  undesirable  consequences  of  this  nature  and  to  avoid 
bloodshed,  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  has  found  it  necessary  to  resettle  the  entire 
German population of the Volga district to other areas[.]
24 
 
This decree follows similar themes of distrust and the linking of ethnic identity to 
state loyalty to those exemplified by the deportation of the Ingrian Finns, though at an 
even greater scale, as the fate of the Ingrian Finns under the Soviets echoes in many 
ways the treatment of the Volga Germans. Wars and perceived kin-state relationships 
leading to distrust leading to deportation accompanied by Russification are recurrent 
themes,  and  the  Volga  Germans  can  be  seen  as  suffering  more  acutely  than  the 
Ingrians, who were in time allowed to return to their pre-War home region, likely due 
to the more enduring memory of Germany as the pre-eminent threat to the USSR in 
the Second World War. The eighteenth-century origins of the communities as part of 
the growing Russian Empire are a further point of commonality, stressing the later 
                                                 
22 Ibid. pp. 254-6.  
23 Ibid. p. 283-4.  
24 Cited in Koch, The Volga Germans, p. 284.   
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uncomfortable  reactions  amongst  Russia’s  rulers  to  the  ethnic  diversity  inherited 
under  the  earlier  Petrine  and  Catherinian  expansions,  though  in  the  case  of  the 
Ingrians,  this  was  a  case  of  an  inherited  minority,  rather  than  the  actively-sought 
colonisers  of  the  lower  Volga  lands.  Ethnic  diversity  in  Russia  had  become 
problematic by the end of the nineteenth century. The reaction to come in the Western 
European nations of Finland and Germany would also show patterns of preference for 
perceived ethnic conformity, as seen through their return immigration laws. 
 
 
Figure 19 
An example of the post-evacuation remnants of a Volga German community – ruins of the Lutheran Cathedral at 
Rosenheim, an agricultural settlement known now as Podstepnoye, in Saratov Oblast, Russia.  
Photo by onesign, 15 April 2012. Creative Commons licence for re-use.  
Available online at URL: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/onesign/7109836715/>, accessed 26 March 2013.  
 
The deportations of the Volga Germans, beginning in early September 1941, were “in 
the  most  brutal  form”,
25 involving  repossession  of  all  land  and  property,  and 
execution of all resisters.
26 Although in 1964 Khrushchev politically rehabilitated the 
Volga Germans and retracted the 1941’s indictment of mass treason, this retraction 
granted neither remuneration nor facilitation of return to the Volga region.
27 German 
                                                 
25 Gerhard Teich, “Die russlanddeutsche Bevoelkerung in Kriegs- und Nachkriegs-zeit 1941-1950”, in 
Johann Kampen and Hans Kampen (eds), Heimatbuch der Deutschen aus Russland, Stuttgart: 
Landmannschaft der Deutschen aus Russland, 1958, p. 87.   
26 Koch, The Volga Germans, p. 286.  
27 Ibid. p. 299.   
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settlements on the Volga were renamed, and German community buildings were left 
damaged and abandoned (see figure 19). Dispersed amongst the towns and villages of 
Siberia and Kazakhstan, the Germans settlers formerly of the Volga region continued 
to be Russified on the grounds of preventing nationalist unrest, by a government, as 
described  by  the  former  Italian  ambassador  to  Moscow  Luca  Pietromarchi  in  his 
examination of Soviet political culture The Soviet World, insistent on “drown[ing] the 
national minorities in a sea of Russians and Ukrainians”.
28   
 
The  Volga  Germans’ descendants  have  since  resettled  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, the former West Germany, and after 1990 
the reunited Germany, hereafter referred to as Germany), through Germany’s own 
Right to Return immigration policy. Legal provisions for residency and citizenship 
differ primarily between Germany and Finland in that, up until 1999-2000, Germany 
defined itself more strictly as a community of jus sanguinis. The Right to Return law 
for  Ingrian  Finns  may  have  presented  advantages  for  those  of  perceived  Finnish 
identity  to  settle  in  Finland,  but  Finnish  law  nevertheless  presents  relatively 
straightforward provisions for naturalisation of non-citizen long-term residents, and 
has codified practices and requirements for naturalisation clearly and concisely in the 
2003 Nationality Act, which passed without controversy or real dissent.
29 In contrast, 
German traditions of citizenship before 2000 have generally been welcoming to the 
German diaspora (including Volga Germans) whilst remaining quite closed to non-
German migrant communities, rejecting long-term and even German-born residents of 
migrant  backgrounds  from  citizenship.
30 Many  German  residents  from  migrant 
backgrounds are legacies of the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) program from the 1950s 
and  1960s,  which  attracted  immigration  from  North  Africa,  the  Middle  East  and 
Southern Europe for temporary work in Germany. Guest workers who opted to settle 
in Germany permanently did not necessarily qualify for German citizenship up until 
the  year  2000,  nor  did  their  German-born  descendants.
31 Despite  approximately  7 
                                                 
28 Luca Pietromarchi, The Soviet World, translated by L.F. Edwards. London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1965, p. 424.  
29 Marc Morjé Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009, p. 78-80.  
30 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992, p. 185.  
31 Simon Green, “Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany: The Impact of Unification and the 
Berlin Republic”, West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4, October 2001, pp. 86-9.   
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million  foreigners  living  permanently  in  the  reunited  Germany  by  the  mid-1990s, 
Germany’s 1990 Alien Act (Ausländergesetz) stated that Germany was not a country 
of  immigration,
32 a  notion  controversially  echoed  by  German  Interior  Minister 
Wolfgang  Schäuble  in  2006  when  he  announced  to  a  Congress  of  German 
Conservatives that “we have never been an immigration country and we still aren’t 
one today”.
33 Schäuble is a Christian Democrat, the German party most associated 
with strict and conservative stances on immigration and citizenship law reform, which 
came to a head in 1999 when the party staunchly opposed reforms introduced by the 
Social Democrat-Greens coalition government under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to 
allow naturalised German citizens to hold dual citizenship.
34  The German Christian 
Democrats thus give perhaps the clearest representation of a tradition of thought in 
Germany aligned more to the idea of citizenship as a national community of descent, 
even if it is distinct from the community actually residing in the nation state.  
 
The relationship with this tradition of jus sanguinis and right to return immigration 
law is, unlike in Finland, enshrined in Germany’s constitutional document. Article 
116 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) reads: 
 
1)  A  German  within  the  meaning  of  this  Basic  Law  is  a  person  who  possesses  German 
citizenship  or  who  has  been  admitted  to  the  territory  of  the  German  Reich  within  the 
boundaries of 31 December 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the 
spouse or descendant of such person. 
2)  Former German citizens that between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945 were deprived of their 
citizenship on political, racial or religious grounds, as  well as their descendants, shall on 
application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived 
of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 and 
have not expressed a contrary intention.
35 
                                                 
32 Wesley D. Chapin, Germany for the Germans? The Political Effects of International Migration, 
Westport/London: Greenwood Press, 1997, p. 1.  
33 Cited in Andrea Dernbach, “Wir sind kein Einwanderungsland”, Der Tagesspiegel, 7 December 
2006, available online at URL: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wir-sind-kein-
einwanderungsland/783936.html>, accessed 3 April 2013. Original German text: Wir waren nie ein 
Einwanderungsland und wir sind’s bis heute nicht.   
34 Green, “Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany”, p. 97.  
35 Bundesministeriums der Justiz, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Saarbrücken: juris 
GmbH,  2012,  pp  38-9.  Original  German  text:  1)  Deutscher  im  Sinne  dieses  Grundgesetzes  ist 
vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit besitzt oder 
als  Flüchtling  oder  Vertriebener  deutscher  Volkszugehörigkeit  oder  als  dessen  Ehegatte  oder 
Abkömmling  in  dem  Gebiete  des  Deutschen  Reiches  nach  dem  Stande  vom  31.  Dezember  1937 
Aufnahme gefunden hat. 2) Frühere deutsche Staatsangehörige, denen zwischen dem 30. Januar 1933 
und dem 8. Mai 1945 die Staatsangehörigkeit aus politischen, rassischen oder religiösen Gründen 
entzogen worden ist, und ihre Abkömmlinge sind auf Antrag wieder einzubürgern. Sie gelten als nicht 
ausgebürgert, sofern sie nach dem 8. Mai 1945 ihren Wohnsitz in Deutschland genommen haben und 
nicht einen entgegengesetzten Willen zum Ausdruck gebracht haben  
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The references to the Second World War expulsions and refugees in both sections of 
Article 116 echo similar ideas of atonement for historic injustices to those seen in the 
Finnish example (as discussed in chapters four and five). Yet here, this atonement 
forms part of Germany’s constitutional identity. Marc Morjé Howard argues that the 
post-Second World War environment in Germany was acutely aware of the wartime 
and post-Second World War recriminations the descendants of German settlers in 
Eastern Europe (referred to in German as Aussiedler) faced, and thus “allowing them 
to return to Germany was considered a basic fundamental human rights issue”.
36   In 
1953, the Bundestag in Bonn passed the somewhat opaquely named Gesetz über die 
Angelegenheiten  der  Vertriebenen  und  Flüchtlinge  (Law  on  the  Affairs  of  the 
Expellees and Refugees, most often referred to simply as the Expellee Law), Article 6 
of which broadly defines the expellees and refugees named in the Grundgesetz as all 
those who had suffered in Eastern Europe for their perceived kin-state relationship to 
Germany.
37 This would logically include the Second World War deportations of the 
Volga Germans.  
 
Between  1950  and  1984,  an  average  of  36,000  Aussiedler  per  year  migrated  to 
Germany.
38 By the late 1980s, barriers to emigration in the Soviet Union had been 
diminished  by  glasnost-perestroika,  simplifying  Volga  German  emigration  and 
resulting in a peak in 1990 of 400,000 Aussiedler arriving in Germany from the Soviet 
Union.
39 Between 1987 and 1999, 2.7 million Aussiedler from the Soviet Union had 
resettled  in  Germany.
40 As  this  dramatic  increase  began,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany was simultaneously occupied with the costs and challenges of integrating 
the  former  East  Germany  into  the  newly  reunited  nation  state,  making  the  added 
burden  of  integrating  large  groups  of  new  settlers  politically  undesirable,  so  the 
government reacted by implementing measures to control the inflow.
41 Beginning in 
1992,  a  limit  of  220,000  Aussiedler  permitted  to  resettle  in  Germany  was 
                                                 
36 Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, p. 121.  
37 Simon Green, The Politics of Exclusion: Institutions and Immigration Policy in Contemporary 
Germany, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004, pp. 30-1.  
38 The Center for Volga German Studies at Concordia University, “Immigration to Germany: Ethnic 
German Repatriates”, 24 May 2009, available online at URL:  
<http://cvgs.cu-portland.edu/immigration/Germany.cfm>, accessed 8 April 2013.  
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, p. 122.  
  281 
implemented,  followed  by  other  measures,  including  requiring  potential  return 
migrants to apply at foreign diplomatic missions, and pass a national language test 
(similar restrictions would also be introduced by Finland in its own Right to Return 
policy,  as  discussed  in  chapter  five).
42 The  measures  were  largely  effective  in 
reducing  migration  numbers,  bringing  the  year-total  for  Aussiedler  arrivals  in 
Germany  to  under  100,000  by  2000.
43 Coincidentally,  the  Volga  German  Return 
migration would not outlast the Ingrian Finns’ equivalent, as the German government 
made the decision in 2010 to end the admission of Volga Germans to Germany as 
returnees.
44 
 
The notions of identity constructed in the Volga German law largely mirror those of 
the Ingrian Finnish example, minus the specifics of Finland’s historical relationships 
with  Sweden  and  Russia.  Notions  which  would  also  be  discussed  in  the  Ingrian 
Finnish Return law on integration capability, on the nation state’s duty to protect 
vulnerable kin-minorities abroad, and on the legacy of the Second World War which 
are investigated in chapters four and five of this thesis, also define the Volga German 
example. However, Germany’s large non-Aussiedler immigrant communities provide 
a  readily  available  point  of  comparison  with  the  newly  arrived  Volga  German 
returnees,  which,  as  will  be  further  argued  here,  diminished  the  significance  of 
ancestral connection in defining national identity more readily than could happen in 
Finland, with its significantly smaller immigrant communities. Though Finland has 
until relatively recently seen comparatively moderate levels of immigration, and thus 
has  lacked  minority  communities  with  which  to  compare  its  returnee  settlers, 
Germany may stand as a potential vision of things to come for Finland as immigration 
increases and diversifies there.  
 
The ideas of German national identity prompted in the political discussion on Volga 
Germans in Germany are perhaps best summarised in the 1953 Expellee Law itself, 
which states: 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. pp. 122-3.  
44 Ibid. p. 123.   
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Ethnic Germans in the context of this law are those who are regarded as belonging to the 
German  ethnicity  in  their  homeland,  if  this  identification  can  be  confirmed  by  certain 
characteristics like ancestry, language, upbringing or culture.
45 
 
Ancestral connection to Germany, the German language, German values and German 
cultural inheritance are thus presented as the elements of German identity espoused 
here, creating an apparent link between Germany as a community of ethnic Germans 
and the Aussiedler as ethnic Germans outside the core community. The history of the 
Aussiedler migration  program  shows  an  evolution  in  how  the  first  characteristic, 
ancestral connection, relates to the others. Under a jus sanguinis citizenship model, 
ancestry is the omnibus identity construction that defines all others – the German 
language,  German  upbringing  and  German  culture  are  thus  the  product  of  ethnic 
German  descent,  rather  than  of  the  experience  of  living  in  the  German  national 
environment, and becoming fluent in German and acquainted with German values and 
culture in this way.  
 
The idea of integration capability for Volga Germans is particularly pertinent as it 
relates to the significance of German language as a characteristic of German identity. 
Specifically, the experience of Volga Germans with limited German language abilities 
as  compared  to  other  second  and  third  generation  migrant  communities  speaking 
fluent German transformed the perception of German language from an ancestrally 
inherited capability to a product of environment. To this end, Morjé Howard argues 
that the contrast between the experiences of monolingual Russian-speaking Aussiedler 
in  Germany,  granted  automatic  citizenship,  against  the  position  of  German-born 
Turks who spoke fluent German but as descendants of non-citizen Gastarbeiter did 
not qualify for citizenship, was fundamental to undermining the jus sanguinis model 
in the 1990s.
46 Perhaps the first notable expression of this was in 1989, after several 
German municipalities began to extend voting rights to non-citizens.
47 The German 
Federal  Constitutional  Court  issued  a  ruling  that  local  voting  by  foreigners  was 
unconstitutional, but included in its statement a recommendation that foreigners living 
                                                 
45 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertrieben und Flüchtlinge, 
available online at URL:  
<http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bvfg/__6.html>, accessed 8 April 2013. Original German text: 
Deutscher Volkszugehöriger im Sinne dieses Gesetzes ist, wer sich in seiner Heimat zum deutschen 
Volkstum bekannt hat, sofern dieses Bekenntnis durch bestimmte Merkmale wie Abstammung, Sprache, 
Erziehung, Kultur bestätigt wird.     
46 Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, p. 123.  
47 Ibid. p. 126.   
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permanently in Germany should be granted citizenship to allow for their political 
participation.
48 Here  was  one  of  Germany’s  most  elite,  influential  and  respected 
political institutions arguing for citizenship law reform.
49  
 
This precipitated a major reform to German immigration and citizenship law in 1999-
2000,  when  the  Social  Democrat-Greens  coalition  government  introduced  new 
legislation  to  move  Germany  towards  a  jus soli model  of  nationality.  The  reform 
established a right to German citizenship after a residence of 8 years, provided certain 
criteria had been met, including knowledge of German language, though this test was 
administered by state rather than federal government, and was known to be more 
challenging in conservative German states like Bavaria than in the more liberal city-
state  of  Berlin.
50 As  much  as  German  language  abilities  are  held  as  indicative  of 
German identity, there is a tacit notion within the 2000 law that German-speaking, 
German  born  descendants  of  Turkish  Gastarbeiter are  more  readily  integrated  in 
Germany than Russian-speaking, Russian born descendants of German Aussiedler.  
 
However, German citizenship law could not be completely liberalised; the German 
Christian Democrats balked at the proposal to allow dual nationality, and spearheaded 
a petition against the measure in early 1999 that had received 5 million signatures by 
May of that year.
51 Eventually, a compromise was reached – dual nationality was 
possible up until age 23, at which point the second nationality must be renounced, or 
German citizenship would automatically be lost.
52 The new law, passed in May 1999 
and entering into effect in 2000, is described by Morjé Howard as “a remarkable 
change  after  decades  of  exclusive  reliance  on  jus  sanguinis”.
53 However,  Morjé 
Howard  goes  on  to  note  that  “the  prohibition  of  dual  citizenship  makes  the 
liberalisation only partial, and it remains to be seen whether Germany will truly open 
up  its  conception  of  who  can  be  German”.
54 Likewise,  Simon  Green  argues  that 
Germany’s  policy  after  2000  still  retains  “more  than  a  whiff  of  ethnocultural 
                                                 
48 Ibid. pp. 126-7.  
49 Ibid. p. 127.  
50 Simon Green, “Beyond Multiculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millennium”, German 
Politics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, pp. 114-5.  
51 Green, “Immigration, Asylum and Citizenship in Germany”, p. 97.  
52 Green, “Beyond Multiculturalism?”, p. 116.    
53 Howard, The Politics of Citizenship in Europe, p. 141.  
54 Ibid.   
  284 
exclusivity”.
55 Yet  despite  its  limitations,  the  beginnings  of  a  transition  from  jus 
sanguinis to elements of jus soli does indicate a reassessment of German identity that 
limits the relative significance of ancestral connections, in favour of being raised in 
Germany, as a better indicator of German language capabilities, and by extension, 
integration capability into the German national community.  
 
The discussion of atonement for historic oppression is rich in the discussion on Volga 
German return migration, as it will be for the Ingrian Finnish example (see chapters 
four and five). Atonement for Nazi crimes has been at the crux of post-War German 
national identity for some time,
56 and in a sense can be seen to inform the notion of 
the “upbringing” component of German identity presented in the 1953 Expellee Law. 
German  upbringing  as  understood  here  is  the  imparting  of  national  values  from 
generation  to  generation,  and  the  discourse  on  historical  atonement  presents 
repudiation  of  the  Nazi  past  and  dedication  to  contrition  for  the  diverse  array  of 
Second World War victims as a core national value, enshrined in national law and 
expected  to  be  imparted  to  the  next  generations  of  German  citizens.  Teaching  of 
Second  World  War  history  has  proven  contentious  in  Germany,  perhaps  most 
famously in the late 1980s during the Historikerstreit (historians’ debate), in which 
right-wing historian Ernst Nolte claimed the rise of Nazism should be characterised as 
a reaction to the fear of communism and the threat of Soviet domination.
57 The issue 
of  ethnic  German  suffering  in  post-Second  World  War  communist  Europe  also 
became a theme of this debate, after the 1986 publication of conservative historian 
Andreas Hillgruber’s Zweierlei Untergang: Die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches 
und das Ende des europäischen Judentums  (Two  Kinds  of  Ruin:  The  Fall  of  the 
German  Reich  and  the  End  of  European  Jewry),  in  which  he  draws  comparisons 
between the suffering of the Aussiedler and that of Holocaust victims.
58 In essence, 
such discourses represent a re-statement of the notion of historical atonement present 
                                                 
55 Simon Green, “Between Ideology and Pragmatism: The Politics of Dual Nationality in Germany”, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2005, p. 948.   
56 Madeleine Chambers, “Germans Rediscover Sense of Patriotism”, Die Welt, 18 May 2009, available 
online at URL: <http://www.welt.de/english-news/article3759078/Germans-rediscover-sense-of-
patriotism.html>, accessed 26 April 2014.  
57 Ernst Nolte, “Between Myth and Revisionism”, in W.H. Koch (ed), Aspects of the Third Reich, 
London: Macmillan, 1985, p. 36.  
58 Wolfgang von Malanowski, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Der Spiegel, 1 September 
1986, available online at URL: <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13518569.html>, accessed 8 
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in the Basic Law Article 116; the Aussiedler had suffered for the wartime crimes of 
other Germans, and thus per the Basic Law were entitled to German citizenship. Yet 
in  the  Historikerstreit, this  notion  spurred  firm  rebuttals  from  left-wing  historians 
such as Jürgen Habermas, particularly as Germany was opened up to a new wave of 
newcomers, the former citizens of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). 
In a 1992 opinion piece for Die Zeit, Habermas accused Nolte of using the spectre of 
communism to “justify” fascism in Germany.
59 The end of the communist German 
Democratic Republic, Habermas argued, introduced a mass of new citizens to the 
Federal Republic of Germany whose opinion on the crimes of the Second World War 
may have been informed by different interpretations of history than those expressed 
by the conservative historians.
60 For former East Germans, merging “de-Stasification” 
with  “de-Nazification”  and  viewing  Germany’s  need  for  historical  atonement  as 
somewhat lessened by the perceived communist threat, could be less convincing.
61 By 
2006, Norman Davis was arguing that the post-Berlin Wall uncovering of Soviet and 
other communist government atrocities largely discredited the position of left-wing 
historians.
62 Yet the era of the Historikerstreit does underline the changing context of 
the 1990s and the effects of the end of the Cold War and German reunification on the 
values Germans extract from the legacy of the Second World War, particularly as it 
relates  to  justifying  Volga  German  resettlement  in  Germany.  The  discussion  of 
historical atonement requires a prime antagonist, and the Historikerstreit shows how 
the  instantly  increased  diversity  of  upbringing  in  reunified  Germany  might 
problematise this.  
 
In  this  way,  the  discussion  on  historical  atonement  also  relates  to  the  notion  of 
German culture as a key element of German identity. Indeed, Cynthia Miller-Idriss 
argues for the understanding of Germany as a Kulturnation; that is, a nation defined 
culturally.
63 The  persistency  of  jus sanguinis in  Germany,  she  argues,  “masks  the 
extent  to  which  cultural  elements  have  always  played  a  key  role  in  Germans’ 
                                                 
59 Jürgen Habermas, “What Does ‘Working Off the Past’ Mean Today?”, in A Berlin Republic: 
Writings on Germany, translated by Steven Rendall, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 23.  
60 Ibid. pp. 21-3.  
61 Ibid. pp. 21-3.  
62 Norman Davis, No Simple Victory, London: Penguin Books, 2006, p. 470.  
63 Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Blood and Culture: Youth, Right-Wing Extremism and National Belonging in 
Contemporary Germany, Durham, NC/London: Duke University Press, 2009, p. 40.   
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conceptions of themselves”.
64 Cultural elements may be understood as norms, beliefs, 
attitudes and their expression through the arts, entertainment and recorded culture.
65  
Klaus von Beyme argues that German culture acted as a unifying concept for the 
politically  separate  East  and  West  Germanys;  that  the  notion  of  Kulturnation 
transcended  Staatsnation.
66 One  such  unifying  cultural  touchstone  was  the  writer 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, whose 200
th anniversary in 1949 was celebrated alike 
in Frankfurt am Main, city of his birth in West Germany, and Weimar, city of his 
death  in  East  Germany.
67Yet  as  with  understandings  of  German  history  and 
upbringing, the different political realities of East and West could inform different 
understandings of cultural elements. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, it may no longer 
be accurate to describe the German Kulturnation as having the same resonance for 
former Easterners as for the more established citizens of the Federal Republic. Indeed, 
sociologist Wolf Lepenies argues: 
 
Only Germans born after October 1990 will be united, not only in the sense that they will have 
comparable opportunities, but also in the sense that there will be an increasing correspondence 
in their life situation, which includes a common outlook on the future as well as a shared 
historical identity.
68   
 
Divergence in perceptions of German identity for former East Germans and West 
Germans  may  wane  over  time,  but  the  pre-1990  generations  were  informed  by 
different  political,  social  and  thus  cultural  realities,  and  may  have  diverging 
interpretations of German cultural identity based on these different social, political 
and cultural environments. What’s more, differences in cultural outlook between East 
and  West  Germans  when  the  Iron  Curtain  was  lifted  could  appear  quite  minute 
compared  to  differences  with  Soviet-raised  Aussiedler  descendants,  much  further 
beyond the Iron Curtain and isolated from contact with West Germany and West 
German notions of a unifying German cultural identity.  
 
An idea of humanitarianism also relates to the discussion on historical atonement, 
which also takes as its starting point the legacy of the Second World War. Morjé 
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66 Klaus von Beyme, Kulturpolitik und nationale Identität, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998, p. 
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Howard describes Germany’s asylum policy as amongst the world’s most generous,
69 
and Wesley D. Chaplin attributes this directly to the shadow of the Third Reich, and 
the need to escape its negative legacy.
70 The result before 1990 was relatively large 
but manageable refugee numbers (57,400 in 1987), until the collapse of communism 
and  outbreak  of  violence  in  Yugoslavia,  when  numbers  increased  dramatically 
(438,000 in 1992, a European record).
71 Though Volga Germans arriving at the same 
time shared with Yugoslavian asylum seekers the experience of ethnic discrimination 
in  their  homeland  (in  the  Volga  German  case,  more  historic  than  contemporary), 
Volga  Germans  had  the  distinct  advantage  of  rights  to  citizenship  based  on 
Germanness, not afforded to Yugoslavian asylum seekers. The perceived ethnic link 
to Germany, therefore, remained a great advantage as a tool to leave previous home 
nations for humanitarian reasons. The large number of asylum seekers in Germany 
bred resentment and violence from far-right movements: asylum centres in Rostock, 
Mölln  and  Solingen  were  attacked,  and  several  demonstrations  and  counter-
demonstrations were held in 1992-1993.
72 This was interpreted in the international 
press  as  a  serious  undermining  of  the  post-war  German  values  of  tolerance  and 
peace.
73 However,  the  disparity  in  treatment  of  Yugoslavian  refugees  and  Volga 
German return migrants, both grounded to varying extent in humanitarian arguments, 
again shows how increased diversity in Germany challenged the German Right to 
Return law’s principle of ethnic exclusivity. Sections of the German left noted the 
disparity in treatment, and forced a compromise with conservative politicians seeking 
to decrease the refugee flow in 1993: asylum would not be granted for those who had 
passed through a safe third country before arriving in Germany, while limitations in 
the  number  of  ethnic  German  returnees  permitted  citizenship  would  also  be 
introduced.
74 The early 1990s asylum application spike is thus an example of how 
diversity of immigration flows to Germany provided a choice for Germany to legally 
define itself as a community of descent, or to maintain the construction of German 
identity  that  specifies  liberal  and  tolerant  attitudes  as  the  new  post-war  German 
values. The 1993 reforms indicate the choice was for the latter.  
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In 1991, the sociologist Nora Räthzel described the Aussiedler in Germany as “the 
not-really-German-at-all ethnic German[s]”.
75 Indeed, the context of Germany in the 
early 1990s, opened to a diverse array of non-citizen residents – including asylum 
seekers  from  the  Balkans  and  the  former  Gastarbeiter  and  their  descendants  – 
challenged  previous  assumptions  of  ancestral  or  ethnic  German  identity  and  their 
legal  saliency.  The  aspect  of  German  identity  that  is  defined  as  an  ancestral 
connection to the German Vaterland defined by language, culture and values comes 
into conflict with the realities of modern Germany, which is diverse in its language, 
culture and values. All three areas, as it emerged in the 1990s, are shaped more by 
national environment than ancestral connection, and this undermined the construction 
of Volga German identity in the German Right to Return Law as more German than 
non-citizen individuals with longtime German residency. Rather, the gradual decline 
of the Volga German Return law indicates a transition in Germany to a somewhat 
more jus soli identity construction.  
 
This transition was facilitated by the presence in Germany of a diverse range of non-
citizens and those with migrant backgrounds. This distinguishes the German example 
from that of Finland, even though the discourses on the Return laws themselves show 
points  of  great  commonality.  Both  laws  maintain  discussions  on  integration 
capability,  humanitarian  interventionism  and  historical  atonement,  yet  without  the 
large  migrant  communities  and  diversity  present  to  prompt  a  reassessment  of 
Finland’s own construction of national identity, the example of the decline of the 
Ingrian Finnish Return law can better be understood as a reassessment of Ingrian 
identity, rather than Finnish identity, at the political level. By contrast, the Volga 
German Return law declined as the concept of Germanness, and the status of other 
migrant groups in Germany, was also being altered and reassessed. However, non-
returnee migrant communities in Finland are present (and do increase over the period 
1990-2010), as noted particularly in chapter five, though not at the same scale as seen 
in  Germany,  and  without  yet  the  same  political  voice  or  impact.  If  Finland  does 
continue to diversify, and groups with migrant backgrounds that do not necessarily 
conform to its established identity constructions continue to grow, it stands to reason 
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that Finland could follow Germany and begin to reassess its national identity to more 
accurately reflect the community actually residing there.  
 
The example of the Volga Germans shows how right to return laws’ constructions of 
identity  can  be  essentialist,  or  outmoded  and  non-reflective  of  the  national 
community. As discussed further in chapter five, Finland’s population has become 
increasingly diverse across the period 1990-2010, with growing migrant communities 
from non-returnee backgrounds. Thus, the construction of Finnish identity promoted 
by Finnish political figures and institutions in the Ingrian Return policy, implying 
ethnic  limitations  on  the  concepts  of  Finnishness  and  Finnish  citizen,  does  not 
necessarily reflect the population of Finnish citizens actually living in Finland over 
this period. If the immigrant communities of Finland are expected to increase, both as 
a result of inter-European migration through Finland’s membership in the EU, and an 
anticipated  growth  of  immigrant  communities  for  which  strong  base  communities 
have been established (particularly Somali and Vietnamese communities– see figure 
15  in  chapter  five),  ethnically  exclusivist  definitions  of  Finnish  identity  become 
increasingly problematic. This experience has already played out in the German case, 
with a similar law in a country where more diverse immigration patterns are already 
established, and immigrant communities are consequently larger.  
 
Effectively, the Volga German case shows how discursive constructions of national 
identity  based  on  ethnicity  in  citizenship  and  immigration  policies  can  become 
problematic through their exclusion of other groups living within the nation state’s 
borders,  and  how  such  discursive  constructions  of  national  identity  suppress 
alternative national identity constructions that can embrace and encompass these other 
groups. Excluded groups like the non-citizen guest workers and their descendants 
have  succeeded  to  some  extent  in  undermining  the  ethnically-essentialist  identity 
constructions of German immigration law by challenging the Right to Return law. 
However, as is agued in this thesis, the challenge to (and cancellation of) the Right to 
Return law in Finland follows a different pattern, which does not really depart from 
ethno-culturally  exclusivist  constructions  of  national  identity.  National  identity 
constructions that exclude those living within the nation state deemed not to conform 
to  perceived  ethnic  core  characteristics  have  therefore  not  been  challenged  and 
undermined in Finland in the same way as they have in Germany, although increasing  
  290 
diversity in Finland leaves open the possibility that future challenges may occur even 
after the end of the Finnish Right to Return policy.  
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